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ABSTRACT
Economic and. political unrest among rank-and-file 
people of the rural South reached an unprecedented level 
during the last decades of the nineteenth century. Between 
1877 and 1900, white farmers and sharecroppers became dis­
illusioned with the conservative Democratic regimes which 
had been established at the end of Reconstruction; Negro 
agriculturists, in these same years, were grossly exploited 
by their employers and by the political elite which ruled 
the states of the late Confederacy. The Greenback party, 
the Farmers' Alliance, and, finally, the People's party, 
attempted to unite in mutual action the disadvantaged rural 
population of both races. A number of historians have 
already examined the pattern of post-Reconstruction agrarian 
protest in most southern states. However, a comprehensive 
study of the subject in Louisiana has hitherto not been 
attempted.
To understand the nature of agrarian protest.in 
Louisiana, the basis for its grievances, and the causes of 
its ultimate failure, a broad-gauged examination of the 
social, economic, and political conditions prevalent in the 
state in the 1877-1900 period was mandatory. Louisiana 
newspapers, both urban and rural, furnished key insights.
iv
The private letters of leading citizens which related to 
political and economic matters revealed much about upper 
class attitudes. Legislative records, combined with regis­
tration and election figures and United States census 
reports, provided extensive documentation of the undemo­
cratic methods and the conscious social neglect prevalent 
in Louisiana in the years under discussion. To provide a 
flavor of contemporary life and emotions, and to avoid mis­
interpretations, the narrative of this study has been inter­
spersed with expressions of opinion by those persons who were 
directly involved in shaping Louisiana's destiny during the 
years after Reconstruction.
The Populist, or People’s, party, organized 
nationally in 1891, was supported in Louisiana by the same 
rural elements which also furnished the bulwark of Populist 
strength in other agricultural states of the South and West. 
But in no other state, the evidence suggests, was the Popu­
list cause so hopeless. Even though sixty per cent or more 
of Louisiana's voting population supported the Populist- 
Republican state ticket in 1896, the conservative Democratic 
regime refused to bow to the wishes of the majority; the 
customary methods of vote fraud, economic coercion, and out­
right violence were intensified. Leaders of the poor whites 
threatened the planter-merchant oligarchy with class war, 
but the threat was not carried out. Louisiana agrarianism 
had been dealt a mortal blow. In the years following 1896,
vi
lower class whites became increasingly apathetic toward 
politics; their Negro allies, meanwhile, were disfranchised 
through legislative action and constitutional revision.
The attempt to unite poor white and poor Negroes 
under the Populist banner in Louisiana was paralleled in 
other southern states, but the biracial agrarian efforts in 
the Pelican State had certain distinctive facets. By 1898, 
when Populist leaders in other southern commonwealths had 
generally concluded that the Negro-poor white alliance was 
hopeless, and that disfranchisement of the blacks would 
benefit the white agrarians, Louisiana’s state Populist 
platform spoke up for civil rights and bitterly opposed the 
movement to eliminate Negroes from the registration rolls.
It is concluded that the severity of conservative Democratic 
methods in Louisiana aroused a biracial class consciousness 
in that state, temporary though it was, which is unequaled 
in southern history.
INTRODUCTION
Louisiana's colorful but often tragic history gives 
her a unique place among American commonwealths. A strain 
of irony seems to course through everything associated with 
the Pelican State; it is fitting that'two of Louisiana's 
leading products are sugar and salt, and that two of her 
culinary delights are pecan pralines and hot peppers. 
Certainly the years from the end of Reconstruction to the 
end of the nineteenth century illustrate the irony of the 
state's history. In 1876 the disputed election returns from 
Louisiana provoked violent controversy on the national level 
because the outcome of the presidential campaign hinged upon 
those returns, yet registration and election figures indi­
cate that the Hayes-Tilden returns, though rife with fraud, 
more honestly represented public opinion than the official 
totals announced in any state contest for the remainder of 
the century. In 1876 both sides stole votes. Afterward, 
this prerogative rested solely with the triumphant Bourbon 
Democracy.
That the Pelican State was exploited byvenal poli­
ticians during the Reconstruction years few would deny; even 
historians of such diverse opinions as E. Merton Coulter and
vii
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W. E. B. DuBois agree that the Louisiana Carpetbaggers were 
a corrupt lot. But after 1876 Bourbon misrule replaced 
Radical misrule. Spectacular stealings at both the ballot 
box and the State House continued, and no state in the post- 
Reconstruc.tion South permitted so disastrous a neglect of 
schools and other public institutions as did Louisiana. 
Ruling in the name of home rule and white supremacy, Gover­
nors Nicholls, Wiltz, McEnery, and Foster were either unable 
or unwilling to curb the more repressive and brutal elements 
among the dominant oligarchy, and the disadvantaged majority 
of people, both white and black, were economically exploited 
and politically ignored.
Bourbon repression naturally provoked unrest among 
the lower classes. First in 1878, and then again with the 
People's party of the 1890's, agrarian reformers came forth 
to challenge the state Democratic regime. Yet Louisiana 
posed special and exasperating problems for any reform 
movement. Lower class interests were not only divided by 
the racial antipathies common to all southern states, but 
the ethnic, religious, and even language differences between 
the poor whites of northern and southern Louisiana posed 
formidable obstacles to any statewide effort of protest. 
Moreover, the Democratic oligarchy, militant and shrewd, 
dealt out severe treatment to any political or economic 
dissenters. Only once was Bourbon rule really threatened.
In the state election of the spring of 1896, poor whites and
ix
Negroes attempted to combine with dissident elements among 
the upper class; the incumbent regime found well over half 
the state's voting population aligned against it. But the 
oligarchy proved equal to the emergency. The usual methods 
of vote fraud, intimidation, and violence were intensified, 
and Louisiana Populism was smothered with a savagery un­
paralleled in the South,
Researching and writing on Louisiana of the late 
nineteenth century has proved to be a demanding and de­
pressing task. Many times, preconceived notions or tenta­
tive hypotheses had to be abandoned. And, obviously, not 
all questions have been answered in the following pages, nor 
have all possible avenues of inquiry been explored. But my 
research thus far has compelled me to sympathize with the 
agrarian reformers of that day, and to deplore the tactics 
by. which the ruling Bourbons retained power and beat down 
even mild and conciliatory efforts at reform. That the re­
formers themselves might have been equally vicious and self- 
seeking if given the reins of power is, of course, possible. 
But the point is that they were denied the opportunity to 
prove the sincerity of their words. The Bourbons not only 
refused to permit free elections, but heaped up unnecessary 
thousands of fraudulent votes in order to drown out and dis­
courage the voices of protest. Nor is it necessary to judge 
the Louisiana Bourbons by the standards of the present in 
order to condemn them; their undemocratic and even pitiless
actions were atavistic in the nineteenth century, and re­
pulsed, at the time, many persons who would normally be 
allied with vested interests. So as to avoid misinterpre­
tation, and to provide a flavor of contemporary life and 
emotions, the narrative of this study has been interspersed 
with numerous expressions of opinion by those persons who 
were directly involved in shaping Louisiana's destiny during 
the years following Reconstruction.
CHAPTER I
POLITICS OF THE NEW DEPARTURE
April of 1877 was a month for celebration in Louisi­
ana. The Federal government had abandoned the Carpetbagger 
government in the State House; military Reconstruction was 
over. Some scenes of revelry had grotesque overtones. In 
New Orleans, conservative Democrats welcomed a select 
number of Carpetbaggers, Scalawags, and Negroes into the 
"compromise" legislature which assembled, appropriately, in 
Odd Fellows Hall.^ The solons cheered when a white suprema­
cist named Captain Kidd presented a gold-headed cane to a
Negro Republican from a parish with the felicitous name of 
2Concordia* Upriver, Baton Rouge residents greeted the 
restoration of home rule in noisy fashion, and "the loudest 
and longest ringing . . . was the bell of the Mount Zion 
(colored) Baptist Church. Long after the others had stopped, 
its clarion notes sounded forth: ’Nicholls is Governor!
•^Nation. XXIV (April 19, 1877), 277; New York 
Times. April 25, 28, 1877.
^New York Times. April 24, 1877; New Orleans Daily 
Picayune. July 4, i879. Cited hereafter as Daily Picayune.
1
Louisiana is free!1"3
Five months earlier the state election had been 
held. At the same time, November of 1876, Louisiana had 
joined with less turbulent commonwealths in the selection of 
a President of the United States. The national Republican 
ticket was headed by Rutherford B. Hayes; Stephen B. Packard 
represented Republican hopes to retain control of the state 
government. The Democratic presidential nominee, Samuel J. 
Tilden, was less important to Louisiana partisans than 
gubernatorial candidate Francis T. Nicholls. The election 
returns produced the anticipated imbroglio on the state 
level. Both Nicholls and Packard claimed victory.^ But 
quite unexpectedly, the presidential vote in the fifty-seven 
parishes took on decisive importance. The outcome of the 
national election hinged upon the electoral votes of Louisi­
ana, South Carolina, and Florida: the only states still
under military Reconstruction. Hayes needed all their 
electoral votes to achieve even the slimmest of victories in 
the electoral college; yet first returns showed Tilden 
leading in each of the three.^ But fortunately for the
3Pailv Picayune. April 28, 1877.
^Clarence Howard Nichols, "Francis T. Nicholls, 
Bourbon Democrat" (unpublished Master’s thesis, Louisiana 
State University, 1959), 46-55; Garnie W. McGinty, Louisi­
ana Redeemed; The Overthrow of Carpet-baa Rule. 1876-1880 
INew Orleans, 1941), 52.
5
C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction: The
Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction [Boston. 
1951), 17.
Republicans, Louisiana and the other states in question per­
mitted a special returning board to "review" election re­
turns; in all three, the Hayes partisans who made up the 
boards transformed an apparent Democratic victory into a 
Republican victory.
The tangled web of negotiations between southern 
Democrats and northern Republicans which smoothed the way 
for the inauguration of Hayes need not be detailed in this 
study.^ In brief, southern congressmen agreed not to join 
diehard northern Democrats in a filibuster to prevent the 
electoral commission's awarding of the disputed states to 
Hayes. In return, northern Republicans gave assurances to 
the South that Hayes would withdraw Federal soldiers from 
support of the remaining Carpetbagger governments; Hayes 
himself had previously indicated (though not publicly) his 
disapproval of military intervention in the South. Economic 
as well as political factors were involved in this famous 
"Compromise of 1877." Interwoven with the political dicker­
ing, and perhaps even more important, was the fact that 
northern Republicans began turning friendly ears to southern 
demands for Federal appropriations to finance railroads, 
levee construction, river and harbor clearance, and other
6Ibid.. passim, for the best account of negotiations 
on the national scene. For events in Louisiana, see Mc- 
Ginty, Louisiana Redeemed, passim; also, Ella Lonn, Re-" 
construction in Louisiana After 1868 (New York, 191877 473- 
525.
4desired projects.^
Uncertainty and mutual distrust arose to plague the 
secret negotiations of Hayes Republicans and southern Demo­
cratic politicians during the winter of 1876-77. The out­
come, both for Louisiana and the nation, was frequently in 
doubt. In New Orleans, the state capital, both Packard and 
Nicholls moved ahead as if assured of ultimate victory; each
Q
took an oath of office on January 8. Packard and his 
legislature occupied the State House with the help of the 
outgoing Republican Governor, William Pitt Kellogg. The 
Nicholls government had to bide its time in Odd Fellows Hall. 
But there was no doubt that the Democrats were in de facto 
control of the state.9 Packard’s hope for Federal help in 
overthrowing the rival Democratic government faded as the 
inauguration of Hayes approached; United States troops in 
New Orleans guarded Packard in the State House but made no
C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South: 1877- 
1913. Vol. IX of A History of tne South, eds. Wendell Holmes 
Stephenson and E. Merton Coulter (Baton Rouge, 1951), 23-50. 
“It would be futile," wrote Woodward in Reunion and Reaction. 
"to attempt to decide . • . which of the ’two forces'
[ political or economic factors 3 was the more effective in 
winning the southerners over and breaking the filibuster." 
Before his inauguration, Hayes did not publicly commit him­
self on the question of maintaining troops in the South; 
President Grant, however, on February 26, 1877, frankly 
admitted that further use of the troops would be contrary to 
popular opinion in both North and South. Grant also 
promised southerners that the troops would soon be removed. 
See Woodward, Reunion and Reaction, passim.
®New Orleans Times. January 9, 1878.
9Nation. XXIV (January 11, 1877), 19.
hostile move toward Odd Fellows Hall. Packard's legis­
lature began to dwindle as a number of the shrewder members, 
"reduced to [ their ] last chew of tobacco and . . . sup of 
w h i s k e y , s e n s e d  the drift of events and moved over to 
seek recognition, or financial reward, in the Nicholls
K 11house.
On April 5 the arrival in New Orleans of a special
commission from President Hayes gave proof that the national
Republicans were ready to carry out their part of the
bargain. The President's, commission did nothing which a
simple withdrawal of troops would not have accomplished;
however, the presence of these dignitaries gave a moral
12weight to the rather sordid proceedings. With the aid of
a "contingent fund," a select number of Packard men were
bribed into entering the Nicholls house, thus giving the
Democratic legislature a quorum of members whose election
13
was undisputed by both parties. Edward A. Burke, who 
played such a leading role in the Compromise of 1877, re­
marked years later that the Hayes commissioners were: "No
more than a mere set of clerks to carry out the work that
.-^New York Times. April 24, 1877.
**Dailv Picayune. January 3, 14, 1877.
12Nation, XXIV (April 26, 1877), 241.
^ N e w  York Times. April 22, 24, 1877.
had been commanded of them."
The phrase "New Departure" had again come into vogue. 
First used in the Reconstruction South during the presi­
dential campaign of 1872, it referred to a coalition of 
practical-mended southern Democrats with the Liberal Republi­
can movement in the North; both groups had hoped to end Re­
construction and defeat President Grant's bid for re-e- 
15
lection. This first New Departure failed. But four years
later, in the tense months between November of 1876 and
April of 1877, political commentators revived the ex- 
16
pression. The second attempt at New Departure was more 
significant; it referred not only to the acquiescence of 
southern Democrats to the seating of Hayes, but to portents 
of lasting political and economic change throughout the 
South.
The Nicholls legislature pledged its good faith to 
the bargain by resolving that, under Democratic home rule, 
Negroes as well as whites would enjoy political freedom and 
equality under the law; public education for both races 
would be continued; and "kindly relations between white and 
colored citizens on a basis of Justice and mutual
l4New Orleans Times-Democrat. October 15, 1887.
^E. Merton Coulter, The South During Reconstruct­
ion: 1865-1877. Vol. VIII of A History of the South, eds.
Wendell Holmes Stephenson and E. Merton Coulter (Baton 
Rouge, 1947), 344-45.
1&New Orleans Times. February 24, April 24, 1877.
17confidence," would mark Louisiana*s history in the future.
In addition, worried local Republicans were assured of im-
18*munity from prosecution for "past political conduct." This 
promise of fair play from New Orleans must have eased Hayes’s 
conscience. For he surely realized his conciliatory policy 
would be criticized in the North if, in the future, Republi­
can blood was spilled in the state. The President was soon 
informed that Packard had said: "How basely you [ Hayes ]
have betrayed the Republican party in Louisiana and with
what alacrity you have turned over the poor negroes to the
ig
Democrats to be outraged and murdered by them."
The New Departure, supposedly, was a two-way street. 
Louisiana Democrats, for their part, expected fruits of the 
new policy from Washington. When the Daily Picayune re­
marked that "Louisiana . . . needs letting alone"2® the 
reference applied to political meddling only; economic 
intervention on the other hand, was not only desired but was 
impatiently awaited. Theoretically, States’ Rights was still 
sacred dogma. But in view of Louisiana’s choked harbors
^ N e w  Orleans Democrat. April 17, 1877.
18Nation. XXIV (April 19, 1877), 227.
19George A. Sheridan to Rutherford B. Hayes, July 21, 
1877, in Papers of Rutherford B. Hayes; Louisiana Politics, 
Parts 10-23, Inclusive. (Microfilm copies from Hayes Me­
morial Library, Fremont, Ohio, in Division of Manuscripts, 
Library of Congress). Cited hereafter as Hayes Papers.
20Pailv Picayune. Ajari! 10, 1877.
and crumbling levees, strict construction of the Consti-
21tution must be "abandoned for the laxity of the present."
Enviously viewing Federal generosity in northern climes, the
22South sought her share "as an act of justice."
Yet in President Hayes's mind, the most important
aspect of the New Departure was its implied reorganization
of the Republican party in the South. The desertion of
Packard constituted a final abandonment of the whole theory
of Radical Reconstruction. By 1877 the Republican party of
the North had shed its midwestern agrarian origins and was
dominated by the economic and social ideas of conservative 
23businessmen. The Radical policy of using military force
in the South so as to keep poverty-stricken Negroes from
falling under the political domination of their white land-
24
lords and employers was clearly incongruous. Moreover, 
threats made against large property by some Carpetbag and 
Scalawag leaders probably discredited them more in the eyes 
of Northern Republicans than did their frequent and flagrant 
acts of dishonesty while in public office.
Unrealistic as it might seem, the end of military
^ Ibid.. April 28, 1877.
^Shreveport Evening Standard. October 16, 1878.
^Woodward, Origins of the New South. 28.
24Vincent P. De Santis, Republicans Face the
Southern Question; The New Departure Years.~I^77-1897
(Series LXXVll. No. 1. Johns Hopkins tJniversity Studies in
Historical and Political Science: Baltimore, 1959), 26-27.
Reconstruction was in fact an attempt to increase and stabi­
lize the voting strength of Republicanism in the South. As 
Hayes viewed it, the new appeal would be aimed toward the
"better class" of southerners whose economic views coincided
25
with those of northern Republicans. Race issues were to be
pushed aside as irrelevant to the more significant business 
26
interests. A strong precedent for such an alliance did
exist. The defunct Whig party of ante-bellum days had,
until the mid-1850's given the South a vigorous two party
system; southern men of property in the Whig party had
joined with northern businessmen of the same political faith,
in common opposition to the supposed equalitarian tendencies
27
of Jacksonian Democracy. Of the two men elected to the
presidency from the old Whig party, one came from Hayes's
28
state of Ohio and the other was a Louisiana planter. Most
of the great planters of the pre-war South were Whigs. One
competent authority estimated that from two-thirds to three-
29
fourths of the slave population was owned by Whigs.
25Nation. XXIV (April 19, 1887), 227.
26Ibid.. (April 5, 1877), 202.
27
Roger W. Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in
Louisiana; A Social History of White Farmers and Laborers
during Slavery and After. 1870-1875 (University. Lai. 1939), 
121-27.
28
William Henry Harrison, elected in 1840; Zachary 
Taylor, elected in 1848.
^Arthur Charles Cole, The Whig Party in the South 
(London, 1913), 69-70.
10
Close advisors and personal friends of President 
Hayes supported him in the attempt to give southern Republi­
canism a more respectable and Whiggish mien. General James
M. Comley, described as the President’s “most devoted 
30
friend," travelled down the Mississippi in May of 1877 to 
sound out native white southerners on the hoped-for politi­
cal New Departure. "I find," he wrote Hayes, "that on the 
river there is a sort of general feeling that the old Whig 
.Party is to be revived. . . . The expectation that ’Henry
Clay Whiggery* is to live again. . . .  It seemed wonder- 
31ful." Comley*s letter reinforced previous information that
leading businessmen in New Orleans endorsed the neo-Whig
32
aspect of the New Departure.
Curiously, some reasoned that the last state to be 
free of Reconstruction might also be the first to embrace 
the Whiggish New Departure. "Louisiana is a peculiar 
state," John B. Robertson of New Orleans wrote Hayes’s Post­
master-General David M. Key: "She contains so many heterog­
eneous elements that it is not at all improbable she will be
30
Charles R. Williams, The Life of Rutherford 
Birchard Hayes: Nineteenth President of the United States
IBoston, 1914}, II, 421-22. '
31
James M. Comley to Rutherford B. Hayes, April 30, 
1877, Hayes Papers.
32Andrew J. Kellar to Rutherford B. Hayes, April 20, 
1877, Hayes Papers.
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the first to lead off in the reconstruction of parties in 
the Union.”33
Secretary of War Richard W. Thompson believed a 
change in party name would be necessary because of "the 
prejudices existing in the South." In accord with Thompson’s 
idea, the Daily Nation of Washington, D. C. announced itself
O  A
as the organ of "a new Whig Party." As a practical poli­
tician he surely realized the danger of alienating Union 
veterans and southern Negroes accustomed to the Republican 
designation.
As envisioned by the President, the new "respectable" 
Republican party in the South should turn its back on most 
of the old Radicals of military days but not, of course, re­
nounce Negro votes. National Republicans blandly assumed 
the Negro would always herd toward the party of emancipation. 
"The colored citizens," a group of neo-Whig enthusiasts in 
New Orleans told Hayes, "are almost instinctively Republi­
cans and nothing will drive them into the . . . Democratic
36Party except coercion." Ex-Congressman Chester B. Darrall,
33John B. Robertson to David M, Key, April 26, 1877, 
Hayes Papers.
O A
St. Louis Republican, quoted in Daily Picayune. 
April 26, 1877.
35De Santis, Republicans Face the Southern Question.
47.
3 f%John Ray, John E. King, and others to Rutherford
B. Hayes, April 21, 1877, Hayes Papers.
12
a Carpetbagger merchant-planter of St. Mary Parish, wrote 
to Hayes that although "fear and uneasiness" was prevalent 
among rural colored people, it would "wear away as they see 
that no harm comes to them and that you do not abandon them 
or the party they have looked to for protection." Darrall 
also believed white Democrats had come to realize, by 
Hayes's generous dealings with Nicholls, that the Republi­
can party was no longer a revolutionary ogre. " I think we
37
have reached their hearts," he said.
Visiting Louisiana in 1879, Republican politician 
Stewart L. Woodford of New York gave the Daily Picayune a 
frank statement of the ultimate purposes of the New De­
parture:
The Republican party at the North comprises the 
wealth, intelligence and respectability of the com­
munity, and it is not strange then that it should 
desire alliance with the same element in the South, 
allowing the ignorant masses tg go where they belong, 
to the Democratic party, . . ,38
When the New York visitor spoke of "ignorant masses" 
he presumably referred only to the poor whites. Since 
Negroes were regarded by party leaders as unswerving 
Republicans they were excused— politically, at least--from 
such contempt. Reduced to bare simplicities, the Republi­
can argument proposed that Negroes should continue to vote
37Chester B. Darrall to Rutherford B. Hayes, April
27, 1877, Hayes Papers.
^ Dailv Picayune. November 25, 1877.
13
for the party because it had once been liberal, and wealthy 
whites should join the party because it was now conservative.
Hayes’s New Departure was an antithesis of the 
original Republican approach in Louisiana. Northern rule 
first entered the state in May of 1862 with the ungainly 
form of General Benjamin F. Butler, military administrator
O Q
of the captured Confederate city of New Orleans. History
could not have selected a more suitable actor to play the
first scene in the drama of Louisiana’s Reconstruction.
Butler began his long political life as a workingman’s
advocate in the left wing of the Jacksonian Democracy in his
40
home state of Massachusetts. This "rascally but
thoroughly intelligent"4  ^politician-soldier, during his
stay in New Orleans, distributed food rations to the poor
and inaugurated a public works program which cleaned up the
pestilence-ridden city and gave government employment to the
42heads of poor families. Butler’s assumption of responsi­
bility for the welfare of the masses was a bold, new concept 
in a region hitherto dominated by a planter-merchant
^  James Parton, General Butler in New Orleans (New 
York, 1864), 254. , A recent biography of Butler is Hans
L. Trefousse, Ben Butler: The South Called Him BEAST! (New
York, 1957).
40
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson 
(Boston, 1945), 342.
41Ibid.. 520.
4^Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana. 186.
oligarchy.
To conservative Louisianians, the words and deeds
of Butler “betrayed the soul of a dangerous demagogue" bent
43
on "humbling and ruining the upper classes." The Union 
General did not conceal his attempt to align the poor of 
both races against the entrenched gentlemen-rulers of the 
state; in fact, he apparently believed that he had inaugu­
rated a great proletarian movement of protest in the Deep 
S o u t h . B u t  the years of Reconstruction which followed 
witnessed the quick submergence of welfare-state Radicalism. 
Venal Carpetbaggers, Scalawags and Negro politicians, acting 
under military protection, exploited both rich and poor. In 
truth, Butler's own conduct revealed the Janus face of 
Louisiana Republicanism; his peculations in cotton and sugar 
were foretastes of worse to come. For over a decade, "poor,
4 5
distracted, downtrodden Louisiana" suffered under a satur­
nalia of corruption, moderated, to a slight degree, by half­
hearted measures of reform.
The so-called Radicals did little toward economic
43Albert Phelps, Louisiana: A Record of Expansion
(Boston, 1905), 313-14.
44
William Edward Highsmith, "Louisiana During Re­
construction" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana 
State University, 1953),6.
45 .
Samuel H, Lockett, "Louisiana As It Is" (un­
published longhand MS, 1873, deposited in Howard-Tilton 
Library Archives, Tulane University), v.
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change in the state* The Freedmen*s Bureau, set up by
Congress to take charge of abandoned and confiscable Rebel
land, made feeble and short-lived efforts to divide up the
46great plantations* The Bureau also distributed pro­
visions to disaster-stricken areas, making no distinction 
between the races, and provided relief work for the un­
employed in the years from 1865 to 1868. However, this work 
came to an end in the latter year, when the Bureau turned
over its duties to generally unsympathetic local authori-
.. 47ties.
The Constitution of 1868, under which Louisiana ob­
tained readmittance to the Union, gave the ballot to the
freedmen and erected the framework of a state-supported,
48
desegregated public school system. But proposals to limit 
the size of land purchases and place additional taxes on
49
speculative holdings were beaten down in the convention.
This destruction of hopes for economic reform through 
political Reconstruction resulted partly from the misconduct 
and hypocrisy of self-seeking Radical officials, but also
4^John Cornelius Engelsman "The Freedmen*s Bureau in 
Louisiana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXXI (January, 
1949), 204-13.
47Ibid,, 164-75.
4®Louisiana, Constitution of 1868. Arts. 98, 135. 
4^Highsmith, "Louisiana During Reconstruction," 206.
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because the great majority of whites put racial issues above 
any mutual class interest they might have with the Negro.
The largest majorities turned in for the Conservative-Demo­
cratic party during Reconstruction often came from poverty- 
stricken white parishes. However, at least a few of the 
seeds of class protest planted during Reconstruction germi­
nated years- later among the poor whites and Negroes of the 
State; the Populist party of the 1890*s attempted to create 
an economic and political coalition similar to that en­
visioned by Butler in the 1860fs.
The Whiggish New Departure of 1877 was not unani­
mously endorsed by Louisiana Republicans. In the dying 
hours of Stephen Packard’s government, his authority con­
fined to about one acre of the state, this Maine Carpet­
bagger reverted to the language of economic Radicalism. 
Packard fumed over his desertion by Hayes and the business 
community of New Orleans. His words sounded like Butler’s, 
and like those to be used by Populist orators a generation 
later:
The so-called Nicholls Government rests its claim 
. . .  on the support it receives from the rich and 
aristocratic classes of this city. It is a threatened 
oligarchy of wealth, and a menace to the middle and 
poorer classes. . . .  A government established on 
such a basis would tend to make the rich richer and 
the poor poorer . • . white as well as black.50 
(italics mine).
The conservative press of the city was horrified by
50Pailv Picayune."March 28, 1877.
17
the ’’vicious spirit” of Packard’s address. One newspaper 
remarked that "Louisiana cannot afford a Government which is 
prepared to experiment in Communism and organize raids upon
business capital under pretentious appeals to the . . .
51
lower classes." Equally infuriating was Packard’s threat
to summon rural laborers for a march on New Orleans "to
52scatter hand grenades instead of seed."
Outside New Orleans many Negro and Scalawag sup­
porters of Republicanism gave evidence of dissatisfaction 
with the new Hayes policy. Editor W. Jasper Blackburn of 
the Homer Iliad, an old foe of secession and a staunch 
Unionist through the war, refused to concede the legitimacy 
of the Nicholls government.5  ^ By the fall of 1877, in St. 
Landry, Natchitoches and Avoyelles Parishes, a Workingmen’s
party was organized by former Republican politicians with a
54
view of appealing to the laboring classes of both races.
It is probably not coincidental that St. Landry witnessed a 
series of lower class independent movements throughout the
51Ibid.. March 29, 1877.
52
Ibid.. March 28, 1877.
53Vienna (La.) Sentinel, quoted in ibid.. April 5,
1877.
54
Washington (La.) Enterprise, quoted in Daily 
Picayune. September 30, 1877; Natchitoches People*s Vindi­
cator. quoted in Daily Picayune. October 6, 1877; Marksville 
Bulletin, quoted in Daily Picayune. December 13, 1877.
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1880's^5 and, along with Natchitoches -Parish, successfully
united Negro and poor white voters under the Populist
banner in the last decade of the century.
One aged member of the Grange in Louisiana beseeched -
Hayes to reject the "Money Power" which had boarded the
Republican party during the Grant years; he advised that the
New Departure be transformed into an alliance with liberal
and independent elements in the South. "Stand by the
Laborer and with Producers and Plow holders," Lewis Huber, a
57retired farmer living in New Orleans, wrote the President,
He suggested that Hayes endorse the Greenback party platform;
such a move, Huber predicted, "will thoroughly bust up the
Democrat Party." The President received similar letters
58from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia; however, 
inflationary ideas were repugnant to Hayes*s hard money eco­
nomic philosophy.
Th6 Conservative-Democratic party of Louisiana, in
53''James E, Richardson to J. M. Currie, August 1,
1882, in William E. Chandler Papers (Division of Manuscripts, 
Library of Congress). Cited hereafter as Chandler Papers.
56
Natchitoches Louisiana Populist. November 16,
1894. Cited hereafter a¥ Louisiana Populist.
57Lewis Huber to Rutherford B. Hayes, April 22,
1877, Hayes Papers.
^ D e  Santis, Republicans Face the Southern Question.
58-59.
the first months after Reconstruction, showed visible splits 
over local and personal issues; but there appeared to be no 
inclination to fuse politically with Hayes*s Republican 
party. Some northern observers of the Nicholls legislature 
realized this fact from the beginning. "From a political 
standpoint," a correspondent of the New York Times observed, 
the President's policy "is almost . . .  certain to be a 
disastrous failure." The Times man pointed out that though 
Louisiana's Democrats were jubilant over Packard's collapse,
"that they should feel any gratitude to President Hayes . .
59
. has never entered their minds." The same newspapermen 
suggested that although many of the "old Whigs" of 1861 had 
opposed secession, this did not necessarily indicate that 
they would now join Republican ranks, even of the respectable 
Hayes variety. Property losses during the war and the social 
upsets of Reconstruction had made "these rich men" ardent 
Democrats.^0
In 1877 the Conservative-Democratic party of Louisi­
ana, as in other southern states, obviously had the loyalty 
of most native whites of all economic backgrounds. Wealthy 
planters and merchants were in the party because of their 
distaste for high taxes, financial irresponsibility, and the
5^New York Times. April 26, 1877. 
60Ibid.
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labor-upsetting actions which had characterized the Radical 
regime. Most poor whites supported Democratic candidates 
because of inbred racial antipathy to the Negro, whose aspi­
rations, now that he was free, seemed to pose a threat to
61
the white man’s place in society. Thus, the "Conserva­
tive-Democratic" appellation (sometimes the words were re­
versed) was used to satisfy both the elite and the mass of 
the home rule party* But by 1878, within a year of Recon­
struction’s demise, the party was self-confident to the 
point of dropping the dual designation. As a rule, Louisi­
ana’s rulers relied thereafter upon the simpler name of 
"Democrat.
Another term, "Bourbon Democracy," has often been 
applied to characterize the leadership of the home rule 
party of the South in the years after Reconstruction. 
Northern newspapers such as the Chicago Times used it as a 
political epithet in accusing southern leaders of reaction­
ary tendencies; it was claimed that the southerners had
learned nothing from war and Reconstruction, and yet had
63
forgotten none of the bitterness of those years. So
^Theodore Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the South: 
1865-1933 (University of California Publications in History. 
Vol. LXIV: Berkeley, I960), 3-4.
^Dailv Picayune. January 11, 1878.
^°Ibid.. November 4, 1879. See also Francis Butler 
Simkins, A History of the South (New York, 1956), 311-25.
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narrowly defined, "Bourbon" would not- apply to most of the 
partisans who redeemed Louisiana from Radicalism. They had 
learned from the past. Especially were some of them avid 
students of the newer techniques in vote fraud, bond 
swindles, and assorted other forms of peculation, which 
Carpetbaggers such as Henry Clay Warmoth had brought to 
Louisiana. As one Democrat wrote, Warmoth taught "our
people as well as his . . .  a great many things hitherto not
* 64found in the books." But the Pelican State had witnessed
wrongdoing in high places long before Warmoth1s time; his
methods were sometimes audacious and novel, but his purposes
were well understood by those familiar with ante-bellum
65 *
politics. A northern observer submitted an interesting
hypothesis: that it was Louisiana which corrupted the
Carpetbaggers, not the reverse.^
The dominant element in the Nicholls administration
had no desire to turn the calendar back to 1860; at least,
they did not wish to do so in an economic sense. Louisiana’s
redeemers believed the state should seek out and encourage
business development. Outside capital was eagerly invited.
Agriculture, of course, was not entirely forgotten; it
64Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. March 4, 1890.
65
See Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana. 
121-56; T. Harry Williams, "The Gentleman from Louisiana: 
Demagogue or Democrat," Journal of Southern History. XXVI
(February, I960), 3-6.
66
New York Times. February 2, June 25, 1878.
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could join in the new order by adopting more scientific and
67
businesslike methods. Above all, the old planter-merchant 
oligarchy of the ante-bellum period was being revised by new 
ideas, new faces, and new money.
Yet if "Bourbonism" be equated to a feudalistic 
state of mind, to the proposition that the privileged few of 
one race deserve to dominate the incapable many of ell races, 
then the home rule Democrats of Louisiana deserved the 
appellation. Business ideas of the post-Reconstruction 
South retained overtones of plantation feudalism. And a re­
duction in state expenditures for social services, even 
below the ante-bellum level, was justified on the dual
grounds of Louisiana’s poverty and the need for attracting
68outside capital with low taxation. Noblesse Oblige was
still considered the best philosophy for an orderly society.
"We must admit," said the official journal of the state
69government in 1882, "we are . . .  Bourbon."
The upper echelon of the Louisiana Democracy of 
1877 embraced the dogmas of neo-Whiggish economics, and in 
private life engaged in mercantile or financial pursuits.
67New Orleans,Democrat. August 26, 1877; St. Joseph 
North Louisiana Journal. May 10, 1879. For a good defi­
nition oi New South Bourbonism, see International Review. X 
(March, 1881), 199.
68
Nichols, "Francis T. Nicholls, Bourbon Democrat,"
17-18.
69Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. March 7,
1882.
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However, the turbulent Reconstruction era was scarcely over
before those capitalists who were not directly engaged in
politics began to realize that business interests would be
compromised whenever political expediency or personal ambition
intervened. As early as 1878 urban merchants were joining in
70the chorus of complaints against the Louisiana Democracy.
By 1878, even the President of the New Orleans Cotton Ex­
change protested the methods and aims of the men he helped
71bring to power two years before. Louisiana businessmen 
were beginning to learn, much to their indignation, that 
pothing in the state took precedence over the desires of 
those who struggled for political power.
Three men were foremost in the ranks of the Demo­
cratic party of Louisiana at the end of Reconstruction: 
Governor Francis T. Nicholls, Lieutenant-Governor Louis A. 
Wiltz, and the behind-the-scenes political manager,'Edward 
A. Burke. All three were Confederate veterans; or, in 
Burke's case, claimed to have fought for southern inde­
pendence.^
Forty-three years of age when he became governor, 
Nicholls had lived quietly as a small slaveholder in 
Assumption Parish before the war. He attained the rank of
70
Daily Picayune. October 27-31, 1878.
71
New York Times. November 19, 1878.
7o
■^Woodward, Origins of the New South. 70.
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brigadier general in the Confederate army and served 
bravely, losing an arm and a leg on the battlefields of 
Virginia.^ Both Nicholls's political naivete and the vote 
appeal of his heroically mangled body commended him to 
shrewd Democratic managers. Even the Republicans shrinked
M j
from criticizing the man. Yet the governorship proved to 
be a severe disappointment to Nicholls; he soon discovered 
that powerful elements within the party were thwarting his 
moderate approach to racial and political problems. "From 
the very beginning," Nicholls wrote, "there were men around 
me trying to injure me and break down my influence. . . . 
Republican politicians shrewdly evaluated the Governor's 
position. Warmoth was moved to comment that "Nicholls is a 
good man, but from the country. . . .They are running over 
him while they are using him."^* And Warmoth added that 
disreputable Democrats felt obliged to run "men of charac­
ter" for office in 1876; but, once in power, these self- 
seekers had shoved the decent (Nicholls) element aside.
Alcee Fortier (ed.), Louisiana: Comprising
Sketches of Counties. Towns. Events. Institutions, and 
Persons. Arranged in Cyclopedic Form (Atlanta. 1909). II,
^ N e w  Orleans Republican. July 26, 1876, quoted in 
Nichols, "Francis T. Nicholls, Bourbon Democrat," 36.
75Barnes F. Lathrop (ed.), "An Autobiography of. 
Francis T. Nicholls, 1834-1881," Louisiana Historical 
Quarterly. XVII (April, 1934), 259.
^Cincinnati Enquirer, quoted in Daily Picayune. 
November 22, 1878.
25
Wiltz, thirty-four years old, had aspired to the
governorship at the state Democratic convention which nomi-
77
nated Nicholls. He was of mixed German and Spanish
ancestry, and had married into a wealthy French family.
Wiltz had served as a captain in the Confederate army; after
the war, he became a banker-politician in New Orleans, and
78
was elected to the MayorTs office in 1872. Beginning in 
1877, Lieutenant-Governor Wiltz helped organize an anti-
7<j
Nicholls faction in the Democratic party. His most valu-
80
able ally in this work was Edward A. Burke.
Burke, unlike Nicholls and Wiltz, was not a native 
Louisianian. Thirty-five years old in 1877, he claimed 
Kentucky as his place of birth. However, rumors of northern 
origin were circulated by his enemies; they enjoyed calling 
him "the Carpetbag boss." Friends referred to him as 
"Major" Burke, and claimed that he rose to that rank in the 
service of the South. A fawning newspaper article related
77McGinty, Louisiana Redeemed. 34.
78Fortier (ed.), Louisiana. II, 654.
79McGinty, Louisiana Redeemed. 126-28.
®^New York Times. November 19, 1879; New Orleans 
Democrat. December 13, 1879.
81
New York Times. November 19, 1879. Professor C. 
Vann Woodward believes that Burke was of northern origin, 
but did become a major in the Confederate army. However, 
Woodward, like other researchers, was unable to conclusively
?in down Burke's career before he arrived in Louisiana in 870. Cf. Woodward, Reunion and Reaction. 191-93; Origins 
of the New South. 70-71.
26
that at age twenty-three Burke was chief of the Field Trans­
portation Bureau of the Confederacy's Trans-Mississippi
Department, “with the largest property account of any
82
officer in the Confederacy. . . . "  Burke arrived in New
Orleans in 1870. He worked as a common laborer, until he
obtained a salaried position on the New Orleans, Jackson
and Great Northern Railroad.83 Less publicized was his
business affiliation with Charles T. Howard's Louisiana
84State Lottery Company. The Major's activities, by the 
mid-1870*s, had spread in all directions; he entered poli­
tics, managed the Nicholls campaign against Packard in 1876, 
and was a key figure in the negotiations with northern Re­
publicans in 1876-77. Carpetbaggers envied and admired
Burke; ex-Governor Kellogg smiled when he told the Major
85that the Democrats could not get along without him. In
1878 Burke was elected State Treasurer and promised to be
"a safe custodian of the public funds. . . .  A foe to
86extravagance." But looking after Louisiana's treasury 
required only a portion of this ambitious man's time; in
1879 he became Managing Editor of the New Orleans Democrat.
go
Shreveport Times. quoted in Winnfield Southern 
Sentinel. July 23, 1886.
83Ibid.
8i%oodward, Reunion and Reaction. 192.
8^Paily Picayune. November 19, 1879.
88Ibid.. November 1, 1878.
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purchased it a year later, and then consolidated this paper
with another city daily to form the powerful Tlmes-Democrat
87
in 1881.
Probably as early as 1877 Wiltz and Burke saw the 
advantages to be gained from joining forces against the 
more upright Nicholls element of the party.. Certainly by 
the time of the constitutional convention of 1879 a solid 
political alliance between the two was concluded: an
agreement which spelled the doom of the incumbent adminis-
88tration. With Wiltz presiding, the constitutional con­
vention cut Nicholls's term short by calling for a new 
gubernatorial election, and at the same time lengthened
Burke's term as treasurer to six uninterrupted years.
89Nicholls, "the maimed and noble chieftain, went back to 
private life with the realization that Burke and Wiltz had 
amputated his political career with a skill which exceeded 
that of the Confederate surgeons who relieved him of an arm 
and leg.
The factional quarrels which beset the Louisiana 
Democracy seldom spilled over into national politics; at
®^Richard H, Wiggins, “The Louisiana Press and the 
Lottery,“ Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXXI (July, 1948), 
781, 785.
88
Daily Picayune. November 14, 1879; New York Times. 
November 19, 1879.
897This was Major Burke's oratorical description of 
Governor Nicholls, auoted in Daily Picayune. November 3. 
1879.
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least, not to the point of aiding the plans of President
Hayes for a revived Republican party in the state. Hayes
never presumed that the Louisiana whites would come over
en masse to his remodeled party. But he did classify the
Pelican State as one of seven ex-Confederate commonwealths
where his "pacification policy" was expected to bear
90
political fruit. Democratic Congressman Randall L.
Gibson was closely associated with the Presidents plans;
for a time, Gibson had a large voice in selecting men for
91key Federal jobs within the state. Soon, however, Hayes
received bad news from Louisiana. The Presidents political
emissary, James M. Comley, had arrived in New Orleans and
had suddenly reversed his estimate of the Whiggish revival
along the Mississippi. "The *old Whig1 sentiment I spoke
of," Comley wrote Hayes, "petered out before we reached New
Orleans. There is nothing here to hang an old Whig party on.
The truth is there does not seem to be anything except the
92
Customs House to hang anything on here. . . . "  Comley 
also informed the President that local Republicans were 
restless over reports that the administration planned to 
shun Carpetbaggers in the distribution of Federal patronage.
^^Rutherford B. Hayes to William D. Bickham, May 3, 
1877, quoted in Charles R. Williams (ed.), Diary and Letters 
of Rutherford B. Haves (Columbus, 1924), III, 432.
91John E. Leonard to Rutherford B. Hayes, May 12, 
1877, Hayes Papers.
92James M. Comley to Rutherford B. Hayes, May 11, 
1877, Hayes Papers.
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The Comley dispatch may have had something to do
with the Presidents decision to use more caution in his
attempts to bulwark Deep South Republicanism. In addition,
White House mail was being flooded with tales of woe from
those who felt abandoned. "Mr. President I give you my word
as a Christian woman," wrote Mrs. C. C. Antoine, wife of the
Negro ex-Lieutenant Governor of Louisiana, "some time we
have not a nickel in the house. . . .  Mr. President . . .  do
93something for my husband. . . Members of the returning
board of 1876 were especially clamorous in reminding Hayes
of their past labors in his behalf. After some delay, Hayes
felt obliged to reward those Louisianians who had helped put
him in office; even Packard was given the lucrative consul-
94
ship in Liverpool, England.
In line with Hayes’s policy, dignified old Whigs in 
Louisiana were soon forced to share Federal appointments 
with less well-mannered white and Negro Radicals. The re­
luctance of many distinguished white applicants to proclaim 
themselves Republicans irritated the President, just as his 
insistence upon the point irritated the former. Congressman
93Mrs. C. C. Antoine to Rutherford B. Hayes, August 
18, 1878, Hayes Papers. As Lieutenant-Governor from 1873 to 
1877, Antoine held the highest office to which any Louisiana 
Negro has ever been elected. But after Reconstruction he 
slipped into obscurity. In 1890, a brief report told of 
Antoine’s arrest in Fort Worth, Texas, on a charge of public 
drunkenness. Fined $5.00, and unable to pay, Antoine was 
"sent to the rock pile." Baton Rouae Dailv Advocate* Julv 
10, 1890.
94
New York Times. May 7, 1878.
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Gibson was "extremely pained" when Hayes angrily told him:
"My policy must not be mistaken. My determination is to
95
appoint- none but Republicans to office. . . . "  Hayes*s 
increasingly stiff attitude was also attributable to the 
fact that his New Departure policies in Louisiana and else­
where were coming under steady attack by the Stalwart 
faction within his own party. Led by Senators Roscoe 
Conkling and William E. Chandler, the Stalwarts opposed 
pacification of ex-Confederates because it interfered with 
the "bloody shirt" campaign tactics by which they won
political power in northern states, and because they felt it
96
would accomplish nothing in the South.
The troubles of Hayes in Washington and Nicholls in 
Louisiana were analogous in many respects. Just as »ayes 
was opposed by the congressional Stalwarts, so, in Louisi­
ana, did "unreconstructed" Democrats complain that Nicholls*s 
"reconciliation of the Radicals was the silliest policy . . .
an insult to the intelligence and virtue of those who have .
97
. . so bravely carried on the war against wrong. . . ." 
Dissident native whites felt the war against Radicalism was
/
Charles Gayarre to K. R. Rogers, June 12, 1877, 
Hayes Papers.
96De Santis, Republicans Face the Southern Question.
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not yet won; when the "compromise" legislature met again in 
1878, there were sixty-two Democrats against fifty-two 
Republicans in the House of Representatives, and twenty
98
Democrats against sixteen Republicans in the State Senate. 
This margin, felt the Democratic extremists, was too slim.
Nor did the rejoicing over Reconstruction's end hide
the strong current of discontent among the articulate white
population of Louisiana. Only the most naive could believe
that the Democratic party had emerged from Reconstruction
with pure hands, or that the political troubles of the state
were over because Governor Nicholls had been installed in
office. The day that Federal troops left the vicinity of
the State House one conservative writer felt obliged to throw
a sour note into the festivities:
The era through which we have just passed has left 
its impress. . . . There has not been a steal in the 
past twelve years in which some of those who proudly 
enroll themselves among the "oldest and best" have . 
not had their hands.99
The role of the Louisiana State Lottery in Demo­
cracy's victory was common knowledge. Chartered by the 
Carpetbagger legislature of 1868, the lottery managers 
shrewdly drifted toward the Democratic party as the day of 
Radicalism waned,. The chief spokesman for the lottery,
*^*Dailv Picayune. January 7, 1878.
99
New Orleans Times. April 24, 1877, quoted in New 
York Times. April 28, 18777
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Charles T, Howard, was a former New Yorker who was not the 
sort of man to ignore either politicians or public relations. 
In seeking to gain respectability for his gambling concern 
he purchased the services of two southern gentlemen of "un­
blemished records and pure fame"; ex-Confederate Generals 
P. G. T. Beauregard and Jubal A. E a r l y . T h e s e  worthies 
supervised all lottery drawings, "really as representatives 
of the people*" to see that all was honest.
Reformers within the Democratic party of Louisiana 
were dismayed when, during the crisis of 1877, the lottery 
contributed a sum of money estimated at from $34,000 to
$250,000 for the purpose of undermining the loyalty of the
102
Republican legislature. The lottery, so it was said,
103"purchased Packard's negroes like so many pigs," and 
thereby placed the real beneficiaries, the Nicholls govern­
ment, under a distinct obligation to the company. It was, 
wrote one ashamed Democrat, a marvellous opportunity for the
lottery, and "the buzzard nose and eye of Charlie Howard
104
smelt and saw the prey and seized it." The lottery soon
^ 0Dailv Picayune. December 11, 1878.
101Ibid.
102
Berthold C. Alwes, "The History of the Louisiana 
State Lottery Company," Louisiana Historical Quarterly.
XXVII (October, 1944), 996-98.




had its reward. A bill for repeal of its Carpetbagger 
charter was tabled in the legislative session of 1877, and 
again in 1878.105
The future of Negro suffrage in the state provided 
another area of discord within the Democratic party. Real­
istic whites could not agree with an editor who cheerfully 
opined that since Federal meddling had ceased "the negro 
question is ended at last. . . .  He is lost in the great
mass of other voters. * . ,"106 ^ow coui<j this be? In
107thirty parishes Negro voters outnumbered whites. And
even though the 20,000 majority which colored voters held
in the last year of Reconstruction was cut severely by
Nicholls officials, registration figures in 1878 revealed
that Negroes continued to hold a slight majority in statewide 
108registration. Thoughtful Democratic politicians viewed 
the Negro majority as a danger but also as a tempting 
opportunity. As early as the passage of the first Recon­
struction Act of 1867, prominent ex-Confederates in Louisi­
ana, such as Duncan F. Kenner and P. G. T. Beauregard,
101=5
John Samuel Ezell, Fortunefs Merry Wheel: The
Lottery in America (Cambridge, Mass.; 1960), 246.
106pajLiy Picayune. May 1, 1877.
^^Marguerite T. Leach, "The Aftermath of Recon­
struction in Louisiana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly.
XXXII (July, 1944), 664.
*^®Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State.
1902, 546-47. This report contains a handy compendium of 
registration and election figures from 1872 to 1900.
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realized that Negro voters might be put to conservative use.
"If the suffrage of the Negro," Beauregard said in 1867, "is
properly handled and directed, we shall defeat our adver-
109
saries with their own weapons,"
As Reconstruction ended the influential Daily 
Picayune became enthusiastic over the vision of Negroes ac­
cepting the advice of white Democratic patricians. "Shake 
off degrading prejudices," Negroes were told, "trust to 
honor, and we who bear the grand old name of gentlemen will 
show you how great a victory your defeat has been."^*"* Con­
servative editors diligently reported any word about Negroes 
who cooperated with local whites, including the macabre ex­
ample of bi-racial harmony in the town of Thibodaux, where a
"mixed crowd of negro and white" lynched a colored man sus-
111
pected of rape.
But events soon proved that the racial harmony and 
political forgiveness which Nicholls and his legislature 
proclaimed in April of 1877 was not underwritten by many 
state and local officials. Whites were naturally indignant 
over the innumerable raids on public funds, the vote 
stealing, and other high-handed activities which the alien
109John Rose Ficklen, History of Reconstruction in 
Louisiana Through 1868 (Series XXVII, No. 1, Johns Hopkins 
University Studies in Historical and Political Science: 
Baltimore, 191(5), 1&5.
110
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Carpetbaggers and their Negro allies had engaged.in during
the Reconstruction years. Once the Democrats took over,
retribution was not long in following. Apologists for the
acts of vengeance which came in the summer and fall of 1877
explained that promises made to the Hayes commission should
be narrowly defined: that immunity for "past political
112
conduct" did not include peculation and vote fraud. Among
those jailed for theft were two members of the Nicholls
("compromise") legislature, Senator David Young of Concordia,
and Representative P.. J. Watson of Madison Parish. Both were 
m • 113Negroes.
The fact that Nicholls appointed a few well-known
Negro politicians to minor offices hurt him with ardent
Democrats and did little to reassure the majority of Negroes;
they claimed the Governor meant well but was actually power- 
114
less. A northern observer commented that "a large
portion of the colored people desire to leave the State.
They do not care where they go, but are puzzled to know how 
115
to get away." The major target of Democrats bent on
vengeance was the unsavory returning board. On July 5,
1877, the Superior Criminal Court of New Orleans ordered
112Nation. XXV (July 12, 1877), 17.
113
Daily Picayune. July 25, October 28, 1877.
^^New York Times, June 9, 1877.
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the arrest of all four members of the board: J. Madison
Wells, Thomas C. Anderson, Louis M. Kenner (rumored to be a
116
mulatto nephew of Duncan F. Kennerj, and Gadane Cassanave.
Wells and Anderson were white men. "We donft care anything
about the two niggers," wrote a New Orleanan,. but the
white men "ought to be in the penitentiary. . . .  We presume
117
Nicholls will pardon Wells and Anderson, of course."
Without question, these arrests were instituted on 
the part of anti-Nicholls forces for the purpose of em­
barrassing the Governor and capitalizing on the growing dis­
content with his pacific attitude. The day before the re­
turning board was arrested an unruly mob in Baton Rouge sup­
posedly threw "100 rocks" at Nicholls while he visited the 
118
town. The New Orleans Times professed that the action
against the returning board also meant serious trouble for
President Hayes. Information produced at the trial might
give Stalwart Republicans enough ammunition to impeach the 
119
President.
The accused were released on bail and their trials 
delayed until early 1878, a time which, significantly, 
coincided with the next meeting of the Louisiana legislature.
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New Orleans Democrat. July 6 , 1877.
117New York Times. July 17, 1877.
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Meanwhile, more blows fell upon the Hayes vision of a con­
servative Republican party in the South* Hayes had hoped 
to overcome a slim Democratic majority in Congress by in­
ducing enough New Departure southerners to support James A.
Garfield, a personal friend, for the speakership of the
120
House of Representatives. Yet when Congress met in
special session in October, all Louisiana and most southern
121
Democratic members voted against Garfield. He was 
narrowly defeated. Shortly thereafter, the President ex­
pressed a "grave doubt" about the feasibility of federal aid
to the Texas and Pacific Railroad, a project much beloved by
122New Orleans businessmen.
Late in November the United States Senate voted
thirty to twenty-eight to seat William Pitt Kellogg as a
123
member from Louisiana. Kellogg was sent to Washington 
¥  the defunct Packard Legislature. His rival, old Whig 
Henry M. Spofford, wras the choice of the Nicholls government. 
The precarious majority which Republicans enjoyed in the 
Senate provided the practical reason for seating a Carpet­
bagger rather than taking chances with old Whigs; the
120
Woodward, Origins of the New South. 42, 46.
121
Congressional Record. 45 Cong., 1 sess., 797.
122,
Woodward, Reunion and Reaction. 234-35.
123Congressional Record. 45 Cong., 1 sess., 797.
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Republican Senators, it was said, "drew in Kellogg as a dry
124
sponge draws in dirty water." The new Senator was an 
anathema to Louisiana conservatives, and the decision to 
seat him drove another nail in the coffin of the New De- 
^ parture.
The trial of the returning board gave ample proof, 
if any be needed* that Louisiana was still hopelessly 
imashed in the web of hatred spun during Reconstruction 
years. The fact that anti-Nicholls politicians were mani­
pulating these emotions to have their way in the state was 
recognized by at least a few observers. President Hayes was 
informed of the situation through the letters of General 
Winfield S. Hancock, who arrived in New Orleans in February
to look after the interests of the national government and
125act as "peacemaker." Hancock’s messages were sent to 
General William T. Sherman, and from there forwarded to the 
White House.
Anderson, the first to go on trial, was found guilty 
of gross vote fraud in the Vernon parish returns of 1876; 
immediately thereafter, Hancock arranged a private meeting 
with Governor Nicholls. After this meeting, Hancock wrote 
Sherman:
The Governor will pardon such members of the 
Returning Board as may be tried and convicted. He
^ 4Pailv Picayune. December 13, 1877.
125
Winfield S. Hancock to William T. Sherman, 
February 14, 1878, copy in Hayes Papers.
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fully recognized that there was a tacit understand­
ing that political matters of the past were not to 
be revived. [ The reason for delay in pardoning 
Anderson ] is the matter of the Constitutional 
Convention now before the Legislature. Gov.
Nichols [ sic ] is opposed to that scheme, which 
. . . embraces a proposition to legislate the 
Governor . . . out of office.126
The Hancock letter shows that Governor Nicholls
understood, as early as February of 1878, what was behind
the move for a new constitution. But Nicholas enemies were
temporarily thwarted; the Louisiana State Supreme Court re-
127
leased Anderson on March 18, 1878. This action took the 
burden off Nicholls. The legislature killed the move for a 
convention and charges against Wells, Kenner, and Cassanave 
were dropped.
Perhaps the most disturbing element in the imbroglio 
was the aging but fierce ex-Governor, J. Madison Wells. The 
old Scalawag planter from Rapides Parish had been scheduled 
to appear for trial after Anderson. At the end of the Ander­
son trial, Wells dispatched a long and unbelievably vicious 
account of Louisiana affairs and personalities to the New 
York Times. Among other things, he said the presiding judge 
at the Anderson trial had once embezzled $600,000 and was 
“in a beastly state of intoxication" during the trial; that 
the prosecuting attorney was a known murderer; and that E.
126Ibid., February 15, 1878.
127
New York Times. March 19, 1878.
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A. Burke was really "A. E. Burk" who had stolen money from
his home town in the Midwest and had subsequently fled to
the South. Then, as an afterthought, Wells added that
Congressman Gibson*s swarthy complexion was due to Negro
128
ancestors in Adams County, Mississippi.
Governor Nicholls could scarcely be considered as
an agrarian reformer. His messages indicate an inability or
refusal to understand the needs of the poor of Louisiana of 
129
either race. As Dr. David Brickell so accurately ob­
served at the time, Nicholls's "zeal for what is called
* state credit* and the welfare of the money power has blinded 
130
him. . . . "  Yet Brickell admitted that Nicholls was an 
honest gentleman who represented the best, and not the 
worst, of Louisiana*s Democratic leadership. And those re­
formers who were critical of Nicholls soon had more deserving 
targets for their attacks. For the returning board affair of 
1878, though it resulted in a Nicholls victory, only delayed 
the inevitable. A year later the "noble chieftaK^ n'*, would 
have his term cut short and the Burke-Wiltz Democratic 
machine could legislate in the name of home rule and white 
supremacy.
128Ibid.. February 19, 1878.
129Louisiana, Official Journal of the House of 
Representatives. 1878. 7-14: Louisiana'. Official Journal of 
the House of Representatives. 1879, 7-19.
■^^New Orleans Vindicator. July 20, 1878, clipping 
in Brickell Papers.
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Slowly, Louisianians of both farm and city came to 
learn that the overthrow of Radicalism did not mean an end 
to the evils of the Reconstruction era. A close study of 
registration figures and election returns for the remainder 
of the century will indicate that the election of 1876, 
whether Republican or Democratic figures be taken, was the 
most honest the state would know for at least the next 
generation. In 1876 both sides balanced each other by 
stealing votes. Afterward, this prerogative would be 
solely the possession of white conservatives.
Civil war, followed by the social turmoil of Re­
construction, impoverished and demoralized Louisiana to a 
worse degree, perhaps, than in other southern states. Even 
Creole patricians such as seventy-two year old Charles 
Gayarre'/ found themselves asking for political sinecures. In
1877 Gayarre-mailed President Hayes a copy of his History of
Louisiana along with an embarrassed request for a place at
131
the New Orleans Customs House. He suggested that the 
President read certain pages in the book describing the 
difficulty President Jefferson and Governor Claiborne en­
countered in filling local offices in the Louisiana terri­
tory. Respectable inhabitants of that earlier day had
Charles Gayarre^to Rutherford B. Hayes, May 15, 
1877, Hayes Papers.
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scorned the public payroll.
"Such," Gayarre' concluded, "was [ the Louisianians1]
original and native dignity of character. If that character
has since been modified, it is due to circumstances which
they have not been able to control, and to influences which
132they could not resist." Thus did the aged recorder of 
Louisiana*s past apologize for present failings in himself, 
his class, and his state.
132Ibid.
CHAPTER II
LAND AND LABOR IN THE WAKE OF RECONSTRUCTION
The Civil War and Reconstruction disrupted and then
depressed the economy of Louisiana. In 1860 the state*s
$602,118,568 of property ranked her first in the South and
second in the nation in per capita wealth. Then followed a
generation of disaster. The first Federal census after
Reconstruction estimated the factual value of property at
$422,000,000, a plunge to thirty-seventh in wealth among all
1
states and territories.
One fact had not changed. Louisiana after Recon­
struction, as before, was fundamentally rural. New Orleans, 
with 216,090 inhabitants in 1880, was the tenth largest 
community in the United States. But beyond this one urban 
center there was no city in Louisiana worthy of the name.
The census listed Shreveport as second in size, with barely
U.S., Bureau of the Census, Tenth Census of the 
United States: 1880. Valuation. Taxation and Public In­
debtedness. VII, 5, 12. The decrease in wealth was com­
pounded by an increase in population, Louisiana had 939,436 
inhabitants in 1880; an increase of 31.98 per cent since 
1860. Some scholars have made the erroneous assumption that 
Negroes, being slaves, were not reckoned into the per capita 
wealth estimates for 1860, But they were, as a simple 
application of mathematics will show. For an example of 




8,000 inhabitants; four other towns reported more than
2
2,500 inhabitants. Seventy-four per cent of the popu­
lation lived in a rural environment. Outside New Orleans
and its immediate environs, the percentage for the state
3
stood at an astonishing ninety-seven per cent rural.
The majority of Louisianians, of both races, re­
turned to agricultural pursuits at the close of the Civil 
War. Lack of economic opportunities in New Orleans and 
other communities discouraged any mass movement from 
country to town. Emancipation had altered the legal status 
of plantation labor, but the Negro himself was still 
present. Some freedmen drifted into the towns, but the 
great majority remained in the bottomlands; their knowledge 
of agriculture, and lack of other skills, was in itself a 
form of perpetual bondage. Rural whites, for the most part, 
were similarly immobilized. Many old planters in the 
bottomlands were ruined by exorbitant credit, high Recon­
struction taxes, and labor troubles; but with cotton and 
sugar selling for twice and over the 1860 prices, the
Ibid., Statistics of Population. I, 196-99. Be­
sides the six towns above 2,500 there were only fourteen 
other communities which had over 1,000 inhabitants.
3
The distinction between "rural" and "urban'1 used 
in this study follows the rule first adopted by the census 
bureau in 1910. That is, incorporated towns of over 2,500 
population, plus densely settled fringe areas, are classi­
fied as urban; all else, rural. U.S., Bureau of the Census, 
Thirteenth Census of the United States: 1910. Pooulation.
I, £i, 53. !
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4
plantation system managed to survive. Ownership might 
change but, as much as possible, the old way of life was 
retained,. And thirty cent cotton was a potent lure in the 
hill country, too. Small landowning whites in the northern 
and Florida parishes, after 1865, began reducing their 
garden crops and came increasingly to pin their hopes for a
5
better life on the soft white fiber. Necessity also played 
a part in the yeoman and poor white shift to cotton. Im­
mediately after the war, many of them lacked even the rude 
belongings they had possessed in 1860, and were on the 
verge of starvation. If only to restore their living 
standard of ante-bellum days, they needed store credit. And 
merchants would not usually grant advances unless the pro­
spective debtor could pledge a money crop.
Despite.high prices and fertile soil, prosperity 
seemed to elude Louisiana agriculture. Statistics of the 
census of 1880 starkly reveal the depths into which the 
rural economy had sunk during the previous generation. The
following figures give some measure of the decline:
4
James E. Boyle, Cotton and the New Orleans Cotton 
Exchange: A Century of Commercial Evolution (Garden City.
New Vorkj 1934), 155; J. Carlyle Sitterson,Sugar Country: 
The Cane Sugar Industry in the South. 1753-1950 (Lexington. 
Kentucky; 1953), 171, 303.
5
U.S., Tenth Census, Cotton Production in the 
Mississippi Valiev and Southwestern States. V, pt. I, 67; 
Walter L. Fleming, **The Reconstruction and Southern Eco­
nomic History," The South in the Building of the Nation, 




Rural population: 526,038 688,556
Cash value, farm land 
and buildings:
$204,789,662 $58,989,117
Number of farms: 17,328 48,292
Improved acres: 2,707,108 2,739,972
Cash value,
implements: $18,646,225 $5,435,525
Ginned Cotton (lbs.): 311,095,200 241,570,275
Sugar (1,000 lb hhds.): 221,726 171,706
Molasses (gals.): 13,439,772 11,696,248
Indian corn (bu.): 16,853,745 9,889,689
Sweet potatoes (bu.): 2,060,981 1,318,310
Rice (lbs.): 6,311,367 23,118,311
Livestock (except swine): 868,525 787,334
Swine: 634,525 633,489
Value, all livestock: $24,546,940 $12,345 r905
Visibly, Louisiana*s agriculture emerged from
U.S., Bureau of the Census, Eighth Census of the 
United States; 1860. Agriculture, II, 66-67. The census 
of 1860 reported Louisiana*s cotton production at 777,738 
bales of 400 pounds; the census of 1880 listed 508,569 bales 
of 475 pounds. For the sake of comparison and clarity the 
cotton figures in the above table are reduced to pounds.
7
U.S., Tenth Census. Report on the Production of 
Agriculture. Ill, 3-9, 118-119. Estimates for the rural 
population in 1860 and 1880 are based on the measurement 
first used by the census bureau in 1910. Obviously, not all 
rural people can be thought of as engaged in agriculture. 
Yet, in the period discussed, practically all "rural non­
farm" residents, such as merchants, lawyers, etc., had a 
direct interest in the economy of their farming neighbors.
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Reconstruction with manifold ills. Although the rural popu­
lation in 1880 showed an increase of thirty-one per cent 
since 1860, the production of cotton and sugar, the chief 
money crops, actually declined. Two major subsistence crops, 
corn and sweet potatoes, had shrunk to almost half their 
former bushel totals. Among the cereals only rice and oats 
showed any increase. The number of swine remained about 
equal to the ante-bellum figure, but all other livestock 
had a collective decrease of about ten per cent. Yet most 
alarming of all was the plummet of farm land values. The 
amount of tilled land and permanent pastures (improved 
acres) had increased by almost 33,000 acres since 1860; how­
ever, the value of farm land and buildings showed a decline 
of over seventy per cent. In 1880 all the improved land in 
the state was worth less than the land tilled in just 
eighteen sugar parishes before the war. Livestock valuation 
was down fifty per cent. Again, the decrepit condition of 
rural Louisiana can be illustrated by dividing the amount of 
.improved acreage into the value of farm implements (ma­
chinery and tools) for both periods. The cash value of 
these assets averaged $6.88 per acre in 1860, and had shrunk 
to a trifling $1.98 by 1880.
Much of this financial loss could be traced to the 
shattered sugar plantations. Before the Civil War, Louisi­
ana produced ninety-five per cent of the total sugar crop of
48
8
the South. The introduction of expensive steam machinery
in the 1820,s had eliminated most of the small producers;
dominating the region, by the 1840*s, were the great
planters who owned refining mills and possessed scores of 
9
slaves. The less than 1,500 planters who owned their own 
mills in 1860 were as much industrialists as they were 
agriculturists.^ But the war emancipated the planters' 
source of labor, and the expensive machinery was wrecked or 
confiscated.
Recovery in the sugar parishes was painfully slow.
At the end of Reconstruction, in 1877, only 127,000 hogs­
heads of sugar were produced--less than one-third of the 
output of ante-bellum banner years.^ Agricultural re­
formers, led by Daniel Dennett of the Daily Picayune.
believed that a division of the great estates into small
12
farms would solve the sugar country's problems. Dennett 
did not suggest a confiscation or forced sale of the sugar 
lands; rather, he proposed that planters bring in white 
labor from northern and western states and set up a system
Q
U.S., Annual Report of the Commissioner of Agri­
culture for the Year 1878 (Washington. 1879). 275.
a
Paul Wallace Gates, The Farmer's Age: Agriculture.
1815-1860 (New York, 1960), 127, 284.
10Ibid.. 125-26.
^William C. Stubbs, "Sugar Products in the South," 
The South in the Building of the Nation. V, 193.
•^%>ailv Picayune. April 15, 1877.
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of tenant farming. The thrifty among these white tenants,
Dennett assumed, would eventually be able to purchase the
13
tracts of land they worked. Then, the ex-planters would
14engage solely in refining. But most planters thought this 
impractical. Great estates continued to predominate, and as 
new refining mills were built the men who owned the mills 
also possessed the land upon which a majority of the cane 
was grown. Thus, by the lSSC^s, sugar factories and fields 
continued on in much the same way as the ante-bellum period, 
with poorly paid Negro gang labor as a substitute for
i 15slavery.
Land ownership did undergo profound changes in the 
sugar country after 1865, but by a process which kept the 
plantations intact. The fabulous profits of pre-war years 
lured northerners with capital to invest into buying up the 
old estates from impoverished planters. One ante-bellum 
owner who was able to hang on in the new era estimated that 
nine-tenths of the sugar estates changed hands in the period 
from 1865 to 1877.^ Some of the new owners bought land 
for purely speculative reasons; over thirty per cent of the
13Ibid.. March 18, 1877.
14Ibid.. October 21, 1877.
15Sitterson* Sugar Country, p. 240, 261-62.
^Letter from "Rusticus" in Daily Picayune.
September 23, 1877.
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former cane fields remained fallow and weed-choked through­
out Reconstruction. At least half the new proprietors were
T7
northern men, or men supported by northern banks. Promi­
nent among them were Republican politicians. Ex-Governors 
Henry Clay Warmoth and William Pitt Kellogg used their ill- 
gotten fortunes to become members of the sugar aristocracy.
Warmoth was particularly successful in achieving a status
18
of respectability among his neighbors. Influential Demo­
crats, whose conservative ideas on economic questions
harmonized with Warmoth's beliefs, wished him luck "in
19everything--except his infernal politics."
In 1880 only eleven parishes returned sugar as
their leading crop in acreage--Plaquemines and St. Bernard
in the First Congressional District; Jefferson, St. Charles,
St. James, and St. John the Baptist in the Second; Ascension,
St. Martin, St. Mary, and Terrebonne in the Third; and West
Baton Rouge in the Sixth District. These eleven parishes
produced seventy-four per cent of the state's total sugar 
20
output. All eleven had Negro majorities. Sugar was also 
the chief money crop (though not the leader in actual
17Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana. 249.
18
James E. Richardson to J. M. Currie, August 1,
1882, Chandler Papers.
19
Daily. Picayune. November 24, 1879.
20
U.S., Tenth Census. V, 3-5.
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acreage) in four parishes of the Third Congressional
District: Assumption, Iberia, Iberville, and Lafourche,,
Two of these, Assumption and Lafourche, had more white
inhabitants than Negroes. Nowhere, however, could many
whites be found at work on the great plantations as
laborers or tenants. As before the war, the majority of
whites in rural South Louisiana tilled their small acres,
tended livestock, or engaged in fishing and trapping. Some
raised sugar cane on little plots and sold the stalks to the
21
planter-refiners.
King cotton, rather than sugar, retained first place
among the money crops of the state. Cotton acreage in 1880
22
quadrupled the amount of land planted in cane. In twenty- 
nine parishes, half the districts of the state, cotton ex­
ceeded any other crop in the number of acres planted. In 
addition, cotton led as .a money crop in six other parishes 
where corn ranked first in the amount of tilled land.
The Fourth and Fifth Congressional Districts, situ­
ated north of the thirty-first degree of latitude, produced
23
78.5 per cent of the entire cotton crop of the state.
Every parish of Northeast Louisiana (the Fifth District) 
returned cotton first among all crops in acreage. Tensas
21
Daily Picayune. June 11, 1879.
22u.s. Tenth Census. V, 3-5.
23Ibid.. 33.
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parish, in that region, led the state in production with
41,859 bales in 1879. Concordia listed an astounding 91.8
per cent of her tilled land under cotton; East Carroll
topped every parish, and every county, in the South in
productivity: 451 lint pounds raised for each acre in
24
cotton. In the land of Northwest Louisiana (the Fourth 
District), cotton was listed first in acreage in seven of 
the twelve parishes. There, cotton production exceeded
10,000 bales in Bossier, Caddo, DeSoto, Natchitoches,
Rapides, and Red River Parishes.
Yet cotton was not entirely confined to North Louisi­
ana. Cotton also ranked first in tilled acreage in the 
Sixth Congressional District, which sprawled westward from 
the Florida parishes, across the Mississippi River, and into 
the prairies of St. Landry Parish. With the exception of 
Avoyelles, all of the parishes of the Sixth lay below the 
thirty-first parallel of latitude. Avoyelles, East Felici­
ana, Pointe Coupee, St. Landry, and West Feliciana raised 
over 10,000 bales per year. Other parishes in the Sixth 
District raised considerably less. Farther to the South, 
cotton fields appeared at intervals in the Third Congress­
ional District. Tiny Lafayette Parish led this region with 
3,489 bales; only two others, Iberia and St. Martin, 
produced over 1,000 bales for the crop reported in the 1880
53
census. Overall, the geographic predominance of cotton 
may be noted by the fact that only seven parishes in the 
state reported no bales, whereas in twenty-five parishes 
absolutely no sugar was refined.25 However, in nearly 
every parish a number of farmers planted cane for home use
i 26as molasses.
In one respect cotton was akin to sugar. It, too, 
was most at home in the alluvial soils along the rivers. 
Parishes which bordered the great rivers of the state con­
tinued, after the war, to lead in the number of bales pro­
duced. The tier of six parishes adjoining the Mississippi
River from the Arkansas border south to Baton Rouge contri-
27buted one-third of all Louisiana1s cotton. These same 
six parishes, in 1860, boasted some of the wealthiest and 
most extensive landholdings in the South. A generation 
later, the plantations remained; but these plantations had 
become patchworks of tenant farms where Negro occupants 
rented or worked on "shares" for the few white landowners. 
In these six parishes, in 1880, lived 12,247 whites and
25Ibid., 3-5.
Monroe Observer, quoted in Daily Picayune,
October 29, 1877.
27'East Carroll, Madison, Tensas, Concordia, Pointe 
Coupee, and West Feliciana parishes. These six grew 
167,265 of the 508,569 bales raised in the state in 1879. 
U.S., Tenth Census. Ill, 118-19.
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77,116 Negroes.28
But the alluvial belt was not confined to the 
parishes along the Mississippi. Cotton culture was also 
predominant along the fertile banks of the Red, Black, and 
Ouachita Rivers--tributaries of the great stream. However, 
these bottoms were more narrow than the delta of the Missis­
sippi. A few miles away, oak uplands or unfertile piney 
woods assumed command of the countryside. The hilly oak 
regions, covering most of ten parishes in the northwest and 
northcentral portions of the state, included many varieties 
of soils. Some portions of the oak uplands ranked second
OQ
only to the alluvial bottoms in fertility.
Less esteemed were the longleaf pine hills and the 
pine flatlands which prevailed in the poverty-stricken 
parishes of Catahoula, Calcasieu, Grant, Vernon and Winn in 
North and West Louisiana; and in Livingston, St. Tammany, 
Tangipahoa, and Washington Parishes of the Southeast. Along 
with these parishes, for the purposes of this study, should 
be included the coastal lands of Cameron and Vermilion.
From the standpoint of economies and politics, these latter 
were similar to the piney woods areas. The eleven parishes 
listed above; nine of them pine and two of them marsh 
parishes, may be considered as the "backland" of post
28Ibid.. V, 3-5. 
29Ibid.. 30.
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Reconstruction Louisiana. In almost every respect this 
immense backland represented an antithesis to the alluvial, 
plantation districts along the Mississippi and its 
tributaries. But in all eleven backland parishes, after the 
war, numerous small farmers attempted to emulate the 
alluvial planters in the production of cotton as a money 
crop. Despite infertile soil, all ten, by 1880, listed 
cotton as the chief money crop. Only in Grant and Tangi­
pahoa, however, did cotton exceed corn in total acreage. 
These pine and marsh parishes had an overwhelming pro­
portion of whites: 55,009 to 23,025 Negroes in 1880.3^
The backland region, making up over thirty per cent 
of the total land area of the state, was also the most 
thinly populated and the most meagerly tilled. Some insight 
into the poverty of the backlands can be gained by a com­
parison of the value of farm and produce (sold, consumed, 
or on hand) with the same values in certain alluvial cotton 






Value of Value of
Products z Land33
Cameron 2,087 $ 60,601 $ 193,299
East Carroll 1,023 1,268,136 1,299,209
St. Tammany 4,258 33,028 85,292
Tensas 1,571 1,620,638 2,899,533
Vernon 4,783 150,969 153,602
Madison 1,261 853,635 1,834,295
Winn 4,797 240,803 241,836
Concordia 1,320 1,262,772 980,743
Although many parishes fit neatly into blanket 
classifications as "alluvial," "oak upland," "piney woods," 
or "coastal marsh" regions, others defy such a simply de­
scription. For example, huge St. Landry Parish held practi-
Q Jk
cally every soil type known to the state. Catahoula, 
Natchitoches, Ouachita, and Rapides offered other instances 
of a great diversity of soil and terrain inside parish 
borders. Along the western edge of the Florida Parishes the 
Mississippi River bluffs gave much the same appearance as the 
oak uplands of North Louisiana; yet the original fertility 
of the bluffs and certain historical and geographic factors
31Ibid.
32Ibid.
33Ibid. The above figures exclude Negroes, who 
constituted the great majority in the alluvial parishes. 
However, almost all land, and most of the farm products, 
belonged to white planters in the alluvial parishes (Con- 
coraia, East Carroll, Madison, and Tensas) listed.
3«St. Landry, in this period, included not only its 
present borders but also the later-created parishes of AGadia 
X1886) and Evangeline (1910),
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had prompted the growth of plantations and so gave the bluff 
region the same kind of population and economy as the black 
bottomlands. Louisiana never did yield easily to general­
ization. But, in this regard, it should be noted that 
parishes which contained marked variations in topography and 
soil, such as Natchitoches and St. Landry, traditionally had 
the most serious political difficulties of any in the state. 
And racial conflict was not usually 'the issue. It was a
well known fact of Louisiana politics that the hil] and
35
bottomland whites "do not get along harmoniously."
Especially was this true when abrupt changes in terrain threw
them in juxtaposition.
As previously stated, the poorer class of whites
came increasingly to participate in the raising of cotton
after the Civil War. More was involved than the need for
credit and the temporarily high prices commanded by cotton.
The abysmal decline of land values everywhere in the South
encouraged those who possessed even a few dollars to expand
36
the size of their small farms. Many hoped to purchase
Trinity Herald. July 6 , 1889.
36
The collapse of land values in Louisiana between 
1860 and 1870 was more severe than in any other southern 
state: a decline of sixty-seven per cent in one decade.
Fred A. Shannon, The Farmer^ Last Frontier: Agriculture.
1860-1897. Vol. V. of The Economic History of the United 
States, ed. Henry David and Others tNew York, 1945), 80.
58
37portions of old bottomland plantations. But, as was 
usually the case in the backlands, men without cash for new 
land saw no way to obtain the necessary funds except by 
first raising cotton for sale on their infertile hill acres.
No other crop offered quick returns. It was the "only
38product upon which the farmer can depend for money."
Louisiana*s Commissioner of Immigration expressed his
astonishment in 1867, at the great number of poor white
farmers who had undertaken cotton growing. "In every part
of the state," he wrote, "as soon as you leave the great
plantations . . .  we find not only white men, but boys and
39girls laboring all hours in the fields."
Cotton production in the hills was also stimu­
lated by the relative decline of production in the bottom­
lands. Before the war the vast output of bales from the
^There is no universally accepted distinction be- . 
tween a "farm" and a "plantation.” Agriculturists during 
the nineteenth century often used the terms interchangeably. 
Perhaps the best distinction for Louisiana is the one used 
by Roger Shugg. He broadly classified tilled holdings of
less than 100 acres as "farms," and over 100 acres, as 
"plantations." Yet Shugg perceived that local variables 
would result in numerous exceptions. He concluded that the 
variants could be found in holdings between 50 and 500 acres. 
Anything less than the minimum figure, regarless of fertil­
ity, would almost always be a "farm" in which the owner and 
his family worked the soil; any holding over 500 acres, when 
tilled, would necessitate hired labor or tenants and would 
thus be a "plantation." Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in 
Louisiana. 7, 239.
^®U.S., Tenth Census. V, 67.
J a m e s  l # Watkins, Kino Cotton: A Historical and
Statistical Review. 1790 to 1908 I New York, 1908), 2(1)2.
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plantations had kept the price of the staple too low for 
poor whites and yeoman farmers to engage in serious compe­
tition. But after the war the plantation system groaned 
under innumerable handicaps. Military destruction, in­
efficient labor, and a host of other factors joined to keep 
plantation production somewhat below the 1860 level. As 
late as 1880, cotton shipments from such ante-bellum leaders
as Concordia and Madison Parishes were only fifty-one per
40
cent of the 1860 total. Though surviving, the plantations 
seemed crippled. It appeared that small farmers, for once, 
might be able to produce cotton and make a profit.
Slowly, the poor and yeoman whites came to realize 
how unfounded had been their hopes. Some of the blame lay 
with themselves. Those who deliberately neglected their food 
crops and livestock for the sake of cotton lost whatever eco­
nomic independence they might have once enjoyed. Overpro­
duction of cotton was serious enough in the ante-bellum
South; after the war, small producers compounded the
41
problem. For the great plantations were reviving, and 
cotton production, during the 1870*s, began to climb back 
toward pre-war totals. A steady drop in cotton prices was
40
U.S., Eighth Census. II, 66-67; U.S«, Tenth Census.
V, 3-5.
41
Matthew Brown Hammond, "Cotton Production in the 
South," The South in the Building of the Nation. VI, 88, 96.
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inevitable.
All too frequently, the small farmer made his situ­
ation worse by carrying over into commercial farming the 
same sloppy, haphazard mettfeods of earlier and less ambitious 
days. From his column in the Daily Picayune. Daniel Dennett 
lashed out at the "ignorant, rough, unattractive farming" so 
prevalent in the backlands. He was most distressed by the 
brutal effects such a life imposed upon the farm children.
He wrote of the life of a typical Louisiana farm boy:
He works all day in the field . . . with a half fed 
horse, a dull plow. . . . Often there are no books 
to read, no newspapers, and no schools, and the boy 
grows up in ignorance, his ignorant father his only 
teacher, and a poor old worn out farm his only school 
house.
Worse than the careless and slovenly farmers were
those who became too engrossed in the pursuit of cotton
43profits, and attempted "to get rich too fast." The
Farmerville Home Advocate described a man of this type in
Union Parish, who, "possessed with the insane idea that he
must ’own all the land that joins him,* makes slaves of
44
himself and family." Men of such nature showed concern
45
for their horses but worked their wives to death. Other
4^Pailv Picayune. May 2, 1877.
43
Ibid.. December 23, 1877.
44
Farmerville Home Advocate. May 22, 1885.
45ibid.
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small landowners, aping the planters, tried to live in 
leisure by hiring one or two Negro families and expecting 
from them prodigious feats of labor. A Richland Parish 
farmer admitted: "Too many of us bait our hooks with a
digger* and set it [sic ]out and expect to catch a crop."4^ 
When results proved disappointing the upland employers 
tended to blame the Negro. But not all farmers took this 
attitude. One, in Grant Parish, felt that it was mis­
treatment, not congenital laziness, which caused Negro in­
efficiency. "Treat them as human beings," he pleaded. "Why 
should they not have justice and fair dealing?"47
Although the shortcomings of Louisiana farmers were 
doubtless numerous, it is, nevertheless, unlikely that 
general prosperity would have ensued if all had been models 
of husbandry. Misery, like rainfall, fell upon the hard­
working and honest as well as the lazy or avaricious. Un­
friendly forces, mostly beyond the farmer’s control, worked 
relentlessly against the rural producers of both races. The 
advantages of cheap land and high farm prices during Recon­
struction were somewhat illusory, and were offset by hostile 
legislation, economic depression, transportation difficul­
ties, and lack of credit facilities. Then, after 1877,
^Louisiana State Agricultural Society, Proceedings 
of Third Annual Meeting (Baton Rouge, 1889), 8-9.
47Letter from "Old Hoss," published in Colfax 
Chronicle. May 1, 1886.
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whatever advantages that had once existed were largely gone, 
and only the malign aspects of postwar agriculture remained. 
White and Negro farmers alike faced these burdens. Least 
able to meet the test was the rural Negro. He bore all the 
common ills, along with the added incubus of his race and 
background of slavery.
Thirty cent cotton in the early days of Reconstruct­
ion was as much a boon to Federal tax collectors as to 
Louisiana's farmers. The special levy which Congress placed
on cotton at the end of the war wrung $9,642,535 from the
48
state's producers. This figure might be compared with the
information that as late as 1889 the total amount of bank
49capital in the state was only $5,815,000. The effect of
this tax upon a region trying to pull out of the quagmire
of military defeat was "disastrous and disheartening to the
extreme," remarked the Secretary of Agriculture of the United 
50
States. Wretched and costly transportation facilities
further undermined the margin of profit. And, by the late
1870's, cotton prices had fallen below the figure commanded 
51
in 1860. Yet Louisiana's cotton crop was still twenty-two
48
Watkins, King Cotton. 201-202.
49
Stephen A. Caldwell, A Banking History of Louisi­
ana (Baton Rouge, 1935), 128-29.
^Simkins, A History of the South. 251.
51Charles William Burkett and Clarence Hamilton Poe, 
Cotton: Its Cultivation. Marketing. Manufacturea and the
Problems of the Cotton World (New York. 1906). 23-25.
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per cent under pre-war production. The future held bigger 
crops and lower prices.
In certain regions of the South a shift in popu­
lation took place early in Reconstruction, as thousands of
poor whites came down from the hills to purchase, or to
52
work, the war-shattered plantations. However, little 
such migration occurred in Louisiana. Often the im­
poverished planters were too proud to sell. They still
associated the ownership of alluvial soil with wealth and
53
social position. And whenever plantations did change 
hands the result was usually the same as in the sugar 
country; that is, the land was sold as a unit and the new 
owners adopted the manner and outlook of their predecessors. 
Some planters who were willing to break up their land for 
sale advertised in vain. Even at the end of Reconstruction
cotton plantations, whole or in fragments, practically went
54begging, and the demand for sugar land was "very limited." 
Hill families who wanted to possess farms in the bottoms 
simply did not have the necessary cash. Even so, planters 
welcomed impecunious whites to the bottomlands. They were 
desired as laborers or tenants, to replace the "trifling
52
John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt; A History of 
the Farmers1 Alliance and the People^s Party (Minneapolis. 
1931J, 38-39. '
53 ,
Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana. 261.
54
Daily Picayune. April 5, 1877.
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negroes, who go reluctantly through the forms of scratching
55
the earth for a living. . . . "  The planters of Louisiana 
might wish for white labor, but they got little. Especi­
ally in North Louisiana was white labor unenthusiastic 
about proposals to migrate to the lowlands. This refusal 
perplexed some planters. "It cannot be," said a spokesman 
for the landowners of Tensas Parish, "that these people will




unlimited quantities of rich land," Nevertheless, few of
the hill folk came.
Land in Louisiana was plentiful. Only 8.60 per
cent of the state's 30,000,000 acres was tilled at the end
58
of Reconstruction. Observers believed that at least
59
16,000,000 acres were quite suitable for cultivating. Such 
optimism, however, left many questions unanswered. There 
was not only the problem of fertility and capability of the 
soil. There was the question of how much money settlers 
would need for implements and other necessities before the 
vacant land could be broken for cultivation* Accessibility 
to markets was another serious factor; lack of
55Ibid.. May 1, 1877.
1880.
56
St. Joseph North Louisiana Journal. October 30,
57
Ibid., Franklin St. Mary Banner. March 8, 1890.
58
U.S., Tenth Census. Ill, 3.
59
Daily Picayune. March 22, 1877.
transportation facilities could make even the most fertile
land unprofitable to farm.
In 1866 Congress was told that 6,228,103 acres of
60
surveyed but unsold federal land existed in Louisiana,
The Southern Homestead Act, passed that same year, was sup­
posedly designed to give this land "to all the poor people" 
61
of both races. Any citizen who was head of a family 
could apply for eighty acres (later raised to 160) of 
public land. The homestead was to be free of all charges 
except nominal service fees. After improving the land and
residing on it for five years, the settler would receive
f\0
his final deed.
Homestead offices in Louisiana were located at New 
63
Orleans and Monroe. The federal lands were scattered
throughout the state. Most of the available acres, however, 
were located in the "pine flatlands" of Calcasieu, St. 
Landry, Livingston, St. Tammany, and Tangipahoa Parishes,^ 
By 1 880 alleged homesteaders had applied for 958,627 of 
these acres. Yet just a fraction over 200,000 acres had
^ Congressional Globe. 39 Cong., 1 sess., 715.
^ Ibid.. 717. Negroes and loyal whites were given 
first choice. Confererate veterans could apply after one 
year.
62Roy M. Robbins, Our Landed Heritage: The Public
Domain^. 1776-1938 (Princeton, New Jersey; 1942), 212-14.
63





received final proof of ownership. Unfortunately, most
of the original applicants never intended to farm, and had
never so much as lived on the land. Northern lumber
companies had induced their employees to take advantage of
the southern homestead privilege; a miserable shanty would
be set up as proof of "improvement," the land then stripped
66
of timber, and abandoned to the weeds. Vacant homesteads 
of this sort dotted the state. Worse yet, bona fide farmers 
who desired these denuded acres could not apply for a grant 
because of the difficulty of proving that the first home­
stead was fraudulent, or that it had actually been 
67
abandoned. Some lumber firms did not even bother to take
out dummy homesteads but boldly cut timber wherever they
found it. When the Department of the Interior tried to
crack down on timber thieves in Southwest Louisiana in 1877,
Congressman Joseph H. Acklen of the Third District zealously
68
defended the prosecuted "Calcasieu sufferers."
The monopolization of Louisiana land by lumber and
65
St. George Leakin Sioussat, "State and Federal 
Lands and Land Laws in the South," The South in the Building 
of the Nation. VI, 28.
66
New York Times. October 3, 1878; May 30, 1879.
67Ibid. Abuses of the Homestead Act in Louisiana 
were similar in character and degree to practices in other 
public land states. See Shannon, The Farmerfs Last Fron­
tier. 51-75.
68Ibid.. October 3, 1878.
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other nonfarming interests accelerated in the years after 
1876, when Congress opened public acreage in the South to 
cash buyers as well as homesteaders. The outcome was 
tragic. Between 1880 and 1888 the great majority of Louisi­
ana land sold went to fifty individuals or firms who pur-
69
chased over 5,000 acres each. Of these fifty, forty-one
were northerners who obtained a total of 1,370,332 acres.
Six were Louisiana natives. These latter purchased
99,278 acres.70
Meanwhile, the state of Louisiana owned vast lands
which remained almost untouched. Ten years before -the Civil
War, Congress gave the state possession of all swamplands or
coastal marshes previously unsold, most of it inaccessable
or covered with water. In 1888, over 5,000,000 of these
71
acres were still in the hands of the state land office.
Without doubt the greatest deterrent to homestead­
ing, on federal or state lands, was that prospective, 
settlers lacked initial capital. Particularly were the 
Negroes unable to homestead. A claim itself was of no value 
unless the settler could purchase tools, fencing, plow 
animals, and other essentials. In St. Landry Parish, to
69
Paul Wallace Gates, "Federal Land Policy in the 
South, 1866-1888,* Journal of Southern History. VI (August, 
1940), 318-20.
70Compiled from figures in ibid.
71
Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. April 15,
1888.
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cite a typical example, a settler in 1381 would have to
72spend an estimated $655 before the first crop was raised.
This figure included fencing for only ten acres. But it was
a rare sharecropper or cane field worker who cleared, after
73
necessary expenses, as much as $20 per year. A family-- 
especially a Negro family--which cleared that much was con­
sidered quite fortunate. In theory, then, even a fortunate 
family of sharecroppers would have to scrimp for thirty- 
three years before accumulating the wherewithal to set up 
homesteading. Most tenants and laborers would require a 
period of double to triple their average life expectancy.
In North and Central Louisiana the problems of 
homesteading were entangled with the notorious "Backbone 
Railroad" land grant. Congress, in 1871, authorized the New 
Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Vicksburg Railway Company to build
a line diagonally across the state from New .Orleans, through
74
Shreveport, to Marshall, Texas. The company was to 
receive ten sections of land for each mile of track it laid: 
a princely domain of over 2,000,000 acres. The railroad 
could select this land from a swath of territory eighty
' 72
npailv Picayune. April 2, 1881.
73Estimated from figures in the following: U.S.,
Tenth Census. V, 83-84; Daily Picayune. April 27, 1877; 
Baton Rouge Weekly Truth. May 28. 1886.
74
Congressional Globe. 41 Cong., 3 sess., 392-93.
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miles wide, though it could not disturb any prior, legal
landholdings. Managers of the Backbone Railroad were given
75
five years, until 1876, to complete the line. One dis­
gusted commentator observed that Congress evidently assumed 
"this railroad company had been since 1803 a joint owner 
. . .  of the lands of Louisiana5?*^  The Backbone project, 
like other iGaxpetbagger-inspired schemes, issued copious
stocks and bonds but laid not one foot of track. Its land
77
grant was thereby forfeited in 1876.
Settlers, assuming the Backbone claim was beyond
78
hope of resurrection-, began moving into the territory.
They were mistaken. In 1881 officials of the defunct 
company sold all their "rights" to the New Orleans Pacific-
Texas Pacific combine of Jay Gould, Russell Sage, and
79 80 
others. The price paid was exactly one dollar. At the
time of the transfer the New Orleans Pacific was actually




Opelousas St. Landry Clarion. November 8, 1890.
^ North American Review. CXXXVI (March, 1883), 253.
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would eventually join the Texas Pacific and link Louisiana 
to San Francisco. The Gould-Sage combine made progress 
along another line as well; the entire Louisiana dele­
gations in Congress between 1877 and 1881 signed pledges
"to maintain the integrity of the grant and secure it for
r 81
the I. New Orleans Pacific] company." But the national
government refused to act for several years, holding the
82old Backbone grant "in reservation." Suddenly, in 1885, 
the Secretary of the Interior approved patents for almost
1,000,000 acres of the controversial grant to the Gould-
83
Sage group. The whole thing was "a fraud of the first
84
magnitude," and the hill farmers were furious.
The census of 1880 gave a distorted picture of land 
ownership in Louisiana. According to agents' reports, the 
state contained 48,293 farms. Of these, 31,286 were listed
as cultivated by owners, 10,337 were farmed on shares, and
85
6,669 were leased for a fixed money rental. These 
figures would indicate that 35.22 per cent of the agri­
cultural families were sharecroppers and renters, and that
81Letter from Newton C. Blanchard, published in 
Colfax Chronicle. February 17, 1883.
82North_ American Review. CXXXVI (March, 1883), 253.
83
Winfield Southern Sentinel. March 27, June 5, 1885.
84
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the average size of farms in the state was 157 acres. 
Seemingly, the plantation system was on its way to fragmen­
tation and oblivion. The 1860 census, showing almost the
same amount of land under cultivation, gave only 17,328
86
land units with an average size of 537 acres. However, 
the 1880 report was conducted on an unreliable and mis­
leading basis. Agents were instructed to enter each share- 
cropping section as a separate farm. Omitted was infor­
mation as to who owned these section-farms. As Roger
Shugg*s valuable study pointed out, the disconnected tracts
87owned by a single planter were not registered as a unit. 
Shugg carefully examined local tax lists in nine repre­
sentative parishes. He found, by grouping separate tenant 
plots according to actual ownership, that in those parishes 
nearly a threefold increase {290.1 per cent) in the number
of plantations had taken place since 1860, while the number
88
- of independent small farms declined 17.2 per cent. But
Shugg failed to mention another serious flaw in the 1880
census. Many large plantations, including some of over
891,000 acres, were listed as "cultivated by the owner."
86U.S., Eighth Census. II, 66-67.
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This is a patent impossibility. Plantations of such size
must have contained a number of Negro tenants not mentioned
by the census enumerators. Four bales of cotton on eight
acres of land was frequently the limit that a tenant family
91
was able, or willing, to produce.
Freedmen in the cotton parishes were emancipated
from slavery only to fall into the peonage of tenant
farming. "Very few" Louisiana Negroes owned the land they 
92
tilled. Reports from the alluvial belt and the more
fertile upland regions indicate that only two to five per
cent of the Negro farm families possessed land. Negro
proprietors were most numerous in the least productive
regions; almost half the freedmen of St. Landry, Tangipahoa
93and Winn parishes held their farms in fee simple ownership. 
These three parishes were the only exceptions in a bleak 
picture. Louisiana appeared to fall somewhat below the 
general estimate for the South that five per cent of the 
Negro farm families, at the end of Reconstruction, were
90
Thomas P. Gill, writing in 1886, pointed to this 
distortion. In Gill's words: "Can the owner of a farm of
1,000 acres and over* . . .be called a working cultivator?" 
North American Review. CXLII (January, 1886), 56.
91U.S., Tenth Census. V, 84.
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The tenant system that emerged after the war was a
crude but practical method of reviving production with
newly-freed Negro labor. In theory there were two types
of tenants: the sharecroppers, who received a portion of
the crop for their labor, and the tenant renters, who paid
a fixed money fee to the landowner.^ This distinction
might be important in some states, but apparently was not
in Louisiana. Those who "paid" rent did so in the form of
a stipulated amount of cotton per acre rather than with 
97actual cash. Though most renters owned their implements 
and plow-animals, they differed from the sharecroppers in 
no other important respect. The sharecroppers, who had no 
fixed rental, gave from one-half to two-thirds of their crop 
to the landlord in compensation for land, cabins, teams, and
Q A
7^Hammond, The South in the Building of the Nation. 
VI, 90. The percentage of total acreage owned by Negroes 
was probably lower yet. In 1882 a Negro State Senator said 
his race owned less than one per cent of Louisiana1s land. 
Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. March 28, 1882.
95Oscar Zeichner, "The Transition from Slave to Free 
Agricultural Labor in the Southern States," Agricultural 
History. XIII (January, 1939), 30.
96Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the South. 21.
97
New Orleans Weekly Louisianian. April 5, 1879; New 
York Times, December 7. 1879: U.S.. Tenth Census■ V, 84. 
Usually the rental charge was a specified amount of cotton 
(e.g., ninety pounds for each acre rented). In 1879 Madison 
Parish planters reportedly charged renters $8.00 per bale for 
ginning the cotton. Together with the rent, this meant the 
Negroes were being charged $17.00 per acre for land which 
had a market value not in excess of $25.00,
74
implements provided. In some cases, where the landlord
made prior arrangement to furnish food and other necessities,
98sharecroppers got as little as one-tenth of the crop. But 
renters, if the crop was poor, might have nothing.
It is hazardous to generalize about the tenant 
systems. Individual circumstances made for infinite varie­
ties. However, this much can be stated: by 1880 only two
of the thirty and more cotton parishes used the wage system
go
in preference to shares and rentals.77 Also, the overwhelm­
ing majority of cotton land tenants were Negroes. In no 
more than five parishes did whites outnumber Negroes as non­
landowning farmers. These five were Catahoula, Sabine, St. 
Tammany, Vernon, and Winn.*^ Overall, in Louisiana, most 
white agriculturists possessed the land they worked. Most 
Negroes did not. A few colored sharecroppers managed to 
become landowners, but the process was painfully slow. As 
late as 1928, Negro historian W. E. B. DuBois estimated his 
race owned approximately 10,000 of the 135,463 farms of 
Louisiana.
^^Zeichner, Agricultural History. XIII, 32.
98rhe wage system, as far as can be assessed from 
conflicting reports, predominated only in Catahoula and St. 
Tammany, among the cotton parishes* U.S., Tenth Census. V, 
83.
100Ibid.
*0*Crisis, XXXV (September, 1928), 296, quoted in 
Paul Lewinson, Race. Class and Party; A History of Nearo 
Suffrage and White Politics in the South (New York. 1932). 
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In the late nineteenth century, the economic chasm 
between Negro tenant and small white landowner appeared to 
be closing. But it was the white man*s fall that narrowed 
the gap, not the Negro*s rise. The chief equalizing element 
was the crop-lien system, an incubus which pressed down 
upon both races with impartial severity. A crop-lien was 
simply a merchant*s mortgage upon growing cotton--a legal 
guarantee that store credit extended for food, clothing, and 
other necessities furnished during the year would be paid 
for by a proportionate value in cotton when the crop was 
ready for shipment. The crop-lien is usually associated 
with the postwar era but in fact was much older. Early in 
the 1800*s New Orleans commission merchants and factors were 
already sending cash advances and supplies to the cotton and 
sugar planters. This credit gratified the material wants of 
the planters and facilitated the cultivation, gathering, and 
shipping of their crops. In 1843 the city merchants ob­
tained legislation permitting them a prior line, or "first 
privileges" on the crop. This act protected merchants
l @n
against the misfortunes or bad faith of the planters.
After 1865, over the South, the crop-lien took on 
new life, a shift in emphasis, and a broader base. Funda­
mental conditions in the post-war economy caused it to ex­
pand. First, the shortage of money and food made almost all
^ ^Dailv Picayune. October 9, 1877.
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rural people dependent upon store accounts until harvest
time. Second, since rank-and-file white farmers as well as
Negroes grew the staple, the number of these credit accounts
throughout the state multiplied. This fragmentation of the
lien system also shifted its retail aspect away from New
Orleans; country stores in the hills and bottomlands took
103
on a new importance. Some of the larger planters, such
as the Bosley family of Red River Parish, continued to deal
104
directly with New Orleans factors. These "factors and 
commission merchants" who dealt with planters performed for 
them essentially the same services that wholesale merchants 
did for the country storekeepers. And planters like the 
Bosleys, who distributed food supplies to their tenants, 
were acting the part of the rural storekeeper. On the 
other hand, country storekeepers in the crossroads villages 
had two broad classes of credit customers. First there were 
the little proprietors who worked their own land and were 
thus outside the tenant system, but whose need for equipment 
and provisions drove them to seek credit. Second, in cases 
where the landlord did not distribute food supplies or set up 
"plantation stores," the sharecroppers perforce had to deal
■^^New York Times. April 24, 1877.
104Business statements from Chaffee and Powell, 
Cotton Factors and Commission Merchants of New Orleans to 
H. G. Bosley, Coushatta, December 18, 20, 1886, in Bosley 
Family Papers (Louisiana State University Archives). Cited 
hereafter as Bosley Papers.
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with outside storekeepers.
The lien system put all its debtors in a hapless 
position. But by the nature of things, tenants suffered 
the worst. Having already signed away up to two-thirds of 
their crop to landlords, they had to pawn the third re­
maining to the merchants for the necessities of life. As
stated before, landlords sometimes distributed food or set
105
up plantation stores. In such event the tenant dealt 
with the one man who already owned most of the crop under 
the share system, and now would have a credit lien on the 
remainder. But for both tenants and small landowners, the 
crop-lien became a self-perpetuating fact of life. When 
the tenant1s crop was handed over to the merchant in the 
fall, and the cost of supplies deducted, a deficit fre­
quently resulted. By law, the laborer was then obliged to 
contract with the same merchant for the next year--and so 
the cycle began again. The same rule applied to small white 
landowners. And yet there appeared to be little alter­
native to the lien system. New Orleans bankers would not
advance money for mortgages on rural land, and so the farmer
106
had no collateral except the growing crop. What about
X  V
The nadir of the, lien system was reached in cases 
where landlords bought supplies on credit from retail 
country stores and then distributed these goods to their 
sharecroppers. Thus, the already-inflated retail prices 
were hiked again. Daily Picayune. Januaty 11, 1879; New 
York Times, December 7, 1879.
^^New Orleans City Item, quoted in Colfax Chronicle. 
March 17, 1888.
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rural banks? As late as 1886 there were no state or national
107
banks to be found outside of Orleans Parish. Even when
small private banking institutions in Baton Rouge and
Shreveport are counted, fifty-five of the fifty-eight
parishes had no banking facilities whatsoever.
Credit merchants who kept books on an illiterate
clientele had limitless chances to practice dishonesty.
The system was, indeed, scarcely fair even under the most
honest of storekeepers. But the cruelty of the crop-lien
arrangement was seldom intentional. The country merchants
were themselves victimized by the system. They, to.o, had
to buy their wares on credit. Most rural storekeepers
(and planter-merchants) dealt with New Orleans wholesale
houses, commission merchants, and factors. After collecting
the cotton, storekeepers often followed it by rail or river
down to the metropolis and settled accounts with their
108
creditors in the city. These wholesale men, in turn, 
were frequently in debt to northern or northern-controlled 
banks. Here, perhaps, was the key to the greatest evil of 
the lien system: the multiplication of middlemen which it
encouraged. The banks lent money to wholesale merchants 
(or factors) at eight per cent per annum. These merchants
107
Louisiana, Official Journal of the Consti­
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passed this interest along to the country retailers and
added seven per cent more as a fee for endorsing notes,
109selling cotton, and other services. Then came all the
shipping and handling charges on the cotton sent downriver,
and charges on the supplies sent up the river. By the time
the country storekeeper (or planter-merchant) placed the
merchandise on his shelves he had already paid more than
the retail price a cash customer might pay for the same
goods in the city.
Next came the storekeeper*s turn to gouge. Being
no better or worse than most men, he assumed that his time
and worry deserved a handsome profit. He also felt that a
high rate of interest was due him for the great risk taken
in advancing supplies all year long to often untrustworthy
customers. The storekeeper did not compute his interest
charge separately. The credit price took care of that.
When debts were settled the farmer had paid anywhere from
20 to 200 per cent or more over the cash price in the 
110
city. One angry member of the Louisiana legislature 
estimated the range of merchant interest rates in some parts
109
Chaffee and Powell to H. G. Bosley, May 11. 1877, 
Bosley Papers; National Economist. Ill (July 19, 1890), 288.
•^^Dailv Picayune. January 11, 1879; New Orleans 
Weekly Louisianian. April 5, 1879; Rayville Richland Beacon. 
June 11, 1881; Shannon, The Farmers Last Frontier. 91.
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of the state to run as high as 500 per cent!^*
It was an exceptional farmer whose crop did much 
more than square his account at the store at the end of the 
year. Frequently the ledger showed a deficit. Human bond­
age before the war, observed a Catholic bishop of North 
Louisiana, was not so evil as the "more grinding slavery" 
of the crop-lien. The old form of servitude chained only
half the population. This "new form," said the bishop,
1 19meant "slavery for both white and colored people.
Tenantry and its twin, the crop-lien, held the 
cotton regions in a double vise. But the sugar parishes 
escaped their grip. There, another form of economic organi­
zation had evolved. During and immediately after the war 
the "share" system had been tried by numerous sugar
1 1 o
planters. The planters did not care for the system 
since it did not afford opportunities for close supervision. 
The tenant system did not catch on. By the 1880's most 
planters depended upon Negro laborers who were paid a stipu­
lated wage.'*'^ Neither did the crop-lien have the same
H^-Baton Rouge Weekly Truth. May 28, 1886.
110
Natchitoches Enterprise. March 2, 1899.
^ ^Daily Picayune. June 23, 1877.
114J. Carlyle Sitterson, "The Transition from Slave 
to Free Economy on the William J. Minor Plantation," Agri­
cultural History. XVII (October, 1943), 223.
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importance in the sugar country. Many of the smaller
planters were jnmeshed in it, but the larger sugar planters
escaped because their personal fortunes permitted them to
avoid heavy indebtedness.
Most sugar plantations paid wages by the month. A
few paid by the week or day. Wages were naturally higher
when Negroes purchased their own rations--lower when the
employer supplied food. Planters who feared that laborers
might wander off before the backbreaking harvest work
commenced resorted to the effective device of withdrawing
one-third of each month1s wages and holding this money until
115
the end of the year. With all its drawbacks, Negroes 
seem to have preferred the wage system to sharecropping. 
Evidence of this is the fact that many thousands emigrated 
from the cotton fields to the sugar lands during the Re­
construction years. Negroes were "more satisfied" when
116
they could see money in their hands.
Nevertheless, labor troubles did come to the cane 
fields. Wages, which ran as high as forty-five dollars per 
month with rations at the end of the war, began to creep 
downward before the decade of the 1860*s was over. Rates 
paid for labor took a more sudden plunge after the
•^^ Daily Picayune. December 21, 1877. 
U 6Ibid., April 28, 1877, June 15, 1879
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beginning of the nationwide depression in 1873. Sugar
prices declined, and wages sank accordingly. The drop in
wage rates was compounded by the oversupply of labor in
some parishes, caused by Negroes who had drifted in from the
cotton parishes. Planters such as Donelson Caffery, Sr.,
hoped to lower wages as far as possible, reasoning that "if
118
labor is plentiful labor is cheap." In October of 1877
Caffery organized the cane growers of St. Mary, the leading
sugar parish of the state, for the purpose of ending "the
119
ruinous policy of competition" for labor. Wages in St. 
Mary, for the January-October growing season, were there­
upon set at fifteen dollars per month with rations and 
eighteen dollars per month without rations. Only able- 
bodied Negro men were to be paid the specified rates. Women 
and children were used only during the grinding season, for
fifty cents or less per day. "Infamous laborers or those
120
engaged in strikes" were to be blacklisted. Sugar 
planters near the Mississippi river followed the example of 
the St. Mary landowners, and by late November of 1877 a state­
wide organization of large producers, the Louisiana Sugar 
Planters* Association, began to take shape under the
^^Sitterson, Sugar Country. 245.
^ 8Pailv Picayune. October 3, 1877.
119
Ibid.
12°Ibid.. December 21, 1877.
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leadership of Duncan F. Kenner.
By 1880, with the depression over, pay scales rose
slightly. Along the Mississippi River laborers received,
during the long growing season, $22.50 per month without
122
rations; that is, seventy-five cents per day. The 
Negroes complained, however, that rising prices in the 
plantation stores kept them close to starvation and de­
stroyed any hope of accumulating savings. A laborer in St.
John Parish spoke for many when he grumbled: "I begin de
123
year wid nothin' and end wid nothin!."
Though the majority of Louisianians of both races 
remained close to the soil, other voices had the ear of 
state officials, voices which urged that the Pelican State 
join in the procession toward an industrialized "New South." 
But the advocates of industry had to tread carefully. 
Although the welcome mat was extended to northern capital­
ists it was deemed essential to somehow adjust this economic 
New Departure into the Procrustean bed of southern tradition.. 
The New South Bourbons could not entirely forget the rank- 
and-file white voters who were depended upon to maintain 
the state Democratic party in power. Consequently, 
emotional appeals on behalf of industrialization became
•^■^Sitterson, Sugar Country. 253.
■^^New Orleans Democrat. March 19*22, 1880.
123
Daily Picayune. March 29, 1880.
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common. Industrialization was pictured as a sort of non­
violent continuation of the Civil War; the idea was ad­
vanced that although "we have lost the victory in the field 
of fight, we can win it back in the workshop, in the 
factory."124 Practical arguments were also used. More 
factories, more railroads, were supposed to end unemployment 
and raise living standards. The benefits of industry might 
also extend to the countryside. Sawmills set up in the pine 
parishes would hire local men, and so bring the jingle of 
money and the hum of civilization to the backwoods and 
hills. One textile mill was already in operation in rural 
Claiborne Parish. More mills, it was hoped, would locate in 
the countryside if proper inducements were made. But of all 
lures to northern business, the one which was most stressed 
was the abundance of cheap labor.
Promoters of New South business could pridefully 
point out that with the exception of the sugar refineries, 
Louisiana's infant industries showed great vitality in re­
covering from the ravages of war. Though the number of 
manufacturing establishments decreased from 1,774 to 1,553 
between 1860 and 1880, the actual value of products rose 
from $15,587,473 to $24,205,183. The amount of invested
1 94.
Columbus (Ga.) Reqister. auoted in ibid.. March
24, 1881. "
125Bioqraphical and Historical Memoirs of Louisi­
ana (Chicago, 1892), I, l1/, 135. ;
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capital showed similar growth.*2^ Fifteen hundred industrial
plants, most of them small, produced fifty-six per cent as
much wealth as all the crops raised on Louisiana*s broad
acres. Only 12,167 men, women, and children created the
value of these manufactured items. Yet the hundreds of
thousands of Louisianians who toiled in the wind and rain
127of the fields could not double this amount.
The moral, to many, was obvious. Since machinery 
produced more in value than did the soil, it followed that 
industry would regain for Louisiana her lost riches. Capi­
tal investment could "make the Pelican State more powerful
than Holland, . . .  build cities more beautiful than 
128V e n i c e . T e x t i l e  mills were particularly desired. New
Orleans was the world's chief cotton port. By the late
1870's one-third of all the nation's cotton passed through 
129the city; yet the number of bales remaining in the state 
to be fashioned into textiles, was pitifully small. In 1876 
Louisiana produced 560,000 bales of cotton. New Orleans
wharves handled three times that figure. But only 889
130bales remained in the state. Why, it must have been
*2^U.S., Compendium of the Tenth Census. II, 975. 
127Ibid.. 928, 975.
^2^Scribner*s Monthly. VII (December, 1873), 156. 
^29pailv Picayune. May 12, 1877.
■^^Watkins, Kina Cotton. 202.
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asked, did Louisiana grow so much but create so little?
Trade in fiber and produce was the’life blood of New
Orleans. But despite the fact that her commerce relied upon
goods from the plantations and farms, the Crescent City was
the only spot in Louisiana not saturated with an agricultural
environment. In 1880 two-thirds of all manufacturing plants
131
in the state were inside the city. But the 9,504
industrial workers (7,666 of them adult males), made up only
a fraction of the total labor force of the city. One year
after Reconstruction's end it was estimated that the city
contained at least 45,000 men over the age of eighteen who
132worked for wages. Occupations were as varied as the life
of the city itself. Skilled workers--typographers, screw-
men, mechanics--all had formed benevolent and protective
labor societies long before secession; after the war, their
societies or unions were clearly the strongest among the
133
labor associations of New Orleans. Somewhat lower on
the economic ladder, but still organized, were laborers in 
the tobacco manufacturing plants and cottonseed oil mills. 
But most urban workers had no skills and toiled for thirty- 
five cents or less per hour. These less fortunate workers
131U.S., Compendium of the Tenth Census. II, 928, 
975, 1068-71.
^ ^Daily Picayune. November 10, 1878.
133
Arthur Raymond Pearce, "The Rise and Decline of 
Labor in New Orleans," (unpublished Master's thesis, Tulane 
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87
occasionally grouped into ineffective associations. Long­
shoremen and the levee roustabouts formed a Laborers1 Union 
Society and attempted to resist the hiring of degraded, 
poverty-stricken newcomers to the city who were willing to 
work for ten cents per hour. ^ 4
Skilled or unskilled, wage earners in New Orleans 
were sinking into despair during the latter years of Re­
construction. The economic depression touched bottom 
between 1874 and 1878, during which time the cauldron of 
Louisiana*s political troubles boiled over. Racial ani­
mosity among the workers was on the rise. Bitter compe­
tition for jobs combined with political issues to divide
135Negro and white laborers into hostile camps. Benevolent
and charitable associations seemed unable to provide food
for the unemployed and helpless. Landlords and business
leaders tended to blame hard times on Carpetbaggism, and
few but the Carpetbaggers would disagree.
"Death is staring us in the face," a laborer wrote
in the last days of Reconstruction. "How long! oh, how
long! will these poor men and women and children . . .  be
kept in bondage and misery in our distracted city and 
1 *36state?" Under the circumstances, white labor in New
^34Pailv Picayune. November 4, 1877.
135Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana.
303.
136
Daily Picayune. April 15, 1877.
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Orleans and farmers in the upcountry, joined hands with the 
economic upper class of Louisiana during the dark days of 
1876-77. Underprivileged whites generally accepted the 
conservative verdict that Radicalism and its social turmoil 
had caused the hard times. In truth, it did appear that 
Republican pilfering and the continued political chaos was 
halting any chance for economic recovery. Whites, rich and 
poor, united in a "common sympathy" of race and regional
13'pride to fight for home rule under the Democratic banner. 
The victory was won, but white unity would one day be 
tested in the fire of class conflict.
137New Orleans Issue. June 4, 1892. The Issue was 




"Agrarianism" is often related to an American demo­
cratic ideal which took shape in the writings of Benjamin 
Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and John Taylor of Caroline: 
a belief that "those who labor in the earth are the chosen 
people of God."*' Accordingly, agriculture was eulogized 
as the fundamental employment of man. Other callings were 
dependent. The agrarian myth extolled the moral primacy of 
hard working, self-sufficient rural folk: the yeoman
middle class, who presumably represented the very apex of
2
American civilization.
From the beginning, the agrarian myth commingled 
fiction.with reality. Self-sufficiency was, more often 
than not, gladly abandoned whenever the farmer had access 
to transportation or markets. He seemed as anxious to get
^Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, quoted in A. 
Whitney Griswold, "The Agrarian Democracy of Thomas 
Jefferson," American Political Science Review. XL (August, 
1946), 667.
2
Paul H. Johnstone, "Old Ideas versus New Ideas in 
Farming," Farmers in A Changing World. U.S., Department of 
Agriculture Yearbook. 1940. 116-17.
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3rich as any other American. Gradations of property and 
sectional conflicts of interest precluded the development of 
a homogeneous national class of agriculturists based upon 
the yeoman stereotype. However, all types of landowning 
farmers in America had certain attitudes in common: a
desire to own more and better land, an individualistic and 
pragmatic outlook on life, a suspicion of urban ways and 
especially urban politicians, and a tendency toward conser­
vatism in times of prosperity.4 These rural feelings knew 
no special class, or time, or place.
True political solidarity among the major sections 
and classes of agriculturists in America was never attained. 
The much vaunted ante-bellum agrarian alliance of South and 
Northwest during the Jackson period was often vague and 
paradoxical. Moreover, conflicts of interest could be 
noted among agriculturists within each state or region. 
Although the Civil War tended to unify agrarian sentiment on 
a purely regional basis, at the same time it smothered the 
already feeble concept of national harmony among agri­
cultural interests. The conflict of 1861-65 decided far
3
Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan
to F.D.R. (New York, 1955), 37.
4Gates, The Farmer's Age. 2.
5An excellent discussion of conflicting interpre­
tations of Jacksonian Democracy may be found in Charles 
Greer Sellers, Jr., "Andrew Jackson versus the Historians," 
Mississippi Valiev Historical Review. XLIV (March, 1958), 
615-33.
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more than the fate of the Confederacy. It ushered in a 
period of business and industrial expansion at a time when 
northern and southern farmers were politically and emotion­
ally divided.
After the war the political dichotomy of agrarian 
America continued. Politicians North and South, of both 
major parties, tended to divert public attention from those 
economic issues which were of greatest importance to 
farmers, and instead rehashed the emotion-packed "bloody 
shirt" memories of the war. Meanwhile, agriculture*s share 
of the national wealth declined as business power in- . 
creased.^* Eastern banking interests, allied with monopo­
listic-minded railroads arid industrial corporations, domi­
nated Congress and dictated to most state legislatures. 
Currency contraction made the farmer's debt load more 
burdensome at the same time that farm prices were falling. 
Faced with this situation, the more aggressive rural people, 
North and South, began to organize for mutual defense. 
Associations such as the Grange, the Greenback party, the 
Farmers' Alliance, and the People's party were utilized to 
align the hosts of agriculture against enemies both real 
and imagined.
Two pathways of agrarian protest lay open. The more
^Everett E. Edwards, "American Agriculture--The 
First 300 Years," U.S., Department of Agriculture Yearbook, 
1940, 258.
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conservative farmers veered toward businesslike organization
for specific goals; they wished to advance their economic
position as commercial producers and were not otherwise
interested in disturbing the status quo. As capitalists,
they wished to modify the capitalist system only in so far
as to allow larger profits for agriculture. Particularly
in the South, the conservative agrarians balked at joining
reform-minded third parties. But the agrarian left wing,
drawing its support from smaller landowners and tenant
farmers, eschewed the rural businessman philosophy and
looked favorably upon political action along working class
lines. The small landowner "was so poor and distressed that
7
he forgot he was a capitalist. . . Consequently,
spokesmen for the agrarian left, reasoning that farmers and 
workers were being placed in the same underdog economic 
position, eventually sought to create a third party which
Q
would unite the disadvantaged of wshop and field" in a 
great crusade against special privilege. Nor was the Negro 
voter forgotten; third party agrarians in the South came .to 
look upon the Negro as a partner in misery and thus a 
potential ally in protest.
Negro agrarianism in post-Reconstruction Louisiana
7
Quoted in Woodward, Origins of the New South. 194.
O
°New Orleans Issue. December 30, 1893; Chester 
McArthur Destler, American Radicalism. 1865-1901: Essays
and Documents (Connecticut College Monograph No. 3: New
London, 1946), 15-31.
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had peculiarly futile and tragic overtones. The aspirations 
of poor whites and poor Negroes were similar, and in some 
localities, leaders of the two were moderately successful 
in arranging a united front against the Bourbon Democracy. 
But prior to the Populist uprising of the 1890's such 
efforts of biracial class unity in Louisiana were scattered 
and infrequent. Also, there were few parishes in the state 
where lower class Negroes and whites could be found in large 
numbers; the freedmen were concentrated in the alluvial 
districts and were subject to political intimidation by the 
conservative plantation owners, while the bulk of the poor 
white population lived in the backcountry or the towns.
This degree of geographic separation, along with the tra­
dition of racial antagonism common to both, hindered co­
operation. Therefore, Negro agrarianism makes up a 
partially separate story, and when circumstances warrant 
will be discussed separately.
Louisiana agrarianism in the years after Recon­
struction was obviously not one concerted movement but 
rather an amalgam of attempts by dissident out-groups to 
wrest control of local and state government away from the 
Bourbon oligarchy which dominated the economy as well as 
the politics of the state. The agrarian reformers came 
from essentially three groups: the producer-minded, middle
class white landowners; the more radical-minded rural 
whites, most of whom owned infertile hill farms or worked
94
as tenants; and the mass of Negro tenant farmers and rural 
wage earners, who were the most disadvantaged of the three. 
The first group, although active in the Grange and the 
Farmers* Alliance, generally refused to countenance third 
party talk and would side with the great plantation owners 
on questions pertaining to race or the Democratic party.
The second group, also active in the Grange and Alliance, 
provided the bulk of support for the Populist party of the 
1890*s; through that party they came to advocate a united 
front with urban labor elements as well as the Negroes.^
The Negroes, for their part, appeared anxious to join hands 
with the radical white agrarians whenever and wherever the 
opportunity came.
The role of urban radicalism must also be considered. 
Although not, properly speaking, an integral part of the 
agrarian crusade in Louisiana, a politically militant labor- 
ite element did exist in New Orleans as early as the Recon­
struction era. In 1891 the People*s Municipal party was 
organized as an urban affiliate of the Populist party for 
New Orleans.Louisiana, however, was overwhelmingly rural, 
and any serious statewide reform program would necessarily 
be agrarian in nature. Although the New Orleans laborites
g
Cf. Daily Picayune. October 3, 1891; New Orleans 
Times-Democrat. February 18, 1892.
■^New Orleans Issue. August 1, 1891.
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were instrumental in helping found the state Populist party, 
urban Populism itself soon proved disappointing.^ For the 
purposes of this study, the New Orleans radicals should be 
thought of as rather ineffective urban allies of Louisiana's 
left wing agrarians. But the fact that political fusion 
between the poor of town and country was seriously proposed 
is in itself significant. Their traditional antipathies ran 
deep; their attempt at fusion would have been undertaken 
only under extreme provocation,
Louisiana posed special and exasperating problems 
for any reform movement. In addition to the Negro-white 
division common to all southern states, the ethnic, re­
ligious, and the unique language barrier between the poor 
of the northern and southern parishes presented a formidable 
obstacle to any statewide organization of protest. Louisi­
ana's rate of illiteracy, being the highest in the nation, 
also hampered attempts at communication among the poor. But 
the most formidable hurdle of all was the Bourbon'-controlled 
ballot box. In the years after Reconstruction, Louisiana
more than "lived up to its reputation of being the only
12southern state perpetually corrupt." Senator Kellogg's 
grim jest that "after the polls are closed the election
•^Daily Picayune. October 3-4, 1891; Melvin J.
White, "Populism in Louisiana During the Nineties," 
Mississippi Valiev Historical Review. V (June, 1918), 15.
*%imkins, A History of the South. 320.
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13really begins," held much unhappy truth, because with 
election laws and registration procedure under the control 
of the conservative Democracy, candidates opposed to the 
status quo were counted out with dismal regularity. Perhaps 
in no other American state did reformers wage such an uphill 
fight.
Toward the end of the 1890*s, looking back on 
Louisiana's agrarian reform efforts, a critic remarked that 
they all "tried to rally the nondescript mass of people who 
have everything to gain and nothing to lose."'*'4 This was 
true. But the man who made the observation was a spokesman 
for the ultra-Bourbon element, and seemed unable or un­
willing to understand why the "nondescript" should be weary 
of the role in society assigned to them, or why they should 
be angry at the vote frauds which perpetuated the system. 
Spokesmen for the disadvantaged majority, on the other hand, 
believed that the powers of government should, and could, be 
used to ameliorate economic problems. This was not in the 
context of classic Jeffersonian agrarianism, but the state 
and nation had changed considerably since the early days of 
the century. Left wing agrarianism in Louisiana, in the 
years from the end of Reconstruction to the end of the 
century, amounted to a futile series of attempts to
13Congressional Record. 47 Cong., Special Sess. 
Senate, 120.
^Natchitoches Enterprise. March 2, 1899.
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overthrow the state's corrupt Bourbon oligarchy and inaugu­
rate a government which would truly represent farmers and 
laborers, in place of the old system which permitted a 
privileged few to run the state in the manner of a private 
plantation.
In Louisiana, as well as other states, the fore­
runner of post-Reconstruction agrarianism was the Patrons of 
Husbandry, better known as the Grange. First organized in
Washington, D.C., in 1867, the Grange soon became a nation-
15
wide fraternity of farmers. Oliver H. Kelley, founder of
the Grange, believed its purposes should be educational and
social in nature. He hoped the order would eradicate
16
sectional hatreds. Through a union of northern and 
southern agriculturists, Kelley assumed, the emotional 
wounds of the Civil War might be healed.
The early Grange leaders did not appeal to any 
special class of agriculturists. They intended the order to 
be a general union of all. Kelley and his associates 
avoided militant agrarianism; individual Granger units were 
admonished to refrain from using the order for partisan 
political purposes, and even political discussions at Grange
■^Edward Wiest, Agricultural Organization in the 
United States (University of Kefrtuckv Studies in Economics 
and Sociology. Vol. II, Lexington, 1923), 375.
16
Fred A. Shannon, American Farmers' Movements 
(Princeton, 1957), 55: Carl C. Tavlor. The Farmers'
Movement: 1620-1920 (New York, 1953), 116-17.
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meetings were forbidden. Inevitably, many Grangers chose
to ignore the ban on politics. Railroads and special
interests pressured legislators and congressmen, why should
not the tillers of the soil protect themselves in the same
fashion? The Grange also undertook numerous cooperative
enterprises. The heavy profits made by middlemen who
bought and sold to farmers induced Grangers in many states
to set up cooperative stores, business agencies, and even
17
farm implement factories. The original social and edu­
cational aims of the Grange were shoved into the background.
The turmoil of Reconstruction delayed the entrance 
of the Grange into Louisiana. Not until March of 1872 was 
a Grange unit established in the state. Expansion was slow; 
almost two years elapsed before a state organization was 
effected. Then, however, came a remarkable surge forward.
In f873 only 26 units with a total of 853 members were re­
ported. But by 1875 there were 315 subordinate units with
18
a membership of 10,078. Credit for the spread of the 
Grange in Louisiana belongs chiefly to two men: H. W. L.
17Amos G. Warner, "Three Phases of Cooperation in 
the West," History of Cooperation in the United States 
(Vol. VI, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical 
and Political Science: Baltimore, 1888), 367-82.
18
Thomas C. Atkeson, Semi-Centennial History of the 
Patrons of Husbandry (New York, 1916), 45-46; Solon Justus 
Buck, The Granger Movement: A Study of Agricultural
Organization and its Political. Economic and Social Mani­
festations. 1870-1880 (Harvard Historical Studies. Vol.
XIX, Cambridge, 1913), 58 ff.
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Lewis of Tangipahoa Parish, Master of the state Grange, who
joined hands with Daniel Dennett, then a resident of St.
Mary Parish, to stump the hill and bayou country in the
19
interests of the organization. Lewis and Dennett did
their work-well. By the time their two year tour was over,
Granges were established in almost every parish of the state.
20
Even urban Orleans had an active unit.
The social features of the Grange were exceedingly 
important to rural white Louisianians during the unhappy 
Reconstruction years. Dennett wrote that the Grange "broke 
the monotony of farm life . . . carried light into neighbor­
hoods and to homes which would never have been enlightened 
from any other sourceii* The elaborate ritual of Grange 
meetings added color to ordinarily drab lives, and instilled 
in rural folk a sense of the importance of their labor, 
"Agriculture was the first calling of man," the Patrons were
informed. "No order or association can rank with the tillers 
22
of the soil." Farmers* wives were welcomed into Grange 
membership. Sometimes more women than men showed up at
■^Curley Daniel Willis, "The Grange Movement in 
Louisiana" (unpublished Master's thesis, Louisiana State 
University, 1935), 18-21.
20
Daily Picayune. March 23, 1877.
21Ibid.
22Manual of Subordinate Granges of the Patrons of 




Inevitably, the Grange became involved in Louisi-
24
ana's partisan politics. Most Grange members were native
whites and, therefore, almost without exception, foes of
the Carpetbagger government. Some Granges crossed the
color line and admitted Negroes, but the real purpose on
such occasions seems to have been to woo colored people
away from Republican Union Leagues and kindred organi- 
25
zations. Biracial Granges, in Louisiana, appear to have
been the exception and not the rule. Also, no evidence
exists of. any Republican-dominated Grange units within the
state. Grange petitions denounced the "system of studied
plunder" of the Radical state administration and bitterly
26
protested the forced sale of farm land for taxation.
Dennett himself, the Grange's state Deputy, admitted to
27
being a member of the Knights of the White Camellia.
The Grange in Louisiana recruited its membership 
almost entirely from the middle-sized to small landowners 
who raised cotton, corn, and livestock. The uplands of
22Pailv Picayune. May 30, 1877.
24As one writer in the late nineteenth century ex­
pressed it, Louisianians have a tendency "to drag all 
things, all issues, into politics." Biographical and 
Historical Memoirs of Louisiana. I, 138.
2^Willis, "The Grange Movement," 16.
26Ibid., 37-38.
^Highsmith, "Louisiana During Reconstruction,"
249.
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North Louisiana and the Florida parishes were Grange strong­
holds. The organization was also quite active in the 
southern parishes of St. Landry and Lafayette, for these 
latter, like the uplands, were dominated by white landowners 
of modest means. Exceptions may be found; there were patrons 
affluent enough to offer rent-free cabins and half the crop
to any "starving whites" of New Orleans interested in moving
28to the country and becoming tenants. Yet the great land­
lords, the sugar barons especially, avoided the Grange. Dr. 
E. K. Branch of Avoyelles Parish, who became Master of the 
Louisiana Grange in 1877, reported that large planters in
the southern portion of the state "have never taken any
29interest in our organization,"
Economic activities of the Grange in Louisiana
followed the same path pursued by the Patrons in other
states. Cooperative stores, owned by farmers, were set up
at two points in St. Helena Parish, at Clinton in East
Feliciana Parish, at Washington and Big Cane in St. Landry
30
Parish, and at Winnfield in Winn Parish. A state whole­
sale agency, with headquarters in New Orleans, was organized
2^Pailv Picayune. March 18, April 10, 1877.
29Ibid.. May 1, 4, 1877.
30Journal of Proceedings, Fifteenth Session of the 
National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry (Philadelphia. 




to serve the Grange stores. But poor management, plus
depressed business conditions, caused the demise of the
32
state agency in 1877. Thus the cooperative movement ac­
complished little. Usually, local Grangers were too poor to 
set up stores of their own. The usual tactic was to confer 
with a sympathetic local merchant and make group purchases at 
reduced prices. The few genuine cooperative stores soon met 
the fate of the state agency. The only survivor was the 
Grange store at Winnfield, which was still doing business in 
1885 under the management of George P. Long. By that
time, Long had to deal with the regular New Orleans whole-
34
salers who sold to the private stores.
Unlike the Grange in many states Louisiana Patrons 
did not engage in the bitter fight with the railroads. The 
reason was simple. There were few railroads to denounce.
As late as 1875 there were just 539 miles of track in the 
whole state; within the next six years only 93 more miles
^ Dailv Picayune. April 19, May 30, 1877; Winnfield 
Southern Sentinel, December 11, 1885; Willis, "The Grange 
Movemerit7"~So7^3T
32
Buck, The Granger Movement. 254; Willis, "The 
Grange Movement," 60-62.
33An older brother of Huey P. Long, Sr., and there­
fore an uncle of Governors Huey and Earl Long. Henry E. 
Chambers, A History of Louisiana; Wilderness-Colony- 
Province-Territory-Siate-People IChicaqo. 1925). III. 184.
34Winrifdeld Southern Sentinel. August 28, September 
25, December 11, 1885.
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35
were added. Louisiana ranked tenth among the eleven
former Confederate states in mileage by the latter date.
Only Florida, with one-third Louisiana*s population, had
36
less track. Instead of hating railroads, the majority of
Louisiana’s farmers eagerly looked forward to the day when 
rail lines might relieve them of the onerous rates charged 
by steamship lines on the Mississippi and its tributaries. 
Railroad hostility, it is true, existed to some degree in 
parishes where tracks had already been laid, but deep- 
rooted criticism was delayed until trouble over the Back­
bone land grant developed in the 1880*s. In the meantime 
it was assumed that railroads would provide competition for 
the river boats; competition was assumed to mean lower 
charges. Those who might point with alarm to the railroad 
troubles in other states were assured that when new lines 
were developed in Louisiana they would "always be held in 
check by the healthy competition of water transportation."3"^ 
And so, while waiting for the railroads to come, Grangers
attempted to fight steamboat monopolies by contracting with
38shipowners who offered lower rates for group shipments.
35Poor, Manual of the Railroads . . . 1881. 439.
36Ibid., 415.
37Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. May 20,
1882.
OQ
Willis, "The Grange Movement," 55-56.
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None of these "Grange Boats," so called, appear to have been 
cooperative enterprises.
The Grange displayed a laudable interest in edu­
cation. Adult Grangers were encouraged to read agricultural 
journals and discuss scientific farm methods at the regular 
meetings.^ Attempts were made to secure better schools for 
rural children. Dissatisfaction with public facilities 
prompted the creation of "Grange schools" for white children 
in Lafayette and St. Helena Parishes.4® The Grange also 
attempted to control Louisiana State Agricultural and 
Mechanical College, as Grange leaders desired that the 
college not be merged with Louisiana State University at 
Baton Rouge.4* Some wanted direct Granger management of the 
school. North Louisiana Grangers felt the agricultural 
school should be located at a more "interior point" where 
poor students might receive practical instruction without 
"being brought in contact with the vices and^ extravagances 
of the city [sic ] . «4^ The Nicholls legislature ignored
39Buck, The Granger Movement. 325; Daily Picayune. 
April 8, 1877.
4®Willis, "The Grange Movement," 80; Daily Picayune. 
May 30, 1877.
4*Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the South. 41.
4^Pailv Picayune. March 13, 1877. The Louisiana 
Grangers took a remarkably provincial view of what consti­
tuted a "city." Baton Rouge, at the time, was a sleepy 
country town of less than 8,000 inhabitants. Even after it 
became the state capital in 1882, hogs still ran wild in the 
muddy streets and "formidably attacked" fruit peddlers.
Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. July 27, 1882.
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the clamor. In 1877 the two state institutions were merged
at Baton Rouge.
By 1877 the Grange was visibly dying in Louisiana.
Even in such a stronghold as De Soto Parish the order was
reportedly "played out."4*^ That year marked the nadir of
the great depression of the decade and saw the failure of
the state agency. Politics proved distracting to Grange
members; tempers heated to the boiling point in the campaign
of 1876 and its aftermath; upcountry white farmers even
neglected their crops as they waited for news of the
44Nicholls-Packard struggle in New Orleans. Grange members 
became "discouraged and careless," failed to pay their dues, 
and by 1879 the state Grange was dormant.4^
Some few subordinate Grange units maintained a 
flickering existence; however, outside of East Baton Rouge, 
St. Helena, and Winn Parishes, little activity can be noted 
after 1879. Even there it was feeble. Dennett, writing in 
1881, complained that every other state in the South re­
tained some kind of statewide organization. He and a,hand­
ful of others continued to agitate for a revival of "our 
Louisiana Lazarus."4^ Their efforts had little result. The
40 •
Daily Picayune. November 23, 1877.
44Natchitoches People*s Vindicator, auoted in ibid.. 
March 26, 1877.
45Pailv Picayune. February 18, 1881.
4^Ibid.. February 19, 1881.
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day of the Grange was over. However, the next decade would 
see new and more dynamic agrarian organizations which bore 
the markings of a Granger heritage. The Grange had intro­
duced the concept of united action, the belief that farmers 
must raise their voices in harmony to achieve economic and
political rights. It was "the great pioneer." of agrarian
47
reform in Louisiana. The Farmers' Alliance, the Populist
party, would list among their leaders men who joined the
Grange in the 1870*s. They, especially, tried to avoid the
48
shoals which shipwrecked the parent order.
The moribund Grange played little part in the 
exciting state and congressional elections of 1878. Never­
theless, the campaigns of that year mark a critical milepost 
in the history of Louisiana agrarianism and, therefore, 
deserve examination. All six United States Representatives, 
the State Treasurer, a majority of seats in the legislature, 
and all municipal officials in New Orleans were to be named
40
on November 5, 1878. Conservative Democrats excitedly 
pointed out that the work of redeeming the state from Radi­
calism was yet unfinished— nearly half the legislative seats 
and one congressional district remained in Republican
4^Leesville People's Friend. March 21, 1889.
48
Colfax Chronicle. March 5, 1887.
49
New Y0rk Times. September 30, 1878; New Orleans 
Democrat, October 26, 1878.
107
50
hands. Despite the slashing of registration lists, Negro 
voters still held a slim statewide majority over the whites. 
Conservatives revived the spectre of Republican rule, ex­
tolled the virtues of white (Democratic) unity, and scoffed 
at the proposition that any issue could possibly divide the 
"harmonious and powerful combination" of rich and poor
K-+ 51whites.
Nevertheless, some Democratic leaders professed un­
easiness. Although the Negro Republican majority might be 
reduced to a minority by intimidation, economic coercion, 
and vote fraud, such tactics had a limit. A wholesale dis­
franchisement of the Negro was, for the time being, too 
dangerous. Northern public opinion had to be considered. 
Absolute removal of the freedman from politics might goad 
the national government into reviving the Reconstruction 
measures; even the troops might be returned. In addition, 
black belt plantation owners already envisioned how their 
laborers vote could be used as a lever to dictate policy 
to the state Democratic party. In the ante-bellum years 
slaves were counted for the purposes of giving planters
52disproportionate representation in the state legislature.
^Otis A. Singletary, "The Election of 1878 in 
Louisiana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XL (January, 
1957), 47.
5^Paily Picayune. January 11, 1877.
59
Louisiana, Constitution of 1852. Arts. 8, 15; 
Lewinson, Race. Class, and Party. 9-10.
108
The Negro vote, if properly applied, would be of even 
greater value. Planters wanted an expanded voice in the 
state government. The Negro had given it to them once. He 
could again.
The real fear was the white vote. There was little 
concern over the possibility of a shift of white voters 
toward the Republicans. Nevertheless, there was one bother­
some possibility: the fragmenting of Democratic votes
through independent candidates, or by the emergence of a 
third political party. Other southern states, redeemed 
from Radicalism in the early 1870's, had already experienced 
such outbreaks of rural white insurgency. The Louisiana 
Bourbons read these warning signals and made preparations 
to meet the approaching storm. They tried to herd off any 
agrarian movement by repeatedly warning that independency
would lend "indirect aid" to the Republicans by dividing
53
the white vote. Dissension among "ourselves," it was 
stressed, would balloon the importance of the Negro vote and 
return Kellogg, Wells, and their friends to power. Of 
course, the truth of the matter was that Democratic leaders 
realized the great advantages of a two party political 
division along racial lines. They wanted nothing to disturb 
such a simple way of getting and holding office.
The working farmers and city artisans who helped
5^Pailv Picayune. January 14, 1877.
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place the Nicholls government in power expected much of it. 
Somehow, it was naively assumed, the restoration of home
rule would bring back "peace, plenty and prosperity . . .
54
that with Nicholls for ruler nickels will be plenty." But 
by the fall of 1878 the Democratic redeemers had been in 
power a year and a half and the millennium showed no signs 
of coming. The Bourbon-dominated legislature had further
restricted the meagre flow of money by slashing state, city,
55
and parish expenditures by $2,748,000 in its first year.
Local government suffered a blow when the legislature 
authorized the executive to add appointed, members of the 
previously elected police juries; this was done at the re­
quest of black belt planters who wished to blunt the power 
of Negro officials in their districts.^ But police jury 
packing was not confined to parishes with a heavy Negro 
majority. The act applied to all. Hill whites also had to 
accept the governor's appointments.
Election laws placed on the statute books in 1877- 
78 were marvels of ingenuity but were hardly designed for 
reform. Police juries, appointed by the state administration 
were empowered to select polling places and name the election 
commissioners. These commissioners, in turn, supervised
54Pailv Picayune. January 11, 1877.
^Fortier (ed.), Louisiana. I, 427.
^ Congressional Record. 47 Cong., Special Sess. 
Senate, 120; New York Times.~November 24, 1879.
110
the elections, counted the ballots, and signed the official 
tally sheets. Ominously, the act of making false returns 
was not declared a crime.
And the Bourbon program of reform through "rigid 
economy" was beginning to take devious paths. Large 
property holders were favored by a reduction of tax rates 
and a slashing of assessments. Planters whose crops sold: 
for $30,000 or $40,000 a year were assessed about half the 
value of their mules and equipment; it was claimed that the 
taxes of such wealthy men amounted to less than $250 per 
year. Even then they were not pressed to pay.^® Governor 
Nicholls, to his credit, spoke against these tax abuses. 
Once he complained that people of small property usually 
paid their taxes, but "men of large means and property" 
deliberately abstained and nothing was done.^ But the 
governor was powerless to force changes, and his outspoken­
ness must have strengthened the resolve of the more con­
servative Democrats to be rid of him.
Rumblings of discontent against the Bourbon govern­
ment began to grow louder. One farmer, in what must have
^7Daily Picayune. January 8, 1879; New York Times. 
November 24, 1879.
^®New York Times. January 19, February 5, 1879; 
Daily Picayune. January 10, November 3, 1878; January 8,
18797“
^Louisiana, Official Journal of the House of Repre 
sentatives. 1879, 7-19; Daily Picayune. January 8, 1879.
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been a typical complaint, noted that the "worthy gentlemen" 
talked endlessly about improving the state’s credit among 
businessmen but made no attempt to help the depressed 
farmers of the state. "It seems," the rural man grumbled, 
that "the rulers" looked upon the earth of Louisiana and 
the people who work it as part of "the same mass, and 
beneath . . . respect or r e l i e f . T h u s  it was that a 
growing number of farmers began to decide that the Demo­
cratic party had no real interest in them, Some turned 
attentive ears elsewhere.
The Greenback party had already become well known 
in the North and West by the time it entered Louisiana in
1878. Proposing to lift the burden of agricultural in­
debtedness and halt the decline of farm prices through a 
program of currency inflation, the Greenbackers also 
appealed to urban labor: to the latter group they claimed
that the national depression and unemployment were caused 
by the deliberate congressional policy of currency con­
traction. Especially denounced .were the national banking 
system and the Resumption Act of 1875. But the Greenback 
movement was primarily agrarian in its leadership and 
appeal, even though a significant number of working class 
people in the Northeast did join the party.^ The
^Dailv Picayune. January 1, 1878.
^*John R. Commons and Others, History of Labour in 
the United States (New York, 1918), II, 244.
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Greenbackers ran their first presidential candidate in 1876.
The South offered him little support. Louisiana, absorbed
in the death-throes of Reconstruction, did not give the
62
Greenback ticket a single vote.
Greenbackers continued to gain strength in the
North, and in February of 1878 held an important convention
at Toledo, Ohio, There, they attempted a closer union with
labor elements and renamed their party the "National 
63party." Meanwhile, inflationist sentiment in the South
was on the rise. By May of 1878 the National party began
taking shape in Louisiana, with its eye on the autumn
64
congressional and state elections. Native white men, who 
had heretofore been the most ardent of Democrats, were among 
the first to join. The editor of the Indianapolis Sun, a 
Greenback paper, confided that an attempt would be made to 
carry Louisiana by a coalition with Negro voters.^ North 
and South, the Greenbackers hoped to bury sectional differ­
ences by agitating national economic reform. Instead of
66"bloody shirt" oratory they chose the "ragged shirt."
62Edward McPherson (ed.), The Tribune Almanac and 
Political Register for 1877 (New York, 1877], 128-30.
New York Times, February 23, 1878; Fred E. Haynes, 
Third Party Movements Since the Civil War with Special 
Reference to Iowa (Iowa City. 1916). 120-43. ""
^4Shreveport Evening Standard. May 10, 1878.
65St. Louis Evening Post. September 28, 1878.
66 '
Washington (D.C.). Post, quoted in ibid.
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As a bona fide third party, Greenbackism took
strongest root in the Fourth Congressional District of
Northwest Louisiana. There, the Shreveport Evening Standard
was horrified to discover, some of those same white men who
had battled for home rule in the Reconstruction riots at
67
Colfax and Coushatta were advocating the new movement.
68
Robert P. Webb of Claiborne Parish, Jesse Moore Tilly of
69Bienville Parish, and Rev. Benjamin Franklin Brian of 
70Grant Parish were among the more prominent Greenbackers 
of the region. All three were Confederate veterans and up­
land agriculturists.
Webb, who was also a lawyer, owned 2,000 acres and
71
was the wealthiest of the trio. Brian was the poorest. 
Born in East Feliciana Parish in 1833, he worked as a 
blacksmith until the beginning of the Civil War, and then 
served four years in the Confederate cavalry. After the 
close of hostilities he homesteaded near the village of 
Pollock, in what was soon to become Grant Parish. Having 
"hewed his_ farm out of the forest," Brian then divided his
67
Shreveport Evening Standard. May 10, 1878.
68
Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest 
Louisiana INashville, 1890), 457-58.
69Ibid.. 204-205, 662.
70
Colfax Chronicle. October 19, 1878.




energies among farming, preaching, and politics. He was
active as an ordained minister in the Missionary Baptist
Church, and his political career began in 1876, when he made
an unsuccessful race for the State Senate on an Independent-
73
Republican coalition ticket. Benjamin Brian was destined 
to become one of Louisiana*s outstanding agrarian reformers. 
His career spanned every rural movement from the .rise of the 
Grange to the decline of the Populist party.
Lack of funds and means of organization hampered the 
growth of the National party in Louisiana. One feeble news­
paper, the Haynesville Greenback Dollar, propagandized to a
limited number of subscribers along the northernmost tier of 
74
parishes. In Alexandria, an organ called We. the People
emerged in 1878 as an alleged affiliate of the Greenback
movement, but its chief purpose lay in promoting the
congressional candidacy of that indefatigable Scalawag
75
Republican, J. Madison Wells. In Northeast Louisiana a
series of fragmentary independent movements were organized
by native whites on the local level, notably in Tensas and
76
Morehouse parishes,
72See Benjamin Brian*s obituary in Louisiana Popu­
list, November 6 , 1896.
73
Colfax Chronicle, September 30, 1876.
74
Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Louisiana. 
I, 169; Colfax Chronicle. November 15. 1879.
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The situation in Tensas offered a classic example
of why outsiders looked upon Louisiana politics in such
amusement and contempt. A "Country People's ticket" was
organized in Tensas in 1878 by Confederate veterans and
Negroes, in opposition.to the regular Democratic candidates
for parish offices. The political boss of the parish,
Judge Charles C. Cordill, was a Scalawag Republican who had
shifted with the winds in 1876 to assume control of the
77
local Democratic organization. Cordill and his friends
were large planters. They had used the Republican label
during Reconstruction for the most palpable of reasons:
Tensas Parish was over ninety per cent Negro. When, in
1878, local Negro Republicans found they could no longer do
business with Cordill, they turned to the yeoman white
farmers of the parish. The first proposal for this bi-
racial combination came from Arthur Fairfax, one of the few
colored landowners of the parish. The result was the
Country People's ticket, with Confederate veterans for all
78
the local offices and the Negro, Fairfax, for Congress.
This interesting coalition was thus opposed by the large 
planter (ex-Republican) Democrats of the Cordill machine! 
Greenbackism seems to have played no part in the Tensas 
struggle, and little wonder. Local issues would have
77Pailv Picayune. November 1, 1878.
78Ibid.. January 8-9, 1878.
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plagued the wisdom of Solomon.
Greenback sentiment existed in South Louisiana; 
however, a bona fide third party crusade failed to material­
ize. In its place were a number of independent political 
disturbances which soon caught the attention of professional 
politicians. For example, around New Orleans a revival of
the old Native American, or Know-Nothing, party' was being 
79
voiced about. In New Orleans the Native Americans
managed an uneasy fusion with the Republican party and ran
Robert S. Howe for Mayor as an opponent of the Democratic
candidate, Isaac W. Patton. At this moment two other -
political fragments, the Citizen's Conservative Association
(Made up of merchants), and the Tax Payers’ Union (mostly
landlords) broke away from the Democracy to run a slate of
candidates for parish and municipal offices in New Orleans.
These two parties of the extreme right wing condemned the
city machine of Patton, Burke and Wiltz for its corruption,
and agitated for a more drastic reduction in taxation, even
80
to the point of abolishing state taxes entirely. The 
regular Democrats in New Orleans thus faced three opponents 
even more conservative than themselves.
A fifth political movement then began among the un­
represented working class people. It should be noted that
^ N e w  York Times. July 23, 1878. 
8QPailv Picayune. October 30-31, 1878.
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during the summer of 1878, prior to the elections, New
81Orleans suffered one of its worst yellow fever epidemics.
A number of angry workingmen blamed the inefficient and 
careless Democratic administration for the unsanitary 
conditions which spread the plague. In October these 
laborers formed the Workingmen's party, and denounced the 
Democratic as well as the other conservative parties. John 
C. Fleming, a self-styled "humble mechanic," headed the 
ticket as a mayoralty candidate. The Workingmen's ticket 
issued a blistering manifesto which urged the poor of both 
races to desert the old party banner. Negroes were reminded 
that President Hayes and his Republicans had deserted them, 
and that "the Brigadier General, so-called Democracy, re­
fused to recognize the manhood of their race." The city and 
state administrations were denounced as "imbecile," and as 
"the vilest government that ever disgraced a civilized 
community." Moreover, the laborites raised the ghosts of 
the epidemic victims, who "are crying aloud for retributive
justice upon those who by their neglect forced them to un-
82
timely graves." But Fleming added that his party was non­
violent. "God knows," he said, "we have misfortunes enough 
without bringing about others by . . . conflict." He warned,
81
Mabel Brasher, Louisiana: A Study of the State
(Richmond, 1929), 262.
82d ailv Picayune. October 30, November 1, 1878.
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though, that the patience of the "oppressed and neglected"
was wearing thin; that Louisiana could never prosper as long
as its working people continued to be "little better than
83
mendicants and slaves." The Daily Picayune sneered at the
Workingmen*s party and called it "a half hearted communism,"
and opined it would not make much headway with the hard-
84headed, practical population of New Orleans.
Conservative Democrats watched apprehensively as the 
Greenbacker, laborite, and other splinter groups began to 
take shape in the summer and fall of 1878. At the state 
Democratic convention in August, conservative leaders moved 
swiftly to blunt the liberal-inflationist uprising. For 
what came out of the Democratic conclave was a classic Green- 
back party document.00 The platform implored Congress to 
repeal the Resumption Act, which placed existing paper 
money on par with gold; demanded repeal of the restrictive 
national banking system; and advocated the issuance of 
"treasury notes, commonly known as greenbacks." These 
greenbacks, said the Louisiana Democracy, should be used for 
all legal tender purposes, including the redemption of United 
States bonds. Republicans were condemned for the "ruinous 
financial policy" which oppressed working people. And
83Ibid.. November 2, 1878.
84T, . ,
Ibid.
®5New York Times. August 8, 1878.
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"warmest sympathy" was tenderly expressed for all laboring
i 86classes.
After this outburst of pseudo-liberalism the party 
delved, into more practical matters: Major Burke was nomi­
nated for state treasurer and Louisiana's need for a new 
constitution was proclaimed. However, to ease the fears of 
Nicholls supporters, "it [was] not proposed to displace
or interfere with the incumbent officials of the state 
87
government." But the inflationary part of the platform 
had considerable practical value. The demand for monetary 
reform was put to excellent use by those Democrats who were 
forced to run against Greenbackers. In Grant Parish, a hot­
bed of inflationism, voters were told that "the Democratic
platform is as good a document as any Greenback man could 
88
wish."
By their endorsement-of Greenbackism Louisiana's
new rulers drove yet another nail in the coffin of President
Hayes's hopes for a political New Departure. Lverywhere in
the South, in 1878, the dominant Democratic party attempted
to placate the agrarian agitation. But only the Louisiana
89Democracy, "more reckless than the rest," expressed
88New Orleans Democrat, August 7, 1878.
87ibid.
88Colfax Chronicle. October 12, 1878.
89
New York Times. August 8, 1878.
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inflationary doctrines with such uncompromising boldness.
The New York Times. a mirror of nothern Republican conser­
vatism, was aghast at the platform which emerged from the 
Baton Rouge convention. It "contains about as mischievous
a series of demands as the most rabid of the Labor-Green-
90back conventions," the Times fumed. But Edwin L.
Godkin’s Nation probed deeper. This magazine denounced the
document as "vicious and unprincipled," but understood why
it had been issued. The "fine gentlemen of Louisiana,"
said the Nation, merely wished to conciliate "the mob," and
are "hoping that the platform will pass for buncombe outside
their own state, and that no mischief will result in 
91
Congress." Future events proved Godkin’s analysis to be
correct. And something near the nadir of hypocrisy was
plumbed by the Daily Picayune, which condoned the platform
but hoped that the huge Democratic majority would not be
misunderstood by outsiders as an endorsement of Green- 
92
backism.
Not to be left out when crafty politics was afoot, 
the state’s Republicans eagerly joined in the betrayal of 
agrarian demands. The wounds suffered by Louisiana Republi­
cans in 1876-77 were grievous but not necessarily fatal.
90Ibid.
91Nation. XXVII (August 15, 1878), 89. 
9^Pailv Picayune. November 1, 1878.
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Patronage from the national administration, after 1877,
gave party leaders a livelihood, and the presence of a Negro
voting majority allowed the more naive Republicans to hope
that the state government might someday be recaptured. A
state Republican convention was held in September of 1878,
but the meeting broke up after the "Customs House faction"
shoved through a resolution which maintained that a quorum
93was not present. The purpose of this maneuver was soon
clear. The dominant wing of the party, the Customs House
men, wished to fuse with the state convention of the
National party which was scheduled to meet in Baton Rouge
on September 18. The Nationals, when they met, nominated
Dr. John S. Gardiner for State Treasurer and approved of
the following slate in the congressional races: Henry C.
Castellanos, First District; E. North Cullom, Second
District; Robert 0. Hebert, Third District; J. Madison
Wells, Fourth District; John T. Ludeling, Fifth District;
Arthur Fairfax (short term) Fifth District; and W. L.
94Larimore, Sixth District. Only Gardiner, a Baton Rouge 
physician, was listed on the ticket as a straight-out 
"Greenbacker." Castellanos and Cullom appeared on the 
ticket as "Greenbacker-Republicans," Larimore as an
93W. W. Marks to Rutherford B. Hayes, December 10, 
1878, Hayes Papers.
94New Orleans Democrat. September 20, 1878; New 
York Times. September 19, 20, 1878.
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"Independent," and the others were listed as "Republican.
Yet all had the endorsement of the so-called National party, 
and, except for Larimore, the candidates were all ante­
bellum residents of Louisiana. Fairfax was the only Negro. 
Even partisan Democrats admitted that the National Republi­
can combination was under the "exclusive control of white 
men."
Thus constituted, the National party of Louisiana 
was hardly a bona fide Greenbacker movement. What had 
transpired was rather obvious. Genuine inflationists, 
headed toward a state organization, were thrown into con­
fusion by the Democratic platform issued in August. Into 
this vacuum stepped the sharp-eyed Customs House Republi­
cans who organized the National convention for the sake of 
sailing Republicans under a false flag. E. North Cullom, 
an old Whig turned Republican, had dreamed up the project.^ 
He did it •’for no other ultimate purpose" than to make in­
roads into the solid white vote. As Cullom told President 
Hayes, in confidence, "the Republicans knew perfectly well 
they had nothing to gain by taking the field under a square 
Republican banner." White solidarity must be broken. 
Otherwise, "the colored man may just as well not vote," for
^5New York Times. October 28, 1878.
96
Daily Picayune. November 10, 1878.
97E. North Cullom to Rutherford B. Hayes, February 
6 , 1878, Hayes Papers.
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his ballots would not be counted as cast, Cullom assured 
Hayes that all the National congressional candidates were
Q Q
simon-pure Republicans. *
Despite its name, the National party of Louisiana
was absolutely mute on the question of monetary reform. Its
"Address to the People* blasted Burke and the "flock of
cormorants" of the Bourbon Democracy and compared them--
correctly but hypocritically--to the Republicans "who
wallowed in the corruptions of the Warmoth and Kellogg
99
administrations." Special attention was devoted to the 
old Know-Nothing element. National candidates, some of 
them at least, lashed out at the foreign-born voters in New 
Orleans. Poor whites and blacks were informed that 
foreigners should henceforth be kept out of the state; 
otherwise, native labor would be deprived of its chance to 
make a living. Upstate, the Nationals added anti-Catholic 
propaganda to the election b r o t h . B o u r b o n  Democratic 
spokesmen, seemingly jealous of this competition in the use 
of prejudice, angrily reacted to the anti-Catholic propa­
ganda. They chided the National party for its
99
Daily Picayune. November 3, 1878. Obviously the 
two ex-governors were not at the moment in control of the 
Republican state party machinery, even though Kellogg still 
held a seat in the United States Senate. But neither War­
moth or Kellogg publicly denounced the "National" maneuver.
^■^New Orleans Democrat. October 21, 1878; Shreveport 
Evening Standard. October 22, 1878.
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"fanaticism."'^'*'
True Greenbackers and labor reformers were baffled
by the turn of events. . The Democrats took their platform.
The Republicans took their name. In no other state was the
monetary issue so confused, for only in Louisiana did the
Democrats come out so strongly for inflation, and only in
Louisiana was the National party mute on the subject.
Adding to the muddle was the fact that quarantines against
districts infected with yellow fever halted the ordinary
means of communication between the hills and low country.
Some northern parishes were without mail service from early
109August to late November. ^ Meanwhile the conventions and 
the election had taken place.
While the campaign was underway the Democratic and 
National candidates for Congress, as if by common consent, 
avoided the monetary issue. Nationals tried to stir up 
religious and anti-foreign sentiment while the Democrats 
stuck by their old reliable, the race issue. However, both 
parties tried to eat into each other1s bastion of strength. 
Just as the so-called Nationals courted dissident whites, 
so did Democrats ask for Negro support. But the Democrats 
seldom pleaded with the colored man--they insisted. 
Appearing before a Negro rally in North Louisiana, a
^^•Dailv Picayune. November 1, 1878.
10^Coushatta Citizen, quoted in ibid.. November 29.
1878.
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Democratic candidate bluntly told his audience that con­
servative whites had "all the intelligence," and "negroes 
103are ignorant," He said he was doing them a favor by
telling them to vote Democratic, since "we are going to
carry the election anyhow. . . .  We can get along without
you." And the Shreveport Evening Standard warned: "If
they [ the Negroes ] do not appreciate these efforts and
still join the enemies of the State . . . they must take
the iconsequences."^^ Hill country Greenbackers who allied
with the Republicans were roughly handled. Benjamin Brian,
running for the legislature on a coalition ticket, was
informed that he "was a good dog gone astray. He was in the
105
company of sheep killing dogs and had to be killed."
The clever shifts of both Democrats and Nationals 
made discussion of the currency question meaningless. Con­
sequently, some local agrarian condidates took a different 
tack and lashed out at the planters and merchants for en­
couraging the spread of the crop-lien system. Democratic 
leaders were horrified. In Caddo Parish, Independents who 
criticized the crop-lien to Negro audiences were denounced 
as incendiary r a d i c a l s . A  Democratic judge warned that
^Colfax Chronicle. October 12, 1878.
104
Shreveport Evening Standard. October 15, 1878.
105
Colfax Chronicle. October 5, 1878.
^^New York Times. January 20, 1878.
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if these malcontents won, "Grant and the troops" would soon
march through the streets of Shreveport, and "the place
would be made so desolate the bats and owls would roost on 
107
our wharves."
Violence increased as election day of 1878 
108approached. All Louisiana campaigns in the generation 
following Reconstruction would draw blood, and 1878 set the 
post-Reconstruction pattern. Threats of murder were suf­
ficient to persuade Republican campaigners to flee Natchit­
oches Parish and to convince the entire slate of Independent
candidates in Morehouse Parish that healthier climates must
109
be sought posthaste. More stringent measures were taken 
in troubled Tensas, where eleven men were killed, and in 
Caddo, where "up to twelve" Negroes, by Democratic count, 
met d e a t h . T h e s e  outrages supplied convenient propaganda 
for northern Republican journals. The New York Times head­
lined one Tensas story "KILLING REPUBLICAN VOTERS," which 
neatly summarized the limit of theHmes's solicitude for the
^ ^Dailv Picayune. January 11, 1879.
^®®Fatalities were anticipated. In September a 
leading Democratic newspaper in North Louisiana predicted 
"the deluded Negroes" would "provoke their white neighbors 
to violence." Shreveport Evening Standard. September 28,
1878.
109
Daily Picayune. January 8, 1878; New York Times. 
November 4, 1878, January 8, 1879.
^■^Natchez (Miss.) Democrat, quoted in New York 
Times. October 18, 1878; Shreveport Times, quoted in Daily 
Picayune. November 14, 1878; New York Times. Januarv 8.
1879.
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111freedmen of Louisiana. For the state as a whole, at
112least forty persons died in election disturbances. Most 
of the dead were Negroes. Republican claims ran as high as
l l O
seventy-five murdered Negroes in Caddo Parish alone.
Most dramatic were the events in Tensas Parish.
Fighting broke out when an armed band of planters tried to
capture Arthur Fairfax, the Negro leader who set the fusion
effort there in motion. Judge Cordill claimed the fusion-
ists were "trying to excite the Negroes to violence," and
called in white militia from the surrounding parishes.
The leader of the rescue mission was General J. Floyd King
of Concordia Parish, who had a personal interest in the
affray since he was a Democratic candidate for Congress.
Nearby Mississippians, hearing that private property and
"the lives and honor of women and children were involved,"
reacted instinctively and came across the river by the 
115scores. After being told by white supporters of the 
Country People*s ticket that it was "not a nigger’s war,"
H l N ew York Times. October 14, 1878.
^^Woodward, Origins of the New South. 57.
113Nation, XXVII (December 12, 1878), 358.
■^4New York Times. October 26, 1878; January 8, 1879. 
It is interesting to note that Governor Nicholls blamed the
Cordill group for starting the trouble. This fact was used
against Nicholls by the ultra-Bourbons. Cf. New Orleans
Weekly Pelican. May 11, 1889.
■^^New York Times. October 18, 1878. One hundred 
armed Mississippians reportedly crossed the river.
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the Mississippi volunteers went home,-LJ-^  Indeed, they had 
profaned the Holy of Holies— States* Rights.
Election returns from over the state gave mute evi­
dence of intimidation and fraud. The entire slate of 
Democratic congressmen was elected, and Burke beat Gardiner 
for the treasury post. Rankest of all the frauds were those 
occurring in certain parishes where Negroes constituted over 
sixty per cent of the total population, but where Democrats 
won with votes in excess of the white registration. Returns 
from these parishes, when compared with registration figures, 
make interesting readings
11 7Congressional Elect ion-*"*- 















Bossier 1,401 45 800 2,200
Caddo 1,815 279 li476 3,732
Concordia 1,037 955 294 2,637
E. Feliciana 964 1 743 1,005
Morehouse 1,102 19 646 1,337
Natchitoches 2,811 0 1,830 1,963
Richland 1,008 8 643 1,232
Tensas 2,795 90 318 2,931
W. Feliciana 1,796 98 440 1,540
117Louisiana, Report of Secretary of State. 1902, 
546-49, 570-72; Daily Picayune. November 3. 1878. Since 
registration figures in Bossier parish were not submitted in 
1878, the figures for 1880 are used.
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Close behind in the suspicious category were eight
other parishes listing a total Negro registration of 4,319,
but in which the National Republicans received the total of 
118one vote. As the awesome returns poured in, even the 
staunch New Orleans Democrat admitted that the "immense
119majorities . . . are confusing--almost incomprehensible." 
But, mused the Daily Picayune, since "frauds in Louisiana 
elections are . . . things of the . . .  past," the only 
logical explanation was that Negroes had suddenly and 
sagaciously deserted their old Republican leaders. Thus, 
the harmonious returns of 1878, according to the latter
newspaper, offered convincing proof that race antagonism was
^  • *  120 dying out.
Such a schizophrenic explanation was contrary to
truth and common sense. Ample evidence exists that the
overwhelming majority of Negro voters in the state would
have supported the National ticket if given the opportunity.
191Many endured incredible hardships in attempting to do so.
*^®Louisiana, Report of Secretary of State. 1902, 
546-48, 570-72.
H^New Orleans Democrat. November 9, 1878, quoted in 
Philip D. Uzee, "Republican Politics in Louisiana, 1877- 
1900" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State Uni­
versity, 1950), 48.
•^^Dailv Picayune. November 9-10, 1878.
121U.S., Congress, Senate, Report of the Committee 
to Inquire into the Alleged Frauds and'Violence in the 
Elections of i8'/6. 46 dona.. 3 sess.. No. 655. passim.
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The Negro masses were illiterate and their political acumen 
rather weak, but even the most ignorant of them knew full 
well which of the two parties stood uncompromisingly for 
White Supremacy, Some Democratic candidates admitted the 
obvious. General King, the newly elected Congressman from 
the Fifth District, was quoted as saying: "I consider a
negro if he votes the Democratic ticket to be either a fool
1 00or a hypocrite." ^  Probably a handful of Negroes did mark 
ballots for the Bourbon Democrats of their own free will. 
Probably in Ireland there were some Catholic peasants who 
loved their English landlords and supported the Tory 
ticket.123
On the local level Democratic opponents in 1878 met 
with only meagre success. Republicans, Nationals, and
104
Independents obtained twenty-six legislative seats.
Probably just one of the Nationals, C. H. Watson of St.
Helena, was a bona fide Greenbacker. The Democrats elected
the municipal slate in New Orleans, but failed to gain a
125clear majority* John Fleming*s liborite ticket was 
denied representation at the polls and recorded a mere 209
122Pailv Picayune. January 9, 1879.
1 O O
North American Review. CLI (November, 1890), 594. 
^ 4Uzee, "Republican Politics in Louisiana," 205-
207.
125
New Orleans Democrat. November 9, 1878.
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votes. Before the election, a Democratic paper estimated
126
Fleming’s strength at 2,000. North of the Red River, 
Republicans managed to salvage East Carroll and Madison, but 
their Independent and Greenback allies in other parishes 
went down to defeat.
Even so, the election of 1878 blazed a trail for the 
more ambitious and relatively more successful Populist- 
Republican combination of later years. The New York Times, 
looking over the 1878 returns, prophesied that "the experi­
ment . . . probably will not be without its fruits in 
Louisiana. . . . The ice is broken, and white Democrats have
led negro Republicans in a conflict with the ’regular*
127
machine." But if the pattern for future agrarian protest 
was set in Louisiana in 1878, so was the autocratic Bourbon 
method for perverting or repressing such protest.
^■^New Orleans L ’Union, quoted in Daily Picayune. 
November 1, 1878.
107
■ New York Times. January 20, 1879.
CHAPTER IV
"EXODUSTERS" AND THE CONSTITUTION OF 1879
Among Louisianafs Negro population, dissatisfaction 
with Bourbon rule entered an acute phase in the early 
months of 1879. An emotionally charged movement known as 
"the Exodus," or "the Kansas Fever," suddenly seized the 
imagination of the colored population of the lower Missis­
sippi River valley. Some who observed it compared the 
Exodus of 1879 to the hegira of the Hebrew peoples from 
Egypt.^ In Louisiana, at least 10,000 Negroes departed the
state that year, and perhaps 50,000 made futile efforts to 
o
leave.
Since 1874 there had been vague talk of a Negro 
migration. At that time Benjamin "Pap" Singleton, a
-^International Review. VII (October, 1879), 373.
9
This estimate is based upon an evaluation of Exo­
dus reports in the following newspapers: Daily Picayune.
March 1-December 30, 1879; New Orleans Weekly Louisianian. 
March 15-December 15, 1879; St. Joseph North Louisiana 
Journal. January 18-May 24, 1879; Shreveport Evening 
Standard. April 22, 1879-January 4, 1880. It is possible 
that the number of Louisiana Negroes who attempted to join 
the Exodus exceeded 50,000, for all of the above sources 
tended to minimize the migration.
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Tennessee Negro, began sending promotional literature to
colored preachers throughout the South which advertised a
freedman's colony he was planning to create in the state of 
3
Kansas. Even more distant was the journey proposed by a 
Shreveport Negro group in 1877. The latter tried unsuc­
cessfully to arouse enthusiasm for a mass migration to 
4
Liberia. In 1878 a report from Pointe Coupee Parish told 
of a Negro plot "to kill the leading white men of the
5
region and establish a nation of their own." No whites 
died but five Pointe Coupee Negroes were lynched. Rumors 
of a great migration, or other drastic action by the colored 
population, persisted.
The Kansas Exodus of 1879 was born of confusion and 
despair. The reasons why it burst forth at that particular 
time, and in Louisiana, are fairly clear. The two years 
which had gone by since the end of Reconstruction witnessed 
an increase in economic oppression; landlords and merchants 
were squeezing Negro sharecroppers and renters, now that 
home rule had been restored, with greater impunity. The 
deaths and vote frauds which resulted from the congressional 
election of 1878 boded ill for the colored people of
3
John G. Van Deusen, "The Exodus of 1879," Journal 
of Nearo History. XXI (April, 1936), 119.
4
New York Times. June 9, 1877; Shreveport Herald, 
quoted in Daily Picayune. January 5, 1878.
^New Orleans Democrat. June 7, 1878*
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Louisiana. As the Negroes themselves realized, 1878 had 
provided a foretaste of the wrongs to come."^
The fraud and bloodshed of 1878 prompted the 
meeting of a subcommittee of the United States Senate in New 
Orleans, under the chairmanship of Republican Senator Henry
7
M. Teller of Colorado, beginning January 7, 1879. Hundreds
of Negroes flocked into the city to pour their tales of woe
into the willing ears of the Republican Senators. Once
having testified, the Negroes feared the trip home might
8terminate in the Great Beyond. These disconsolate and 
homeless people became the tinder for a flashfire movement 
destined to sweep across plantations from Louisiana to the 
Carolinas.
While the Teller sub-committee met in New Orleans,
Republican Senator William Windom of Minnesota arose in
Congress to inquire into the possibility of "promoting and
encouraging" a migration of maltreated southern Negroes to
the western states, where they might take out homestead 
g
privileges. Word of Windom*s resolution quickly reached 
6
Daily Picayune. April 22, 1879.
7
New Orleans Democrat. January 8, 1879.
®New Orleans Times. January 20, 1879. The Negroes* 
fear of reprisals was justified. The Democratic press ad­
mitted that two Shreveport Negroes who were on their way 
downriver were taken by a mob, and "nothing more has been 
heard of them." Daily Picayune, quoted in New York Times. 
December 22, 1878.
9Congressional Record. 45 Cong., 3 sess., 483.
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the freedmen of Louisiana, who did not seem to share the
white verdict that the proposal was "stupid and idiotic.
Within two weeks, thousands of Negroes in the alluvial
cotton districts of Louisiana and Mississippi were packing
their belongings for the journey to the West. The first
group departed Madison Parish in February, to debark at St.
Louis, shivering, barefooted, and half-starved.^
Later "Exodusters," as they were called, followed
the route taken by the Madison Parish vanguard: north by
steamboat to St. Louis, then west by rail to the plains.
Most selected Kansas as the final destination. "Pap"
Singleton1s earlier agitation could have had something to do
with this choice; but more important, the very name of
Kansas had a special connotation for southern Negroes.
"Kansas," said one Exodus promoter, "with her freedom and
broad prairies, with the memories of John Brown and his
12
heroic struggle, seems naturally the state to seek."
The Exodus excitement might have cooled had it not
been for the action of the Louisiana legislature in setting
13
up the machinery for a constitutional convention in 1879. 
Ever since the triumph of Nicholls, unreconstructed
J ^Daily Picayune. March 17, 1879.
■^Van Deusen, Journal of Negro History. XXX, 119-
21.
^Dailv Picayune. April 22, 1879,
13
New Orleans Weekly Louisianian. March 15, 1879.
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Democrats had clamored for an overturn of the Radicals1
constitution of 1868. Organic law, it was said, must now
14be written by "real people." The constitutional con­
vention began its work in April of 1879; it was dominated, 
of course, by Democrats. Exodus leaders perceived that the 
"real people" meant to tamper with universal manhood 
suffrage. Among the Negro masses the fear was less well 
defined, but it was generally understood that the convention
would produce nothing of benefit for dark-complexioned 
15
citizens. River, roads in the cotton parishes soon were 
choked with creaking sharecropper wagons. Some sold their 
meager possessions for boat fare to St. Louis. Others, 
without funds, struck out on foot for "somewhar."'1'^  Kansas 
people were advised by Louisiana*s Bourbons to keep their 
hogs penned up.^
On April 18, 1879, as delegates to the consti­
tutional convention were arriving in New Orleans, a less
formal assembly convened at the Free Mission Baptist Church
18on Common Street. This "Exodus convention," as it was
*4Pailv Picayune. November 9, 1877.
15
New Orleans Weekly Louisianian. March 15, 1879.
*^St. Joseph North Louisiana Journal. April 12, 1879.
^ Dailv Picayune. April 30, 1879.
^®New York Times. April 18 , 20, 1879; New Orleans
Weekly Louisianian. April 26, 1879.
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called, had been organized by George T. Ruby, T. Morris
Chester, the Rev. Emperor Williams, and others. Ruby
claimed the movement began as a secret organization in
Caddo Parish in 1874. A Negro named Henry Adams was the
19chief instigator. He wandered from one plantation to the
next, quickening the pulse of resentment by asking the
field hands to tell him of their grievances against the
20white landlords. Now, said Ruby, this association had 
grown to a membership of 92,800. He claimed that above two- 
thirds, 69,000, were Louisiana Negroes, the others being 
from Texas, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Alabama. Ruby attri­
buted the growth and potency of the exodus idea to the fact 
that "representative political leaders [Negro and white
Republican politicians ] were neither intrusted C sic ] with
21nor informed of its existence."
Negroes were cautioned that the Exodus needed better 
organization. Ruby suggested that "head men" be appointed 
to go to Kansas and search out the best locations for home­
steads. "Meanwhile," he said, "pending the formation of 
.colonies, . . .  we advise an abandonment by the colored 
people of all the turbulent, bulldozed [cotton ] parishes 
of this State." He added that in the sugar lands of South
^ Dailv Picayune. April 22, 1879.
20Van Deusen, Journal of Nearo History. XXI, 122-23. 
21Pailv Picayune. April 22, 1879.
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Louisiana "life and personal liberty are comparatively 
secure," and that the wage system prevalent there would give
Negroes a better chance of accumulating the wherewithal for
22the trip to Kansas and the purchase of farm equipment.
In effect, this was a proposal to the Negroes to
wait— to temporarily halt the Exodus to Kansas. Ruby’s
advice about the sugar parishes as an intermediate stop for
the western journey did have some merit. But the suspicion
arises that some of the Exodus leaders might have been in
the pay of sugar planters who were willing to depopulate
the cotton parishes in order to build up a bigger labor
surplus for themselves. A convention of cotton growers of
Louisiana and Mississippi, meeting at Vicksburg on May 2,
evidently believed the sugar barons to have had something
23
to do with the exodus excitement. State Senator Theo-
phile T. Allain of Iberville Parish denounced the "Exo-
dusters" but said if they simply could not remain in the
24cotton parishes, "let them remove to the sugar belt."
Allain was a Negro. He was also a sugar planter.
Worried Negro politicians, with few exceptions, 
tried to break up the Exodus meeting. Pinckney B. S. 
Pinchback and James D. Kennedy, editors of the Weekly
22Ibid.
23Ibid., May 3, 1879.
24Ibid., April 24, 1879.
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Louisianian, endeavored to convince the assembly of its 
error. Pinchback called the Exodus a "wild goose chase,"
and blamed it on the "influence of an illiterate and mis-
25guided clergy." Even Arthur Fairfax, who approved of the 
Kansas migration, remarked that there were too many un­
worthy Negro ministers in it. Fairfax said the editor of 
the Donaldsonville Chief told him that this one newspaper
shop printed and sold over 500 licenses to preach in one
26
month alone.
But preachers rather than politicians had the ear 
of Louisiana’s colored people in 1879. Illiterate or not, 
the Exodus agitators showed an awareness of economic 
issues, and a realization that politicians of both parties 
and both races were insincere in their expressions of sym­
pathy for working people. One example of this was the 
reception accorded David Young at the gxodus rally. Young 
was a State Senator and one of the least reliable of Negro 
officeholders. His appearance almost caused a riot. He 
was denounced as a "bloated capitalist" when he urged the
27blacks to work out their differences with the land owners.
^ N e w  Orleans Weekly Louisianian. April 5, 1879.
26
Daily Picayune. July 10, 1879. Fairfax, in addi­
tion to being an unsuccessful aspirant to Congress in 1878, 
was also President of the Negro Baptist Convention of 
Louisiana. During the Exodus excitement of 1879, Rev. Fair­
fax’s actions were somewhat hampered due to the fact that he 
was awaiting trial for murder. St. Joseph North Louisiana 
Journal. April 26, 1879.
^ N e w  York Times. April 20, 1879.
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After Young was hooted down, the assembly listened to a
message sent from Frederick Douglass, a noted Negro leader
on the national scene. Douglass asked that the Exodus
cease, "because it is an untimely concession to the idea
that colored people and white people cannot live together
28in peace and prosperity." The gathering was unimpressed. 
Someone in the crowd perspicaciously asked "why Fred 
Douglass had left the South, where he now advises his race
O Q
to stay?"^7 It seems there was no answer.
The New Orleans Exodus convention served to publi­
cize the movement but did little more. Money was supposed 
to be raised for organizational purposes but the finance 
committee reported a total collection of just $11.05. On 
the last day the audience listened to an address by a 
certain Mr. Turcke, an agent for the Honduras Immigration 
Society. Apparently he praised the virtues of Honduras over 
Kansas, but his speech was delivered in such a thick German
accent that his listeners were unable to ascertain what it 
30was all about.
Proceedings were closed by T. Morris Chester, an ex- 
member of the Louisiana State Board of Education. Chester 
sounded a note of despair but urged that the Exodus
28
New Orleans Weekly Louisianian. May 10, 1879.
29
Daily Picayune. April 19, 1879.
30
Ibid.. April 22, 1879.
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continue. "We have been systematically cheated and 
plundered by planters and country merchants until starv­
ation stares us in the face," he exclaimed. "If we are 
illiterate, it is because white men made it a crime to 
teach us to read. . . .  If we are poor, it is because we 
have been denied the right of property, life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness. Our past in the South has been 
an existence of sorrow, tears and blood, and under the un­
christian and despotic public sentiment, the future is with-
31out a ray of hope."
Shortly after the disbanding of the New Orleans
gathering the Hxodus excitement reached its peak in North
Louisiana. Dispatches from harassed planters revealed that
besides the 5,000 and more already departed, 3,000 others
were now assembled along the Mississippi between the towns
of Vidalia and St. Joseph. Influential whites again pressed
Senator Young into service. Young was from Concordia Parish
and presumably he would have more influence there than he
had shown at the New Orleans rally. And so Young left his
seat at the constitutional convention to go to Vidalia and
32persuade his fellow blacks to abandon their journey. He 
exhorted to the crowds along the levee; he needed them as 
constituents just as planters needed them as laborers. This 
Negro Republican had hitherto been a favorite target for the
31Ibid.
32Ibid.. April 27, 1879.
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Bourbon press. But as a reward for helping to stem the 
fcxodus tide, the Daily Picayune ceased calling him names and 
used the appellation "Mr. Y o u n g . W h e n  his work was done 
and the Exodus fever had subsided, Senator Young*s value to 
the Democrats was ended. In 1880 some old charges concern­
ing misuse of public funds were revived and Young was ex-
34pelled from the legislature. Re-elected in 1882, he was 
again expelled.'*5
Whatever Young*s influence, the Exodus excitement 
began subsiding in the cotton parishes by late May. Colored
sharecroppers who earlier spoke of moving were now involved
36
in bringing their cotton crops to maturity. Perversely,
however, the excitement had begun to spread to the sugar
parishes and hundreds of colored families from South Louisi-
37ana started for "the promised land" of Kansas. Ripples
33
Ibid.. May 3, 1879.
34Louisiana, Official Journal of the House of 
Representatives. 1880, 77-79, 88-89.
35Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. June 15, 
1882. Young eventually became persona non grata to Republi­
cans as well as Democrats. Probably his most grotesque 
action came at the state Republican nominating convention in 
1884, when he arose to move that Samuel D. McEnery, the 
Negro-baiting Governor of Louisiana, be endorsed by that 
convention for reelection. "Dave Young," a Republican news­
paper commented, "is cheeky enough to look Gabriel in the 
face and demand his trumpet." New Orleans Weekly Pelican. 
November 12, 1887.
36St. Joseph North Louisiana Journal. May 24, 1879.
**^New York Times. July 16, 1879.
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were now spreading far over the South; Kansas fever was 
being felt as far away as North Carolina and Virginia. How­
ever, Louisiana and Mississippi continued to supply the 
majority of ragged migrants. Figures vary, but throughout
the South perhaps 200,000 made efforts to go on the 
38
journey. How many actually reached the Sunflower State
is unknown, but about 40,000 were reported there at the end 
39of the year.
As late as January of 1880, "GWINE TO KANSAS" 
reports appeared in North Louisiana newspapers. The Shreve­
port Evening Standard remarked that these latter unfortu­
nates would reach their destination "in time to get the 
cream of the winter,"4^ Truly, the climate and people of 
the Great Plains were not proving to be entirely hospitable. 
Some who reached Kansas immediately became dissatisfied and 
made a footsore journey back to the cotton land; others, at 
intervals during the following decade, moved out of Kansas 
to seek greener pastures in Oklahoma.4*-
LouisianaVs planters were very fond of complaining 
about the general worthlessness of Negro labor.
38
Simkins, A History of the South. 515.
^Fortier (ed.), Louisiana. I, 400-401.
4<-) Shreveport Evening Standard. January 4, 1880 
^Shreveport Weekly Caucasian. January 7, February
6 , 1890.
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Traditionally, this topic ranked alongside the weather and 
politics as a favorite topic of genteel conversation. Yet 
the conduct of landowning Louisianians during the Exodus 
excitement indicates that the Negro as an agricultural 
worker was not so despised, after all. "What are our lands 
worth without labor?," cried an anguished East Carroll 
planter. "Would we not be senseless idiots to drive away
A O
our sole dependence. . . ? " ^  A delta editor urged his
readers to "let no means remain untried" to stem the flight
of colored labor,4^ In Morehouse Parish these means
included a resolution to tar and feather anyone soliciting
44
or advising colored people to emigrate. Planters in­
veigled certain steamboat companies into refusing passage 
for migrant Negroes, whether the latter had funds or not. 
Boat captains on the Red River let it be known that emi­
grants to Kansas "must walk, as they don*t intend to trans­
port a single one of them."45 Negroes met this same obsta­
cle along the Mississippi River. At the latter stas am, how­
ever, hundreds obtained passage by pretending they were only 
going as far as Vicksburg or Memphis. Once there, they
4^Letter from T. L. Van Fossen, an East Carroll 
planter, published in St. Louis Republican, quoted in Daily 
Picayune. April 12, 1879.
43St. Joseph North Louisiana Journal. April 12,J879.
44Bastrop Morehouse Enterprise, quoted in Daily 
Picayune. May 2, 18^9.
45
Daily Picayune. April 15, 1879.
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would wait a day or two, then continued their journey north­
ward.4^
Various horror stories were'circulated among the 
blacks. Some Kansas towns, it was rumored, threatened to 
shoot all colored people on s i g h t o t h e r  Kansas com­
munities supposedly refused to let any of "Uncle Abe’s mis-
4-8guided children" inside the corporation limits. An alarm
was spread that Negroes who did manage to get to St. Louis
49were dying of smallpox. Vivid pictures were painted of
the "wailing winds and drifted snowbanks" of the Kansas 
50
winter. And shame was heaped upon those who planned to
depart. Even if they were mistreated, wasn*t fleeing the
51state a poor way of asserting one’s manhood? It was not
unknown for planters to journey to Kansas, pleading with
52
their ex-laborers to return home.
In the end, a few measures were taken to halt the 
Exodus which showed wisdom and moderation. In Concordia
^ International Review. VII (October, 1879), 378.
47St. Joseph North Louisiana Journal. April 12,1879.
48Lake Providence Carroll Conservative, quoted in 
ibid.. May 10, 1879.
49
St. Joseph North Louisiana Journal. March 22,1879.
Shreveport Evening Standard. January 4, 1880
5^Pailv Picayune. April 19, 1879.
52Ibid.. May 16, 1879.
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Parish, for example, planters stemmed the tide not only with
Senator Young1s oratory but also by equitably adjusting the
sharecroppers1 contracts and striking off all the back debts
53
At plantation stores. Eventually, even the dreaded con­
stitutional convention worked to placate the unhappy colored 
voters. In mid-July a coalition of rural Democrats and
Republican delegates beat down an attempt by the ultra-
54
Bourbons to restrict manhood suffrage. Such economic and 
political concessions were grudgingly given, but had bene­
ficial results from the planter point of view. Exodus ex­
citement began to fade.
Events of 1878 and 1879 showed something of the 
potential strength of white and Negro agrarianism. But at 
the same time, the congressional elections and the consti­
tutional convention which followed also proved that farming 
and labor interests had little-voice in the presiding 
councils of the state government. Generally, the consti­
tution of 1879 was a triumph for the conservative planters 
and businessmen. Though the convention did not restrict the 
right of suffrage, the fight to preserve it had been a 
bitter one.^^
Delegates from the hill parishes joined with
53Ibid«. May 3, 1879.
New Orleans Times. July 16, 1879; Shreveport
Eveninct Standard. November 27, 1879.
55Pailv Picayune. July 10-12, 1879.
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Republicans in the convention to defeat suffrage re­
striction. A grim warning influenced the final vote. If 
the planters and businessmen tampered with the franchise, 
delegates were cautioned, not only would the Kansas Exodus 
be intensified, but a coalition would develop (at the 
general election to ratify the constitution) "between the 
poor whites and colored people, which would . . . inaugu- 
rate a reign of communism and secret societies." This 
kind of talk was not all idle vapor. Marxist ideas were 
not unknown to Louisiana. New Orleans was one of seven 
cities in the United States where a branch of the Inter­
national Workingmen*s Association (or "Red International")
57
had taken root between 1867 and 1872. Shortly before the 
constitutional convention met, "the Socialists of New 
Orleans" celebrated the anniversary of the Paris Commune,
hoisted a red flag, and exhorted working people "to liberate
58themselves from the oppression of a small minority."
After much debate, the constitutional convention
59voted down suffrage restriction eighty-five to thirty-four.
56Ibid.. July 10, 1879.
^Philip Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the 
United States (New York, 1947), I, 4l3; Cf. Pearce, "The 
Rise and Decline of Labor in New Orleans," 23-24.
^Dailv Picayune. March 20, 1879.
5^New Orleans Democrat. July 11, 1879.
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The extreme Bourbons were also forced to compromise their 
demand that bondholders be permitted to retain the high 
interest rate of seven per cent on the state debts which 
had been piled up during Reconstruction.^ Conservative 
spokesmen admitted that much of the debt was fraudulent in 
origin. Yet this fact was not important, they argued. It 
was the ‘•honor” of the state which mattered. The original 
virtue of the bonds was of no significance, so the argument 
ran; these bonds were now private property, and therefore, 
sacred. Specious appeals were made about the "widows and 
orphans” who would suffer if debts were repudiated or the 
interest rate scaled down.^ The truth was that wealthy 
Louisianians of the Democratic faith as well as Republicans 
and foreign capitalists now possessed these bonds; conse­
quently, businessmen in New Orleans joined with English in­
vestors to urge the convention not to tamper with the
O
debt. When the debt issue came up in the convention, 
Republicans stood squarely with the business Bourbons to 
oppose a scaling of the principal or the interest rate. 
Republican unanimity was accounted for with the remark that
^Caldwell, A Banking History of Louisiana. 105. 
During the Kellogg administration, in 1874, Louisiana * s 
state debt was cut almost in half, in principal. But the 
seven per cent per annum interest on the remainder was re­
tained. . See also Benjamin U. Ratchford, American State 
Debts (Durham, 1941), 183-92. !
^ Dailv Picayune. May 14, 1879.
62London Times, June 10, 1879*
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"the party loved honesty." But perhaps the secretary of the
convention came closer to the truth when he related the
story that a $200,000 slush fund had been distributed to
make sure the thirty-two Republican delegates saw things the
bondholders* way.
Country Democrats, joined by delegates from the
poorer wards of New Orleans, fought for a scaling down of
the interest rates and even hoped to slash the principal
down to $ 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . Leader of the repudiationists was
delegate E. E. Kidd of poverty-stricken Jackson Parish.
"Captain" Kidd, as the Bourbons called him, threw a fright
into New Orleans businessmen with his slashing attacks upon
65the bonded debt. Finally, a compromise was arranged. 
Although the principal of the debt was not molested, the 
interest rates on the bonds were severely reduced. Thus, 
what the New Orleans Times called the "communistic, spirit" 
of the pine hills had won a partial victory.
Outside of the suffrage and debt issues, the Bour­
bon program emerged from the convention triumphant and in­
tact. The state property tax was reduced to a paltry six
^ Dailv Picayune. July 1-2, 1879.
^4New Orleans Times. March 13, 1879; Nation.
XXVIII (June 5, 1879), 212.
65
Daily Picayune. July 4, 1879; Congressional
Record. 47 Cong., Special Sess. Senate, 145.
^ N e w  Orleans Times. quoted in Woodward, Origins of 
the New South. 91
150
mills on the dollar; parish and local taxes were limited to 
ten m i l l s . A l l  but the smallest manufacturing establish­
ments were exempted from any taxation whatsoever for a period 
of ten years, despite the cry of one country delegate that
"this effort -to overturn the agricultural character of the
68state, and make it a manufacturing center, must fail."
In other action, the convention decided to vest inordinate
power in the office of governor, while the authority of the
legislature was so narrowed that its functions became
69"almost mechanical."
The increase in gubernatorial power, especially in 
the appointment of local officials, was politically the most 
significant work of the convention. The Bourbon delegates 
were looking toward the future. They had in mind the domi­
nation of the entire state by the simple method of virtually 
turning local government over to the executive office. 
Therefore, in future elections, their task was greatly
simplified; they merely had to see to it that the proper
70sort of man was nominated for this one office. The
67
Louisiana, Constitution of 1879. Art. 209.
^®Ibid., Art. 207; Daily Picayune. July 26, 1879.
The ten year tax exemption for manufacturers was extended 
for ten more years by constitutional amendment in 1888.
Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian Advocate. May 12, 1888.
^ Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Louisiana.
I, 46.
70Chambers, A History of Louisiana. I, 46.
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incumbent governor, Nicholls, was rapidly proving himself to 
be recalcitrant and undesirable; and through some fast work 
on the part of. Major Burke and Louis Wiltz in the closing 
days of the convention, a provision was inserted into the 
document which cut Nicholls*s term short by one year. 
Theoretically, the Governor was eligible for re-election, 
but it was common knowledge that he stood no chance at all 
of being nominated at the next party convention. All 
elected state and legislative officials, except Treasurer
71Burke, had their terms cut short along with the Governor1s. 
Burke, by the way, was presumed to be the mastermind of the
fight to halt outright repudiation of the state debt at the
constitutional convention. "Verily," snapped the Colfax 
Chronicle, "merit hath its reward, and the Major deserves 
something for his service in the interest of the bond­
holders."*^
The country Democracy also lost its fight against
the Louisiana State Lottery Company. Charles Howard*s
powerful gambling concern had been greatly displeased when
the legislature, prior to the convention, voted to repeal
the lotteryfs charter; Governor Nicholls, after some vacil-
73lation, signed the reform measure in March of 1879.
^Louisiana, Constitution of 1879. Art. 264.
72Colfax Chronicle. August 2, 1879.
73New Orleans Democrat. March 28, 1879.
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Howard's next move had been to train his guns on the up­
coming convention.
The lottery question consumed eight days of debate 
in the convention. All the Republican delegates voted to 
give the lottery legal status in the new organic law.74 
But backland Democrats, as on the debt issue, parted 
company with the business element of their party. When 
Democratic delegates caucused, mention of the lottery had
an effect similar to "tossing a firebrand into a powder 
75magazine." William A. Robertson of St. Landry Parish led 
the pro-lottery Democratic forces at the convention.
Harking back to the crisis of 1877, he reminded Democrats 
of something many of them preferred to forget--that the 
lottery had given much financial aid in the fight to over­
throw Radical rule. In fact, he said, the present Demo­
cratic governemnt "would never have been established" with-
76out lottery money. The alignment of planter-merchant 
Democrats with the Republican delegates was clearly too 
much for the hill delegates, but they fought on nonetheless. 
Their churchgoing constituents in North Louisiana hated the
74Since the lottery had financed the Democratic coup 
of 1877, the Louisiana Republicans' ability to forgive is 
truly touching. Or perhaps some other consideration was 
involved.
75Pailv Picayune. July 10, 1879.
76Ibid.. July 9, 1879.
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lottery and expected their representatives to fight on to 
the bitter end.
Both sides in the lottery dispute agreed that public 
sentiment was generally against Howard’s company; but, as 
Robertson suggested, the people’s anger was directed prima­
rily at the monopoly features of the old charter. He then 
introduced a proposal to continue the charter until January 
1, 1894, for which the lottery would pay the state $40,000 
per year, as provided by the original legislative act of
1868. As a sop to public opinion the prior monopoly was 
77
repealed. Theoretically, future legislative sessions 
could charter all the lotteries they wished. But the Howard 
lottery was the only one specifically named in the consti­
tution. And subsequent legislatures never chartered a
78rival; lottery influence saw to that. Curiously, another 
article in the constitution declared gambling to be a vice. 
As soon as the new organic law was ratified, company adver­
tisements could boast: "This is the Only Lottery Ever
79Voted on and Endorsed by the People of Any State!"
On December 8, 1879, election-satiated Louisiana 
went to the polls for its third election in thirteen months.
77
Louisiana, Constitution of 1879. Art. 167.
78Robert Cinnamond Tucker, "The Life and Public 
Service of E. John Ellis," Louisiana Historical Quarterly 
XXX (July, 1946), 746; Forum. XII (January. 1892). 570.
7^Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. April 5,
1882.
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Ratification of the new constitution was a foregone con­
clusion, and public interest in the state and local races 
was at low ebb. In truth, there was not much choice.
Louis A. Wiltz, Democratic gubernatorial nominee, was a 
staunch conservative. So was his Republican opponent,
Taylor Beattie. Wiltz, a banker, a New Orleanean and a 
Catholic, was not likely to arouse much enthusiasm among 
upstate Democrats. Judge Beattie was a large planter, an 
ex-slaveholder, an ex-Confederate, and an ex-member of the
Knights of the White Camellia. Colored voters were under-
80standably "disgusted" with Beattie’s candidacy. Some
81Republicans expressed a preference for Wiltz. When the
votes were counted, Wiltz had won the governorship by a
82vote of 74,098 to 42,555. The actual number of votes cast 
was probably not sixty per cent of the total returned.
Never before this election was there "such a cold­
ness and apathy" in Louisiana politics, wrote a Democratic
83voter. "The people do not know where to look for relief." 
Feeble attempts were made to arouse third party enthusiasm, 
but without notable success. The "National party" title
®^W. E. Horne to Rutherford B. Hayes, November 10, 
1879, Hayes Papers.
®^J.R. G. Pitkin to John Tyler, Jr., August 15, 1879, 
copy in Hayes Papers.
QO
Louisiana, Report of Secretary of State. 1902, 56L
83
Daily Picayune. November 15, 1879.
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had fallen into disgrace in Louisiana, and only in Natchit­
oches Parish was there a full ticket of Greenback Labor 
party candidates in the field. They were all defeated.®4 
The Workingmen’s party in New Orleans, which ran Fleming for 
Mayor the year before, met, grumbled, and refused to endorse 
anybody.®^ A "Temperance Alliance of Louisiana," centered 
around New Orleans, decided shortly before the election to 
run a state ticket dedicated to a platform of government aid
to agriculture and restriction on the sale of alcoholic 
86beverages. Their candidate for governor was the old
Grange leader, Daniel Dennett. At the time, Dennett was
residing in Mississippi and did not hear of his candidacy
until shortly before the election. When he learned that he
had been placed in the field by the Temperance Alliance,
against Wiltz and Beattie, he accepted the challenge--but
87only because "my defeat is certain." Dennett did not 
campaign. Neither party paid any attention to his candidacy. 
Exactly twenty-seven votes were recorded for Dennett in New 
Orleans, and if he obtained any ballots in the rural 
parishes, they were not reported.
The only noteworthy agrarian victory anywhere in
®4Colfax Chronicle. November 15, 1879.
®5Pailv Picayune. December 1, 1879.
86Ibid., November 15, 1879.
®^Ibid., December 4, 13, 1879.
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the state came from the hill country, in the Twenty-Fourth 
Senatorial District of Catahoula, Grant, and Winn Parishes. 
There, in his third try in three years, Benjamin Brian com­
bined Negro and Greenbacker support to win a seat in the
Op
upper house of the state legislature,00 Brian*s election 
indicated that the agrarian cause was not entirely dead in 
Louisiana*s backcountry.
^Colfax Chronicle. November 22, December 6 , 1879. 
Brian ran for the State Senate unsuccessfully in 1876 and 
1878, and won in 1879. He was endorsed by the local Re­
publican organization all three times. Charles J. Boatner 
of Catahoula Parish, who defeated Brian in 1876, moved out 
of the Twenty-Fourth Senatorial District in 1878, which 
necessitated the special election of that year.
CHAPTER V
BOURBON DEMOCRACY
Charles Gayarre', interviewed by a northern reporter 
in 1873, remarked that Reconstruction had subjected the 
white citizens of the state to such terror and misery that 
they would gladly embrace any change in government, submit 
to wany other species of d e s p o t i s m . T h i s  invitation was 
accepted. Bourbon misrule soon replaced Radical misrule.
An inner clique of professional politicians, taking credit 
for steering the ship of state from under the black clouds 
of Radicalism, soon claimed perpetuation in office as their 
reward. They declared the social stagnation around them to 
be the only alternative to turbulence, and were quick to 
hoist storm warnings against even the faintest wind of 
change.
The heavy anchor of the new order was the consti­
tution of 1879. Under its provisions the Louisiana 
Democracy stripped off its Nicholls facade, and revealed 
the governing circle to be a closed corporation consisting 
of Louis Wiltz, Edward A. Burke, and a few businessmen and
^Scribner*s Monthly. VII (November, 1873), 13
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planters whose social concepts had been fundamentally un­
changed by the Civil War and the Emancipation Proclamation. 
The victory of the Bourbon extremists received formal 
consecration on January 14, 1880, when Wiltz took the oath 
of office as Governor. But it was Burke, the State 
Treasurer, who emerged as the dominant figure, despite the 
vast appointive powers of the Governor. Wiltz, it appeared,
suffered from acute tuberculosis. He failed to respond to
2
treatment, and died on October 16, 1881. Henceforth, 
Burke's new partner, the state's chief executive, was 
Wiltz*s Lieutenant-Governor, Samuel Douglas McEnery of 
Monroe.
From 1881 until 1888 McEnery occupied the Governor's 
chair. He served out Wiltz's term and was elected in his 
own right, for a full four years, in 1884. McEnery, by all 
evidence, seems to have been a weak, affable man, possessing 
most of the faults common to American politicians of the 
day; unfortunately, he was called upon to preside over a 
peculiarly corrupt and demoralized segment of the nation.
It has been said that the 1880*s marks the ebb tide of 
statesmanship in American political history. Certainly in
^NeW York.Times. October 17, 1881.
^Henry Steele Commaoer. The American Mind: An
Interpretation of American Thought and Character Since the 
Eighteen-Eighties (New Haven. Conn.. 1950). 346.
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Louisiana, under McEnery, the political water was low 
enough to reveal the predatory activities of a variety of 
offensive Crustacea.
McEnery leaned heavily upon his friends for advice. 
And chief among his political cronies was State Treasurer 
E. A. Burke. During the McEnery years Burke achieved 
greater power in Louisiana than any other politician of his 
day. His control over McEnery was scarcely concealed.
Even in public, speaking in defense of McEnery, Major 
Burke could not refrain from relishing the fact that Louisi­
anians really understood who ran the State House, "I hear 
it stated from one end of the state to the other," Burke 
remarked, "that this poor weakling of a governor . . .  is
4
under the control and domination of Burke and some others." 
The "some others" included three powerful businessmen: 
Charles T. Howard and John A. Morris of the Louisiana State 
Lottery Company, and S. L. James, chief lessee of the state 
penitentiary, who was, in effect, the largest slaveholder of 
post-bellum Louisiana.
Those who sought favors of McEnery showered him with 
fulsome praise. He was called "the levee Governor," the 
farmer's friend," and "the executive Greatheart." But not
^New Orleans Times-Democrat. October 15, 1887.
^Ibid.. August 6 , 1882; Baton Rouge Daily Capitol- 
ian-Advocate. December 7, 1887; Biographical and Historical 
Memoirs of Louisiana, II, 62.
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all citizens joined in the chorus of adulation. McEnery*s
numerous critics used yet another, and more appropriate
£
title for him— "McLottery." Even staunch Democratic news­
papers grew restive under the mounting evidence of fraud 
and favoritism in McEnery’s administration; when someone 
suggested a raise in salary for the Governor, because the 
state's first family could scarcely get by on the doleful 
pittance of $4,000 per year, the Daily Picayune snapped that 
the "quality of the article paid for" should take first con­
sideration. Viewed in this light, Louisiana's $4,000
7
Governor was "the most expensive in existence." But 
official poverty, however, did not restrain McEnery from 
entertaining, or being entertained by, the more important 
families of the state. And there were legions of farmers in 
Louisiana to whom $4,000 represented unattainable wealth.
Vulpine individuals of the Burke, Howard, and James 
type clustered around McEnery but they were by no means his 
only confidants. Men of personal courage and presumed 
integrity also endorsed him. In fact, there lay the supreme 
tragedy of McEnery Bourbonism: that gentlemen who possessed
the intelligence and capacity to give Louisiana enlightened 
government, were so blinded by bitter memories of the Civil 
War and Reconstruction, as to give unthinking allegiance to
^Bayou Sara True Democrat. February 21, 1892. 
^Dailv Picayune. April 19, 1886.
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whoever bellowed loudest the shibboleths of southern con­
servatism. A case in point was Leon Jastremski. A "warm 
personal friend" of McEnery1s, Jastremski was Mayor of 
Baton Rouge, editor.of the official journal of the state, 
and a leader in Confederate veterans organizations. For a
time, at least, Jastremski fought the lottery and tried to
o
pull McEnery away from its influence. The Mayor-editor 
urged a‘ cleansing of the corruption which had crept into the 
party of white supremacy. But, he insisted, "all reform has 
to be within the Democratic party. Where else do you have 
to go?"^^ His position had one fatal weakness. If the 
party was not purified, if venal elements still dominated, 
Jastremski was nevertheless willing to stay with the party. 
To do otherwise would be, he said, "like burning down the 
house to destroy the bedbugs.
Jastremski, despite his un-southern name, became an 
articulate spokesman for the group without whose support the 
McEnery-style Democracy could never have survived. His 
virtues and faults would seem to be those of most
®Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian Advocate. May 9-12, 
1882; Daily Picayune. October 4. 188^.
Q
7Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. May 9, 21, 
25, June 15, 1882. Cf. New Orleans Louisiana Review.
January 6 , 18, 1892.




Louisianians of the upper class and upper-middle class in 
both city and country. His social philosophy consisted of 
equal parts Old South plantation tradition and New South 
business opportunism. Jastremski gloried in the epithet 
"Bourbon.” But he felt "Stuart" was perhaps more appropri­
ate; that McEnery*s administration should be compared to the 
restoration of that jolly monarch, Charles II. Louisiana, 
like England of the 1660*s, was "sick of profligate excess,
of rampant pseudo liberalism, and . . . prefer [ s ] the
12safer conservative path." He admitted the "reactionary
tendencies of the Democratic party" but insisted that its
apparent backwardness was justified by "the injustice of the
Civil War and Reconstruction."
Business enterprise, said Jastremski*s newspaper,
was what Louisiana needed most. He was annoyed at bills
13introduced by legislators from the "big woods" designed to 
regulate railroad and riverboat companies; for common sense 
dictated that "capital shall always have in Louisiana all 
the remuneration it can earn."^ -4 Jastremski, and those who 
applauded his sentiments, extolled the virtues of the 
constitution of 1879. As the Lake Providence Carroll Demo­
crat proclaimed: "all manufacturers in Louisiana are exempt
l^Ibid.. March 30, November 7, 1882.
13Ibid.. May 20, 1882.
14Ibid.
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from . . . taxation until 1899. Come to Louisiana!
Northern millionaires were to be admired and emulated, not 
denounced. When Jay Gould, an object of national loathing, 
visited Louisiana in 1887, the leading citizens of Shreve­
port prepared an elaborate reception and seemed anxious to 
make his stay in their city a pleasant one. They wanted 
Gould to build another railroad to their city. But the wily 
Gould disappointed his Shreveport admirers by demanding a 
$50,000 subsidy, free depot grounds, and a free right-of-way 
in and out of the city for a small branch line he proposed^ 
But Gould’s interest in Louisiana was not confined to 
getting subsidies for railroads; between January and April
of 1887 he added 250,000 more acres to his timber empire in
17North Louisiana. His popularity did not extend to Grant,
Vernon, or Winn Parishes, where he was the largest land- 
18owner. However, according to Mayor Jastremski, the 
actions of men like Gould simply illustrated the wonderful 
natural law of "survival of the fittest," and his newspaper 
quoted scripture to prove it. In Louisiana, as in ancient 
Israel, God’s providence dictated "that the fathers shall
15Lake Providence Carroll Democrat. August 11, 1888. 
^Galveston (Tex.) Daily News. January 24, 26, 1887. 
^Ibid.. January 28, 1887; Colfax Chronicle. April
2, 1887.
^■^Leesville Condenser, quoted in Winnfield Southern 
Sentinel. March 20, 1885; Winnfield Southern Sentinel. July
3, 1885; Colfax Chronicle. April 2, 1887.
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eat the grapes, and the children's teeth shall be set on 
edge."*^ Grumbling by the poor was futile, infantile, and 
impudent.
Translated into Bourbon political terminology,
"survival of the fittest" meant that all whites, regardless
of economic status, must cooperate in repressing the Negro
voting majority. Registration books in 1880 showed 88,024
colored voters, a majority of 2,573 over the whites. By
1888 there were 128,150 Negroes registered; their majority
20had increased to 3,743 over the whites. Yet as Negro 
registration increased, Republican voting strength mys­
teriously declined. The Democrats ran into trouble only in 
the Second Congressional District, where a Republican 
representative was elected in 1884 and 1888, and in the
Third District, which sent a Republican to Congress in 1880 
21and 1882. Some of the wealthiest men in these two
regions, sugar planters and manufacturers, voted Republican
because of the party's national program of high tariffs and
22fiscal conservatism. These men were powerful enough to
197Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. February
18, 1882.
20Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State. 1902,
548-53.
21
U.S., Congress, House, Biographical Directory of 
the American Congress. 1774-1927, 69 Cong., 2 sess., No. 
7837 ppT 833 7 880, 1044, 1171-72.
^Uzee, "Republican Politics in Louisiana," 39-40,
103-105.
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prevent the local Democratic machinery from perpetrating 
the gross frauds prevalent in other districts. But elsewhere 
in the state, Democratic opponents stood little chance.
The cotton raising Fifth District was denounced as 
the most consistently dishonest region in the entire South. 
"If you don’t vote right we’ll count you right," Negro
23voters were told, in 1880, by the District's Congressman.
By the latter part of the decade vote stealing in the Fifth 
had become a fine art, particularly in the four plantation 
parishes along the Mississippi River, where colored voters 
outnumbered whites, 13,956 to 2,005 in 1888. A comparison 
of these figures with the election returns of that year 
illustrates the thoroughness of Bourbon methods. When sta­
tistics from the following census are added the evidence of 
fraud is compounded:
Totals for Concordia, East Carroll,
Madison, and Tensas Parishes^4
Gubernatorial Voter Voter Popu-
Vote in Registration lation According
1888 in 1888 to Census of 1890
Democratic 15,056 2,005 (white) 1,665 (white)
Republican 543 13,956 (Negro) 12 ,454 (Negro)
^ N e w  York Time s. November 2, 1880 
24Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State.
1902, 552-61; U.S., Bureau of the Census, Compendium of the 
Eleventh Census of the United States: 1890” Population. I 
782-83. There is no evidence that any decline in popu­
lation occurred between 1888 and 1890; in all probability, 
the reverse was true.
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For that matter, a similar breakdown for the entire
state indicates that the cotton parishes listed above were
25merely the darkest stains on a panoply of falsehood:
Gubernatorial Voter Voter Popu-
Vote in Registration lation According
1888 in 1888 to Census of 1890
Democratic 136,746 125,407 (white) 130,748 (white)
Republican 51,993 128,150 (Negro) 119,815 (Negro)
Bourbon leaders made little effort to conceal the 
vote frauds, and they explained the situation with dis­
arming frankness. Vote theft was absolutely necessary. 
The elections of 1876-78 had only "strangled, and not 
killed" the "monster" of Negro domination;^ to permit a
free ballot would admit "a mongrel government made up of
9 7the worst elements of both races." Governor McEnery 
thoroughly agreed. "It is time," His Excellency said, 
"that the law shall be silent and [we shall] uphold our 
liberty at all hazards."2® Huge Democratic majorities in.
25Ibid.
26
St. Joseph North Louisiana Journal. October 30,
1880.
27Lake Providence Carroll Democrat. October 20,
1888.
28New York Tribune, quoted in Uzee, "Republican 
Politics in Louisiana,1* 84.
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the black belt parishes were equated to the chastity of 
white women, the memory of the Confederate dead, and the 
Divine Wisdom of Heaven. "What recreant," thundered the 
New Orleans Daily States, could possibly, remembering Re­
construction, "stand up before almighty God and accuse the 
wisdom or integrity or beneficence of the Democratic 
party. . . ?w29 The fact that election frauds were undis­
guised perhaps added to the enormity of the crime. Men who 
participated in vote stealing unquestionably did great harm 
to their own standards of moral.conduct, and the effect 
upon children taught to believe that cheating was "patriotic 
and right" can only be imagined.3^
But the Bourbon rationale for vote fraud in state 
and congressional elections scarcely told the whole story. 
Why, it might be asked, if Negro majorities were so menacing, 
were Democratic registrars so liberal in adding colored men 
to the voting lists? The statewide totals showed white 
registration as decently under the actual number of males 
over the age of twenty-one; however, there were 8,335 more 
colored men on the rolls in 1888 than showed up for the 
census taker two years later. Many who departed with the
Kansas Exodus remained on the voting list for the next
-*■   -   -   — -
29
New Orleans Daily States, quoted in Lake Provi­
dence Banner Democrat. January 25, 1896.
30Forum. XX (January, 1892), 597-98.
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generation, and colored cemeteries were bastions of strength
for the party of white supremacy. The remark that " a dead
darkey always makes a good Democrat11 was a truism of state 
31
politics. Yet the supreme irony could be found in the 
census returns of 1890, which proved the hue and cry over 
the supposed "black menace" to be a Machiavellian sham. 
Louisiana*s white males of voting age outnumbered colored 
by 10,933. A white majority had'been transformed into a 
Negro majority of almost 4,000, through the counting of 
8,335 fictitious Negroes, and the failure of about 5,000 
whites to register.
But returns from the cotton plantation parishes were 
not doctored for the mere purpose of insuring the election 
of Democratic officials. Most local officials were either 
appointed, or could be easily removed. And Republicans-- 
Negroes, at that--were sometimes permitted to hold office 
in such parishes as East Carroll and Madison. More im­
portant matters than mere elections were involved. Under 
the convention system for nominating state and congressional 
candidates, each parish was permitted to send a delegation 
in proportion to the number of Democratic votes cast in that 
parish at the previous election. A parish might choose its 
-own method of election convention delegates, but the size of
31Louisiana Populist. October 22, 1897. Parish 
assessors acted as registrars of voters. Assessors were 
appointed by the Governor. Hence, all registrars were 
Democrats.
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the delegation depended upon the previous Democratic vote.
The swollen, false returns from the black belt, based on
Negro registration, allowed planters to throng into these
Democratic nominating conventions in commanding numbers.
The worst offenders in the packing of conventions,
as in ballot box stuffing, could be found in the Fifth
Congressional District of Northeast Louisiana. The four
parishes along the Mississippi River, where lived only 11.3
per cent of the adult male whites of the District, were
able to go into the congressional nominating convention of
1888 with seventy-five delegates. The other eleven parishes
of the District, with 88.7 per cent of the whites of voting
32age, sent seventy-nine delegates. And some of the dis­
advantaged parishes had pockets of planter strength; these 
latter would send a handful of delegates to the convention, 
permitting plantation interests to have an absolute majority 
in the naming of candidates and in the writing of the plat­
form. Much the same was true in Northwest Louisiana*s 
Fourth District. There, Caddo, Bossier, and Rapides parish 
manipulated Negro majorities so as to dominate the other 
nine parishes of the District, where the vast majority of 
whites lived. Though the Sixth District suffered less from 
Bourbon rule, even so, East and West Feliciana, Pointe
^^Lake Providence Carroll Democrat. August 4, 1888; 
Ruston Calioraph. quoted in ibid.. October 20, 1888; U.S., 
Compendium o^ the Eleventh Census. I, 782-83.
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Coupee, and West Baton Rouge parishes carried much greater
weight in Democratic conventions than their white population 
33
justified. The First, Second, and Third Congressional 
Districts were comparatively free from the rampant vote 
stealing for convention purposes so common to other areas of 
the state; however, none of the latter three was entirely 
free from frauds at the ballot box.
Local politics, more often than not, reflected the 
undemocratic aspects of the state and congressional cam­
paigns. Few parishes, even where the Democratic and Re­
publican parties were closely matched, used the primary 
system in selecting party nominees. Local politicians were 
fond of the "mass rally" technique. When time came for 
making nominations to the legislature, the sheriff*s 
office, or other court house positions, the local ring 
called for the party faithful to assemble and make their 
wishes known. What could be more democratic? The theory 
was fine, but, grumbled the Crowley Signal. sometimes the 
call was poorly advertised or held in an obscure place; the 
result was "a sort of confidential limited mass
33Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. November
1, 1887. In the Sixth District parish of West Feliciana, 
in 1882, the Democratic white minority apparently lost 
control of the Negro vote. By some "strange misunder­
standing, "as the Bourbon press termed it, the parish re­
turned a Republican majority— for the candidate of that 
party in the Third District! The Secretary of State's 
office had simply sent up ballots for the wrong district. 
Ibid., January 25, 1882.
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meeting."^4 McEnery partisans had a special trademark. They 
perpetuated themselves in certain North Louisiana court­
houses by proclaiming open-air, free-for-all parish.nomi­
nating rallies, but farmers up in the hills were given "a 
notice as short as that which the hawk gives the chicken.^ 
Local self-expression was also stifled by the executive 
appointment of police jurors. Begun on a partial basis 
under Nicholls, it was made universal during the Wiltz- 
McEnery administrations. Beginning in 1880, every police
36juror in the state received appointment from the Governor.
The class of men appointed were certain to squelch any 
proposal to raise local taxes, a fact which, to wealthy 
planters and merchants, proved "the wisdom of this mode of 
selection.
Republican leaders packed their "mass meetings" 
also, but the evil was most pronounced in the Democratic 
party, and most harmful, since the great majority of state
34Crowley Signal, quoted in ibid., March 6, 1888.
35Shreveport Democrat, quoted in Baton Rouge Daily 
Capitolian-Advocate. November 10, 1887.
^ Dallv Picayune. February 29, April 12, 1880;
Police Jury Code of the Parish of East Feliciana: Con­
taining a i ^ q ^ ^ ^ T t h e  State Laws Relative to Police 
Juries (Clinton. 18831. 8-9.
37
H. Thompson Brown, Ascension Parish Louisiana.
Her Resources. Advantages and Attractions; A Description 
of the Parish and the Inducements Offered to Those Seeking 
New Homes tDonaldsonville. 1888). 11.
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and parochial officials would be selected at meetings of 
the latter. Drunken rowdies were often on hand at Demo­
cratic ward and parochial meetings, so as to discourage 
decent folk from attending; and whosoever raised his voice 
in protest at the high-handed proceedings would be de^
38nounced as "a crank, and . . . howled down accordingly." 
Once the nominees were chosen and the party label applied, 
a voter had this alternative: support the ticket or suffer
denunciation as a traitor to the white race. Even barnyard 
language was used. A white man who presumably cast a 
Republican ballot was described as "sleeping with the 
hogs."39
One student of southern politics has suggested that
the condition of public education may be the best criterion
40
by which to evaluate a governing oligarchy. If this be 
true, then the people of Louisiana suffered under the 
South*s least enlightened, and harshest, Bourbon regime.
No other southern state, in the late nineteenth century, 
allowed its public institutions to fall so low, or per­
mitted its children to undergo a worse degree of education­
al neglect* The oligarchy used certain standard arguments
^®Arabi St. Bernard Voice, quoted in Colfax Chroni­
cle. October 22, 1887.
39National Economist. Ill (July 19, 1890), 279.
V [ aldimer ] 0. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in 
State and Nation (New York, 1950), 160.
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to justify its niggardly school appropriations. Louisiana 
was poor. Taxpayers needed a breathing spell. The state 
must encourage manufacturing, railroads, and capital in­
vestment; these would not come without the sort of assur­
ances embodied in the constitution of 1879. The Bourbon 
Democrats were fond of calling their regime "a taxpayer*s 
government.** But apparently what they strove for was quite 
the opposite; a government of should-be taxpayers who paid 
no taxes. By some occult process, adherence to a laissez 
faire businessman*s philosophy had become the test of 
loyalty to the traditions of an agricultural past.
The plea of poverty was grossly exaggerated. Most
Louisianians were poor, but by no means all. Individuals
and corporations of great wealth could be found within the
borders of the state, and these privileged few used the
poverty.of the majority as a specious excuse for avoiding
taxation upon themselves. By 1892, according to the Times-
Democrat. thirty-five millionaires lived in New Orleans 
41
alone. Other immensely wealthy persons could be found in 
the rural parishes, particularly in the sugar country. 
Governor Nicholls, a rather benign conservative, denounced 
those who made persistent efforts "to present Louisiana as 
a pauper, unable to . . . carry out the duties of her
4*New Orleans Times-Demoerat. May 11, 1892, quoted 
in Shugg, Origins of Class Struoafi~'in Louisiana. 291.
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statehood.** Such claims, he said, were "utterly without
foundation."4^ Mendacity, however, knew no limits; even
the opulent lottery company claimed to be "almost entirely
profitless."4'* Howard and his associated were not inclined
to discuss company books with the public, except to say
that only seven per cent of the receipts in the monthly
44drawings came from inside the state. By 1890 the lottery 
grossed from $15,000,000 to $60,000,000 a year, according 
to various estimates. One angry lottery foe, writing in 
Forum magazine, said the company kept at least forty-seven 
per cent of its gross take; the remainder went out in
45prizes, advertisement, and bribes to public officials.
The charge of excessive profit making was corroborated by 
evidence that, from 1868 to 1890, company stock soared from 
a par value of $100 to $1,200 per share. Since the 
lottery reported 50,000 shares by the latter year, this 
represented a capital value of $60,000,000. And the net 
ajmnual profit, by minimum estimate, was at least double the
^Louisiana, Official Journal of the Senate. 1890,
414.
4^Pailv Picayune. January 1, 1877.
44Forum. XII (January, 1892), 570.
45
Cf. ibid.. 561; Alwes, Louisiana Historical 
Quarterly. XXVII, 1021-24; Ezell."Fortuned Merry Wheel. 
250-54; Chambers, A History of Louisiana. I. W5.
^Louisiana, Official Journal of the House of 
Representatives. 1890, 29, 321.
total amount of revenue taken in by the state government.
By comparison, all nineteen national banks in Louisiana in 
1890 listed total resources of $14,359,000, and total de­
posits in the six state banks stood at $7,486,000.4^
A look at state institutional and other official 
reports in the 1880-1900 period reveals a melancholy 
pattern of social neglect. The six mill ceiling on state 
taxation, and the ten mill limitation on local taxes 
effectively stifled social legislation. Indifference in 
high places made the picture even darker. Chief of suffer­
ers was public education. Only 1.25 mills went to the 
current school fund, whereas 2.75 mills went to pay interest 
on the state debt; and the latter excluded interest on edu­
cational bonds, which had to be paid out of the 1.25 mill 
school fund.4®
Ironically, ante-bellum Louisiana had shown more 
interest in a free school system than had any of the 
neighboring states. At one time, in the early 1850*s, half
of the white children of educable age managed to obtain
40
rudimentary instruction. After the war Louisiana*s school
4^Caldwell, A Banking History of Louisiana. 128-29.
4®Louisiana, Constitution of 1879. Art. 209.
^Fortier (ed.), Louisiana. II, 428-29. Among all 
adult whites (age twenty and above, illiteracy shot up from 
10.15 per cent in 1860 to 19.28 in 1890! In 1860, out of 
175,238 adult whites, there were 17,808 illiterates. In 
1890, out of 269,556 adult whites, 51,989 could not read or 
write. Cf. U.S., Eighth Census. I, 188-89, IV, 506; U.S., 
Compendium of the Eleventh Census. Ill, 316.
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system was revived under the hands of Carpetbaggers, and
Negro children were counted among those eligible for public
education. Reconstruction schools were, by law, racially
integrated, and from 1872 to 1876 a Negro served as super-
50intendent of the state’s educational system. But, as
with everything else during the Reconstruction era, school
money was "squandered or misappropriated."5* Expenses
quickly outran revenue; teachers were forced to hawk pay
warrants at a fraction of their face value; but even the
Daily Picayune agreed with the Radicals that New Orleans
"brokers and money lenders were the real recipients of the
greater part of the money appropriated for . . . education
52in Louisiana for many years"
If judged alone by the results of their handiwork, 
it would seem the Democratic party, after it came to power 
in 1877, held Negro and poor white children personally 
responsible for the failings of Reconstruction era schools. 
Education funds were pruned immediately. The constitution 
of 1879 allowed further emasculation. A similar program of 
Bourbon retrenchment took place in other southern states, 
but what happened to education in Louisiana after
50Louisiana, Annual Report of the State Superin­
tendent of Public Education to the General Assembly of 
Louisiana for the Year 1875 (New Orleans. 16^61. 95.
51Ibid.
52Pailv Picayune. April 23, 1877.
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Reconstruction was fortunately without parallel elsewhere. 
The following figures reveal, the outlines of a social dis­
aster of the first magnitude:
‘S'}
Louisiana Public Schools in 1890 Compared with 
Education in Poorer Southern States
True value of 
property





South Carolina 400,911,000 428,000
Florida 389,489,000 531,000
Educable white Educable colored





South Carolina 71 191
Florida 45 104
53U.S., Bureau of the Census, Abstract of the
Eleventh Census: 1890. pp. 205, 228-29: U.S.. Compendium
of the Eleventh Census. I, 748. The educable child-teacher 
ratio was found by dividing the number of public ufchool 
teachers into the number of inhabitants of the five-through- 
twenty year age group, which the Bureau of the Census con­
sidered "educable." It is true that Louisiana had more 
parochial school teachers than the other states listed, but 
even if they were added, the Pelican State would still # . 
retain bottom ranking in all categories. Especially would 
this be true of Negro education. Counting public, parochial, 
and private schools in 1890, there were only 828 teachers 
for over 200,000 Negroes of school age. U.S., Compendium 
of the Eleventh Census. Miscellaneous Statistics. II. 221.
223.
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States with Illiteracy Rate 
Above Forty Per cent 













Carolina 22.39 78.55 55.41
(2) Alabama 25.05 80.61 50.89
13) Georgia 23.18 81.58 49.86
(4) Missis-
, . sippi 16.57 75.17 49.52
(5) Louisiana 19.83 79.06 49.05
(6) North
Carolina 31.71 77.44 48.33
(7) Florida 20 .-73 70.66 43.42
(national
average) (8.75) (70.00) (16.97)
1890: Three
States:
(l) Louisiana- 20.33 72.14 45.83
12) South *
Carolina 18.11 64.07 44.95
(3) Alabama 18.44 69.08 41.00
(national
average) ( 6.23) (56.76) (13.34)
Louisiana "rose" from fifth to first place in 
ignorance among all states in the nation between 1880 and 
1890. She was the only state, North or South, to show an 
absolute rise in the percentage of native whites who could 
not read or write, and the one state in the nation where
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Negro illiteracy continued above seventy per cent. At the 
end of the Reconstruction era, Louisiana’s Bourbons had 
vowed to promote and encourage education for black and 
white;54 but Governor Nicholls paid little attention to 
public schools, and Wiltz and McEnery even less. Those who 
shouted loudly for white supremacy might well have pondered 
the following statistics: in 1890, Louisiana’s white
children, of native parentage, in the ten to fourteen year
55age group, were 27,74 per cent illiterate. By contrast, 
colored children of the same age group were 19.69 per cent 
illiterate in Missouri, 26.18 per cent illiterate in Texas, 
and 26.18 per cent illiterate in Florida.5^
The youth of post Reconstruction Louisiana came 
close to having no state school system at all. "When the 
intelligent classes . . . secured possession of the govern­
ment,’' one official said, "there were many who said of the 
public school, ’cut it away. Why cumbereth it the 
ground?*"5^ At the constitutional convention of 1879 a 
serious attempt was made to abolish the office of state
54New Orleans Democrat. April 17, 1877; Nation.
XXIV (April 19, 1877), 227.
^U.S., Compendium of the Eleventh Census. III. 314.
56Ibid.
^Louisiana State Public School Teachers* Associ­
ation, Proceedings and Papers of Second Annual Convention 
(Baton Rouge, 1894), 18.
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superintendent of public education; this backward step 
failed to win approval, but other constitutional provisions
RO
were almost as malign. For instance, parish superin-
59tendents were limited to a salary of $200 per year.
The Bourbon Democracy scorned Federal aid to public 
education. The proposed Blair bill, debated in Congress 
from 1883 to 1888, would have poured, over a period of ten 
years, an estimated $4,000,000 into Louisiana schools.^
No state needed the money more. But the same men who per­
petually clamored for Federal aid to Louisiana*s levees 
"raise [ d ] their hands in holy horror” at the Blair 
bill,^ and denounced it as an infringement on States* 
Rights. Most of the newspapers in the state agreed with the 
Shreveport Times: Federal handouts to education would be
"humiliating” and "squinting too much in the direction of
fsO
centralization." Perhaps it was true, as the Populists 
alleged in the 1890*s, that the Bourbon Democracy
^^Dailv Picayune. May 28-29, 1879.
^Louisiana, Constitution of 1879. Art. 224.
^®Cf. Monroe Bulletin, quoted in Baton Rouge Weekly 
Truth. April 16, 1886; Woodward, Origins of the New South. 
64-65.
^Mortroe Bulletin, quoted in Baton Rouge Weekly 
Truth. April 16, 1886.
^^Shreveport Times. quoted in New Iberia Enterprise. 
September 23, 1885.
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deliberately sabotaged Louisiana’s school system, not so 
much for the sake of economy, but in order to hold public
intelligence down to the lowest common denominator and so
63
keep rural people of both races docile. In fact, there 
was one miserable Louisiana school which epitomized the 
system. Its classes met inside a sheep barn.^
The Bourbon fist fell hardest upon Negro education.
t
In 1890, colored children from nine to nineteen years of
age numbered 137,287; of these, only 51,645 were literate.
Even in Mississippi the blacks of this age group were
65twenty percentage points ahead in literacy. Negro 
poverty depressed education for the race as much as did the 
penurous policies of the Bourbon government. School books 
cost more than Negro parents were usually able or willing 
to spend; consequently, they sent their offspring to school 
“with almanacs in their hands, and old almanacs at that."
But governmental attitudes hurt the most. The Superin­
tendent of Public Education in St. Mary Parish bluntly re­
marked that school funds in his district went to white edu­
cation only. The Negroes, he said, "must work out their own
^^Montgomery Mail, quoted in Colfax Chronicle. 
September 9, 1893; Louisiana Populist. June 5, 1896.
64
Louisiana State Agricultural Society, Proceedings 
of Ninth Annual Meeting (Baton Rouge, 1895), 28.
^^U.S., Compendium of the Eleventh Census.III. 314-
3.5 . .
66
Daily Picayune. March 27, 1881.
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salvation. . . .w^
Few Negro teachers had adequate training; in hast
Feliciana, for example, at the end of Reconstruction, white
inspectors found all teaching applicants for Negro schools
6 8in the parish to be totally unqualified. Southern Uni­
versity, by grace of the constitution of 1879, was es-
6 9tablished "for the education of persons of color." The
legislature appropriated a small fund but failed to provide
7 0for one detail--construction. Subsequently, the Board of
Trustees paid for a building by reducing faculty salaries
and borrowing additional funds by putting up future salaries
for collateral. The faculties* money was still being used
in the twentieth century to pay off this mortgage, at eight
71per cent per annum. x The neglected university did not
72turn out a single graduate until 1887, and as late as 
1898, had only ten students taking college-level courses.7^ 
There was unconscious irony in the statement made by
^Quoted in Betty Porter, "The History of Negro 
Education in Louisiana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly.
XXV (July, 1942), 805.
^^Dailv Picayune. November 20, 1877.
^Louisiana, Constitution of 1879. Art. 231.




7 3 Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. July 1, 1898.
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Governor Murphy J. Foster, in 1896, that "this institution
is a fair index to what is being done throughout the state
74for the education of colored people." The failure of
Negro higher education naturally hurt the quality of.
instruction at lower levels. By 1893 there were 62,654
Negro children (out of approximately 200,000 eligibles)
75enrolled in Louisiana’s public school system. Forty-six
of their teachers had college training. Exactly fourteen
7 fi
had college degrees.
Hostility against Negro education per se was always 
present. But it seldom reached print during the brief 
period of the alleged "New Departure" immediately following 
the end of Reconstruction. Later, however, toward the 
close of the 1880*s, the frankest sort of criticism of the 
very idea of Negro education began to appear in editorials 
and public speeches. Colored people were out of place in a 
schoolhouse, or so it seemed to a Catahoula Parish news­
paper. With divine insight, the Trinity Herald commented:
"God never intended the negro to be educated. Like the
7 7horse, he was destined to work for what he eats."
74lbid.. May 14, 1896.
7  p.
Louisiana, Biennial Report of the State Superin­




Trinity Herald, quoted in New Orleans Weekly
Pelican. September 21, 1889.
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Furthermore, the Negro should be "put where he properly
belongs, and to which the whites purchased him for--in the
78field and the wood pile." The aptly-named Shreveport
Weekly Caucasian agreed. Ignorant Negroes, it concluded,
were a pesky problem, but "education is the most dangerous
remedy for the evil yet proposed. That education is a long
79stride toward social equality no sane man can doubt." On 
the other hand, the foes of white education were not so 
impolitic as to publicize their views. Besides, legislative 
inaction, whether by accident or design, did quite enough. 
Louisiana*s white children were already beneath the liter­
acy level of Negro youths in other states of the late 
Confederacy.
A decaying school system was the most far-reaching 
of Bourbon failings, but it was by no means the only stain 
on their social record. Another pernicious ill concerned 
the state*s method of disbursing money to public insti­
tutions and employees. Under McEnery, the general assembly 
failed to provide for the order and priority of payments; 
this had the effect of placing in the hands of the State
Treasurer, Major Burke, an arbitrary control over public
8 0funds and over the payment of all warrants. It was
"^Trinity Herald. June 13, 1889.
^Shreveport Weekly Caucasian. February 6, 1890.
80ovShreveport Evening Standard, quoted in Baton
Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. May 17, 1882.
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charged, and repeated without denial in the official journal
of Louisiana*s state government, that Burke consistently
gave priority to bondholders, and by 1882 had deposited to
their credit over $1,000,000 in a New Orleans bank. At the
same time he refused to redeem on demand the state warrants
issued to mere public institutions and employees, using the
excuse of an empty treasury. Warrants sent to the insane
asylum at Jackson, according to the Superintendent, were
cashed by New Orleans brokers at thirty-five cents on the
dollar. Later, these same brokers bundled up the paper,
sent it to Burke, who would suddenly discover that the
81treasury had revenue for redemption.
Conditions in the Jackson asylum were deplorable.
In 1882 the Superintendent threatened toqpen the gate and 
turn the starving inmates "loose on the highway" if he
QO
received any more thirty-five-cent-on-the-dollar warrants.
This prospect seems to have stirred the legislature into
action; henceforth, the commercial value of the warrants was
increased slightly by making them recievable for taxes due 
83
the state. But the most tragic examples of state neglect
^Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. May 11, 
1882. According to this source, Burke gave the brokers
sixty-five cents on the dollar.
IMsj** Ju3*Y 1882. A questionable reform, since 
it had the effect of devaluing the adready inadequate tax 
payments.
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of the insane were not to be found at the Jackson insti­
tution; inmates, there it appeared, were considered fortu­
nate by comparison. More miserable were the mentally ill 
from poor families in New Orleans. These urban insane 
were locked away in what the Louisiana Asylum Board blandly
QA
called a "city prison for crazy people."0^ There was no 
room for them at Jackson. In 1881, out of 170 in the 
Orleans compound, 69 died. And 1881 was considered a
healthy year for New Orleans, since no epidemics were re-
. . 85ported.
A group of legislators, visiting the Jackson insti­
tution in 1888, were plainly shaken by what they found.
Most wards had no furniture whatsoever, not even beds. No 
medical supplies of any sort could be discovered on the 
premises. Inmates went about in filthy rags; some were 
almost nude, and practically none had shoes. Inquisitively,
the legislators entered a cellar dining hall, but came up
86
again hurriedly--the stench was overpowering. Their 
blistering report to the General Assembly brought some im­
provements; by 1890, steam heat was installed at Jackson, 
whereas in earlier years attendants had to walk the inmates
84Ibid.. June 20, 1882.
85Ibid.
^Louisiana, Official Journal of the Senate. 1888, 
330-33. The solons were also dismayed to observe racial 
integration among the Jackson inmates.
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about during cold weather to keep them from freezing to
07
death. But the insane were by no means the only unfortu­
nates whom the state neglected, a fact which could be 
attested to by the deaf, dumb, and blind, confined at Baton 
Rouge. Since all these latter were victims of serious 
handicaps the legislature of 1888 logically concluded to 
crowd them all under one roof.^® Instead of two dilapi­
dated buildings, the deaf, dumb, and blind, after 1888, had 
one dilapidated building. Governor McEnery, by the way, 
disliked the idea of throwing all the handicapped together, 
for the reason that "centralizing them" would "propagat [ e] 
a race of deaf mutes."®9 But economy won out over McEnery1s 
theories of genetics.
While the insane and physically helpless suffered 
through indifference and parsimony, one other segment of 
the bottom rung of society received considerable legis­
lative attention. The convicted criminals, unlike the 
others, were capable of yielding a profit and thus came up 
for frequent discussion in the General Assembly. It was 
decided that lawbreakers should pay for their crimes in a 
literal sense; therefore, by renting penitentiary inmates to
®7Paily Picayune. January 14, 1877.




private contractors, the state was not only relieved of the 
financial burden of convict upkeep, but obtained a stipu­
lated sum of money from businessmen who were willing to 
lease, and work, the criminal population.
Louisiana pioneered the convict lease system in the 
South. In 1844 the state prison, which had earlier been 
equipped for government-sponsored manufacture of cotton 
bagging, was turned over to the management of a private 
c o m p a n y . F o r  a fee, the state leased out both convicts and 
machinery. During Reconstruction Louisiana continued the 
lease system, but instead of working inside the penitentiary
walls, all able-bodied prisoners were shipped over the state
91for levee and other construction work. Carpetbagger 
governments in other parts of the South also accepted the 
idea that convicts should earn a profit for private con­
tractors as well as the state. In 1870, the Warmoth govern­
ment in Louisiana made a long-term convict lease agreement; 
S. L. James and two other contractors were granted per­
mission to utilize the labor of all state prisoners for a
92
period of twenty-one years.
^Fortier (ed.), Louisiana. II, 296-97; Woodward, 
Origins of the New South. 212.
^ Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Louisiana.
I, 43.
^^Dailv Picayune. June 15, 1877; Blake McKelvey, 
"Penal Slavery and Southern Reconstruction," Journal of 
Negro History. XX (April, 1935), 155.
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James emerged as the dominant lessee, and when the
contract was renewed in 1890, no other name but his appeared
Q3on the agreement*7 James, in turn, sub-let a number of 
convicts to smaller contractors. A state "Board of Control" 
was empowered to inspect and report on the treatment of 
prisoners. But the effectiveness of the board was somewhat 
hampered by the fact that its members received their sala­
ries, not from the state, but from Mr. James.^ Thus, for 
thirty years, James and his lesser partners, in exchange for
payments into the treasury ranging from $5,000 to $50,000 
95per year, were given custody of the many thousands of 
individuals who fell into Louisiana’s penal system. This 
lease agreement was designed entirely for profit, but it did 
have incidental corrective value, of a grim sort. A high 
percentage of those under the care of Mr. James did not live 
to commit other crimes.
According to Louisiana-born George Washington Cable, 
the penitentiary lease in his home state was about the most 
brutal and corrupt example of the system to be found anywhere
^^Louisiana, Senate Calendar: Thursday, July 10,
1890, 11-12.
^Louisiana, Official Journal of the House of 
Representatives, 1894, 14.
95
Cf. Daily Picayune. June 15, 1877; Louisiana, 
Official Journal of the House of Representatives. 1894, 14,
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in the South.^ So completely did the state neglect its 
duties, Cable noted, that no official report on the lessees 
and their charges was published. But any traveller who 
happened to observe convicts at work needed no document to 
substantiate the evils of the lease system. A Clinton news­
paper described what was common knowledge:
The men on the [James] works are brutally treated 
and everybody knows it. They are worked, mostly in 
the swamps and plantations, from daylight to dark. 
Corporeal [sic] punishment is inflicted on the 
slightest provocation. . . . Any one who has travelled 
along the lines of railroads that run through Louisi­
ana’s swamps . . .  in which the levees are built, have 
seen these poor devils almost to their waists, delving 
in the black and noxious mud. . . . Theirs is a 
grievous lot; a thousand times more grievous than the 
law ever contemplated they should endure in expiation 
of their sins.97
Occasionally, information on the convict death rate 
was released. Fourteen per cent of all prisoners were known 
to have died in 1881, and the annual death rate seldom
go
appeared much lower.7 Worst of all, in 1882, the death 
rate climbed above twenty per cent; that year, 149 of 700 
prisoners expired while under the care of James and the sub­
contractors,^ In 1884, 118 of 850 prisoners died.^^
^ Century Illustrated Monthly Magazine. XXVII 
(February, 1884), 582-99.
97Clinton East Feliciana Patriot-Democrat. quoted 
in Daily Picayune. March 22, 1886.
^Century Illustrated Monthly Magazine. XXVII 
(February, 1884), 596.
QQ
Daily Picayune. June 11, 1882.
^^Baton Rouge Weekly Truth. June 4, 1886.
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Later, it was apparently thought to be a wise policy to
conceal convict mortality statistics; Governor McEnery, with
customary aplomb, merely noted in his annual message of 1888
that the convicts "are well taken care of, humanely treated,
well fed and clothed, and not overtasked in their labor.
This cheerful news appears rather at variance with testimony
given a legislative committee which investigated charges of
102"brutality and inhumanity" in the James work camps. For 
example, a Negro convict named Theophile Chevalier attracted 
the committee’s attention because he had no feet. During- 
the winter of 1884-85 Chevalier labored outdoors, without 
shoes, in a North Louisiana construction camp. He soon 
developed a severe case of frostbite, but was forced to 
continue work. Then gangrene set in, and one of his feet 
rotted off. After some delay, the camp superintendent 
called in a local "physician" who removed the other foot 
with a penknife. Chevalier was serving a five year
103sentence. He had been convicted of stealing $5.00.
Three-fourths of James’s convicts, as a rule, were 
Negroes. Before the Civil War the statistics were re­
versed; whites outnumbered Negroes in the Louisiana
^■^Louisiana, Official Journal of the Senate. 1888,
23.
102New York Times. May 22, 1886.
103Ibid.
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penitentiary about three to one. By a specimen piece of 
Bourbon logic, this proved "very conclusively the improved 
moral condition of the blacks during the slave regime."104 
Under the James lease, prisoners were sometimes used, in 
violation of the lease agreement, for plantation labor as 
well as construction work. Rural newspapers bitterly de­
nounced the practice of putting white men to work, virtu­
ally as slaves, in the sugar fields. Lagona plantation,
in St. Mary Parish, was owned by S. L. James and used both
105white and black prisoners. Some of the most conservative 
papers in the state--even the Shreveport Times— criticized 
the convict lease system, since it tended to undermine the 
idea of the dignity of labor. Bringing the criminal class 
into direct competition with free labor, said the Times, was 
causing "intense dissatisfaction" among the working people 
of Louisiana and was "hurtful to their pride. Parti­
cularly did farm people resent the competition of James’s 
charges. But whenever the lease system was criticized, its 
inexcusably high death rate was almost always underscored. 
Cable went so far as to say: "the year’s death rate of the
convict camps of Louisiana must exceed that of any
^^Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Louisi­
ana. I, 150.
^■^^Marksville Bulletin, quoted in Daily Picayune. 
April 23, 1886.
■^^Shreveport Times, quoted in Winnfield Southern 
Sentinel. July 24, 1885.
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pestilence that ever fell upon Europe in the Middle Ages.
. . ." The state, he charged, had been seduced "into the
committal of murder for money.
All things considered, the state lost money under
the lease system. Business arrangements between the state
and the lessee were highly favorable to the latter. The
"penitentiary ring" was a power in Louisiana politics
second only to the lottery; humorists, noting the influence
of S. L. James and his friends, sometimes referred to them
1 Oftas the "James Gang." By special dispensation, charged 
the Daily Picayune. James was allowed to pay his annual dues 
to the state in depreciated back warrants rather than cash, 
and was also permitted to make lavish deductions for so- 
called "repairs" to the old penitentiary at Baton Rouge, 
where convicts unsuited for hard work were kept. In 
1884 the Legislature gave the James firm a monopoly on 
levee construction in Louisiana, at a fixed price. James 
and his partners sub-let much of this work, at a neat 
profit, to small contractors; moreover, he was doubly pro­
tected by being allowed to turn down any levee work which he
^ 7Centurv Illustrated Monthly Magazine. XXVII 
(February, 1884), 597.
^®Farmerville Gazette. February 19, 1896.
^ ^ Daily Picayune. November 2, 1887.
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deemed unprofitable.**^ It would seem that the legislature 
of the most water-logged state along the Mississippi be­
lieved that a guaranteed profit for a private firm took 
precedence over the need for adequate levee protection.
The nearest thing to a progressive idea endorsed by
Louisiana1s Bourbons was the cause of immigration. Not
only northern capital, but northern settlers as well, were
encouraged to come and share in the potential eden of the
"New South."*** This kind of talk dated back to 1865. It
was one point upon which Democrats and Republicans could
agree, during Reconstruction and after. In particular did
the younger Bourbons of the 1880*s, such as Joseph E.
Ransdell of Lake Providence, extoll the burning need for
112Yankee "pluck, energy, and money." Immigration pro­
moters could be heard in every southern state during and 
after Reconstruction; but Louisiana*s tub-thumpers, it 
would seem, felt compelled to bang the loudest. They real­
ized only too well that most northerners regarded Louisiana
H ^ L o u i s i a n a ,  Compendium of Legislative Acts Re­
lating to Levee Organization and Kindred Subjects; 1*856- 
1918 (New Orleans. 1919). 156.
***Paul H. Buck, The Road to Reunion: 1865-1900
(New York, 1937), 155-58.
*12Lake Providence Carroll Democrat. August 18,
1888. Ransdell, in the 1880*s, was a young lawyer and real
estate promoter in Northeast Louisiana. He entered politics 
in the 1890*s, entered Congress by defeating a Populist 
opponent in a special election in 1899, and finally lost a 
seat in the United States Senate to Huey P. Long in 1930.
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"as an extensive burying-ground, where mosquitoes, alli­
gators and •niggers’ might thrive, but where ’white folks’
113inevitably passed in their checks after a brief sojourn.lliAg 
The state’s violent political system received extensive 
space in leading northern newspapers. And when the 
Chicago Times remarked that Louisiana’s people were "differ­
ent from , . . any other state in the Union," no compliment 
115was intended. Prospective immigrants, reading these
"slanders,"*^ feared to come.
Louisiana's boosters tried to parry unfavorable 
publicity with fabulous accounts of its potential wealth, 
healthy climate and congenial citizenry. The Mephitic odor 
which clung to the state’s reputation had to be cleansed.
The perfume was applied with a heavy hand. Northern farmers 
were invited to "come and till where the south wind blows 
softly," and were informed that "the small farmer . . .  in 
a few years . . . will grow rich, and with but little severe 
labor.*117 ^ ncj dilate! For it, no praise was too
•^3Daily Picayune. May 2, 1886.
^^From 1877 to 1880, a day-by-day check of the New 
York Times reveals that news from Louisiana, most of it un­
flattering to the extreme, appeared on the front page with a 
frequency second only to the states of the Middle Atlantic 
and New England area.
115Chicago Times, quoted in Baton Rouge Daily Capj- 
tolian-Advocate. August 8, 1882.
liftAOLake Providence Carroll Democrat. August 4, 1888.
117
Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. March 5, 1890.
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extravagant. Louisiana's weather was "deliciously delight­
ful,"^® since, by an imaginative reversal of seasons, the 
winter was "warm* while summers were always "cool."^^ Even 
epidemic-ridden New Orleans told the world that he health 
and sanitation was "badly m i s u n d e r s t o o d . "120 Northern 
skeptics who wondered about "old scores connected with the 
war" received assurances from Tangipahoa Parish that southern 
people "rejoice that slavery is wiped out" and were sorry 
that the Civil War had occurred.121
Yet Louisiana's welcome mat was not out to all. The 
General Assembly in 1880 resolved: "That the needs of the
State of Louisiana don't require Mongolian immigration at
1 9 9
this time." And Negro immigrants, except to the large 
planters, were generally considered personae non grata. There 
were "too many colored people" as it was, believed the Ray- 
ville Beacon: "Louisiana Needs Whitening."123 some went so
H®Louisiana State Agricultural Society, Proceedings 
of Ninth Annual Meeting. 77.
119X7Southern Homeseekers* Guide and Winter Resorts on 
the Southern Division of the Illinois Central Railroad 
IChicaqo. 1887). passim: Brown. Ascension Parish. 2.
Inofficial Souvenir and Program of the Louisiana 
Industrial Exposition and Jubilee: May 8 to 31st. 1899 (New
Orleans, l8$9), 69.
191 Southern Homeseekers' Guide . . . Illinois Central 
Railroad. 57.
l^Dailv Picayune. March 18, 1880.
^^Rayville Richland Beacon. May 26, 1888.
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to criticize the Negro for occupying space which might be
put to better use by industrious Yankees. As the Hammond
Leader suggested: MA11 that is needed down here to make
the country a veritable ‘gateway* to paradise is the
elimination [sic 3 of the colored population."124 The
warning of George W. Cable, who said that the only way to
make the South a good place for white men to come in, was to
first make it a good place for black men to stay in, failed
125to be heeded in his native state.
By 1886 the immigration societies, associations, and
conventions, on both the state and parish level, had been
engaged in fitful activity for a generation. But for all
the windy resolutions and brightly colored pamphlets, there
was little proof of accomplishment. Industrious northerners
were not much in evidence. True, thousands of men had
moved into Louisiana since the Civil War, but most of them
were restless poor whites from the southeastern states, or
Negro laborers of similar origin. These latter had been
lured in by the agents of large planters. It was high time,
asserted the Baton Rouge Weekly Truth, to face facts:
For twenty years we have been crying for immigration.
We have been descanting upon the richness of our soil 
- and the luxuriance of our climate, the vastness of 
our material resources and our own inability to
^^Hammond Leader, quoted in Baton Rouge Daily
Advocate. February 5, 1&90.
1 0‘S
George W. Cable, The Nearo Question: A Se­
lection of Writings on Civil Rights in the South, ed. Arlin 
Turner (Garden City, New York, 1956), 231,
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develop them; forgetting , all the time, that the 
very arguments we use are suggestive of some hidden 
and inherent defect in our situation. . . .
Who would desire to settle in a State where trade 
is affected with a palsy and the people are poor and 
growing poorer. . . ? We are living under a mer­
cantile system that corrodes and eats at the vitals of 
our agriculture. . . .126
Suddenly, however, immigration prospects began to 
brighten. In 1886, the first trainloads of homeseekers 
from northern and midwestern America arrived in Lake Charles 
to investigate agricultural possibilities in the watery 
wilderness of Southwest Louisiana. They had been lured down 
by the promotional activities of the Walkins Syndicate, an 
association of northern and English investment corporations 
whose Louisiana holdings were managed by a Kansas banker, 
Jabez B. W a t k i n s . T h e  Watkins syndicate had earlier 
purchased 1,500,000 acres of marsh and prairie land from 
Louisiana, paying from 12^ cents to $1.25 per acre.*-2®
With the help of the Southern Pacific railroad, tons of 
pamphlets were scattered among the northern states, in­
forming agriculturists of the great potentialities of this 
new "Garden of Eden."^^ Watkins induced the President of
^^Baton Rouge Weekly Truth. November 26, 1886.
'127Edward Hake Phillips, "The Gulf Coast Rice 
Industry," Agricultural History. XXV (April, 1951), 92-93.
129stewart Alfred Ferguson, "The History of Lake 
Charles, Louisiana" (unpublished Master's thesis, Louisiana 
State University, 1931), 68-71.
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Iowa Agricultural College, Seaman A. Knapp, to come to Lake
Charles and take charge of prairie land development and 
130sales. A phenomenal land boom was soon underway. By 
1890, thousands of farmers had come down from Iowa, Illi­
nois, Michigan, and other states to buy acreage from the 
Watkins Syndicate. Some of the earlier arrivals, noting 
that rice crops flourished even under the primitive methods 
used by native Acadian farmers, decided to apply midwestern 
methods and machinery to the local crop.*3* Their success 
was so impressive that the later immigrants arrived with 
the specific intention of planting rice; by 1892, Southwest
Louisiana was rightly regarded as "the great rice center of 
1 32America." ^ Land values within the next few years in­
creased 1,000 per cent and over in the prairie country.*33 
State politics also took a more promising direction 
as the decade of the ISSO’s neared an end. In January of 
1888, Governor McEnery was defeated for renomination by a 
coalition of reform elements, working inside the Democratic 
party. The reformers rallied behind the maimed war hero,
130joseph Cannon Bailey. Seaman A. Knapp: School­
master of American Agriculture (New York, 1945J, 114-15.
131Ibid.. 116-21.
*3%,ouisiana State Agricultural Society, Proceedings 
of Sixth Annual Meeting (Baton Rouge, 1892), 18.
*33Phillips, Agricultural History. XXV, 94.
200
Francis T. Nicholls. The change from McEnery to Nicholls 
was a decided improvement; yet, unfortunately, this was due 
not to any special virtue of Nicholls's, but because of the 
extraordinary failings of McEnery. To replace McEnery was 
per se betterment.
Those who directed the Nicholls wing of the party 
were often referred to as "the more respectable Democrats 
of the State."^4 The Burke-Wiltz-McEnery machine, fi­
nanced by the lottery and the penitentiary lease interests, 
had cast a number of respectable gentlemen out of the inner 
circle of power when Nicholls*s term was cut short by the 
constitutional convention of 1879. McEnery, for a brief 
period after he succeeded to the governorship in 1881, made 
vague gestures of conciliation to the old patrician class^^ 
But his actions belied his words. In 1884, efforts to stop 
McEnery*s bid for the Democratic nomination to a full term 
came to naught. Later, as it became evident that McEnery 
and Burke would seek yet another term in 1888, the grumbling 
which had been heard from large portions of the gentry 
turned into wrathful clamor. "McLottery" was surrounded by
*^4New York Times. April 22, 1884. Chief among the 
pro-Nicholls, anti-McEnery Democrats were: Edward Douglas
White, Randall Lee Gibson, Newton C. Blanchard, and Robert 
N. Ogden. The venerable Daily Picayune, and about half the 
rural press, expoused the pro-Nicholls cause.
l^Baton Rouge Daily Capjtolian-Advocate. May 10,
1882.
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"buzzards and parasites."136 j^ e and his clique could no 
longer be endured.
Unseating McEnery from the gubernatorial chair could 
only be accomplished at the quadrennial party convention to 
nominate state officials. Both the McEnery "Regulars" and 
the Nicholls "Reformers" devoted most of 1887, the year pre­
ceding the convention, to the business of lining up parish 
delegations. It was a prolonged, bitter struggle. In Union 
Parish, to cite one instance of bloodshed, the two campaign
managers of the rival Democratic factions died in the streets
137of Farmerville after a gun duel. Nicholls was strongest 
in the small farm districts and among the Democratically-in­
clined portion of sugar planter interests. McEnery*s support
came from the parishes of great cotton plantations. New
1 88Orleans held the balance of power.
This campaign offers some revealing, though hardly 
edifying, information as to the moral tone of Louisiana 
politics of the period. McEnery partisans dwelt upon the 
"imbecility and disastrous failure" of the Nicholls
•^^ Dailv Picayune. October 26, 1887; Homer Claiborne 
Guardian, quoted in Opelousas St. Landrv Democrat. January 
15, 1887.
^■^New York Times. December 21, 1887.
l^®See Minden Democrat-Tribune. quoted in Daily 
Picayune. January 24, 1887; Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Ad- 
vocate. January 7, 1888; Henry Clay Warmoth. War. Politics- 
and Reconstruction: Stormy Davs in Louisiana (New York.
1930), 248.
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administration of 1877-80.^9 Burke took the lion*s share 
of credit for ending military Reconstruction.-*-4^ Governor 
McEnery, a Negro-baiter par excellence, equated the oppo­
sition to Republicanism, softness toward Negroes, and sundry 
other un-southern activities. He solemly pronounced 
Nicholls to be “unsound on the race question.H^4  ^ The 
powerful Times-Demoerat. Burke's newspaper, kept up an edi­
torial barrage on the theme that white supremacy and status 
quo in the State House were indivisible. McEnery knew how 
to handle "bad and dangerous n e g r o e s . N i c h o l l s ,  on the 
other hand, had proven himself in the Tensas troubles of 
1878 to be "too honest [sic ] H about such matters as vote 
fraud and intimidation.^4^
Nicholls partisans dragged out an awesome array of 
skeletons from the McEnery closet. A dying school system, 
wretched conditions in the state institutions, the convict 
lease-levee contract scandals, fraud in state lands in­
volving brother John McEnery, the ignoring of local senti­
ment in appointments to parish officers--a list of evils
^ ^ Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Louisiana.
II, 62.
^4^New Orleans Times-Democrat. October 15-16, 1887.
• ^ Dailv Picayune. November 4, 1887.
*4% e w  Orleans Times-Democrat. October 14, 1887, 
January 6, 1888.
143Pailv Picayune. October 14, 1887; St. Martin- 
ville Messenger, quoted in ibid., October 3, 1887.
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which enraged the hill farmers and embarrassed "the best 
people of the state.”^44 The Daily Picayune wondered what 
dark secrets Burke might be hiding in the books of the 
treasury office; a change in administration would at least 
give the public an examination of these records for the 
first time in a decade.^4^ But one subject of mutual em­
barrassment was not discussed. The Louisiana State Lottery 
Company, always a watchful fisher in political waters, had 
contributed money to both factions.^4**
The "Reform" effort to oust McEnery was something 
less than an immaculate crusade. Although speakers at 
Nicholls rallies rehashed the scandals of the incumbent 
administration, it must be noted that they considered other 
matters more significant. They replied to Negro-baiting 
with Negro-baiting. Stung by the assertion that Nicholls 
was "unsound on the race question," his friends were proud 
to relate how their one-armed hero had once slapped a
l440pelousas St. Landry Democrat. January 1, 1887.
•^45Pailv Picayune. October 16, 1887. This news­
papers hostility to Burke might be attributed to the fact 
that it had been engaged in a circulation war with Burke’s 
Times-Democrat since 1881. In June of 1882, a duel between 
State Treasurer Burke and C. H. Parker, editor of the Daily 
Picayune, was fought behind the New Orleans Slaughter 
House, which resulted in Burke being shot in both legs. 
Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. June 8, 1882.
l460pelousas St. Landrv Clarion. December 27, 1890; 
Baton Rouge Daily Advocate,. December 3, 1890. Nicholls *s 
supporters admitted later that their side accepted lottery 
money in 1888.
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colored man's face.^47 Nicholls, for his part, did not 
propose to end the mediaeval penitentiary lease, nor suggest 
that local officials should be elected rather than appointed; 
he criticized the harsh methods, rather than the underlying 
principles, of Louisiana Bourbonism. According to poli­
ticians in the Nicholls movement, the only mortal sin com­
mitted by the McEnery clique was that the clique was trying 
to perpetuate itself in office. This attitude was strik­
ingly revealed in a pro-Nicholls speech by Robert N. Ogden. 
Colonel Ogden told his audience:
When it is said that the McEnery officials are corrupt 
and all that, it does not amount to much of an argu­
ment, for you find corrupt officials everywhere; but 
when it is said that Governor McEnery*s officials 
intent to perpetuate themselves in office . . .  it 
is the truth, for that is their intention.148
On January 5, 1888, one week before the gubernatorial 
nominating convention, Orleans Parish elected its delegation. 
The city gave Nicholls a majority^ the stand-off between the 
uplands and the cotton black belt was broken. Even Mc- 
Enery*s old friend Jastremski then conceded d e f e a t . -^49
^^Arcadia Record, quoted in Daily Picayune. Oc­
tober 29, 1887. Jn spite of the animosity which both Demo­
cratic factions displayed toward colored people, a few 
Negroes expressed interest in the Nicholls campaign. A 
Republican newspaper complained that these colored people 
"even have the cheek to call themselves 'Reform Nigger 
Democrats." New Orleans Weekly Pelican. September 10, 1887.
^48paily Picayune. October 4, 1887,
149Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. January
7, 1888; New Orleans Times-Democrat, January f>-8f 1888.
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Major Burke, who saw his hold on state politics slipping
away, worked desperately to block Nicholls*s nomination, but
150to no avail. The convention stampeded to Nicholls and 
made a clean sweep of the incumbent administration. Next, 
of course, came the presumably minor hurdle of the April 
general election. Nicholls*s opponent was none other than 
"The Prince of Carpetbaggers," Henry Clay W a r m o t h . B u t  
there seemed to be no cause for Democratic alarm. Among 
other portents, Nicholls*s revived popularity among rank- 
and-file whites was attested by the news that a patent 
medicine called "the Francis T. Nicholls Stomach Bitters" 
was "the sensation of the hour."^^
Suddenly, Governor McEnery tossed out a bombshell 
by announcing that a "fair count" of ballots would take 
place in the general election. This, thought the 
Nicholls "Reformers," was a dastardly thing for McEnery to 
say. If the Governor’s planter friends took him at his 
word, they might permit their Negro peons to vote, for 
once unmolested. And Louisiana’s colored people adored
^^New Orleans Evening Truth, quoted in Bayou Sara 
True Democrat. March 19, 1892.
■^1-Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. April 5,
1888.
152Ibid.. March 30, 1888.
l^^Uzee, "Republican Politics in Louisiana," 82;
New Orleans Evening Truth, quoted in Bayou Sara True Demo­
crat. March 19, 1892.
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154Warmoth. Alarmed Nicholls supporters worked quickly to 
placate the aggrieved McEnery, and a compromise was reached.
Nicholls promised the outgoing Governor a position on the
155State Supreme Court. The crisis was over. The fair
count was called off. On election day, the Democratic 
commissioners in the bottomlands worked with customary zeal; 
Nicholls swamped Warmoth, 136,746 to 51,993.^^
Nicholls*s first inauguration, in 1877, expelled 
from Louisiana what one historial has called "a reign of 
irresponsible lawlessness unequaled in the history of
1 R7
civilized peoples." Time proved it to be a hollow
victory. Eleven years afterward, the benign old Brigadier 
was delegated to rescue this still unhappy commonwealth 
from the depths of Bourbon misrule. As Nicholls took the 
oath of office in May of 1888, his second administration 
began with one advantage which the first had lacked. Major 
Burke was no longer a power in the party. Burke soon left
l54Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. April 5, 
1888. According to this source, the Negroes of Baton Rouge 
tended to confuse Warmoth with the Messiah.
^^Fortier (ed.), Louisiana. II, 115; New Orleans 
Evening Truth, quoted in Bayou Sara True Democrat. March 
19, 1892. Warmoth, in later years, claimed that he was 
personally encouraged by McEnery to try and beat Nicholls 
in the 1888 general election. See Warmoth, War. Politics 
and Reconstruction. 251-52.
^■^Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State.
1902, 561.
1 57Coulter, The South During Reconstruction. 352; 
Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana. 225-29.
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the United States to attend to Central American mining 
stock, and his continued departure was assured by an investi­
gation which revealed irregularities in the state treasury
1 R O
totalling $1,267,905. The intrepid Major preferred to 
stay in Honduras, out of reach of Nicholls and S. L. James*s 
deadly penal system. Besides, Tegucigalpa bore a political 
resemblance to Baton Rouge. For Burke had discovered, in 
the person of President Louis Bogran, another McEnery.
l^Louisiana, Official Journal of the House of 
Representatives. 1890, 20-21. According to Warmoth, Mc- 
Enery, after being promised a place on the Louisiana 
Supreme Court, pledged to see that "every ballot box should 
be stuffed to the limit in favor of General Nicholls." 
Warmoth, War. Politics and Reconstruction. 253.
CHAPTER VI
THE LOUISIANA FARMERS1 UNION
Every spring, after plowing and planting was over, 
the upland farmers of North Louisiana had a few days for 
relaxation and neighborhood visits. One day might be spent 
in the local cemetery. By custom, on a designated morning, 
family groups would assemble where their dead were buried 
for a “cemetery working:" an annual task of tidying up the
i
churchyard and the grave plots within. At noon, picnic 
baskets would be unpacked beneath the shade of nearby trees. 
Along with the food came a swapping of news and a discussion, 
of mutual problems. If times were hard the faces would be 
grim, and the talk would be bitter.
Near Bayou D'Arbonne, in Lincoln Parish, stood a 
frame church and a cluster of weathered gravestones. There, 
the usual group of neighbors assembled in the spring of 1881. 
A skimpy year was in prospect; credit in the stores was 
tight because last year's cotton crop had proved to be a
personal observation. The custom of a neighbor­
hood "cemetery working" survived, in portions of North 
Louisiana, long into the twentieth century. This writer, as 
a child, was present at several such events at a village 
churchyard in Franklin Parish.
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failure.^ Conversation shifted to the need for an effect­
ive organization of farmers. Most of those present, re­
membering the disappointment of the Grange, shrugged off all 
suggestions. But ten or twelve of the men agreed to meet 
later. They planned to create a new, secret society for the 
promotion of agricultural interests. Their minuscule so­
ciety was first called the Lincoln Parish Farmers* Club. By 
1886 it had been transformed into the Louisiana Farmers* 
Union. Under the latter name, in January of 1887, it merged 
with an organization of like purpose in Texas, to form the 
National Farmers* Alliance and Cooperative Union--better 
known as the Southern Alliance. This largest agricultural 
body of nineteenth century America, the Southern Alliance, 
rose out of many sources, fed by countless wellsprings of 
discontent. The ultimate origins of the Southern Alliance 
were often disputed by contemporary leaders of the movement. 
Obscure men at obscure places were involved in its genesis. 
But part of its mainstream can be traced back to a rustic 
churchyard in North Louisiana, in the early spring of the
^Watkins, King Cotton. 204. Louisiana*s 1880 
cotton crop was the smallest (359,147 bales) since the late 
I860*s. Yet the price farmers received for the 1880 crop 
remained on a level with the 1879 crop of over 500,000 




Lincoln was only one of several parishes to witness 
the creation of a farmers club in the early months of 1881,4 
But the little society at Bayou D*Arbonne seemed more am­
bitious than the others. Especially did one.of its original 
members, J. A. Tetts, hope that the club might be expanded 
into a statewide organization of dirt farmers. Louisianafs 
small agriculturists, Tetts surmised, were, in their dis­
united condition, "the natural prey of all kinds of specu­
lation, and the subject of every class of fraud, from paper 
sole shoes to adulterated fertilizers, and from lying
3
A mistake has been made concerning the date of 
origin of the Louisiana Farmers* Union. All recent agri­
cultural historians (John D, Hicks, Theodore Saloutos, Carl 
C. Taylor and others) who mention the Union begin it one 
year earlier, in 1880. Their source is the same in each 
case: J. A. Tetts, one of the founders of the Farmers*
Union, was quoted in Nelson A. Dunning, The Farmers* Alliance 
History and Agricultural Digest (Washington, 1891), 218-21, 
as giving the spring of 1880 as the date of organization. 
However, it can be verified that all other dates mentioned 
by Tetts, in the information he gave Dunning, are errone­
ously dated one year ahead of the actual event. For example, 
Tetts cites January, 1886, as the date of the merger of the 
Farmers* Union and the Texas State Alliance; however, news­
papers carried the story in January of 1887, Another con­
temporary account, W. Scott Morgan*s History of the Wheel 
and Alliance and the Impending Revolution (Hardv. Arkansas, 
1889), 3^0, records the date 1861 [sic] for the founding of 
the Louisiana Farmers* Union. Morgan*s date, or course, is 
a typographical error; it should have read 1881. Unfortu­
nately, a close search of available Louisiana newspapers for 
1880-81 yields no information as to the formation of the 
Union in Lincoln Parish. At the time, only one newspaper 
was published in that parish: the Vienna Sentinel. Copies
of it have not survived.
^Dailv Picayune. February 14, 17, 1881.
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advertisements to false market reports."
The constitution and by-laws of the Lincoln Parish 
Farmers* Club stressed the need for political action on the 
part of "the real farmers." Members were urged to work for 
the defeat of "all political rings and . . . machine candi­
dates." Better representation "in the halls of legis­
lation" was called for, so that laws friendly to agri­
culture might be passed, and unfriendly measures defeated. 
Clubs in other parishes were requested "to write us and 
. . . make permanent the organization throughout the State." 
But only "practical farmers . . .  of good moral character" 
need apply.^ In what may have been an oversight, Negroes 
were not specifically excluded from membership.
The club soon ran into trouble over the question of 
secrecy. In the neighborhood lived a number of prospective 
members who belonged to the Primitive Baptist Church, which 
did not permit its adherents to join covert organizations. 
Consequently, the original idea of secrecy was discarded.
The club met twice each month. By the end of 1881 about 
forty men, all from Lincoln Parish, had joined. Apparently, 
the feelers sent out to similar clubs in other parishes 
elicited little or no response. The proposed statewide 
organization simply failed to materialize, and attendance
^Morgan, History of the Wheel and Alliance. 369-70. 
^Dunning, The Farmers* Alliance History. 223.
212
at the meetings in Lincoln Parish began to dwindle. By the 
summer of 1882, the club had virtually disbanded.7
Three years later, in the fall of 1885, Tetts, who 
was secretary of the original club, happened to strike up a 
conversation with Samuel Skinner, another bewiskered farmer, 
on the streets of Ruston. "He had just sold his short crop 
of cotton for a short price," Tetts recalled later. "I had 
also disposed of my crop, and found that my receipts did 
not meet my expenses."8 The two men decided that the time 
had come to resurrect the defunct society.
Tetts and Skinner were, in many respects, typical of 
the small landowner class of upland Louisiana. Skinner, 
fifty-eight years old in 1885, was a "hard-working farmer" 
who lived only four miles from his place of birth. He 
lacked formal education, but laid claim to "a rich fund of 
useful information."^ During the 1870's he had been active 
in the Grange. Disgusted by state and national politics, 
Skinner considered himself an independent; he denied 
allegiance to any political party, Tetts was thirty-eight. 
He had come to Louisiana, a decade earlier, from his birth­
place in the unprosperous "sand hill" region of South
7Ibid.. 219.
8Ibid.
^Morgan, History of the Wheel and Alliance. 371-72, 
Portraits of Tetts and Skinner, rather crudely drawn, appear 
in this work.
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Carolina. Tetts had some education, though he was pulled 
out of school at fifteen and put to work in a grocery store 
owned by a relative. In 1864, at seventeen, he enlisted in 
the Confederate army. Tetts was destined for a long life 
of chronic poverty and disappointment; the Confederacy was 
merely the first of many lost causes he would espouse.
After the war he went back to South Carolina and spent four 
years trying to learn the mechanics of building cotton gins. 
Then he turned to farming. In 1872 Tetts emigrated to 
Louisiana, and selected a homestead in the red soil of 
Lincoln Parish. Like Skinner, he was an ex-Granger.*^
Early in March, 1886, the two men conferred again; 
this time at Tetts's farmhouse.** After making some changes 
in the old club's constitution and by-laws, Tetts and 
Skinner sent word to their acquaintances that an organi­
zation meeting would, on March 10, be held in Antioch 
Church; the place was located about fifteen miles from 
Tetts*s home. Only nine farmers attended. Tetts and 
Skinner went ahead with the meeting, however* They insisted 
upon a secret ritual, and their motion carried. The Lincoln 
Parish Farmers' Club had come to life again.
During the next three months, news of the order 
began to spread throughout the hills of Lincoln, and a
*°Ibid.. 369-70.
**Dunning, The Farmers' Alliance History. 220.
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number of subordinate unions were formed; then, in July, a 
mass meeting was held at the village of Vienna, and a 
"central parish organization" created.^ John M. Stallings, 
a well-to-do farmer with political ambitions, took office as 
President. Tetts was assigned his usual role, that of 
Secretary. Just as the Lincoln Parish club of 1881 had 
hoped to spread the organization into neighboring parishes, 
so did the revived order of 1886. The second effort, unlike 
the first, had the spirit of perseverance.
The formation of the Louisiana State Farmers* Union 
was proclaimed in August, 1886, one month after the mass 
meeting at Vienna. Stallings, and other officials of the 
parish club, now made up the hierarchy of the state union.
A new constitution was soon drawn up, and 1,000 copies 
printed for distribution. Somehow, a copy of the Texas State 
Alliance constitution had found its way into Lincoln Parish, 
and many of its features were incorporated into the organic 
law of the Louisiana order. An abbreviated version of the 
Grange ritual was adopted. The impecunious J. A. Tetts 
asked to be relieved of duty as Secretary, since he was a 
working farmer "and had a large family to support," but the 
other officials of the Farmers* Union persuaded him to stay 
on in the new position of Corresponding Secretary. . Back­




picturesque vigor. The chore of spreading word of the order 
became his primary task. Beginning in August, 1886, Tetts 
made good use of his pen. He composed and mailed out severdl 
hundred letters, and described the Union in a series of 
articles published in an agricultural magazine which had 
considerable circulation in the lower Mississippi valley.^ 
Tetts labored without salary. But he had earned the right 
to be pointed to, in later years, as "the founder of the 
Union in Louisiana.
The Farmers* Union met again in October, 1886. Four
16
parishes of Northwest Louisiana provided all the delegates.
Greenbacker influence was already beginning to show up in
the agrarian order; Jesse Moore Tilley, who figured in the
inflationist clamor of 1878-79, headed the Bienville Barish 
1 7Union. Oddly, the nascent Farmers* Union had not yet 
taken root in the Northcentral parishes of Catahoula, Grant,
^Tetts’s articles appeared in Home and Farm, 
published at Louisville, Kentucky. The only known copies 
of Home and Farm for the year 1886 are located in the Duke 
University Library, and even these are in fragments. Upon 
request, a Duke librarian searched for the Tetts articles 
but found no trace of them.
•^“’Louisiana Populist. September 25, 1896.
^ B y  October, 1886, parish Unions were operating in 
Lincoln, Bienville, Webster, and perhaps Union Barish. 
Information on the initial spread of the Farmers* Union is 
of a vague and conflicting nature. Cf. Biographical and 
Historical Memoirs of Northwest Louisiana. 26b. 690:
Colfax Chronicle. October 4. 1886 - April 30, 1887.
17Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest 
Louisiana. 205. 662.
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and Winn, the area where agrarian radicalism would, in suc­
ceeding years, prove strongest in Louisiana. By January of 
1887 the Louisiana Farmers* Union claimed 10,000 members— a 
gross exaggeration.^*® Not more than six, or at best seven, 
parishes had been organized by that time; the future heart­
land of the order was still virgin territory. Probably the 
actual membership did not exceed 3,000 by the first month 
of 1887, when the merger with the Texas State Alliance took 
place. Apparently, only white farmers were admitted.
Meanwhile, two farm organizations of greater member­
ship were spreading across the neighboring states of 
Arkansas and Texas. And up in the Midwest, the National 
Farmers* Alliance, with headquarters in Chicago, claimed to 
be organized in at least eight states.^ The Arkansas order 
titled itself the "Agricultural Wheel." It arose from 
origins similar to those of the Louisiana Union, beginning 
as a discussion society in a Prairie County schoolhbus* in 
1882. By 1885 the Wheel boasted of units in twenty Arkansas 
counties, and had begun to spread into all neighboring 
states except Louisiana. In 1886, under President Isaac 
McCracken, the Wheel listed 50,000 members; the following 
year, by some fanciful arithmetic, it claimed 500,000 in
•^®National Economist. Ill (March 22, 1890), 15.
*^Roy V. Scott, "Milton George and the Farmers* 
Alliance Movement," Mississippi Valiev Historical Review 
XLV (June, 1958), 102-104.
eight states.^
The Texas Alliance dated back to the middle 1870*s. 
Its economic concepts and internal arrangement borrowed 
much from the Grange, and a good portion of the original 
membership came from that fading fraternity. According to 
Charles W. Macune1s unpublished history of the Alliance, it 
first emerged near Fort Worth, in 1876; stock raisers who 
were having trouble with horse thieves founded the order. A 
The Texas Alliance languished from 1878 until 1885 because 
of political and personal differences among the leadership. 
Some Alliancemen preferred to keep the order aloof from 
politics; others, however, tried to tie it to the Texas 
Democratic party, while a smaller number leaned toward inde-
O Q
pendency and Greenbackism.
In 1885 the Texas Alliance began to make rapid 
strides in membership by harping on the need for economic 
unity. "Business purpose" became, for the moment, uppermost 
Texas farmers, acting through the Alliance, concentrated
E. Bryan, The Farmers* Alliance; Its Origin. 
Progress and Purposes (Fayetteville, Ark., 1891), 21;
Taylor. The Farmers1 Movement. 205.
2J-C. W. Macune, "The Farmers Alliance" (unpublished 
typewritten MS, 1920, deposited in University of Texas 
Library), 3. Cited hereafter as Macune MS.
22commons and Others, History of Labour in the 
United States. II, 462; Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the 
South. 71-T2T
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their trade on one merchant in each locality who would offer
23
them the best terms. Inevitably, politics again reared 
its head. Rumors spread that a strong faction of the Texas 
Alliance hoped to reach an understanding with the urban 
Knights of Labor, so as to create a proletarian block vote 
which could force concessions from the Texas Democratic 
party. Word of this plan reached Louisiana. The Weekly 
Truth, in May of 1886, prophesied that the small farmers 
and city wage earners of Louisiana would make a similar 
coalition.^4
Eighteen eighty-seven marks a dramatic turning point 
in the history of American agrarian movements. Early that 
year the Southern Alliance came to life at Waco, Texas.
From 1887 until 1890 it swept across the cotton states and 
into the Great Plains with cyclonic fury; in fact, two 
historians have suggested that "one must go back to Medieval
Europe, on the eve of the First Crusade, for an emotional
25situation comparable. . . .* Unquestionably, the man most 
responsible for the initial success of the Southern Alliance 
was Dr. Macune, of Texas. But Macune has also been 
given credit for initiating the fusion of Louisiana and
^Macune, MS, 11.
^4Baton Rouge Weekly Truth. May 21, 1886, Cf.
Macune MS, 12-16.
A c
C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson; Agrarian Rebel (New 
York, 1938), 137-38, quoting LouisM. Hacker and Benjamin B. 
Kendrick, The United States Since 1865 (New York, 1934), 301.
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Texas farmers which marked the formal beginning of the
Southern Alliance.^ This point needs some clarification.
For it was the obscure J. A. Tetts, and not Macune, who made
the first overtures.
At the October, 1886 meeting of the Louisiana
Farmers* Union, Tetts, at his own suggestion, was authorized
to correspond with the President of the Texas Farmers'
27Alliance to "try to bring about a consolidation." The 
copy of the Texas Alliance constitution in Lincoln Parish 
carried the names of its officials, and Tetts wrote to the 
man whose name appeared first, President Andrew Dunlap. But 
Dunlap did not answer Tetts*s letter; the political schism 
in the Texas order had forced his resignation in November. 
The powers of President had fallen to Dr. Macune, formerly
O Q
the Chairman of the executive committee. Toward the end 
of the year, Tetts received a note from Texas. .It was from 
Macune. He had discovered the Tetts letter in Dunlap's 
files and, in Tetts's words: "He saw no reason why the two
bodies should not unite and form a National as I had pro­
posed. . . . The Louisianian wrote back, asking Macune
^Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the South. 73; Hicks, 
The Populist Revolt. 108-109.
^Dunning, The Farmers' Alliance History. 221; 
Morgan, History of the Wheel and Alliance. 37^ ).
2®Macune MS, 16.
OQ
^Dunning, The Farmers' Alliance History, 221.
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to send a Texas representative to the next meeting of the
Farmers1 Union, scheduled for January 11, 1887, in Ruston.
Macune sent Evan Jones to Ruston, with the news that the
Texans were anxious to have the Louisiana Farmers' Union
join them and begin the work of proselytizing the rest of
the South. At the Ruston assembly, Tetts was selected as
Ha committee of one" to visit the Texas State Alliance,
meeting at Waco on January 18, with plenary powers to act
30for the Union in completing the amalgamation.
Macune had two motives for expansion. Not only 
would spreading the order be a good thing in itself, but 
also, he hoped, the vision of expansion would serve to get 
the Texans' minds off their internal squabbles which were 
threatening to dissolve the o r d e r . F r o m  Tetts's stand­
point, aside from the obvious need for interstate unity, 
there was good reason for merging with the Texans. Late in 
1886 the Texas Alliance had infiltrated Louisiana territory.
About fifteen lodges in De Soto Parish had joined their
32western neighbors rather than the Louisiana Union. More­
over, the Agricultural Wheel appeared to be considering a 
move into Louisiana; President McCracken of Arkansas had
3®Bryan, The Farmers' Alliance. 12-13; Macune MS,
17.
3^Dunning, The Farmers' Alliance History. 46-47.
3^Mansfield Democrat, quoted in Opelousas St.
Landry Clarion. January 22, 1887; Biographical and Histori­
cal Memoirs of Northwest Louisiana, 244.
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written to Tetts and made inquiries about the Union.33 Both 
these organizations were larger than the Louisiana order; 
all three inflated their figures, but the Texas boast of 
100,000 members was proabbly closer to accuracy than Tetts's 
claim of one-tenth that number for his organization.34 
Tetts seemed to realize that the little Union was destined, 
sooner or later, to be absorbed by one of the more powerful 
orders. To approach one of them first, as he did, must have 
seemed the best course of action.
Attending the Waco meeting were 500 Texans and J. A.
35Tetts. At the closing session on January 21, the two 
state orders merged into the National Farmers Alliance and 
Cooperative Union of America— the Southern Alliance. Macune 
assumed the post of President; Tetts became First Vice- 
President. The formidable task of extending the order 
across the South now lay ahead. Macune mapped out a plan of 
action which would send organizers into every southern 
state; also, he hoped to induce McCracken's Wheel into the 
new order. Prior to the merger with Louisiana, Macune gave 
some thought to affiliation with Milton George's National
33Dunning, The Farmers' Alliance History. 221.
34Bryan, The^Farmers' Alliance. 13; Taylor, The 
Farmers* MovementV £ol.
3%acune MS, 16-17; National Economist. I (April 
13, 1889), 56.
"^Galveston (Tex.) Daily News. January 22, 1887.
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Farmers* Alliance* But both the Texas and Louisiana agrari­
ans disliked certain features of the midwestern order,
particularly its lack of secrecy, loose organization, and
37policy of admitting Negroes.
Before the Waco group adjourned, an announcement was 
made that the next meeting would be held in Shreveport, in 
October of 1887. Despite its significance, the creation of 
the Southern Alliance aroused little attention in the press.
Louisiana dailies mentioned it not at all, and to the
Galveston Daily News, the only important information from 
Waco on January 21 concerned one Jay Gould, who had, that 
day, taken a forty minute tour of the town, escorted by a 
group of prominent citizens. The last paragraph of the same 
story noted, laconically, that some Texas farmers had met 
with J. A. Fitts [ sic] of Louisiana" to form a national 
association of farmers.^®
Between January and October, 1887, the Southern
Alliance took root in eight states. Delegates to the
Shreveport meeting included the distinguished North Carolina 
agriculturist, Leonidas L. Polk.39 Since it was the first
37Bryan, The Farmers* Alliance. 11-13; Dunning, The 
Farmers* Alliance History. 109I
^Galveston (Tex.) Daily News. January 22, 1887.
39New Orleans Times-Democrat. October 13, 1887*
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meeting to include several states, an Alliance handbook 
called the Shreveport gathering "the first national meeting" 
of the Southern Alliance.4® The Agricultural Wheel, im­
pressed by the Alliance's growth, sent a delegation to
41
discuss consolidation. Overtures were made by, and to, 
industrial labor. Tetts introduced the following resolution 
at Shreveport:
The National Farmers Alliance . . . extends its 
fraternal good wishes to all labor organizations 
. . . and ask them to assist us in our battle for 
the rights of producers, and that each work to 
bring about a harmony of sentiment, and unity of 
action between the different organizations of 
labor.42
The resolution passed. But its vague phraseology 
gave evidence of the growing rift within the Southern 
Alliance in regard to combining with urban laborers. A 
fundamental question was involved: if the Alliance went
headlong into "unity of action" with city labor, such unity 
would doubtless be expressed by political pressures on 
political parties, perhaps even by independent political 
action. At least half the Southern Alliancemen were 
small landowners, and most were relatively loyal
4®F. G. Blood, Handbook and History of the National 
Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union (Washington. 1893). 
37.
4*Paily Picayune. October 13-14, 1887; National 
Economist. I (April 13. 1889). 57.
^ National Economist. I (April 13, 1889), 57.
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43Democrats. The more conservative elements, which in­
cluded Macune, were willing to act with urban labor up to 
a point; but they were adamantly opposed to the formation 
of a proletarian third party. The Knights of Labor was the 
only significant order of wage earners in the South.^4 The 
fact that Knights membership included not only urban workers 
but wage earners in the small towns and countryside, gave
it a partially rural cast and seemed to encourage the idea
45of Alliance-Knights cooperation; on the other hand, the 
Knights1 membership rolls took in rural Negro laborers, 
which disturbed the more conservative Alliancemen. But a 
good percentage of the Alliance was too poor to employ 
laborers--many were tenants or worked for wages themselves-- 
and this substrata of the Alliance anticipated, rather than 
feared, the economic and political possibilities of close 
accord with the Knights. Tetts spoke for the left wing of 
the Alliance when he wrote: "The labor in the field ought
to be a friend to the labor in the factory and the mine. .
. . They ought to unite to crush off the leeches that are
4^Cf. Forum. X (September, 1890), 35; Woodward, 
Origins of the New South. 192-93; Saloutos, Farmer Move­
ments in the South. 76; Macune MS, 11-14, 18-30.
^Frederick Meyers, "The Knights of Labor in the 
South," Southern Economic Journal VI (April, 1940), 479,
482.
45Commons and Others, History of Labour in the 
United States. II, 492.
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sucking the life blood of all."4^
In Louisiana, by the time of the Shreveport meeting, 
the Alliance had entrenched itself in all the upland 
parishes north of the Red River. Over 300 chapters were 
meeting weekly; total membership was now probably close to 
10,000, though claims ran much higher.47 Earlier, in 
February of 1887, a newspaper which purported to be the 
state organ of the association, the Choudrant Farmers1 
Union, began weekly publication. Choudrant, a tiny hamlet 
in Lincoln Parish, did not even have a post office.4® As a 
mark of provincial pride, the name "Farmers' Union," rather 
than "Alliance," continued in popular usage within Louisiana; 
all state meetings into the 1890*s took the former desig­
nation.4^ However, the allegiance of Farmers' Union members 
to the Southern Alliance was understood by all. In the 
following year, 1888, the Farmers' Union spread among the 
white farmers of Southcentral Louisiana, and crossed the 
Mississippi into the old Grange strongholds of the Florida
^National Economist. Ill (September 6, 1890), 398-
99.
47Colfax Chronicle. March 5, 1887; Winnfield 
Southern Sentinel. September 16, 1877; Daily Picayune. 
November 16, 1687.
4®Colfax Chronicle. March 5, April 30, 1887.
4%innfield Winn Parish Democrat. September 11, 1888. 
Hereafter, the term "Farmers' Union," rather than "Southern 
Alliance" will be used whenever its activities on the state 
level are described.. This will help avoid confusion, and 
is in keeping with the usage in contemporary sources.
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parishes. By 1889 no less than 15,000, perhaps 20,000, 
Louisiana farmers in thirty-five parishes were enrolled in 
local chapters; promotional literature in French had also
begun to be distributed among the Acadian farmers near the
51Gulf coast. A decade earlier the state Grange, at its
height, had numbered no more than 10,000^ The old centers
of Grange strength were now doubly organized in the Union.
Surviving pockets of Grange activity were quickly
swallowed up into the new order. In 1881, after two years
of inactivity, the state organization of the Patrons of
Husbandry took on a flickering second life through the
efforts of its old leaders, including Daniel Dennett of the
52Daily Picayune. From 1882 through 1886, a prosperous
planter of East Baton Rouge parish, Daniel Morgan, assumed
53charge of what passed for the state Grange. Morgan*s
political affinity for the McEnery wing of the Democratic
54party was common knowledge, and this must have crippled 
50Crowley Siqna1. quoted in Baton Rouge Daily Capi- 
tolian-Advocate. March 30, 1888; Colfax Chronicle. Sep-bem- 
ber 29, 1888.
51National Economist. I (May 25, 1889), 155-56; III 
(August 30, 1890), 383.
^Daily Picayune. February 17-19, 1881.
53Baton Rouge Daily Capitollan-Advocate. August 2, 
1882; Willis, “The Grange Movement," 26-28; Winnfield 
Southern Sentinel. December 18, 1885; Baton Rouge Weekly 
Truth. July 16, 1886.
^Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. December
7, 1887.
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chances for a Grange revival among rank-and-file farmers* 
After 1883, a good majority of the active Patrons in Louisi­
ana were to be found inside the borders of backwoods Winn 
Parish* In 1884, 1885, and 1886, Morgan came up from Baton 
Rouge to preside over the annual "state" conventions of the 
Grange in Winn. By 1885, nine of the sixteen persons
elected to official positions in the Louisiana Grange lived
55in Winn Parish. But when the Farmers' Union entered Winn 
in February of 1887, Grange activity, even there, virtually 
ceased. Morgan then forsook the Grange to play a minor 
role in the Farmers' U n i o n , a n d  at last Dennett was forced 
to admit that the Grange "has had its day."5*^
The business program of the Farmers' Union-Alliance 
in Louisiana followed, in the main, the path staked out by 
the old Grange. Between 1887 and 1890, about a score of 
retail stores, owned by farmer-stockholders, operated under 
the auspices of the U n i o n . B u t  often used was a simpler
^Winnfield Southern Sentinel. December 18, 1885. 
^Colfax Chronicle. September 29, 1888, January 4,
1890.
5^Pailv Picayune, quoted in Leesville People*s 
Friend. March 21, 1889.
58Grant and Winn had three cooperative stores each; 
Sabine, two; Acadia, Caldwell, Claiborne, De Soto, Lincoln, 
Livingston, Rapides, and Webster, one each. List compiled 
from the files of the National Economist; Biographical and 
Historical Memoirs of Northwest Louisiana, passim: Colfax 
Chronicle. April 30. 1887-April 9. 1892; Daily Picayune.
June 30, 1887-April 12, 1890. Most of the Alliance stores, 
and the state agency, had failed by the winter of 1892-93.
228
device known as the "Farmers1 Trade Committee," made up of
delegates from a local Union or group of Unions within a
parish, which would meet with local merchants and agree to
throw all the order*s. trade to the merchant giving the best
terms. A typical arrangement of this type could be found
in Grant Parish, where C. C. Nash, a merchant in the town
of Colfax, obtained the exclusive trade of six nearby Union
on his pledge to limit his net profit to ten per cent on
cash sales, and twenty per cent per annum on credit 
59accounts. The fact that the farmers seemed satisfied 
with this compact offers striking evidence of the severe 
credit terms that most of them had endured up to that time.
Most important of all the cooperative activities 
within the state was the creation of a Farmers* Union 
Commercial Association of Louisiana; it was set up in 1888, 
and its headquarters were located in New Orleans.^ Dif­
fering little from the old state agency of the Grange in 
the 1870's, the Association had both wholesale and retail 
functions. Louisiana products were sold to the outside 
world, and Farmers* Union retail outlets were supplied with 
provisions, along with individual farmers who managed to 
ship their crops direct to the New Orleans office. G. L.
P. Wren, formerly the publisher of the Minden Eaqle-Hve.
5^Colfax Chronicle. March 17, 1888.
^National Economist. I (April 13, 1889), 59;
Colfax Chronicle. October 6, 1888.
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presided over the Board of Directors.^ But actual control 
of the Association's New Orleans office fell to State Agent 
Thomas A~. Clayton.^ Clayton, a Scottish immigrant who had 
settled near Opelousas in the 1880's, had been instrumental 
in spreading the Farmers' Union into St. Landry Parish. 
Beginning in 1888, he divided his time between the New 
Orleans office and his farm.
Inherent in the Alliance economic program, in 
Louisiana and elsewhere, was the farmer's conviction that he 
was being deliberately victimized by the profit-mad business 
interests--the "money power." Monopolistic businesses, ac­
cording to the agrarian dialectic, grew rich off the sweat
and agony of the "producers;" that is, the plain folk who
63labored with their hands. Despite the fact that most 
Alliancemen were landowners, engaged in commercial agri­
culture, their distress was. such, in the late nineteenth 
century, that many viewed themselves not as rural capital­
ists, but as part of the downtrodden mass which capital ex­
ploited.^4 Mounting debts and declining cotton prices 
formed the basis of their complaints. A system of government
^ Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest 
Louisiana. 663; Colfax Chronicle. October 6. 1888.
^For a brief biography of Clayton, see Biographical 
and Historical Memoirs of Louisiana. I, 351.
^Harold U. Faulkner, Politics. Reform and Expansion; 
1890-1900 (New York, 1959), 57-59.
^4Hofstadter, The Age of Reform. 47.
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(particularly in Louisiana), which catered to the desires 
of the more predatory interests of the business world, 
added to the farmer’s woes and intensified his belief that 
a gigantic conspiracy was afoot against the common man.
The conspiracy theory was, of course, an oversimplifi­
cation. But it had some validity. And Pelican State 
farmers were a provincial lot; they did not travel much; it 
was natural for them to believe that Wall Street was as 
selfish and immoral as the Carondolet Street brokers of New 
Orleans who joined Major Burke in robbing the state; that 
the national Congress was simply an enlarged version of the 
cesspool of corruption to be found at Baton Rouge. Under 
the circumstances, it is not surprising that some of the 
more radical voices in the Southern Alliance were heard in 
Louisiana. J. A. Tetts was one such voice. But most dis­
turbing to conservative elements was the State Lecturer of 
the Farmers1 Union, Thomas J. Guice of De Soto Parish.
Guice's origins were as obscure as his circumstances 
were humble. He had drifted into Louisiana from Texas, 
where he was supposedly active in the Greenback party 
during the 1870*s . H i s  poverty, and shabby clothes, 
furnished much amusement for his Bourbon critics.^ But
^Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. October 23, 1890.
^Mansfield Journal, quoted in Colfax Chronicle. 
November 5, 1892.
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Guice1s utterances provoked some of the choicest of Bourbon
expletives. Guice was characterized as a "dirty . . .
f i i 7greasy . . . ignorant . . . "  demogogue, possessing a 
"wide expanse of tobacco stained b o s o m . P o i n t e d  in­
quiries were made in regard to his bathing habits.^ Yet
70all admitted his ability to inflame rural audiences.
Guice carried the conspiracy theory to extreme lengths.
Once, while harranguing a crowd at Natchitoches, he argued
that the Civil War itself had been a plot to enslave the
71poor white man under the pretense of freeing the Negro.
"The farmers and laborers should be the rulers," Guice in­
sisted; otherwise, the "moneyed aristocracy" would increase 
its power until " [ we ] will be reduced to the condition
of the English and Irish peasantry."
Rural anger often exploded into violence. To a 
debt ridden farmer, the.village merchant might be looked 
upon as a local manifestation of the Satanic Baron Roths- 
child described in Guice's orations. The fact that so
67Ibid.. October 3, 1891.
ft
Colfax Chronicle. October 22, 1892.
69Bastrop Clarion, quoted in Baton Rouge Daily 
Advocate. June 17, i89l.
70Daily Picayune. August 7, 1891; Bastrop Clarion- 
Appeal, quoted in Shreveport Evening Judge. February 11, 
1896.
^ National Economist. I (June 15, 1889), 198-99.
72Ibid.
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many of Louisiana*s rural merchants were Jewish made the
parallel even more plausible. Beginning in 1879f years
before the spread of the Farmers* Union, attacks on the
lives and property of Jewish tradesmen became almost
commonplace in Louisiana. That year, in St. Landry Parish,
the stores of Carl Wolff and P. Jacobs were destroyed by
arsonists, as was the residence of another merchant, Sam
Kaufman. In 1881, Lazarus Meyer, a prominent Catahoula
Parish merchant was murdered— presumably by an irate 
73customer. Five years later, to cite another example,
Simon Witkowski, a so-called "renegade Jew" who owned
60,000 acres and a number of stores in the Carroll parishes,
was forced to flee the region after his white tenants
burned one of his stores. Two people were cremated in the
74fire: a clerk and a Negro woman who worked for Witkowski.
Toward the end of the 1880*s the number of reprisals 
by rural debtors against their Jewish creditors increased. 
The gun vied with the torch as a favored weapon. During 
the spring of 1887, rifles were discharged into the homes 
of Jewish tradesmen in Avoyelles Parish, and arsonists in
7^Pailv Picayune. May 22, 1879; Rayville Richland 
Beacon, October 8, i88l.
^4Floyd Messenger, quoted in Daily Picayune.
October 12, 1887; New Orleans Weekly Pelican. December 4, 
1886. Witkowski was regarded as the political boss of West 
Carroll, as well as its largest landholder. He repre­
sented the parish in the state legislature, and, according 
to the Floyd Messenger, was "one of Governor McHnery*s 
satraps."
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Baton Rouge destroyed a gentile was well as a Jewish house
of business.7^ In 1889, during broad daylight, a "large
band" of white farmers rode into Delhi, in Richland Parish,
and shot up every mercantile establishment in town. All
76but one of Delhi’s stores were owned by Jews. The
farmers had taken this action, it was said, "to clear off
old debts." Two months later the same Delhi merchants
received a number of anonymous, threatening messages to
77leave town posthaste.
A spectacular plan of agrarian violence was plotted
by Bienville Parish debtors during the spring of 1888.
They tried, unsuccessfully, to burn the entire business
78section of the town of Arcadia. It is instructive to 
note that during the harvest season preceeding the fire, 
16,116 bales of cotton were shipped from Arcadia and 15,000
7^Colfax Chronicle. March 19, 1887; Daily Picayune 
November 12, 1887.
Vicksburg (Miss.) Commercia1 HeraId. quoted in 
Rayville Richland Beacon. November 2, 1889.
77Shreveport Daily Caucasian. January 4, 1890.
78Arcadia Record, quoted in Baton Rouge Daily Capi
tolian-Advocate. March 30, 1888.
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of these had passed through the hands of local merchants,
The Farmers* Union did not endorse such destructive out­
bursts. Hven the staunchest Bourbon papers seemed hesitant 
to accuse the order of instigating the attacks. But it is 
more than probable that many of the rifles and torches used 
against Jewish credit merchants were held in the hands of 
members of the Farmers* Union.
The Southern Alliance did score one victory over 
the "money power." In 1888-89, the Alliance undertook a 
boycott against the companies of the jute bagging trust.
This industry, which manufactured the covering for all 
cotton bales, aroused the ire of southern farmers by raising
the price of the article, in 1888, to allegedly "unreason-
80able" heights. A Farmers* Union convention held at 
Opelousas in August of 1888, condemned the jute bagging 
industry and proposed "to take measures for the intro­
duction of cotton ba.gging to be used in wrapping bales
79Arcadia Advance, quoted in Baton Rouge Daily Capi­
tol ian-Advo cate. February 1, 1888. The extent to which 
anti-Semitic feelings prompted Louisiana farmers into their 
attacks upon Jewish merchants is difficult to assess.
Gentile tradesmen were also subjected to bullets and store- 
burnings, but not as frequently. Newspaper files of the 
1879-90 period show that the great majority of merchants 
whose person or property was harmed had Jewish names. But 
this in itself is not positive proof of anti-Semitism, since 
Jewish merchants often outnumbered those of other faiths in 
Louisiana communities.
80New York Times. quoted in Lake Providence Carroll
Democrat. July 28, 1888.
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Of
. . . instead of jute." This proposed covering would 
obviously serve a dual purpose; it would create yet another 
use for cotton fiber, and provide cheaper covering for the 
bales. Farmers were jubilant when the Lane Company of New 
Orleans responded with the news that their firm had suc­
ceeded in manufacturing a cotton article which would meet
all the requirements for bale covering, yet would sell at a
82cheaper price than jute. Other state Alliances were
equally interested in cotton bagging. Some established
83cooperative mills. At Birmingham, in May of 1889,
Alliance leaders from all over the South voted unanimously
84to substitute cotton bagging for jute. And even though
a number of important cotton exchanges refused to accept
bales wrapped in cotton bagging, the jute trust had been
thoroughly frightened. By 1890 the price of jute bagging
85had dropped from thirteen to five cents. The triumph 
over the jute monopoly, important in itself, also gave 
Alliancemen a new feeling of power.
8^Colfax Chronicle. August 11, 1888.
®^Ibid., September 15, 29, 1888; National Economist. 
(June 15, 1889), 208.
8:%oodward, Origins of the New South. 198.
84William Warren Rogers, “Agrarianism in Alabama, 
1865-1896“ (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of 
North Carolina, 1959), 279.
85Ibid.. 287.
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As the decade of the 1890*s began, the more extrava­
gant claims of the Southern Alliance ran as high as 
3,000,000 members. However, an official census of the 
order, compiled in 1890, listed 1,269,500 in twenty-two 
states.®7 Louisiana’s membership was officially reported 
at 40,000.®® Though still popularly known as the "Southern 
Alliance," the proper title of the National Farmers1 
Alliance and Cooperative Union (NFACU), adopted at Waco in 
1887, had been changed to the Farmers* and Laborers* Union
of America (FLUA) in September of 1889, when consolidation
89with the Agricultural Wheel was achieved. 7 Finally, at 
the third annual convention of the order, held at St. Louis 
in December of 1889, the title was once again revised. The 
formal designation thereafter was: National Farmers*
Alliance and Industrial Union (NFAIU).^
Efforts to unite the Southern Alliance with the 
National, or Northern Alliance of Milton George, made at
®®Woodward, Origins of the New South. 192.
®7Haynes, Third Party Movements. 234-35.
®®Shreveport Weekly Caucasian. January 8, 1890. In 
all probability not more than 25,000 of Louisiana’s white 
farmers had joined the order by 1890. Smaller still would 
be the number who regularly paid dues. But the number of 
white farmers who sympathized with the work of the Farmers* 
Union must have been double or more the actual membership.
®^Blood, Handbook and History of the National 
Farmers* Alliance. 39-40.
^ Ibid.. N. B. Ashby, The Riddle of the Sphinx 
(Des Moines, 1890), 437-39.
237
St. Louis in 1889, failed for essentially the same reasons
that had prevented a fusion of the Texas Alliance with the
91latter three years before. The Southern Alliance, how­
ever, had grown considerably more powerful than the northern 
order. And at St. Louis, the state Alliances of Kansas and 
the Dakotas bolted George's association to join the stronger 
Southern Alliance.^ The year 1889 was also the end of 
Macune1s two year career as President of the southern order;
Leonidas L. Polk, from 1889 until his death in 1892, served
93as chief executive. Macune turned to editing the official
organ of the Southern Alliance, the National Economist.
which had begun publication in Washington, D. C. some months
94before the St. Louis convention. But Macune still had a 
large voice in the inner circle of Alliance leaders. His 
evangelical zeal continued undiminished. The Alliance, he 
insisted, "is a living, active . . . embodiment of the cause 
of Jesus Christ."^"*
Just as the Alliance claimed affinity with Jesus, so 
did a more worldly agency than either, the Democratic party
91Herman C. Nixon, "The Cleavage Within the Farmers' 
Alliance Movement," Mississippi Valley Historical Review. XV 
(June, 1928), 22-33: Hicks. The Populist Revolt. 119-27.
.^Taylor, The Farmers' Movement. 255.
^3Stuart Noblin, Leonidas La Fayette Polk: Agrarian
Crusader (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1949), 212.
^ National Economist. I (March 14, 1889), 1-12.
^Dunning, The Farmers' Alliance. 260.
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of the South, assert that it was in communion with the cause 
of the farmer. Beyond question, most white Alliancemen in 
the South--at least, before 1890— were dutiful Democrats.
But from the beginning, the Alliance had attracted political 
heretics. A significant minority of the Louisiana Farmers* 
Union membership had a record of Independent, Greenbacker, 
and even Republican activities in the decade between Recon­
struction and the Waco conference. The old Greenbacker-
Republican coalition in Grant and Winn parishes, led by
96Benjamin Brian, wasted no time in joining the Union. The 
fact that Parson Brian, and a number of others like him 
throughout the South, had gone into the Alliance movement 
disturbed conservative elements both within and without the 
order.
In the beginning, Bourbon chieftans scoffed at sug­
gestions that the dirt farmers of the Southern Alliance
might someday rebel against the party of home rule and white 
9 7supremacy. The real problem, as the more complacent 
conservatives saw it, was to deftly forestall the efforts of 
the Alliance to liberalize the Democratic party from within. 
Benign platitudes and sympathy for the woes of the agri­
culturist were expressed by Bourbon leaders in practically
^Colfax Chronicle. November 19, 1887, May 5, 1888; 
Daily Picayune. August 7, 1891.
97Forum. X (September, 1890), 35.
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every part of the South as the Alliance grew to formidable 
size. Yet the entrenched officeholders, with few except­
ions, had no intention of aceedelng to Alliance economic 
demands. Nor were they willing to give dirt farmers a 
larger voice in party councils. Typical of the conserva­
tive Democratic attitude was the following from the Daily 
Picayune: That northern agrarians, in Republican states,
had ample reason for political independency, but the Dixie 
farmer already had f,a party which, while devoted to no 
special cause, nevertheless afford [s] the farmers every
protection."9®
Not surprisingly, the ultra-Bourbon regime in 
Louisiana felt compelled to take notice of the growing 
spirit of agrarian unrest. Before 1886, statewide agri­
cultural organizations had lacked either the inclination or 
the strength to disturb the Louisiana status quo. The 
Louisiana Sugar Planters1 Association, formed in 1887, took 
into its ranks the great land barons of the southern 
parishes, and its President, Duncan F. Kenner, was an "old 
line Whig" presumed to be worth about $2,000,000.99 jn 
cotton parishes, the National Cotton Planters1 Association
9®Paily Picayune. December 8, 1890.
99New Orleans Daily Pelican. July 9, 1887; Dumas 
Malone (ed.), Dictionary of American Biography. X (New York, 
1933), 337-38.
240
(first known as the Mississippi Valley Cotton Planters* 
Association) was founded in 1879. Membership in the latter 
order was also confined to great landlords, together with 
bottomland merchants in the cotton p a r i s h e s . T h e  Grange 
was too weak to disturb professional politicians.
Late in 1886 the flickering attempts to establish a 
Louisiana Farmers* Union began to merit Bourbon attention.
As the renascent order started taking shape in the north­
western parishes, an announcement was made in Baton Rouge 
to the effect that His Excellency Samuel D. McEnery had 
become interested in the subject of agricultural organi­
zation. On December 2, 1886, Governor-McEnery issued a 
proclamation, which read, in part:
As Governor of Louisiana [I ] do hereby request 
the planters and farmers of Louisiana to meet at the 
city of Baton Rouge, in the agricultural hall of the 
State University [on January 26, 1887] for the purpose 
of organizing a State Agricultural Society.101
McEnery was urged by a Baton Rouge "Farmers' and
102Planters' Club" to issue this call. It may be signifi­
cant that Daniel Morgan, a supporter of the Governor, was a
i mleading member of the Club. Morgan, who was also Master
lO^st. Joseph North Louisiana Journal. May 10, 1879; 
Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the South. 57-59.
^■^Louisiana State Agricultural Society, Proceedings 
of First Annual Meeting (Baton Rouge, 1887), 3.
10 9
Baton Rouge Weekly Truth. December 17, 1886.
103Ibid.. April 16, 1886.
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of the mordant state Grange, was in a position to have 
knowledge of the upcountry Farmers1 Union, which up to that 
time had failed to be reported in the New Orleans or Baton 
Rouge newspapers. Governor McEnery made no public mention 
of the Farmers1 Union. But suspicion attaches to the date 
of McEnery*s proclamation, and to the date for which he set 
the organization meeting of the Louisiana Agricultural 
Society. The former came during the time that Tetts and 
his friends were discussing amalgamation with the Texas 
Alliance; the latter missed by five days the birth of the 
Southern Alliance at Waco.
An oration by Governor McEnery opened the first 
session of the Louisiana State Agricultural Society. "Labor 
has organized," said McEnery, "and it is opportune, yea even 
a necessity, for agriculture to combine."^4 But the 
nature of the association which the Governor visualized may 
be gauged by the names of those who were subsequently chosen 
to fill the Society's offices. General Joseph L. Brent, a 
conservative sugar planter and Democratic legislator from
105Ascension Parish, served as President from 1887 until 1890.
■^4Louisiana State Agricultural Society, Proceedings 
of First Annual Meeting. 6.
•^^Brent was succeeded by Dr. W. S. Frierson of De 
Soto parish in 1890. John Dymond, a wealthy sugar planter
from Plaquemines parish, headed the order from 1891 to 1896. 
Louisiana State Agricultural Society, Proceedings of Fourth 
Annual Meeting (Baton Rouge, 1890), passim: Ibid., Proceed­
ings of Ninth Annual Meeting, passim.
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Brent was also president of his parish branch of the state
1 f)ASugar Planters1 Association. Other sugar planters, also
active Democratic politicians, served under General Brent
as district vice-presidents or members of the Society*s
executive committee; the more notable of these were John
107Dymond, Emile Rost, and Donelson Caffery, Sr. None of
the Farmers* Union leaders were listed on the State Society^
committees. Indeed, none of them were reported as attending
the organization meeting which McEnery had called. McEnery
expressed keen disappointment that "every parish in the
108state was not present," He obviously hoped to persuade
farmers into accepting the leadership of the large planters 
who headed the Society; even more, in all probability, he 
hoped to use the Society as a fulcrum to lift the farmers of 
the state away from Nicholls and toward himself.
The Shreveport Times. temporarily at odds with Mc­
Enery, made the snide observation that "such sturdy farmers 
as Governor McEnery and Editor Jastremski" were at the State 
Society*s first convention, along with Mayor Burke and 
other "horny handed sons of toil." The paper added that 
these gentlemen were interested in cultivation, to be sure--
l^Brown, Ascension Parish. 28.
107Louisiana State Agricultural Society, Proceedings 
of First Annual Meeting. 76-77.
108Ibid.. 6.
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they wished to cultivate the farm vote for the incumbent 
r e g i m e . M o r e  frank was the Homer Claiborne Guardian, 
which denounced the State Society as a "sinister" maneuver 
by McEnery--"another contemptible rope-in."^^ And an 
Opelousas editor prophesied that "the great mass of farmers" 
would shun it."^^ However, none of the Farmers' Union 
leaders publicly denounced the State Society. While McEnery 
was Governor, they simply kept away from its meetings.
After Nicholls's return to the State House in 1888, 
a number of small farmers began participating in the Louisi­
ana State Agricultural Society. North Louisiana received 
special attention from the State Society; in 1888 its 
annual convention was held at Shreveport, in 1889 at Monroe, 
in 1890 at Arcadia, and in 1891, at Alexandria. But sugar 
planters remained at the helm. Once in a while, though, a 
radical, slipped into the Society's sessions. At the third 
annual session, Charles V. Soniat was scheduled to read a 
paper with the innoxious title: "Review of the Rice Indus­
try of Louisiana." But he must have shocked staid Society 
officials with his closing, off-the-subject tirade:
Arise, ye agriculturists. . . . The legislators 
are against us. The speculators are against us. The
^-O^Shreveport Times, quoted in Daily Picayune. 
January 24, 1887.
^^Homer Claiborne Guardian, quoted in Opelousas 
St. Landrv Democrat. January 15, 1887.
■^^■Opelousas St. Landrv Democrat. February 5, 1887.
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agriculturist is about turned beggar in the land of 
plenty; the sweat of his brow is turned into pearls 
by that grinding despot, monopoly. . . . The time is 
now ripe for a leader to call us together and beckon 
us to enter one grand association or party of agri­
culturists, to control the destinies of this 
nation.112
Conservatism, however, continued to be the watch­
word of the State Society. President Brent expressed
I I O
horror at any proposal to form a "new party." He also 
defended that bane of the small farmer, the credit system. 
"Credit," said Brent, "is the flower and blossom of good 
government," and he argued that farmers who were hurt by 
the system should blame their "individual frailty.
Brent assumed a friendly but cautious pose toward the 
Farmers* Union. In 1888 he "expressed a desire to hear an 
explanation of [its] objects and purposes," and invited 
"all Alliances, Unions, and Granges" to attend the next 
state convention of the S o c i e t y . B y  1889, Brent had 
reached the conclusion that the Farmers* Union was a "bene­
ficent organization" and implied that it was in partnership 
with the State Society. "We," Brent proclaimed, "are so
•^^Louisiana State Agricultural Society, Proceedings 
of Third Annual Meeting (Baton Rouge, 1889), 39-40.
113
Gen. J. L. Brent, Annual Address Delivered Janu­
ary 25, 1888. at Shreveport, Before the Louisiana State 
Agricultural Society (New Orleans. 1668). 15.




numerous that if we organize in politic [ s ] . . . all the
t
powers and functions of the State would pass under our
control." Of course, he added, Louisiana's farmers should
not take advantage of their electoral majority. Such a
course would be, he said, "inexpedient.
In the end, the Nicholls, or "Reform" wing of the
Democratic party proved more adroit than the McEneryites in
dealing with agrarian unrest. The State Society accomplished
little in that direction for either McEnery or Nicholls;
however, beginning in 1890, a determined effort was made by
the gentry of the Nicholls faction to capture the Farmers'
Union. To achieve their goal the Reform Democrats needed
a stalking horse within the Union. They found him in the
person of Thomas Scott Adams.
Adams, a prosperous cattleman and planter of East
Feliciana Parish, came to Louisiana at the age of thirteen, 
117in 1853. His South Carolina birthplace was not far from 
that of J. A. Tetts. A college graduate and an ex-Confeder- 
ate officer, Adams was raised in the genteel tradition of 
Noblesse Oblige. He entered Louisiana politics in 1884. 
Elected to the state legislature that year, Adams quickly 
became "disgusted with the corruption" he found at Baton
^^Louisiana State Agricultural Society. Proceed­
ings of Third Annual Meeting (Baton Rouge, 1889$, 4-8.
117Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Louisi­
ana . I, 246-47.
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118Rouge. When Alliance organizers visited the Florida 
parishes, Adams was one of a number of substantial farmers 
who joined. He was elected President of the Louisiana 
Farmers' Union in 1888, and was reelected at each of the 
next three annual meetings. By the end of his fourth term 
in 1892 the Farmers' Union was all but dead.^*^ Through 
ineptness and political naivetee, and perhaps a touch of 
mendacity, Adams was largely responsible for its decline.
The Feliciana planter gave enthusiastic support to 
most of the economic panaceas urged by the Southern 
Alliance. But in the all-important field of politics he 
remained an unswerving Democrat. More conservative than 
most state leaders of the Alliance, Adams did not even 
demand a change of personnel within the Democratic party: 
"We ask for a change of measures, not of men," he told his 
fellow Louisianians.^^ Adams was most anxious to put down 
third party talk among the rank-and-file. He spoke the 
Bourbon language. Gratefully, the Nicholls administration 
sought him out.
In August of 1890, shortly before his second re- 
election as President of the Farmers' Union, Adams was ap­
pointed state Commissioner of Agriculture by Governor
118Ibid.
119
New Orleans Times-Democrat. August 2, 1892; 
Colfax Chronicle. August 13, 1892.
•^•^ National Economist. Ill (August 30, 1890), 381.
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Nicholls. Ominously, the Baton Rouge Daily Advocate, which
steadfastly opposed almost any conceivable sort of reform,
agrarian or otherwise, thought Adams*s appointment "an
1 91excellent one." But the Bourbon campaign to capture the 
Farmers* Union had only begun. By invitation, the Union 
held its 1890 convention in the State Capitol, Simultane­
ously, a few blocks away, a number of "the leading citizens
of Louisiana" sat together in the first convention of the
122Anti-Lottery League. Edgar Farrar, Charles Parlange, 
Donelson Caffery, Sr., Murphy J. Foster, and other wealthy 
gentlemen from New Orleans and the sugar parishes had 
organized the League for the announced purpose of fighting 
the Louisiana State Lottery's bid for constitutional re- 
charter in the forthcoming state election of 1892. Anti- 
Lottery Leaguers implored the Farmers* Union to join forces 
with them.^^
Essentially, the Anti-Lottery League crusade of 
1890-92 was a continuation of the Reform Democracy campaign 
of 1888 which ousted McEnery from the State House. It was 
expected that the lottery, in addition to seeking recharter 
in 1892, would attempt to return its favorite, McEnery, to
1 91
Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. August 3, 1890.
122Ibid., August 7, 1890.
1 9^
Sidney James Romero, "The Political Career of 
Murphy James Foster," Louisiana Historical Quarterly.
XXVIII (October, 1945). 1156-52: Daily Picayune. August 
5-6, 1891.
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the executive chair. Respectable conservatives despised
the lottery. It demoralized labor. It "was indubitably a 
124nuisance," Besides, the Farmers* Union had already
announced its firm opposition to the l o t t e r y . j f
patricians in the Democratic party did not come forth to
lead the fight against the gigantic gambling syndicate,
then the farmers might either capture the Democratic party
on an anti-lottery platform, or build a powerful third
party out of public hostility to the lottery. These latter
possibilities may have distressed the gentry more than did
the lottery itself.'*’2^
Anti-lottery leaders proposed that the agrarian
order work with them to seize control of the approaching
Democratic state nominating convention. The League made all 
127the overtures. Many Unionmen were suspicious of League
1 ?8motives and so were "far from friendly" to its proposals.
But when the League pledged the offices of Governor, 
Treasurer, and Superintendent of Public Education to the
124Thomas Beer, The Mauve Decade; American Life at 
the End of the Nineteenth Century (New York. 1926^« 103-105.
^S'Baton R0uge Daily Advocate. August 8, 1890.
^■^Cf. Winnfield Comrade, quoted in Colfax Chroni­
cle, August 20, 1892; Shreveport Progress. November 20, 1897.
•^^Dailv Picayune. August 13, 1891.
l28Ibid.. August 6, 1891.
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Farmers' Union, the agrarians voted, at their annual meeting
in August of 1891, to join hands with the League. By mutual
agreement, their candidate for Governor was announced as
Thomas Scott Adams. Thus was born the "Lafayette Compact,"
named after the town where the Farmers' Union held its 1891 
1 29convention. 7
One Farmers' Union leader who was present at
Lafayette denounced the compact as an attempt to herd the
farmers "back into the old party to be robbed and enslaved 
130as yore." Subsequent events gave weight to this 
statement. Late in December, 1891, the Democratic nomi­
nating convention at Baton Rouge split in half. "Pro­
lottery" and "Anti-lottery" Democratic sessions were held in
separate buildings; each faction denounced the other as
131being a rump convention. The Pro-lottery nominee was, 
as expected, McEnery. And, as the farmers had been promised, 
Adams was nominated for Governor by the Anti-Lottery League- 
Farmers* Union Democratic convention. But after being 
selected Adams arose to make an announcement. He wished to 
decline the honor. "For the sake of the great cause," he 
said, another man should be chosen. At the top of his list
129Lafayette Advertiser, quoted in Opelousas St. 
Landry Clarion. August 15, 1891.
•^Qpailv Picayune. September 19, 1891.
1 31
New Orleans Times-Democrat. December 17-20, 1891; 
Romero, Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXVIII, 1156-58.
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132of suggestions was the name of Murphy J. Foster.
As revealed later, the Anti-lottery League men had
held a number of "harmonizing conferences" with Adams just
133prior to and during the convention. They informed him 
that he could not possibly beat McEnery in the general 
election. Governor Nicholls also reportedly brought 
political weight to bear against Adams and urged instead
1 Q/l
the nomination of Foster. Pointed questions were asked 
about the ability of Adams*s agrarian supporters to provide 
campaign f u n d s . R e l u c t a n t l y ,  Adams capitulated. He 
insisted, however, on a sham nomination. Also, as part of 
the bargain, the Farmers* Union President obtained a lower 
place on the ticket: that of Secretary of State.
137Foster, known derisively as "the Saint from St. Mary," 
thereupon received the convention*s gubernatorial nomi­
nation. Foster went on to defeat McEnery in the April, 1892 
general election.
l32opeiousas St. Landrv Clarion. December 26, 1891. 
133
Chambers, A History of Louisiana. I, 709. 
^^Romero, Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXVIII,
1154.
■^^Chambers, A History of Louisiana. I, 709.
136Baton Rouge Capital Item, quoted in New Orleans 
Louisiana Review. February 3, 1892.
l^Romero, Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXVIII,
1159.
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The Kansas Exodus of 1879 took away only a small 
fraction of Louisiana’s colored population. Probably not 
more than 10,000 managed to leave the state that year, 
though a considerably higher number made efforts to do so.
By 1880 the "Kansas fever" had subsided.* For the re­
mainder of the century, the freedmen of Louisiana displayed 
little interest in emigration, but their protests against 
economic and political conditions within the state by no 
means ceased.
In 1880, and again in 1887, colored wage earners in 
the sugar parishes engaged in strikes which brought down 
upon them the wrath of their employers and the state govern­
ment. Negroes upstate seemed more docile. The tenant and 
share crop systems prevalent in the cotton parishes held out 
even less hope for economic advancement than did the small 
wages paid cane field workers; however, the decentralized 
environment of the cotton plantations restrained the possi­
bility of unified protest by Negro tenant families. Sugar 
field workers, on the other hand, ordinarily worked under
*Daily Picayune. April 14, 1880, March 25, 1881.
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the gang labor system.^ Also, the sugar parishes had at 
least a semblance of a two party system up through the 
1890's; a significant number of sugar planters voted Re­
publican, and Negroes in the region were often allowed a 
modicum of selection in politics as well as in place of 
employment. Black labor in the cotton parishes generally 
had no choice in politics or anything else.
The 1880 strikes began in the cane fields of St. 
Charles Parish on March 17. Plantation owners immediately 
accused the Negro ringleaders of trespassing upon private 
property "and inciting the laborers to stop work in the 
fields." According to the parish judge, the ringleaders 
were armed with sticks, bludgeons and pistols, and were 
"forcing [laborers] to join their band by assaults and 
threats." Judge James D'Augustin admitted, however, that 
most of the population of St. Charles was in sympathy with 
the "rioters." For that reason, the judge insisted that 
the disturbance could not be handled by local authorities, 
and he called upon the state government for militia.^
Richard Gooseberry, colored spokesman for the St. 
Charles strikers, denied the allegations of violence. The
^Sitterson, Sugar Country. 261.
^Cf. Baton Rouge Weekly Truth. June 4, 1886; New 
Orleans Weekly Pelican. October 29, 1887.
4New Orleans Democrat. March 19, 1880; Daily 
Picayune. March 19, 1880.
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colored people, he said, "had simply struck for one dollar 
a day, as they could no longer work for seventy-five 
cents." The planters, on the other hand, insisted that 
Gooseberry*s mob threatened to kill white people, burn 
dwellings, and seize control of the entire parish. However, 
no specific act of violence against the white minority of 
St. Charles was actually reported. And the Negro strikers 
displayed great forbearance when they gathered, on March 19, 
to listen to speeches by Judge D*Augustin and others who 
"exponded the law to them." One local official passed this 
compliment on to the black audience: "The great arm of the
great wheel of agriculture is the nigger. Next is the 
mule. . .
A battalion of state militia soon arrived in St. 
Charles. No resistance was met. Twelve strikers were 
arrested, sent to New Orleans, and each sentenced to serve 
thirty days in jail on charges of trespass. Up to that 
date, March 21, no trouble had been reported in other 
parishes and the strike in St. Charles appeared to be over.7
But labor discontent soon extended to other parishes 
along the lower delta. By March 29, the situation in St.
5New Orleans Democrat. March 18-21, 1880.
^Dailv Picayune. March 20, 1880.
7Ibid.. March 21-22, 1880.
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John the Baptist Parish looked more serious than the previ­
ous disturbance in neighboring St. Charles. The same demand 
was voiced: Negroes refused to continue working for
seventy-five cents. But the St. John strikers took a more 
militant attitude. They proclaimed that "the colored people
Q
are a nation and must stand together." To emphasize this 
idea, the ringleaders set up a provisional government of 
their own, complete with a constitution. All strikers in 
the parish reportedly took an oath to obey the constitution, 
which declared that none would work for less than one dollar 
a day, and any who violated the oath "shall be punished with 
a severe thrashing." The correspondent for the Daily 
Picayune, though hostile to the strike, was impressed by the 
earnestness of the Negroes. "Strange to say," he wrote,
q
they have kept sober."
Governor Wiltz responded to the pleas of St. John 
landowners by a proclamation which warned "these evil doers 
and mischievous persons to desist from their evil doings,"
He also sent in the state militia. The troops, it was ex­
plained, were to be used to "protect the laborers" from 
harm. Despite a number of arrests, the disturbance in St. 
John continued several days. Negroes paraded along the 
parish roads, carrying banners which read: "A DOLLAR A DAY
8Ibid.. March 29, 1880.
^Ibid.. March 31, 1880.
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OR KANSAS," and "PEACE— ONE DOLLAR A DAY." But no violence, 
outside of the whipping of Negroes by Negroes, was re­
ported. ^  One of the ringleaders, when arrested, said that 
he was "glad to go to jail," for at least there he would get 
"enough to eat."^
The St. John strike took place the same week that 
ex-President Ulysses S. Grant paid a visit to Louisiana. 
Strike leaders knew of it, and apparently timed their 
activities accordingly. Grant arrived in New Orleans at 
the peak of the trouble in nearby St. John. "The deluded 
laborers," one report noted, anticipate that "Grant will
1 9come up and make the planters pay the extra wages." It
soon developed that Grant was, in one sense, concerned with
Negro affairs in Louisiana. Remaining in New Orleans, he
attended a reception at the home of P. B. S. Pinchback,
13where he met "the cream of Negro society." Pinchback and 
a number of his guests were scheduled to be delegates to 
the forthcoming Republican national convention. And Grant 
hoped to return to the White House in 1881.^
■^New Orleans Democrat. March 27-April 2, 1880;
Daily Picayune, March 29-April 4, 1880.
^ Dailv Picayune. March 31, 1880.
12Ibid., April 1, 1880.
^'Hjzee, "Republican Politics in Louisiana," 97.
^When James A. Garfield, rather than Grant, was 
nominated by the Republicans in 1880, Louisiana's Negro 
population expressed marked disappointment. Rank-and-file 
colored voters had heard of Garfield and asked "who 
Sarfish' was." Ibid.. 100.
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Shortly after Grant1s departure from New Orleans, 
the strike in St. John was broken. Later in the month of 
April, however, dispersed strikes by cane field laborers 
were reported in Ascension, St. James, St. Bernard, 
Jefferson, and Plaquemines parishes, respectively. But in 
these districts the militia was not needed. Local authori­
ties broke up the strikes by quick arrests of the ring­
leaders. Wages remained at seventy to seventy-five cents 
for "first class" adult males, during the growing season 
for the next few years. The busy harvest and grinding 
season (from mid-October or early November to the end of
the year) usually brought wages of ninety cents to one
15dollar per day.
Localized labor disturbances, poorly organized and 
barren of results for the laborers, continued to crop up 
in the sugar country in the years from 1881 through 1886. 
Until the latter year, Negro workers were affiliated with 
no recognizable labor organization. Even in the rela­
tively serious strikes of 1880, there seemed to be no effort 
to unify the Negro workers of the several parishes. Workers 
in one parish might have taken their cue from events in 
another parish, but no attempt at interparish coordination 
was observed by correspondents on the scene of the 1880
*5Sitterson, Sugar Country. 248, 319.
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troubles
In April of 1886 white men representing the Noble
Order of the Knights of Labor came into the sugar parishes
and began organizing the Negro workers of the countryside. ‘
The Knights, as a national order, dated back to 1878.
Their doctrine of interracial solidarity, along with their
drive to combine all skilled and unskilled wage earners,
male and female, into one national order, identifies the
Knights as one of the most ambitious organizations in
18American labor history. In 1883 came the first report of
Knights membership in Louisiana. For the next three years
19the Knights were confined to the city of New Orleans.
There, they were overshadowed by the Central Trades and
Labor Assembly. The latter organization, born in 1880,
rather loosely federated the multitude of skilled and semi-
20skilled labor societies of the city. Local knights in
21New Orleans had their own district assembly.
^Cf. Daily Picayune. March 18-May 2, 1880; New 
Orleans Democrat7 Marcn 17-Mav 1, 1880.
•^ Daily Picayune. April 17, 1886.
1 ftFoster Rhea Dulles, Labor in America (2d ed., 
rev.; New York, I960), 126-27; Foner, History of the Labor 
Movement in the United States. II, 47, 56.
^Meyers, Southern Economic Journal. VI, 483.
20Pearce, "The Rise and Decline of Labor in New 
Orleans," 25.
^ Dailv Picayune. March 26, 1886.
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By the summer of 1886 the Knights1 nationwide 
membership stood at 700,000. Never again would the order be 
so strong.^ Yet, contrary to the national trend, the 
Knights developed new strength in the rural South during 
the late lSSO^. Membership losses in northern cities were 
partially offset by fresh adherents from the southern small 
towns and countryside. Especially did the order grow in 
North Caroline and Louisiana.^ New Orleans provided most 
of the leadership for the Knights1 program of expansion in 
Louisiana. At least 5,000 New Orleaneans were in the order 
by mid-1887, and a Knights newspaper, Southern Industry, 
had begun weekly publication. ^ It was from this urban 
center that Knights organizers fanned out into the lower 
delta parishes in 1886, to impress upon cane field Negroes 
the need for unity in obtaining concessions from their em­
ployers. Higher wages and payment in “United States money
instead of commissary past board“ were the major rallying
25points. The Knights also recruited white and Negro
^ B y  1888, national membership in the Knights of 
Labor had declined to 210,000. Forum. VII (July, 1889),550.
‘■‘^ Meyers, Southern Economic Journal. VI, 485-86.
^4New Orleans Southern Industry was edited by 
William I. O^onnell. It was one of Twenty-one Knights of 
Labor newspapers published at that time in the United States. 
Philadelphia Journal of United Labor. April 9, 1887; New 
Orleans Weekly Pelican. July 9. 1887.
^Covington Hall, “Labor Struggles in the Deep South1 
(unpublished typewritten MS, n.d., deposited in Howard- 
Tilton Library Archives, Tulane University), 31. Cited 
hereafter as Hall MS.
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artisans in the South Louisiana towns. Early in 1887 the 
Knights were strong enough in Morgan City to run a slate of
candidates in the municipal election, and every man on the
26labor ticket won office.
Louisiana*s sugar planters, after experiencing a 
poor crop in 1886, reduced wages for the following growing 
season to sixty-five cents per day, without rations.^
Most workers averaged twenty days out of every month in the 
fields. The large planters paid wages in commissary notes, 
redeemable in marked up goods at the plantation stores.
Thus, a Negro family with one employed member received what 
amounted to six or seven dollars in real wages for every 
month of the ten-month growing s e a s o n . Although no rent, 
as a rule, was charged for the tiny living quarters, those 
workers without rations had to feed and clothe their fami­
lies out of this meagre pay. Wages for the grinding season 
of 1887 were set by the planters at rates varying from 
seventy-five cents to $1.15 per day for "first class" adult 
males; for six hours of overtime night work, called a watch, 
the planters offered fifty cents.^
^ Dailv Picayune. January 4, 1887.
27Cf. Philadelphia Journal of United Labor. Septem­
ber 17, 1887; Sitterson, Sugar Country. 319. Some, planters 
hired only adult males. But a number also hired "first 
class" females for about fifty cents per day.
28flew Orleans Weekly Pelican. November 19, 1887.
^Cf. New Orleans Times Democrat. November 6, 1887; 
New Orleans Weekly Pelican. November 19. 1887; Sitterson, 
Sugar Country. 319-20.
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In August of 1887, ten weeks before harvest, the 
Knights leaders requested a conference with local branches 
of the Louisiana Sugar Planters1 Association. They wished 
to discuss wages for the approaching busy season. Associ­
ation officials sent no r e p l y . O n  October 24, the Knights 
District Assembly 194 addressed a circular letter to 
planters in Iberia, Lafourche, St. Martin, St. Mary, and 
Terrebonne parishes, insisting that wages be raised for the 
two months of harvesting and grinding. The scale drawn by 
the Knights listed $1.25 per day without rations, or $1.00 
per day with rations. For a night watch, no less than sixty 
cents would be accepted. Further, instead of monthly 
payments of wages, the Knights insisted that payment for day 
work must be received every two weeks, and "watch" money 
each week. The District Assembly which issued these demands 
comprised about forty locals in the five parishes. Planters
were informed that they must meet the terms by November 1,
31or face a general strike.
An estimated 6,000 to 10,000 male laborers went on 
strike when the deadline date arrived with no sign of ac­
quiescence from the planters. Nine-tenths of the strikers 
were Negroes. All virere said to be members of the Kftights of
^Dailv Picayune. October 29, 1887.
31 Philadelphia Journal of United Labor. November 
26,1887; New Orleans Weekly Pelican, November 5, 1887.
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Labor. The planters, though refusing to negotiate, were 
visibly disturbed by the strike. The growing season for 
1887 had been one of near-perfect weather, and a large crop
qq
yield was in prospect. Conservative newspapers portrayed 
the strikers* demands as "reprehensible," and insisted that 
the current low market price of sugar precluded any advance 
in wages*^4 Weekly paydays, said the planters, "would de­
moralize labor." It was "a well known fact that as long as
35the average laborer has money he will not work."
Local officials of the Knights, white men and a 
number of "fairly well educated blacks,"^ received the 
brunt of landowner wrath. Particular bitterness was ex­
pressed toward the white agitators in Lafourche Parish; J.
R. H. Foote and D. Monnier, "two of the prime movers in
37this uncalled for strike," were common laborers in
^Hall MS, 32; New Orleans Weekly Pelican. November
5, 1887.
33William C. Stubbs, Sugar Cane: A Treatise on the
History. Botany and Agriculture o£ Sugar Cane and the 
Chemistry and Manufacture of Its Juices Into Sugar, and 
Other Products' (Baton Rouge. 18$?).~I. 37-38; Daily Picayune. 
October 2^ >, 1887.
^4Baton Rouqe Daily Capitolian-Advocate. November 4, 
1887; New Orleans Times-Democrat. November 3-6. 1887.
^5Pailv Picayune. October 29, 1887,
^ Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Louisiana.
I, 133.
^Ibid.. November 9, 1887; New Orleans Weekly Peli­
can, November 26, 1887.
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Thibodaux, the parish seat. Other leaders among the La­
fourche Knights included Henry Cox, George Cox, and P. 0. 
Rousseau. The Cox brothers were Negro artisans; Rousseau,
a white man, had formerly been a planter but "times [ had]
38changed" for him. As a group, the ringleaders in La­
fourche were depicted as "the most worthless set of men" in 
the p a r i s h . i n  Terrebonne, a "griffe" named Jim Brown 
led the strike.4^ In St. Mary, colored men took the helm 
of labor agitation in 1887. They, together with Negroes 
who encouraged the strike in other parishes, were categor­
ized by Major Burke's Times-Democrat as "bad and dangerous 
• . . relic [ s] of Radical days."4^
Planters also expressed anger toward the New Orleans 
Knights who had first organized the lower sugar country. 
These urban "communists," as the Daily States termed them, 
were blamed for arousing "passions" among the usually 
tractable Negroes.4^ As for the attitude of rank-and-file 
laborers, it was obvious that they placed great faith in
38lbid.. November 9, 1887; New Orleans Weekly Peli­
can. November 26, 1887.
3^Paily Picayune. November 9, 1887.
40Hall MS, 32. A "griffe" being a person of one- 
fourth Negro blood.
4^New Orleans Times-Democrat. November 6, 1887.
4^New Orleans Daily States, quoted in Baton Rouge
Daily Capitolian-Advocate. November 24, 1887.
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the Knights of Labor. One wealthy planter, W. W. Pugh, 
used the word "veneration" to describe Negro attitudes 
toward the labor society. When directives came down from 
Knights headquarters, said Pugh, the workers "generally obey 
at whatever sacrifice it may prove to their own welfare. .
. . . "43 Qne ringleader remarked, as the strike began, that 
the white employers "had never met the negroes united 
before," and he prophesied that every one of the 400 labor­
ers in his group would die before conceding anything to the
planters.4^
On the morning of the first day of the strike a 
battery of state militia arrived in Lafourche Parish.
Members of the Sugar Planters1 Association--not the local 
government— had requested these troops. The landowners 
perceived that "serious trouble" would result from their 
announcement that all laborers who refused to work must 
vacate the plantation cabins. By the 10th of November 
Governor McEnery had ordered ten companies and two batter­
ies of state militia into action. At least one unit brought
^Letter from W. W. Pugh, published in Daily Pica­
yune. November 20, 1887.
^ Daily Picayune. November 2,- 1887.
A E.
New Orleans Mascot, quoted in New Orleans Weekly 
Pelican. November 12, 1887; Philadelphia Journal of United 
Labor. November 19, 1887.
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along a gatling gun.4^ These militiamen were assigned the
work of eviction. White critics of Governor McEnery claimed
that he "had acted hastily" in sending out the militia; the
New Orleans Mascot suggested that His Excellency’s action
"was caused by his eagerness to curry favor with the . . .
wealthy sugar planters in the hopes that he can transfer
their allegiance from Nicholls to himself."47 Major Burke’s
newspaper, on the other hand, dwelt upon McEnery*s alleged
knowledge "of the negro character," which allowed the
48Governor "to appreciate the danger." This trouble in the
sugar country, philosophized the administration organ, was
not a labor dispute. It was a race problem.
The first report of bloodshed came on November 2
from Terrebonne Parish. According to pro-planter sources,
the Negroes shot down four laborers who refused to join in 
49the strike. More serious was the disturbance which fol­
lowed in St. Mary Parish; near the town of Berwick, on the 
night of November 4, Negroes fired upon and wounded four 
unidentified white men; the next day, militiamen killed
^Louisiana, Official Journal of the Senate. 1888,
22; New Orleans Mascot, ‘quoted in New Orleans Weekly Peli-
can, November 12, 188^.
4?New Orleans Mascot, quoted in New Orleans Peli­
can. November 12, 1887.
48New Orleans Times-Democrat. November 6, 1887. 
4^Ibid., November 3, 1887; Daily Picayune. November
3, 1887.
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"four or five** Negro strikers outside of Pattersonville 
c o m m u n i t y . E a c h  side had its own version of the St. Mary 
shootings. Spokesmen for the Knights claimed the troops 
shot without provocation; other reports from the scene said 
the troops were forced to act in self-defense. A St.
Mary newspaper accused "leading colored men" in the Patter­
sonville area of making "incendiary speeches . . . that 
would put the Chicago anarchists to shame." The same source 
quoted one colored Knight as saying: "If the planters do
c;o
not come to our terms we will burn the d-n sugar houses." 
Elsewhere, by November 20, at least one Negro laborer was 
killed and several wounded in Lafourche Parish.53
The sugar strike reached its violent climax during 
the fourth week of November. Predictably, the worst blood­
shed occurred in the town of Thibodaux. For Thibodaux had 
taken on the appearance of a refugee center as hundreds of 
Negro families, evicted from the plantations where they 
refused to work, crowded into its dingy backstreets. A
50Philadelphia Journal of United Labor. December 3, 
1887; Daily Picayune. November 3, 1887.
51Cf. New Orleans Daily News, quoted in New Orleans 
Weekly Pelican. November 19^ 1887; New Orleans Times- 
Democrat. November 7-8, 1887.
5^Morgan City Free Press, quoted in Baton Rouge 
Daily Capitolian-Advocate. November 12, 1887.
53Pailv Picayune. November 21, 1887.
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Daily Picayune correspondent thus described the scene:
Every vacant room in town tonight is filled with penni­
less and ragged negroes. All day long a stream of 
black humanity poured in, some on foot and others in 
wagons, bringing all of their earthly possessions which 
never amounted to more than a frontyard full of babies, 
dogs and ragged bed clothing. . . .  On many of the 
plantations old gray-headed negroes, who were born and 
have lived continually upon them, left today.54
Knights of Labor leaders in Thibodaux attempted to
provide shelter and food for the homeless Negroes. One
observer, sympathetic to the refugees, said they behaved
peaceably and tried to avoid incidents with local whites.
But a critic of the strike wrote that a number of the male
refugees were armed and that the women "made threats to burn
55the town down." The atmosphere grew more tense each day. 
Judge Taylor Beattie, acpondam defender of Negro rights who 
had been the Republican candidate for Governor in 1879, took 
the lead in organizing a committee of local planters and 
Thibodaux property owners for the purpose of keeping the 
town’s new inhabitants under control. Beattie described the 
black refugees as "ignorant and degraded barbarians."56
On November 21 Judge Beattie declared martial law in 
Thibodaux. The militia had recently been withdrawn. In 
their place were armed bands of white vigilantes, composed
54Ibid.. November 3, 1887.
55Cf. New Orleans Weekly Pelican. November 26, 1887; 
Daily Picayune. November 25, 1687.
^Hall MS, 42; Letter from Taylor Beattie, published 
in Daily Picayune. December 3, 1887.
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of local "organized citizens"^ together with a number of 
grim-visaged strangers to the community. These newly 
arrived men were alleged to be "Shreveport guerrillas, well
C Q
versed in killing niggers." Reports of what then trans­
pired are conflicting. All dispatches from the scene agreed 
that shooting began on the night of the 22nd; but the pro­
planter account, that the trouble commenced when two "white 
visitors" to a Negro barroom were beaten and shot,5^ should 
be placed alongside the more explicit pro-Knights version. 
The latter report would have it that the Shreveport mercen­
aries, having failed to provoke the blacks to violence in­
flicted superficial wounds on two of their own men. Then 
the cry went forth: "To arms! To arms! The negroes are
killing the whites!"^
When the firing ended at noon the next day at least 
thirty colored people were dead or dying in Thibodaux. The 
Weekly Pelican, a New Orleans Republican paper, claimed 
thirty-five refugees were killed outright, including lame 
men and blind women. Conservative journals, for the most
5^Pailv Picayune. November 25, 1887.
New Orleans Weekly Pelican. November 26, 1887.
5^Pailv Picayune. November 25, 1887.
^®New Orleans Weekly Pelican. November 26, 1887; 
Philadelphia Journal oi United Labor. Pecember 3, 1887.
^ N e w  Orleans Weekly Pelican. November 26, 1887.
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part, tended to minimize the casualty list. But the ultra- 
Bourbon Daily States listed twenty-five dead Negroes and 
called the encounter "one of the most bloody battles in the 
history of the S t a t e . T h e  Times Democrat agreed that the 
final death total at Thibodaux might reach thirty.^
Another conservative source told of more bodies being found, 
the next day, in nearby swamps, and carried the ugly story 
about a large dark-haired canine which one vigilante was 
supposed to have shot by mistake, because ” [ it ] looked 
like a negro lying down,"^4
The Thibodaux massacre virtually ended the sugar 
strike of 1887. No less than thirty-six Negroes had been 
killed in the troubled parishes during the month of November; 
this total includes the four killed near Pattersonville, the 
thirty in the Thibodaux shooting, and the two Cox brothers, 
who were taken from jail on November 24 and shot by the 
vigilantes. Possibly, the total Negro dead reached forty- 
five. An unpublished history of Louisiana labor disputes 
estimates that the total number of casualties in the sugar
^^New Orleans Daily States, quoted in Baton Rouge
Daily Capitolian Advocate. November 24, 1887.
^ N e w  Orleans Times-Demoerat. November 24-26, 1887. 
^4Pailv Picayune. November 24-26, 1887.
^ N e w  Orleans Weekly Pelican. November 26, 1887.
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parishes, killed and wounded, was "500 to 600."^ But even
if half that number be taken (and the total could hardly
have been less), the sugar strike of 1887 would still rate
as one of the bloodiest labor conflicts in American histo- 
67ry. All the dead were Negroes. So were almost all those 
injured. The violent repression of the strike stimulated a 
short-lived revival of Exodus talk among Louisiana's colored 
population. A few actually did leave the state late in 
November, seeking, as they said, more humane surroundings. 
Their destination was the state of Mississippi.^®
Most sugar workers returned to the fields by the 
early months of 1888.^ Planters now attacked what they 
considered the root of trouble by zealously eradicating the 
Knights of Labor organization from the region. As the
66Hall MS, 40.
®7The Louisiana sugar strike of 1887 receives no 
mention in the standard work on American labor history, 
Commons and Others, History of Labour in the United States.
II, passim. In fact, the Philadelphia Journal of United 
Labor, the national organ of Terence V. Powderly's knights 
of Labor organization, had little to say concerning the 
bloodshed in the sugar strike. But the Journal of United 
Labor, on December 3, 1887, did congratulate the white 
knights of New Orleans for "using their influence to pro­
tect the rights as well as the lives of the colored 
brethren." The Knights District Assembly in New Orleans 
angrily denounced the actions of Governor McEnery and the 
planters. The New Orleans Knights resolved, even before 
the trouble at Thibodaux, that the shootings earlier in 
November amounted to "assasination, . . . AND WE WILL AT 
ONCE APPEAL TO OUR MILLIONS OF WORKINGMEN TO ASK AT THE 
HANDS OF CONGRESS THE REPEAL OF THE DUTIES ON SUGAR."
Daily Picayune. November 13, 1887.
68New Orleans Weekly Pelican. November 26, 1887.
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Jeanerette Teche Pilot pointed out: "The darkey who steers
clear of that organization will always find himself better
7 0off in this section." Those who held membership in the 
Knights were likely to find their household goods uncere­
moniously dumped on the levees and themselves blacklisted.7 -^ 
Minor strikes broke out in four sugar parishes in 1888 but 
were quickly put down. Whites in these parishes, and else­
where, had meantime put in motion a "Regulating Movement"
which discouraged economic or political assertiveness on the
7 opart of Negroes. And so failed the attempt to unionize 
the field hands of rural South Louisiana. By 1891, state 
membership in the Knights of Labor was not significant out-
70
side of its original base in New Orleans.
Viewed in perspective, the sugar country blood­
letting of 1887 was merely a deadlier-than-usual example of 
a much deeper phenomenon. The lot of the Louisiana Negro, 
never really good, was growing harder. Throughout the 
South, during the late 1880*3 and early 1890*s, contempt for 
and hostility toward the colored race was on the rise*74
70
Jeanerette Teche Pilot. May 5, 1888.
71
New Roads Pointe Coupee Banner, quoted in ibid.
7^New Orleans Weekly Pelican. May 11, 1889; Sitter- 
son, Sugar Country. 321 -2£*.
^ Daily Picayune. August 7, 1891.
74C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow 
(ed ed. rev.; New York, 1957), 51-56.
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Nor was this trend confined to the states of the late Con­
federacy. As the American nation took up imperialistic 
adventures in the Pacific and the Caribbean, the doctrines 
of Anglo-Saxon superiority were seconded by northern public 
opinion. No doubt the expatriate Louisianian George W.
Cable was grieved to discover that his pleadings on behalf 
of the freedman, which had fallen upon deaf ears in his 
native state, now received little better attention in the 
North.
Editorial diatribes and mob outrages against the 
black population grew to such proportions, by 1890, that a 
few whites thought that the time for a moratorium had 
arrived. "Heavens," exclaimed the Welsh Crescent, "how we 
would enjoy a rest on the 'nigger* question!"^ Authorities 
on the subject have written that the poor white class of 
southerners tended to be the colored man's worst enemy; 
patricians, on the other hand, were credited with a more 
benign attitude on matters of race. Though believing the 
Negro to be inherently inferior, the white gentry sup­
posedly felt that colored people should be treated more
75Cable, The Negro Question, xix-xx.
76
"It seems, grumbled the Crescent, "that four- 
fifths of the State press can't come out without a long- 
winded article • . . with the negro as their target; and 
what's more, they've been at it for the Lord only knows how 
long." Welsh Crescent, quoted in Baton Rouge Daily Advo­
cate. March 4, 1890.
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humanely and not be hurt or degraded for the mere sake of
77inflicting pain. However, the above generalization, 
.whatever its value elsewhere, was hardly valid in Louisi­
ana in the late nineteenth century. A mass of evidence 
points to the conclusion that the ruling class of the Peli­
can State took an extraordinarily circumscribed view of 
Negro human rights. For the most rabid Negrophobes in the
state were as consistently rabid in defense of upper class
78white privilege. Some of Louisianafs white elite did, of
course, truly uphold the ideals of Noblesse Oblige. But, as
Daniel Dennett once remarked about honest politicians in the
79state,"they [ were ] lonesome."
Lynching in Louisiana, according to a Chicago 
Tribune survey, accounted for 285 deaths between 1882 and
77Cf. Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow. 29; 
Simkins, A History of the South. 509-11: Coulter. The South 
During Reconstruction. 16^-64. However, a twentietK 
century sociological study of a presumably typical southern 
community presents evidence that Negroes themselves believe 
that middle class whites were the "real antagonists" of the 
colored people in the South. John Dollard, Caste and Class 
in a Southern Town (3d ed.; Garden City, New York, 1957), 57.
7®The following daily journals claimed to speak for 
the landowning and business elite of Louisiana. And the 
ferocity these papers exhibited toward the Negro, in the 
late nineteenth century, far outdistanced the Negrophobia 
visible in any other body of public opinion in the state; 
Baton Houge Daily Capitalian-Advocate (Daily Advocate after 
1889); New Orleans Daily States: Shreveport Eveh&nq (and 
Sunday) Judge.
7^Pailv Picayune. February 19, 1881.
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the year 1903. Of this number, 232 victims were Negroes. 
Records kept by Tuskegee Institute corroborate the Tribune 
figures.®*' Not included are the numerous deaths resulting 
from the sugar country trouble of 1887, but even without 
these Louisiana ranked third in the nation in total lynch- . 
ings for the period. Also, the suspicion arises that the 
above statistics fail to include many cases which could not 
be classified as anything but lynch-killings. For example,
the Tuskegee records for 1888 show seven lynchings in the
82state. But a contemporary report that year from just one
parish, Iberia, told of no less than ten colored men
murdered by vigilantes. The Negroes were described as
83"vagrant and lewd." Some lynchings were simply not re­
ported. The Monroe Bulletin refused to print lynch stories 
in Ouachita Parish because white citizens in the area re­
garded such matters "not only with indifference but with
1 *4. Hlevity."
80James Elbert Cutler, Lynch-Law: An Investigation
Into the History of Lynching in the United States (New York, 
1905), 179, 1 8 3 . 1
81Tuskegee records begin with 1885, but bear out the 
Tribune figures quoted in ibid. for 1885-1902. Cf. Monroe 
N. Work (ed.), Negro Yearbook: An Annual Encyclopedia of
the Negro. 1918-1919 (Tuskegee, Alabama. 1919). 374-7*5.
82Ibid.
®®Lake Providence Carroll Democrat. August 25, 1888.
84Monroe Bulletin, quoted in Daily Picayune. Septem­
ber 28, 1886.
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Lower class whites, in particular the "shiftless 
85
. . . Acadians" of South Louisiana, were clearly responsi­
ble for a substantial percentage of the acts of violence 
committed upon Negroes. But contemporary accounts of lynch­
ing episodes indicate that poor whites were not involved in 
a majority of the cases. Middle class landowners or 
merchants, or younger members of the elite families, more 
often than not, instigated and participated in the outrages. 
For instance, in 1890 a reign of terror was conducted 
against "industrious, reliable" Negroes near Baton Rouge by 
white landowners; only colored people who had managed to
accumulate property were shot, whipped, or other wise mo- 
86lested. Their persecutors claimed that possession of land 
by Negroes "was tending toward negro equality." The colored 
farmers were told to sell their property cheaply or be 
killed.87
On another occasion "hundreds of the most prominent
S^New Orleans Weekly Pelican. September 28, 1889.
86Letter from Anna M. Harris, published in Opelousas 
St. Landry Clarion. February 14, 1891.
87Ibid.: Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. November 26-27,
1890. The latter newspaper was, as it said, "always con­
servative" on racial matters, but thought the attacks upon 
Baton Rouge Negro landowners to be "a disgrace . . .  a re­
proach to our manhood." The Farmers* Union in East Baton 
Rouge Parish expressed great indignation over the outrages 
influcted upon local Negroes, and resolved "that the Union 
would do all it could to bring the villains before the bar 
of justice, whether they be members of the Union or not." 
However, the authorities made no arrests.
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citizens in Bossier Parish" conducted a dual lynching near
oo
the town of Benton. Worse yet, a New Orleans report told
of "three nigger boys" who were whipped to death because
"they refused to make targets of their heads for [ sport-
89ing ] gentlemen. . . . "  A Tangipahoa Parish group known
as the "Phantom Riders" molested colored families without
fear of punishment because, it was claimed, "good" citizens
rode with the band.9® When eleven Italians were lynched in
New Orleans in 1891, the press reported that "the better
91element" of the city had done the killing. Also worthy
of attention was the suggestion in one of Louisiana's most
aristocratically inclined journals, the Bastrop Clarion.
that more "little 'neck tie* parties" were needed by the
92colored people around that town. But it took a Shreveport 
paper to describe a lynching as "beautiful." This was "the 
right way," the Evening Judge concluded, "to deal with every 
such black brute. Before the war they kept their places 
like other beasts of the field."9^
^Natchitoches Enterprise. December 8, 1898.
®9Quoted in New Orleans Weekly Pelican. July 2, 1887.
90Ibid.. July 16, 1887.
^Quoted in Philadelphia Journal of the Knights of. 
Labor. March 14, 1891. (formerly the Journal of United 
Labor.)
92Bastrop Clarion, quoted in Daily Picayune. August
10, 1891.
^Shreveport Evening Judge. March 23, 1896.
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Shreveport was unequivocally a city of New South
94"energy, push, and vim." At the same time, its business­
man elite supported or aondoned the most pitiless forms of 
social injustice to be found anywhere in the state. The 
"Shreveport plan" was an archetype specimen. Conceived in 
1889 by a local publication, the Daily Caucasian, the pro­
posal revolved around the old concept that the Negro was a 
sub-human species and should be treated accordingly. Spe­
cifically, Negroes were not to hold "easy jobs." Under 
this heading were listed the occupations of bootblacks, 
waiters, porters, cooks, clerks, and teachers. But the plan 
also implied intimidation of whites. For "no white man" was 
to "be permitted to employ a colored man . . .  in any other
QC,
manner than at the hardest and most degrading tasks." 
Apparently an exception was made for the staff of Shreve­
port^ Negro newspaper, Bailey’s Free South. They were con­
servative Democrats. ^
One spokesman for Louisiana’s Negroes, hearing of 
the plan, described it as "an old mummy" exhumed from "the 
Shreveport pyramids." He added:
The pernicious idea must be limited to the mean Id­
eality in which it had its origin. It would not live
94Shreveport Times, quoted in Daily Picayune. March
21, 1887.
^5Shreveport Daily Caucasian, quoted in New Orleans 
Weekly Pelican. July 1*7, August 17, 1889.
96
7 Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. February 18, 1892.
Ill
in more generous soil, and there are few places in 
this wide world so sterile in noble sentiments as 
that which immediately surrounds the publication 
office of the [ Shreveport] Caucasian. The propo­
sition is only useful as showing the deaths to which 
uncurbed selfishness will . . . go.97
"White supremacy, first, last and all the time," was 
the proud motto of Shreveport, an approving commentator 
wrote in 1896. "And they prove their faith by their
Q Q
works." Nevertheless, claims were made that Shreveporters 
generally acted out of Christian charity. Whites in the 
North Louisiana city were said to be generous "to a fault;" 
"if St. Paul were [ here] today he would positively turn 
green with e n v y . "99 But evidence warrants the assumption 
that the local gentry often acted in a barbarous fashion 
toward helpless whites as well as Negroes. This fact was 
impressed upon two white men who appeared in municipal court 
on a charge of vagrancy. Both were one-legged. The Judge,
97New Orleans Weekly Pelican. July 27, 1889. The 
extent to which the "Shreveport plan" was actually practiced 
in the area is problematical. Obviously, however, many 
Shreveport businessmen continued to hire Negroes for tasks 
which were proscribed by the Daily Caucasian. See Shreve­
port Sunday Judge. February 2, 1096.
QQ
Shreveport Evening Judge. February 24, 1896.
White supremacy was seldom questioned in the Shreveport area, 
even during Reconstruction. Henry Clay Warmoth described a 
group of local Negroes who turned out to hear him, when, as 
governor of Louisiana, he visited the city in 1870: They 
"did not seem to have spirit enough to declare that their 
souls were their own," he observed. Warmoth, War. Politics 
and Reconstruction. 98. In 1879, a baseball club in Shreve­
port named itself "the Caddo Bulldozers." Daily Picavune. 
May 29, 1879.
99shreveport Sunday Judge. February 23, 1896.
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who was also Mayor of Shreveport, enjoyed a grotesque sense 
of humor. He gave the crippled derelicts a sporting chance. 
If they could hop outside the city limits within twenty-five 
minutes they would not have to serve one hundred days in 
jail.100
Elsewhere in Louisiana, well-to-do conservatives, 
such as Henry G. Goodwyn of Colfax, occasionally complained 
that Negroes "were shamefully and needlessly bulldozed, and 
could hope for no legal redress. But the more explicit
pleas for biracial justice were voiced by men who repre­
sented lower class whites. Among the latter was Aurel 
Arnaud. In 1886, as a legislator from St. Landry Parish, 
Arnaud stood up in the State House to deliver a speech re­
garding the Louisiana public road system. The speaker was
102a political independent and of poor Acadian ancestry.
His opening remarks were aimed at a law of 1830 which 
instructed parochial officials to assess twelve days of road 
work, or a stipulated cash assessment, upon all adult males. 
He pointed out that this law worked a special hardship upon 
Negro tenants and laborers, since most colored families 
seldom had as much as forty dollars a year to spend on 
clothes, medicine, and fresh meat. Arnaud expanded upon his
■*-^ Shreveport Evening Judge. March 4, 1896. 
^■^Colfax Chronicle. January 9, 1892. 
^^Baton Rouge Weekly Truth. May 21, 1886.
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theme with blunt language:
Can you not see that this amount is not sufficient to 
support the laborer? And every day you divest him of 
from a chance of earning something is a robbery of 
his daily bread? Should any one . . .  be surprised 
to hear that negroes steal? I am only surprised that 
they do not steal m o r e . 103
Arnaud raised the possibility of another, more suc­
cessful, Kansas Exodus of Louisiana’s colored population if 
their sufferings continued. What would happen then? "These 
very men," he predicted, "who have been clamoring so loudly 
against the negroes . . . would pack up and follow in their 
tracks--play carpetbagger in . . . turn-- [or] would soon 
have to steal or starve themselves." Arnaud hastened to add 
that he was not a "leveller"; he offered no radical pro­
posals. He merely felt that Negroes "must be treated with 
as much consideration as we treat our mules." He indicated 
that this would be a vast improvement over present con­
ditions. Finally, in what must stand as among the most 
candid words every uttered in Louisiana legislative halls, 
Arnaud said:
I have treated the subject entirely as from a 
negro standpoint . . . but are there only negroes in­
volved. . . ? And if there were only negroes in­
volved, would I be here defending their cause? That 
is a question I have often asked myself, but I have 
never dared to probe my heart sufficiently to answer 
it, for fear I would perhaps find myself selfish 
enough to answer: No, because they are negroes. . . .
But in what way is the white laborer treated with more 
consideration? Does the law give him any more
103Ibid., May 28, 1886.
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protection? Is he paid better wages? Does he get 
more or better goods for his money? Do his children 
get more schooling? Yes, there is an immense dif­
ference between the two [ races ] , but this differ­
ence exists only in the fancy of unscrupulous and 
rascally politicians: in every respect the white
laborer stands exactly on the same footing as the 
negro. . . .
I cannot deny that it is with the saddest feel­
ings I have seen myself forced into this tirade, and 
I can draw but one consolation for it. The hope that 
the sad facts I have had to submit to you today will 
save me the trouble of submitting sadder ones in the
future.104
Not so frankly phrased, but to the same point, were 
statements made by certain men in the Louisiana Farmers1 
Union. Notably, J. A. Tetts and Thomas J. Guice spoke up for 
the Negro. "What we want distributed to all men," Tetts 
wrote, "regardless of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude, is the opportunity for the pursuit of happiness." 
Tetts believed that the Alliance movement was doing what 
"the sword, the press and the pulpit" had failed to do; that 
is, forcing the "half Ku Klux and half desperado" cotton 
farmer of the South out of his provincial shell, and into an 
awareness of class interest which transcended racial or 
regional boundaries. "The horns of the Ku Klux [ are] 
knocked off," Tetts assumed. In typically quaint language, 
he went on to write: "The shirt that has been waved so
Ibid. Rep. Arnaud1s outspoken conduct naturally 
irritated the defenders of the status quo. The alternative 
for Arnaud, a conservative paper in his home parish believed, 
was either "prison garb," or "a straight jacket." Washing­
ton (La.) Argus, quoted in Shreveport Times. May 29, 1887.
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faithfully has been torn up . . . and cast into the Missis­
sippi, and by this time no doubt [is] in the maw of some 
cat fish, or making a nest for some mud turtle of a politi- 
can who will have to crawl into his shell when he seems the 
result of the next election."^5 Guice took a similar view 
of class protest. According to this rustic orator, the 
"spirit of fairness" required that poor whites include poor 
blacks in their efforts to ameliorate economic and politi­
cal evils. Guice believed that working people, "be they 
white or black," must act together.^ 6
The Louisiana Farmers* Union, however, was exclusive­
ly a white man*s organization. Neither were Negroes ad­
mitted to the Southern Alliance p r o p e r . H o w e v e r ,  a 
subsidiary association, the Colored Farmers* Alliance, 
emerged in the late 1880*s as a means of bringing the dark- 
skinned agriculturists of the South into the Alliance move­
ment. As early as 1882, a Negro "Alliance" was chartered in 
Arkansas under the aegis of Milton George’s ambitious
^ ^National Economist. Ill (April 12, 1890), 64.
^ ^ Dailv Picayune. October 3, 1891.
l^Dunning, The Farmers* Alliance History. 109; 
National Economist. IV (December 2*7, 1890), 234-35. How­
ever, the Southern Alliance permitted individual state 
orders to determine just how tightly the color line would be 
drawn within each state. Negroes were specifically barred 
from membership in the Supreme Council of the Southern 
Alliance. See Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the South. 82.
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northern o r d e r . K i n d r e d  groups may have been established 
elsewhere. However, a large organization was slow to 
emerge. According to the most authoritative source, the 
origins of the Colored Farmers' Alliance can best be traced 
back to the Negroes of Houston County, Texas, who inaugu­
rated a state order in the winter of 1886-87. A white man, 
Robert M. Humphrey, became General Superintendent. Within 
a year, the Colored Alliance was rooted in a number of 
southern states; by 1890, the order claimed 1,200,000 as 
its total membership. Humphrey reported that "colored 
people everywhere welcomed . . . the Alliance as a sort of 
second e m a n c i p a t i o n .  " ^ 9  though separate, the white and 
colored Alliances of the South pledged "fraternal regard" 
for each other. Both orders held their annual meetings at 
the same date and in the same city, beginning at St. Louis 
in December of 1889. The following December, both met at 
Ocala, Florida.
Fifty thousand Louisiana Negroes were reported in
the membership rolls of the Colored Farmers' Alliance by the 
time of the Ocala convention.m In 1891, at their peak of
^^Scott, Mississippi Valiev Historical Review.
XLV, 107 n.
109
Dunning, The Farmers' Alliance History. 289.
110Ibid., 291-92.
^•^Western Rural and American Stockman. XXVIII 
(December 13~ i8^0). 769. quoted in Saloutos. Farmer Move­
ments in the South. 81.
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activity* the state’s Negro Alliance claimed to be organized
112in twenty-seven parishes. Detailed information regarding 
the Louisiana branch of the Colored Alliance is lacking, but 
it is safe to conclude that the reported 50,000 membership 
was far above the actual number. Possibly, the Colored 
Alliance entered the state as early as 1887; however, the 
first report yet found tells of a Grant Parish lodge which
1 1 O
was set up in October of 1889. Colored Alliancemen were
most numerous in cotton parishes along the Red River.
Apparently the white landowners of the Mississippi River
delta of northwest Louisiana managed to keep their laborers
114out of the order. Few Negroes in the sugar parishes 
joined. The suppression of the Knights of Labor in 1887-88, 
plus the absence of white Alliancemen who might be sym­
pathetic to a similar Negro organization, precluded the 
entrance of the Colored Alliance into most sugar parishes. 
South of the Red River, it was strongest in St. Landry 
Parish, and did not take root there until the summer of 
1891.115
H^Qpelousas St. Landry Clarion. October 10, 1891.
113Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest 
Louisiana. 503.
114The two leading journals of the northeastern 
delta parishes, the Lake Providence Carroll Democrat and the 
St. Joseph Tensas Gazette, have no account oi Negro Alliance 
activity between 1&88 and 1892. These two papers were not 
in the habit of ignoring signs of unrest or organization 
among local Negroes.
1
xx'J0pelousas St. Landrv Clarion. June 27, 1891.
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L. D. Laurent, an Alexandria Negro, was the first
state Superintendent of the Colored Alliance. He held the
post until succeeded by Isaac Keys of Catahoula Parish in
1891.^^ Another significant Negro Allianceman was J. B.
Lafargue, the state Secretary. These men were rather
circumspect in their activities; the Bourbon press seldom
noticed their existence. The mass of Louisiana Negroes, in
or out of the Alliance, gave indications of increasing
caution in their dealings with local whites, and Laurent,
Keys, and Lafargue were probably no exceptions. The race
troubles of the late 1880*s hampered efforts at biracial
agrarian protest. White Alliancemen who came to offer
advice at Negro farmers1 meetings were received "with great
117courtesy," but likely with suspicion as well. Many
Negroes in St. Landry refused to participate in Alliance
activities because they feared white "regulators" were in- 
118volved. Of course, Louisiana*s Bourbon element did what
it could to sow racial ill feelings within the Alliance 
119movement. And the Farmers1 Union President, Thomas S. 
Adams, did not help the situation when, in 1889, he selected
U 6 Ibid.. June 27, October 10, 1891.
^ ^Ibid.. August 15, 1891.
1 1 ft
Ibid.. August 8, 1891.
1197Cf. Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. December 11,
1890; Daily Picayune. September 10, 1891.
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the Shreveport Weekly Caucasian as the official organ of the
120white agrarians.
Yet the possibility of poor white-poor Negro unity
was by no means dead. Before the year 1890 was over, a
third party revolt against the conservative leadership of
both the state Democratic party and the Farmers* Union had
begun to reverberate among the hills of North Louisiana; the
upland whites who led the revolt immediately sought the help
191
of the Colored Alliance. And officials of the Colored 
Alliance did more than merely follow. At Ocala, in Decem­
ber, three of the seven Louisianans present signed the call 
for a national third party convention which would meet the 
next year in Cincinnati: L. D. Laurent, J. B. Lafargue,
^ Shreveport Weekly Caucasian. January 24, 1890.
In the 1890 session of the Louisiana legislature, most of 
the solons who were members of the Farmers* Union (in­
cluding ex-President Stallings and G. L. P. Wren) voted for
a bill which made racial segregation compulsory on all rail­
road coaches within the state. Actually, segregation in 
public facilities had, with certain exceptions in New 
Orleans and along the lower river towns, always been the 
custom in the state. The law of 1890 merely legalized what 
was already a fact in most of Louisiana. However, Negro 
legislators denounced the move to legalize segregation, 
feeling that it would help perpetuate Jim Crowism and was, 
in any case, an added "humiliation." Representative C. F. 
Brown of Jefferson parish, a Negro Republican, denounced the
upper class Democrats as being the prime movers for the
introduction of the bill. Louisiana, Official Journal of 
the House of Representatives. 1890, 200-204. For a dis- 
cussion of segregation in the Pelican State during the early 
1880*s, see Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. May 19, 
1882.
^•^Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. October 5, November
18, 1890; Daily Picayune. November 8. 1890.
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and L. D. Miller. All were officials of the Negro order. 
Louisiana*s white delegation at Ocala, dominated by Presi­
dent Adams, refused to sign this birth certificate of the 
Populist party.^ 2
^Alexandria Farmers* Vidette. quoted in Colfax 
Chronicle. January 10, l89i. The white delegation to the 
Southern Farmers* Alliance convention at Ocala included 
Thomas S. Adams, A. D. Lafargue, J. M. Hancock, and Thomas 
J. Guice. None of them signed the Cincinnati call, and only 
Guice, of the four, later became a Populist. A. D. La­




During the twelve years which followed the abortive 
Greenback uprising of 1878, Louisiana*s Bourbon office­
holders faced no serious third party challenge. The decline 
of the Greenback Labor party in the state was rapid; in the 
presidential election of 1880 their candidate, James B. 
Weaver, was credited with less than 500 votes out of 100,000 
in the official returns.^- But the crowning blow came in 
1884. Benjamin F. "Spoons" Butler, whose very name had 
Satanic connotations in Louisiana, headed the Greenbacker 
national ticket that year; even such a confirmed third party 
man as Robert P. Webb of Claiborne Parish could not stomach
O
the nominee. Butler received just 120 votes in the Pelican 
State.^ Finally, in 1888, after a decade of feeble life, 
the Greenback Labor party of Louisiana held a final meeting
•^New York Times. November 16, 1880; Edward Stanwood, 
A History of the Presidency: 1788 to 1897 (New York, 1898),jvr.
o
Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest 
Louisiana. 45^.




in New Orleans and announced its own demise.
Replacing the Greenback organization was the equally 
ineffective Union Labor party. Nationally, the Greenbackers 
had merged with the newly established latter group in 1887. 
That same year a Union Labor party committee took shape in 
New Orleans under the chairmanship of J. E. Sweeney, a 
Knights of Labor leader.5 Talk of running state and con­
gressional candidates by the Union Laborites in 1888 came to 
naught in Louisiana. The presidential candidate of the 
party received a mere 39 votes out of 115,000 in the of-
fL
ficial returns. Probably the Union Laborites did have a 
thousand or more supporters in New Orleans whose votes were 
simply not counted. At any rate, Louisiana was an exception 
to the general third party pattern in 1888; in most states, 
the Union Laborites drew what strength they had from rural 
areas, for third party politics in northern cities had
7
reached a state of near-collapse.
The apparent lack of third party interest in rural
4New Orleans Times-Democrat, September 20, 1888.
^Dailv Picayune. November 13, 1887.
^See Jeanerette Teche Pilot. October 3, 1888; Louisi­
ana, Report of Secretary of State. 1902, 573; Frank L. 
McVeyTThe Populist Movement (Studies of the American Eco­
nomic Association, Vol. i, No. 3: New York, 1896), 197.
7Commons and Others, History of Labour in the United 
States. II, 469; Haynes, Third Party Movements. 211.
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Louisiana during the decade of the 1880*s afforded much
Q
comfort to Bourbon Democratic leaders. But agrarian unrest 
was, in fact, seldom far below the surface. Hill country 
whites frequently demonstrated their anger against Demo­
cratic officeholders by voting with the Republicans, either 
directly or through the medium of Independent candidates for 
local offices. Governor McEnery's Republican opponent 
carried four upland white parishes in 1884, and greatly ex­
ceeded the total of Negro registration in a number of 
others*^ On the local level, Catahoula, Grant, St. Helena, 
St. Landry, St, Tammany, Washington, and Winn Parishes— all 
with white majorities— elected Republicans or pro-Republi- 
can. Independents to legislative or parochial offices on more 
than one occasion between 1879 and 1888.^ By the latter 
date, the Farmers* Alliance movement was well underway.
Cf. Colfax Chronicle. April 21, 1888; Lake Provi­
dence Carroll Democrat. June 23, 1888; Many Sabine Southron, 
quoted in Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. February 
22, 1888.
^Louisiana, Report of Secretary of State. 1902, 546- 
53, 561. In 1884, a northern correspondent described the 
gubernatorial anti-Democratic vote in backwoods parishes as 
"astonishingly large." McEnery lost Grant, LiviPgston, St. 
Helena, and St. Tammany parishes to the Republican candidate 
John Stevenson. The Republicans came near carrying other 
white parishes that year. See New York Times. April 23, 
1884.
^ C f . Daily Picayune* December 2, 4, 15, 1879; Colfax 
Chronicle. December 6, 18^, May 3, 31, 1884; Baton Rouge 
Daily Ca~pitolian-Adyocate. April 25, 28, May 7-9, 1888; E. 
North Cull om to kutherford B. Hayes, February 6, 1879, Hayes 
Papers; James E. Robertson to J. M. Currie, August 1, 1882, 
copy in Chandler Papers.
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Politically, the Farmers* Union-Alliance had a dual nature. 
At first, it provided a safety valve for agrarian discontent 
and held out to farmers the prospect of talcing over the 
reins of the state Democratic party\ at the same time, it 
constructed a framework for a potential third party revolt 
in case the Bourbon officeholders refused to make room for 
agrarian demands and candidates.
"A New Party, or Not?,** J. A. Tetts questioningly
wrote in the summer of 1890. Tetts, like many others, had
come to recognize the dilemma facing the Farmers* Alliance.
He pondered the alternatives:
The question can easily be settled by both or either 
of the two existing parties. . . . The mouthpieces of 
both these old organizations give us to understand 
that it is our duty to . . . redress our grievances
in our present parties, but in every case discourage
the hope of relief through the methods proposed. . .
. . In this dilemma what shall we do?
The Alliance was not organized as a new party, 
but . . . our principles should be paramount. . . . 
Conditions, for which both parties are responsible, 
are fast driving us into serfdom, and the only heri­
tage we can promise our children is a lifelong struggle 
with powers they can never conquer without bloodshed 
and anarchy.
During the months of 1890-91 the Louisiana version
of the People’s party came to life. The circumstances which
led to the founding of this newest party in the Pelican
State rose out of a generation of mass frustration and 
poverty, but three proximate reasons can be given for its
^Quoted in National Economist. Ill (June 28, 1890),
237-38.
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emergence at that particular time. One was the refusal of
Louisiana*s Democratic congressmen, with one exception, to
endorse the favorite panacea of the Alliance--the sub- 
12treasury plan. Introduced by Dr. C. W. Macune in 1889, 
the plan in brief called for the establishment of a govern­
ment warehouse for non-perishable farm products in each 
county of the United States which annually offered for sale 
at least $500,000 worth of such products. With the storage 
facilities would be a sub-treasury office where the farmer 
could obtain, through a negotiable certificate of deposit, 
a loan bearing one per cent interest per year. The farmer 
would have until the next harvest to sell his crop on the 
open market; he would thus be free from merchant or bank 
credit, and free from speculators who depressed market
prices at critical times. Moreover, the plan would put more
13money in circulation. An estimated 817 counties in the 
United States sold enough produce to qualify for a sub- 
treasury. Twenty-nine of these would be in Louisiana.*-4 
Conservatives throughout the United States deprecated the
^^Cnly Congressman Samuel M. Robertson of the Sixth 
District endorsed the Alliance sub-treasury plan. Cf. Baton 
Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. October 1-3, 1890; Colfax 
Chronicle. August 16. £3. 1896: National Economist. Ill 
(June 14, 1890), 204.
lo
Bryan, The Farmers* Alliance. 94-99; Hicks, The 
Populist Revolt. 186-204: Saloutos. Farmer Movements in the 
South. Il9-l2l.
l4National Economist. Ill (April 19, 1890), 72.
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plan as paternalistic class legislation— "hayseed social­
lyism." The official journal of Louisianats state govern­
ment lashed itself into near-apoplexy over the "crack- 
brained" sub-treasury "monstrosity," and then fumed that all 
"the complaints of the downtrodden are simply bosh and non­
sense. . . ."I6
A second proximate contributor to the birth of 
Louisiana Populism was the gradual capture of the Farmers1 
Union by the Nicholls administration and its extra-official 
arm, the Anti-Lottery League. The appointment of Union 
President Adams as State Commissioner of Agriculture, and 
the subsequent Farmers1 Union-Anti-Lottery League compact 
at Lafayette, baited the trap which was sprung at Baton 
Rouge in December of 1891, when Murphy J. Foster, rather 
than Adams, emerged as the gubernatorial nominee of the 
reform wing of the Democratic party. As early as the fall 
of 1890 a number of hill country Farmers* Union lodges were 
ignoring Adams*s conservative political dicta. But the 
rupture within the Farmers* Union was most clearly revealed 
during its Lafayette meeting in August, 1891. As mentioned 
previously, a minority of the order angrily refused the 
proffered political partnership with the Anti-Lottery, or 
Reform Democrats; Seventy-three delegates voted to accept
i5New York Sun, quoted in ibid. (March 22, 1890)^ 1.
^Baton Rouqe Daily Advocate. SeDtember 30. November
11, 1890.
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the offer; the dissenting minority cast twenty-two votes. 
Nearly all the twenty-two were, or would soon be, active in 
the People’s party.^
The third catalytic agent for Louisiana Populism 
arrived in Baton Rouge one midsummer day in 1890. Charles 
Vincent, roving reporter and subscription agent for the 
Winfield (Kan.) American Non-Conformist, came to deliver a 
speech before the annual convention of the state Farmers*
1 Q
Union.Conservative Democrats knew of the man and feared
him. For though Vincent "disclaimed that he was the agent
19for any political party," 7 the American Non-Conformist.
published by his two brothers, was recognized far and wide
as a potent vehicle for left wing agrarian ideas. The
Vincents’ paper was the principal Union Labor organ in 
20Kansas. More important, Union Labor strength in Kansas
21surpassed that of any other state. But in the months of
^Colfax Chronicle. August 15, 1891; New Orleans 
Times-Democrat. February 19, 1892; Louisiana Populist. Janu­
ary 24, 1896. Farmers’ Union delegates from Acadia, 
Calcasieu, Catahoula, Grant, Natchitoches, Vernon, and Winn 
voted against the League-Union compact at Lafayette.
18For additional information on Charles Vincent and 
the American Non-Conformist, see Elizabeth N, Barr, "The 
Populist Uprising.** A Standard History of Kansas and 
Kansans. ed. William E. Connelly (Chicago, 1918), II, 1140-
w .
19Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. August 7, 1890. 
^Hicks, The Populist Revolt. 154-55.
21Haynes, Third Party Movements. 211.
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1889-90, the Kansas third party men jettisoned the laborite 
name in favor of one more attractive to rural voters. While 
Charles Vincent spoke in Louisiana, his brothers in Win­
field, Kansas, were placing the new name in print: "The
ooPeople’s party.
Charles Vincent soon confirmed the worst of Bourbon 
suspicions. After the farmers* convention in Baton Rouge 
closed on August 8, 1890, the Kansas man spent several weeks 
visiting and lecturing among Farmers* Union leaders in the 
Fourth and Fifth Congressional Districts of North Louisiana. 
The Daily Advocate, having warily observed him at the recent 
convention, wondered if it was possible that the “conserva­
tive spirit,H of the sturdy Anglo-Saxon yeomanry was being 
perverted by "the rantings of lecturer Vincent. . . .
But Vincent’s exhortations were falling upon eager ears. In 
a number of upland parishes, particularly Catahoula, Grant, 
and Winn, conservatism had already become a rather scarce 
commodity. Winfield, Kansas and Winnfield, Louisiana were 
akin in more than name.
Thomas'J. Guice and Benjamin Brian were among those
-v
22Winfield (Kan.) American Non-Conformist, quoted in 
National Economist. Ill (August 16. 1890), 355. Union 
Labor!tes (the Vincents and others), furnished the leader­
ship for the emerging People’s party in Kansas during the 
months of 1889-90. Union Labor headquarters in Kansas were 
at Winfield.
23Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. September 3, 1890.
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who eagerly discussed Populism with Charles Vincent in the 
late summer and early fall of 1 8 9 0 . Another participant 
was one of Reverend Brian*s sons, Hardy Lee Brian. Born in 
1865, Hardy Brian had seen his father challenge Democratic 
candidates in every state senatorial election since Recon­
struction; the youth had been "rocked in an * Independent *
25cradle." After a rude education in the public schools of 
Grant Parish, Hardy Brian moved to neighboring Winn in 
1885, married, and set about farming and schoolteaching 
near the town of Winnfield.^* In 1888, following the family
^Cf. Colfax Chronicle. September 20, October 4, 11,
25, 1890; Winnfield Comrade, quoted in ibid., October 11, 
1890; Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. October 30, 1890.
^Colfax Chronicle. September 12, 1891. Hardy Lee 
Brian was one of nine children. Born near Pollock (in what 
later became Grant Parish) in 1865, he died in Shreveport in 
1949. Hardy Brian became the outstanding Populist leader in 
Louisiana. His writings, chiefly newspaper articles, reveal 
him as an intelligent young man who was rather hampered by 
his provincial background. For Louisiana of the 1890*s, 
however, Brian had serious faults as a third party leader. 
Though quick to anger at injustice, Brian was, essentially, 
a gentle natured man; he was unequal to the task of organ­
izing a truly statewide political organization, or of fight­
ing the Bourbon regime with the sort of vigor and ruthless­
ness that Huey Long later employed. Those who met Hardy 
Brian late in life found him a cheerful old man with no 
apparent regrets or bitterness about his futile venture into 
Louisiana politics. Biographical data on him is scanty, 
although some useful information may be found in the follow­
ing sources: Louisiana Populist. October 14, 1898; Joseph­
ine Harris, "H. L. Brian Looks Back on Life of Stormy 
Politics," published in Shreveport Times. March 13, 1939.
^See Winnfield Southern Sentinel. February 19,
1886; Winrffield Comrade, quoted in Louisiana Populist. 
October 14, 1898.
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tradition, twenty-three year old Hardy Brian ran for State
Representative, as an Independent. The elder Brian was then
making his fifth campaign for the State Senate in a district
which included Winn. The father and son ticket lost to
Democratic candidates; out of about 1,250 votes cast in
27Winn, Benjamin Brian received 409 and Hardy 270. But 
within two years, a distinct leftward shift in sentiment 
among the rank-and-file farmers of the region could be ob­
served. According to Hardy Brian, the 1890 visit of the 
Kansas spellbinder, Charles Vincent, did much to stir the
farmers to action. He "was the first to break the ice for
28a new party," Brian later wrote.
In particular were farmers in the Fourth and Fifth 
Congressional Districts angry over the stand taken by 
Congressmen Newton C. Blanchard and Charles J. Boatner 
against the Alliance sub-treasury plan. In August of 1890, 
Blanchard in the Fourth District and Boatner in the Fifth, 
won out over strong Farmers' Union opposition in the Demo­
cratic party nominating conventions. Thereupon, the Winn 
Parish Union called for delegates, representing the agrarian 
order in each parish of the Fourth District, to meet in 
Natchitoches on October 1 for,the purpose of nominating a
^Baton Rouge Daily Capitolian-Advocate. May 7-9, 
1888; Colfax Chronicle. Mav 5. 1888.
^Louisiana Populist. September 28, 1894.
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29man to oppose Blanchard in the general election. This 
hostility toward Blanchard involved more than the sub­
treasury plan. In Congress since 1881, Blanchard had 
scarcely overworked himself to defend the claims of upland
homesteaders against the notorious "Backbone" land grant of
30
Jay Gould's New Orleans Pacific Railroad. Blanchard was 
a wealthy Shreveport lawyer. The fact that he could, and 
did, sojourn in Europe "for his health" excited angry 
feelings among "those of his constituents who have to 
scuffle around peartly to get a quarter to buy a box of
31Wright's pills to work the malaria out of their systems."
Seven of the twelve parish Unions of northwestern 
Louisiana sent delegates to the Natchitoches assembly. Five 
parish delegations then voted in favor of independent 
political action. Frantically, State Union President Adams 
wired them:
Do not, under any circumstances, nominate an
independent candidate for Congress. Your honor .
. . is pledged to the support of the Democratic 
nominee. . . .  Go forth like men and rally your 
entire forces to the flag of the Democracy. Stand 
by the colors of the party, and bide your time with 
patience.
T. S. Adams, President*^
29colfax Chronicle. September 20, 1890.
30Cf. Letter from Newton C. Blanchard,published in
ibid., February 17, 1883; New Orleans Times-Democrat. quoted
in Farmerville Home Advocate. October 30, 1885.
^Baton Rouge Capitol Item..quoted in Louisiana 
Populist. September 14, 1894.
^^Quoted in Colfax Chronicle. October 4, 1890,
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Delegates from Grant, Rapides, Sabine, Vernon, and
Winn ignored Adams's plea and selected a Farmers* Union-
Independent candidate for Congress. Thomas J. Guice was 
33their nominee.- Immediately, Guice was hit by a flood of. 
conservative bile; the Democratic organ in Grant Parish 
described him as "afflicted with a diarrhoea of words and a 
constipation of ideas," and opined that the "bolting 
farmers" who selected him were influenced by that meddle­
some outsider, Vincent of Kansas.^4 But Guice, after some 
vacillation, declined the nomination. He still held the 
position of State Lecturer in the Farmers* Union. President 
Adams put heavy pressure on Guice, and the fact that only 
four parish Unions--the Rapides group having changed its
mind--were endorsing him, sobered Guice*s obvious desire to 
3bmake the race. The Daily Picayune had previously referred
33The term "People's party" was not used by Louisi­
ana third party men until after the Cincinnati convention of 
May 19-21, 1891. Cf. Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. October 5,
17, 1890; Colfax Chronicle. June 27, 1891.
^4Colfax Chronicle. October 11, 1890. Editor Howard 
G. Goodwyn of the Chronicle was also chairman of the Grant 
Parish Democratic party organization. As editor of the 
Chronicle from 1877 until his death in 1920, Goodwyn closely 
observed and caustically criticized all left wing political 
movements in Grant and neighboring parishes--the heartland 
of rural radicalism in Louisiana, The microfilmed files of 
the Chronicle, fortunately complete, provides one of the 
best single sources for Pelican State agrarianism in the late 
nineteenth century. For a short biography of Goodwyn, see 
Chambers, A History of Louisiana. Ill, 102.
^^Lake Providence Carroll Democrat. October 11,
1890; Opelousas St. Landry Clarion. October 18, 1890.
i299
to him as plain "Guice," but after he declined styled him
36"Colonel Guice." Not to be outdone, the official journal 
of the state offered the title "General Guice.
On election day, November 4, Blanchard received 
8,307 votes. Guice was credited with 277 protest ballots. 
But discontent was, nonetheless, apparent in the 1890 re­
turns; two years before, Blanchard had garnered 16,302 votes 
against a very weak Republican opponent. The returns from 
Winn Parish merited special comment. There, in 1890, ex­
actly ninety-five per cent of the electorate agreed with the 
suggestion in the Winnfield Comrade and stayed away from the 
polls.38
In northeastern Louisiana, attempts to run a strong 
Farmers' Union man against the ultra-conservative Congress­
man Boatner met with similar disappointment in 1890. A 
wealthy lawyer and planter, and a staunch McEnery man, Boat­
ner occupied his seat by courtesy of the disproportionate
strength given the plantation parishes in Fifth District
39Democratic conventions. Hill people were haughtily told
JODaily' Picayune, quoted in Baton Rouge Daily Advo­
cate. October 14, 1890.
^Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. October 14, 1890.
^ ® L o u i s i a n a ,  Report of Secretary of State. 1902, 
573-74; Winnfield Comrade, quoted in Baron Rouge Daily Advo­
cate. October 31, November 18, 1890.
^Winnsboro Franklin Sun. March 2, 1884; Biographi­
cal and Historical Memoirs of Louisiana. I, 301. Boatner 
began his political career in Catahoula parish in 1876, when 
he defeated Benjamin Brian for the state Senate. Boatner 
moved to Quachita Parish in 1878.
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to "quit grumbling" at Boatner4^ and the system which managed
to foist him upon the region. At least Blanchard spoke
kindly of the Farmers' Union; Boatner scored it as a "secret
political organization" which no true Democrat should
join.4*" A convention of "dissatisfied farmers" of the Fifth
District met in Monroe in October of 1890 but failed to name
40
an opposition candidate. Yet Boatner's path was not 
entirely clear. The President of the Lincoln Parish Union 
urged members to "ignore Mr. Boatner"4^ in the coming 
election, and throughout the District Boatner's strength 
declined from his 1888 level by about 10,000 votes.44 The 
Union in Catahoula Parish, dominated by "the poorer class of 
farmers," felt that negative protest was not enough and 
brought out T. E. Pritchard as a candidate. Pritchard 
carried Catahoula, 587 to 435 for Boatner.45 The local 
Colored Farmers' Alliance ignored the Republican congress­
ional candidate and voted for Pritchard.46 Thus, in the
4^Lake Providence Carroll Democrat. October 27, 1888.
4^Pailv Picayune. September 4, 1891.
4^Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. October 3, 1890.
4%uston Progressive Age, quoted in Lake Providence 
Carroll Democrat. September 4, 1890.
44Louisiana, Report of Secretary of State. 1902,
573-74.
45Trinity Herald, quoted in Colfax Chronicle. August 
1, 1891; Louisiana, Report of Secretary of State, 1902, 574.
4^Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. October 30, 1890;
Daily Picayune. November 8, 1890.
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only parish in the state where a Democratic Congressman 
faced an active agrarian opponent in 1890, the Democrat lost.
Third party sentiment in Louisiana, as expressed in 
the congressional races of 1890, seemed almost nonexistent 
outside the northern hill parishes and, as has been seen* 
was quite disorganized even there; small farmers in South 
Louisiana districts put up no opposition to the Democratic 
candidates. In New Orleans, Union Labor candidate Carson 
Mudge drew less than one per cent of the recorded vote in 
the First Congressional District.4"^
Nevertheless, the more astute Bourbons soon mani­
fested uneasiness. The tide of political agrarianism seemed 
to be rising, as was indicated by the growing attention 
throughout the state paid to a third party newspaper in Winn 
Parish. The Winnfield Comrade had begun publication on 
October 3, 1890, and soon had readers in distant parishes.4® 
Hardy Brian was the editor. Brian claimed that the Comrade 
was the first Populist newspaper in the South.4^
4*^ Dailv Picayune. November 16, 1890.
4®Colfax Chronicle. November 8, 1890, July 11, 1891; 
Baton Rouge Dally Advocate. December 30, 1890; New Orleans 
Times-Democrat. August l6. 1891.
^ Louisiana Populist. December 7, 1894. Brian’s 
Winnfield Comrade may well have been the first People’s party 
newspaper in the South. But the evidence is inconclusive.
The Comrade did not, apparently, use the People’s party label 
until after Brian returned from the Cincinnati convention in 
May of 1891, though the paper had been an avowed third party 
organ since its first issue on October 3, 1890. The Comrade 
was published until 1911. Regretably, no copies are extant 
prior to 1910; by that time the paper was in Democratic hands.
302
The Comrade was owned by the Winn Parish Farmers1 
Union. Special circumstances had led to its unique name. 
Prior to purchase by the Union, the battered old press and 
type cases had been used by the Winn Parish Democrat, which, 
after the sale, ceased publication. The new management was 
now plagued with the problem of renaming the paper. The old 
title simply would not do. But an order for new nameplate- 
size type might take weeks to arrive, and besides, money was 
scarce. Recalling the situation a half century later, Brian 
quoted himself as saying, his first day on the job: "We*!!
see how we can change the title we already have." Fortu­
nately, all the letters in ’Democrat"' were upper case. By 
shuffling these letters, and discarding the "t," Brian dis­
covered a combination which at least was not jibberish: 
"Comrade."5^
The Ocala conventions of the Southern Farmers1 
Alliance and the Colored Farmers* Alliance met one month 
after the elections of 1890. Many states in the South had 
gone through gubernatorial as well as congressional cam­
paigns. The Alliance, it seemed at the time, was well under­
way in its plan to take over the Democratic party of the
^See Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Louisi­
ana . II, 168; Colfax Chronicle. October ll. 1890: Shreveport 
Times. March 13, 1939, quoted in James S. Penny, "The 
People's Party Press During the Louisiana Political Upheaval 
of the Eighteen-Nineties" (Unpublished Master's thesis, 
Louisiana State University, 1942), 64-65.
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South. Four new governors {in Georgia, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, and Texas) had won with Alliance backing. Eight 
southern legislatures were said to be under Alliance control. 
About forty-four congressmen in the South endorsed the sub- 
treasury plan.^ By comparison, Louisiana seemed woefully 
behind her sister states in Alliance political victories, 
but President Adams, who took the chastened Guice along with 
him to Ocala, was still pinning his hopes on the 1892 state 
election.^
Conservative Alliancemen at Ocala hailed the sup­
posed victories of 1890 as proof of the efficacy of remaining 
in old party l i n e s . B u t  the Kansas delegation, the Negro 
Alliance, and a handful of southern white Alliancemen took a 
contrary view. The new People’s party in Kansas was booming. 
Less than six months old as a state organization, it had 
elected a majority to the legislature, five congressmen, and 
a United States senator.^ Prominent among the Kansas dele­
gation at Ocala were the three Vincent brothers. They were
^lfaulkner, Politics, Reform, and Expansion. 144; 
Hicks, The Populist Revolt. 178: Saloutos. Farmer Movements 
in the South. 116: Roscoe C. Martin, The People’s Party in 
Texas: A Study in Third Party Politics (University of
Texas Bulletin No, 3308: Austin, 19^3), 36.
^Alexandria Farmers’ Vidette. quoted in Colfax 
Chronicle. November 29, 1890.
^Woodward, Origins of the New South. 235.
54Haynes, Third Party Movements. 240, 251.
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credited with drawing up and circulating among the assembled 
farmers the call for a subsequent "National Union Confer­
ence" at Cincinnati, destined, in 1891, to set in motion the 
national People’s party.^ About 75 of the 500 or more 
individuals present at Ocala signed the call--mostly Kansas 
men and members of the Colored Farmers* Alliance. D Dr. 
Macune and Southern Alliance President Polk tried to arrange 
a compromise which would delay any decision on a third party 
until February of 1892.^  But the militant minority refused 
to wait.
The National Union Conference brought 1,412 dele­
gates from over thirty states and territories to Cincinnati 
in May of 1891. Naturally, the three Vincents were on hand. 
So were such inveterate reformers as Ignatius Donnelly of 
Minnesota, James B. Weaver of Iowa, and Anson J. Streeter of 
Illinois, together with a number of labor leaders who were
there as interested spectators. Among the latter were
58Terence V. Powderly and Samuel Gompers. But the attendance
“^ New York Times, December 5, 1890; Barr, A Standard 
History of Kansas and Kansans. II, 1159.
“^ Philadelphia Journal of the Knights of Labor. 
December 11, 1890.
^Noblin, Leonidas LaFavette Polk. 268; Blood, Hand­
book and History of the National Farmers* Alliance. 66-67.
“^ Cincinnati Enquirer. May 19-21, 1891; Noblin, 
Leonidas LaFavette Polk. 269.
305
at Cincinnati was geographically lopsided. Midwestern and 
Plains states made up the overwhelming majority--Kansas 
alone sent 411--and only 36 were on hand from the entire 
S o u t h . T w o  of the southerners were from Louisiana: Hardy
Brian of.Winnfield and I. J. Mills of Lake Charles.
Young Brian was described by one correspondent as 
"the temporary lion of the hour" on the opening day of the 
Cincinnati convention.^ The Comrade editor seemed to be a 
more outspoken third party man than any other southerner 
interviewed; in fact, most of those who had come up from the 
South followed the lead of Congressman Leonidas F. Living­
ston of Georgia, who said he was present "to fight this
AO
third party move." Brian’s credentials also attracted 
comment. The Winn Parish agrarians, in authorizing Brian as 
their representative, had attached 1,200 signatures, a 
number just 131 shy of the total adult male population of 
the parish! Around Winn Parish, Brian told reporters at
^Cincinnati Enquirer. May 21, 1891; Saloutos,
Farmer Movements in the South. 122-23.
^Cincinnati Enquirer. May 18, 1891.
^Philadelphia Journal of the Knights of Labor. May 
21, 1891. For one thing, Brian entertained the more urbane 
delegates to the Cincinnati convention by telling of his 
departure; he left Winnfield riding on a pony, and rode it 
fifty miles to catch the nearest train which would make 
connections to Cincinnati.
^^Cincinnati Enquirer. May 19, 1891.
ZL o
Philadelphia Journal of the Knights of Labor. May 
21, 1891; U.S., Compendium of the Eleventh Census. I.~~782-83.
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Cincinnati, the people would not be intimidated by Bourbon 
outcries over "the negro menace" and the need for white 
solidarity inside the Democratic party. "The race cry 
doesn’t scare us," he said.^4
After officially proclaiming the birth of the 
national People’s party, the Cincinnati convention adjourned 
on May 21. The Populist platform was not an original docu­
ment. It embodied the Farmers’ Alliance program as stated 
in the "Ocala Demands" of 1890, the major planks being the 
sub-treasury plan, free and unlimited coinage of silver at 
a ratio of 16 to 1 to gold, abolition of the national 
banking system, prohibition of alien ownership of land, a 
graduated income tax, government control (or ownership) of 
communications and transportation facilities, an eight hour 
day for labor, and the direct election of United States 
Senators. The Cincinnati convention was cleverly managed. 
It permitted professional third party warhorses such as 
Donnelly to be "in on the ground floor" as the People’s 
party emerged. And the majority element of the Southern 
Farmers* Alliance, which had wished to delay the third party 
decision, was quickly and carefully placated. The managers 
at Cincinnati set up a national committee to smooth the way
^Cincinnati Enquirer. May 19, 1891.
65Ibid., May 21, 1891.
^Hicks, The Populist Revolt. 217.
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for a union of midwestern and southern agrarian forces at
fs*7
the proposed St. Louis convention in February of 1892.
By that latter date President Polk and many other Southern 
Alliance leaders were ready for Populism.^® The Demo­
cratic party of the South had not been and was not likely 
to be, captured by the agrarians. The victories of 1890
were proving hollow. The sub-treasury plan had been sabo-
69taged in Congress by southern Democrats. Henceforth, the 
fight would be between Bourbon Democracy and the People*s 
party.
Within a month after Brian’s return from Cincinnati,
by July 1, 1891, the majority of Farmers' Union members in
Catahoula, Grant, and Winn Parishes had formally renounced
all ties to the Democratic party,and, while assembled at
Union meetings, pledged their support to the People's 
70party. Soon, Populist stirrings were noticeable among the
Unions of Calcasieu, Natchitoches, Rapides, Sabine, and
71Vernon Parishes. Bourbon spokesmen grew increasingly
^ Ibid.. 214-17; Philadelphia Journal of the Knights 
of Labor. May 28, 1891.
^®Noblin, Leonidas LaFayette Polk. 270-73.
^ Ibid.; Woodward, Origins of the New South. 239.
^Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. June 21-23, 1891; 
Colfax Chronicle. June 20, 27, 1891.
"^Winnfield Comrade. quoted in Colfax Chronicle. July 
11, 1891; Lake Charles Echo, quoted in Colfax Chronicle. 
August 1, 1891; Daily Picayune. October 3, 189TI
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disturbed and angry over these mass defections, and the
choler of the Daily Caucasian was raised several degrees by
the news, in late July, that “Professor Vincent" of Kansas
had returned "to preach his third party heresy to Louisiana 
7 9farmers."
The Populist groundswell attracted a number of
shabby, pathetic misfits. L. A. Traylor, a small, almost
dwarfish man whose political history was said to include
Radical Repbulicanism and Greenbackism, was one such indi- 
7 3vidual. Traylor was an ordained Baptist minister. He had 
also taught school in a number of hill parishes, and, at 
various times, sold insurance for the Famous Life Associ­
ation or peddled "some sort of-patent medicine."'74 During 
the summer of 1891 Traylor took to the road as an organizer 
for the People’s party in North and Central Louisiana. He
seemed to be quite effective in swaying Negroes from Re-
7 5publicanism to Populism. Accused by the Colfax Chronicle 
of preaching "communistic ideas," Traylor replied:
^Shreveport Daily Caucasian, quoted in Baton Rouge 
Daily Advocate. July 28, 1891. See also Hicks, The Popu­
list Revolt. 217.
TO
'JFor information on L. A. Traylor, see Baton Rouge 
Daily Advocate. October 5, 1890; Homer Guardian-Journal. 
quoted in Colfax Chronicle. August 1, 1891; Colfax Chroni­
cle. January 30, 1892.
Homer Guardian-Journal. quoted in Colfax Chroni­
cle. August 1, 1891.
^For Traylor’s activities among Negroes, see 
Colfax Chronicle. August 8, 1891.
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Educational institutions . . . open their doors to 
the rich. Magnificent church buildings with splendid 
embellishments are being erected . . . and the wealth 
of the country, like the oil from the Standard Oil 
Trust, flows through a thousand pipes into the vaults 
of capitalists, making the rich richer and the poor 
poorer. . . .  It is unnatural, unrighteous and dam­
nable, and if I must preach the doctrine of commu­
nists to arouse the people from their lethargy, then 
make the most of it.76
Traylor's Populist activities made him an object of
attention, probably for the first time in his life. He was
appointed President of a so-called "college" in Grant 
77Parish. He was elected Chairman of the Committee of
78Organization of the Louisiana People’s party. Even the 
Daily Picayune took note of him and described him as "promi­
nent."^ In September of 1891, when Grant Parish Populists 
raised money to start a party organ at Colfax, Traylor
became the editor. This paper was christened The Ocala
80Demand [sic] . Traylor then had the opportunity to use 
his acid pen on what he called the "vindictive, villainous
and arrogant . . . Louisiana aristocrats," and he cited the
81editor of the Colfax Chronicle as a prime local example.
^Letter from L. A. Traylor, published in ibid.. 
August 1, 1891.
77Colfax Chronicle. August 1, 8, 1891.
7ft
Daily Picayune. October 4, 1891.
79Ibid.. October 3, 1891.
^Colfax Chronicle. September 19, 1891.
0*1
Colfax The Ocala Demand, auoted in ibid.. October
17, 1891. ~
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Traylor portrayed the Chronicle* which often reprinted anti- 
Populist diatribes from other papers, as a chamberpot into 
which was emptied "the filth and slush" of the state's
QO
Bourbon press. But Traylor's days as a crusader were
numbered. Late in 1891 money from the Louisiana State
Lottery Company began to trickle into Colfax,®^ and The
Ocala Demand suddenly underwent a reversal of policy;
Traylor implored his Populist readers to "enlist under the
banner" of Samuel D. McEnery in the current gubernatorial 
84campaign. On this sour note did Traylor close his third 
85party career. Obscurity again claimed him.
From the summer of 1891 until April of 1892, politi­
cal activity in Louisiana, Populist or otherwise, revolved 
around the question of who would succeed Francis T. Nicholls 
in the governor's mansion at Baton Rouge. The Populists at 
first offered qualified support to Thomas Adams. As Hardy
D O
Hardy Brian confirmed reports that the lottery was 
at work among Populist leaders in Grant Parish, and he 
angrily denounced those who accepted lottery money. Brian 
later called Traylor "the arch traitor and cats-paw." Winn­
field Comrade, quoted in Colfax Chronicle. February 6, 1892; 
Louisiana Populist. August 2, 1895.
84Colfax The Ocala Demand, quoted in Colfax Chroni­
cle. January 9, 1892.
®~*Colfax Chronicle. January 30, 1892. Goodwyn ob­
served that Reverend Traylor was "but a fraction physically 
and morally."
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Brian explained it in the Comrade, the Louisiana Populists 
desired most of all a governor and state legislature sym­
pathetic to the Southern Alliance program; if Adams would 
stand by the Ocala Demands and not become a mere tool of 
the Anti-Lottery League patricians, then the third party men 
would vote for an Adams-headed state Democratic ticket in 
1892.88 But Adams fulfilled none of these Populist pro­
visos. He even expressed doubts about the sub-treasury 
plan.®^ It was at the Lafayette convention of the Farmers* 
Union, in August of 1891, that the break between Adams and 
the left wing agrarians became irrevocable. Not only did 
they foreseethe outcome of the Adams-Anti-Lottery compact, 
but they also resented the fact that Adams's speech before 
the Lafayette gathering made no mention of the Ocala 
Demands, but rather was confined to two main topics: the
lottery evil and the unwisdom of straying from the Demo-
QQ
cratic party. A number of hitherto faithful Adams men 
(including Thomas J. Guice) then proclaimed themselves 
Populists.89
QZ
Winnfield Comrade, quoted in Baton Rouge Daily 
Advocate. July 30, 189X7"
87°'New Orleans Times-Democrat, quoted in Colfax 
Chronicle. October 31, 1891.
88
Daily Picayune. August 8-9, September 17, 1891; 
Winnfield Comrade, quoted in Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. 
August 13, 1891.
890pelousas St. Landry Clarion. August 15, 1891.
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One angry upland farmer wrote about Adams and the 
state Democratic party in such quaint style that the Colfax 
Chronicle published it verbatim. The agrarian's letter con­
cluded with the following (spelling and grammar unchanged) 
words:
I dislike to be called a chronic grumbler but I would 
like to know what kind of gall a man can have within 
him that will advocate a party that has formed a body 
simular to that of a crockadile and equally as danger­
ous with a thousand tubes extending from its eyes nose 
mouth and ears between its ribs and from under its 
tail that can at any time squrt the Dye . . . into the 
eyes of the industrial masses and while they are in 
their blinded condition rob them of the fruits of 
their toil then return home singing hymns of Joy for 
the Success they have had upon their pilfering tour 
Oh if Thomas Jeffrson could rise from the grave and 
take only a side look at the Present sistems of the 
democratic party he would no doubt regret bitterly 
that . . .  he was the Founder of democracy.90
The first state convention of the Louisiana People's 
party was slated for October 2, 1891, at Alexandria. Popu­
list organizers were meanwhile busy. Hardy Brian, Guice, 
and Traylor spent much of September conversing with working­
men's organizations in New Orleans; the Daily Picayune, ob­
serving their progress, reported that the Knights of Labor 
"are in hearty sympathy with the m o v e m e n t . T h e  People's 
Municipal party, as Populism's New Orleans affiliate was 
designated, had been holding meetings since midsummer.
^Letter from S. W. LaCroix, published in Colfax 
Chronicle. September 12, 1891.
^ Daily Picayune. September 16-20, October 3, 1891
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Moreover, the New Orleans Issue. a laborite weekly founded
in the spring of 1891, was now endorsing the Populist 
92
cause. Thomas A. Clayton, manager of the Farmers' Union
Commercial Association of Louisiana, supposedly provided the
93funds for the party in the New Orleans area.
Seventy-eight delegates from seventeen parishes were
present at the Alexandria convention. Most surprising was
the size of the urban delegation. No less than thirty-five
of the total seventy-eight Populists assembled had come up
from New Orleans.^4 Winn Parish, by comparison, occupied
five seats. All those present at the morning session were
white men; however, President Isaac Keys of the Colored
Alliance, along with another Negro Allianceman, arrived late
in the day and the two were admitted to the speaker's plat- 
95
form. Presiding over the convention preliminaries was 
Benjamin Brian. The elder Brian, looking over the assembled 
farmers and laborers, expressed "great satisfaction" at 
seeing the movement he had worked "for the last fifteen
9^New Orleans Issue. August 1, 1891. The Issue was 
owned and edited by J. B. Cameron and J. R. Hoening, Jr.
Both were active third party workers in the city and at 
state Populist conventions.
^Colfax Chronicle. October 31, 1891; Amite Florida 
Parishes. quoted in ibid.. November 7, 1891.
94Daily Picayune. October 2-4, 1891; Opelousas St. 
Landry Clarion. October 10, 1891.
^5Pailv Picayune. October 3, 1891.
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96years" to create finally organize on a statewide basis.
He also spoke of the rising Populist sentiment among Negro 
people. The big planters, Reverend Bridn prophesied, would 
try to stop their colored tenants from joining this mass 
movement; yet he felt confident that this obstacle "would 
be attended to at the proper time." His curious statement 
of confidence was not well rooted in reality.
The convention adjourned without making nominations 
for state office. That would be done later, in February of 
1892. A state organization, however, was set up: Thomas
Clayton was named as chairman of the state executive com­
mittee; Hardy Brian was named secretary of the party.^ 
Also, on October 3, the public could read the potent 
"Address to the People of the State of Louisiana . . . 
Irrespective of Class, Color, or Past Political Affili­
ation." This first platform of the state People’s party 
read, in part:
Nonei can yet tell whether this revolution shall be 
accomplished by peaceable means, by appeals to the 
reason of the dominant element of our population .
. .. or whether a deaf ear will still be turned . .
. until . . . the people rise in their mighty wrath, 
and with swift retributive strokes, beat down the
96Colfax Chronicle. October 10, 1891; Daily 
Picayune. October 3, 1891.
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Daily Picayune. October 4, 1891. Thomas J. Guice 
was absent from the first Populist party convention in 
Louisiana; he claimed illness in the family as his excuse, 
but it may be that he could not afford to travel. A news­
paper in Guice’s home parish said the tax rolls did not 
report him as owning as much as one dollar’s worth of 
property. Mansfield Journal, quoted in Colfax Chronicle. 
November 5, 1892.
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gates of . . . monopoly . . . and corruption, , , ,
You colored men . . . you must now realize that 
there is no hope of any further material benefit to 
you in the Republican party, and that if you remain 
in it you will continue to be hewers of wood and 
drawers of water in the future as you have been in 
the past.
Democrats. . . . Have you not the experience of 
uninterrupted Democratic rule in this state? What 
has it done for you? Are your children growing up 
better equipped for the battle of life than you were?
Are your institutions equal to the demands made upon 
them? Have your public finances been honestly ad­
ministered? The spectre of negro supremacy has been 
used to keep you in the toils of the scheming machine 
politicians as effectively as the voudou is employed 
to terrify the credulous negroes themselves.
But now the machine politicians have put a new 
slide in the magic lantern . . . and show you on 
their screen the hideous figure of lottery rule, to 
intimidate you and prevent you from grasping the hand 
held out to hfclp you escape from your political 
dungeon. Must a man be bound hand and foot in Demo­
cratic fetters before he can be trusted to vote against 
the lottery. . . ? Cast your ballot against this 
lottery and all . . . gambling on the product of your 
labor.
Will you still remain the willing serfs of machine 
politicians? Shall Louisiana not join in that ringing 
shout for liberty and reform that started in Kansas. .
■ ?98
After studying this platform and examining the 
signatures suffixed thereto, the Daily Picayune, headlined: 
"IT MAY BE RIDICULOUS, BUT IT IS REVOLUTION."99 Nothing 
like the Populist convention, said the old New Orleans daily, 
had ever been witnessed in Louisiana before; "it is a
98
Daily Picayune. October 4, 1891
" ibid.. October 5, 1891.
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gathering of all the discontented, dissatisfied and un- 
prosperous elements of the population. . . .  It is easy to 
laugh at, but . . . there is nothing absurd in the fact that 
half the delegates at the Alexandria conference were from 
this city. When the city and country unite, results may be 
serious." Said an upstate Bourbon paper, in noting the 
Populist platform: "For unabashed impudence and unblushing
demagogism [it] has no parallel in the history of revo­
lutionary manifestos.
But the Alexandria conference lacked one bewhiskered 
face that had been present at almost every significant 
agrarian gathering in the state for the past decade, in­
cluding the dismal little gathering near D'Arbonne Church in 
1881. J. A. Tetts was in Alexandria in October of 1891.
But he stayed away from the Populist convention. Tetts, 
since 1889, had steadily fallen under the conservative in­
fluence of Thomas Adams; late that year President Adams ap­
pointed Tetts editor of the "Union department" of the news­
paper selected as the official journal of the Farmers'
Union, the Shreveport Weekly C a u c a s i a n . Shortly
^ ^ H a r r i s o n b u r g  Catahoula News, quoted in Colfax 
Chronicle. October 31, 1891.
•^■^Shreveport Daily Caucasian. January 8, 1890; 
Shreveport Weekly Caucasian. January 30, 1890, The Choud- 
rant Farmers' Union, the first organ of the Louisiana order, 
moved its offices to Monroe in 1888 and had ceased publi­
cation by 1891. In fact, the Farmeri* Union had ceased 
being the state organ of the Union as earlyas 1888.
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thereafter, Adams and Tetts decided that a journal "wholly
102owned and controlled by the Order" was an imperative need.
This decision led to the founding of the Alexandria Farmers*
Vidette; its first issue came off the press on October 22,
10 31890. Tetts was at first co-editor, then editor-in-chief.
The Farmers* Vidette evidently boomed Adams for the 
governorship and praised the Anti-Lottery League more than 
it dwelt upon the problems of small farmers. Tetts also de­
nounced the third party movement, as it spread out of Winn 
Parish, in unmeasured t e r m s . T h e  Populists returned his
fire; Tetts was even accused of being the prime fulorum
105behind the Farmers* Union-Anti-Lottery League compact;
L. A. Traylor referred to the Farmers* Vidette as "Tetts, 
Adams & Co.," and vowed to "eat up Tetts . . . bloddy 
raw."^^ But Tetts, whatever his designs might have been, 
was not equipped to hold his own in the Machiavellian atmos­
phere of Louisiana Democratic politics. On April 21, 1892,
•^ O^ National Economist. Ill (August 30, 1890), 382. 
i m^Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest 
Louisiana. 533; New Orleans Louisiana Review. January 27, 
1892.
■^4Alexandria Farmers* Vidette. quoted in Colfax 
Chronicle. November 7, 14, 1891.
^ ^ Mansfield De Soto Democrat, quoted in New Orleans 
Louisiana Review. January 27, 1892. It was alleged that 
Tetts believed the state printing contract would be thrown 
to the Farmers* Vidette if Foster became Governor.
^•^Dailv Picayune. October 3, 1891; Colfax The Ocala
Demand, quoted in Colfax Chronicle. November 14, 1891.
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three days after the state election, Tetts resigned as edi­
tor of the fading Farmers* Vidette, His usefulness to 
Adams and to the Anti-Lottery League had terminated. Tetts, 
along with his wife and three unmarried daughters, prepared 
to move to the village of Robeline, in Natchitoches Parish. 
He had saved enough money to buy some newspaper equipment,
probably second hand. One month later the Robeline Battle 
107Flag appeared. Tetts had become a Populist.
If a Louisiana voter did not wish to support a
particular ticket in the April, 1892, state election, he had
(in theory at least) four other choices. The fragmentation
of state parties that year confused the most seasoned
political veterans. The pro-lottery Regular Democrats were
running a ticket headed by ex-GOvernor McEnery; the Anti-
Lottery Democrats had Murphy J. Foster at the top of their
slate; the Republicans also.put out two state tickets, with
Albert H. Leonard as the pro-lottery and John E. Breaux as
108the anti-lottery Republican candidates for Governor.
Finally, on February 18, the People*s party placed Robert L. 
Tannehill of Winn Parish, in the gubernatorial race, along 
with a full slate of candidates for the lesser state
^^Colfax Chronicle. May 7, 1892; Penny, "The 
People*s Party Press," 50.
^®Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. December 16-20, 1891; 
New Orleans Times-Democrat. January 20, February 18, 1892. 
Leonard was allied with ex-Senator William P. Kellogg;
Breaux was a member of ex-Governor Henry Clay Warmoth’s 
faction of the Louisiana Republican party.
"Political nomenclature," observed the St, Landry 
Clarion, "is becoming numerous and complex. Also com­
plex were the postures taken by the various nominees. The 
McEnery Democrats, heretofore exponents of the rawest sort 
of Bourbonism, were now wringing their hands in pious dis­
may over the wretched condition of state schools and insti­
tutions. For this same election would decide upon the 
lottery recharter amendment. The McEneryites, supporting 
the lottery offer to pour $1,250,000 per year into the state 
coffers in exchange for a twenty-five year constitutional 
renewal of life, denounced the Foster Democrats as cruel 
"rich men" who cared nothing for the poor school children 
who would gain from the proffered lottery l a r g e s s . Y e t  
the fact that the Foster ticket included three members of 
the Farmers' Union prompted one McEnery enthusiast to cate­
gorize the entire slate, including Foster, as "red revo- 
112lutionists." Foster Democrats, on the other hand,
lO^The Populist state ticket in 1892 offered: 
Governor, Robert L. Tannehill of Winn; Lt. Governor, I. J. 
Mills of Calcasieu; Secretary of State, D, McStravick of 
Orleans; Treasurer, John Mahoney of Orleans; Auditor, John 
Hendricks of Caddo; Superintendent of Education, J. D.
Patton of Grant; Attorney General, Wade Hough of Concordia, 
New Orleans Times-Democrat. February 19-21, 1892.
^■^Opelousas St. Landry Clarion, quoted in Penny, 
"The People's Party Press," 29.
^^•Dailv Picayune. August 24, 1891; New Orleans 
Louisiana Review. January 6, 1892.
l^Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. February 12, 1892.
320
hammered away on the moral evil of the lottery and its 
Carpetbagger origins; they suggested that a McEnery victory 
might bring Major Burke back from H o n d u r a s . M e a n w h i l e ,  
the Leonard and Breaux Republican tickets were much too 
absorbed in their intercine squabble to bother the Democrats.
"This newborn babe," as Hardy Brian termed the 
Louisiana People’s party, hoped to benefit from the family 
fights going on in the Democratic and Republican houses. H-4 
The Populist state platform in 1892 made a special bid for 
the Negro vote. "We declare emphatically," said the docu­
ment, "that the interests of the white and colored races of
the South are identical. . . . Equal justice and fairness
115must be accorded to each. . . . "  Of the 171 delegates 
present at the Populist nominating convention in February 
of 1892, at least 24 were colored men.^^ Two of the 
Negroes present were placed in nomination for a position on 
the state ticket. C. A. Roxborough of New Iberia and L. D. 
Laurent of Alexandria were both candidates for the Populist
■^^Bayou Sara True Democrat. March 9, 1892; Ope­
lousas St. Landrv Clarion. January 2, 23, 1892.
^ 4Winnfield Comrade, quoted in Lucia Elizabeth 
Daniel, "The Louisiana People’s Party" (Master’s thesis, 
Louisiana State University, 1942), 32. The Daniel thesis 
was published in the Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXVI 
(October, 1943), 1055-1149.
115New Orleans Times-Democrat. February 19, 1892.
U 6 Ibid
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nomination to the office of State Treasurer. Other colored 
delegates, however, urged them to withdraw their names; "it 
was not the proper time," the more cautious Negroes ex­
plained, for colored Populists to run for o f f i c e . T h e  
Times-Democrat correspondent indicated that the white Popu­
lists did not take part in the argument, preferring to let 
the Negroes settle it themselves. Shortly before the con­
vention was due to ballot, both Negroes withdrew their 
candidacy. But Laurent and Roxborough did receive organi­
zational positions within the party; they became members of 
the Populist state executive committee.
Robert L. Tannehill, the only bona fide Populist the 
party ever nominated for Governor of Louisiana, was a rela­
tively prosperous resident of Winnfield. He owned a saw mill 
and a cotton gin. Forty-four years of age in 1892, Tannehill 
had previously held one public office: sheriff of Winn
Parish. He served as treasurer of the Louisiana Farmers* 
Union and presided over the parish Union from 1887 to
117Ibid. Laurent was state President of the Colored 
Farmers* Alliance of Louisiana in 1890-91. Roxborough had 
been expelled from the Republican party in 1887 after he had 
been accused of stealing votes for the Democrats. In fact, 
a mob of Negroes in the town of Plaquamine once tried to 
lynch Roxborough. New Orleans Weekly Pelican. April 23, May 
28, 1887.
^®Laurent, immediately after the Alexandria con­
vention, joined a number of white Louisiana Populists at 
the national third party conference which opened at St. Louis 
on February 22, 1892. Jack Abramowitz,"The Negro in the 
Agrarian Revolt," Agricultural History. XXIV (April, 1950)
94.
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1890.^9 Yet Tannehill was virtually unknown outside of 
Winn. The other members of the ticket were equally obscure.
McEnery and his followers tended to' ignore the Popu­
list candidates, assuming correctly that the little agrarian 
party would draw most of its votes from men who would have 
otherwise supported Foster. The Fosterites understood this 
also. Consequently, the Populist ticket was treated most 
hostilely by the Foster Democracy; claims were made that 
lottery money financed the Populist campaign, and that the
third party was making the race "in order to help the
120lottery as much as possible." However, the Fosterite 
charge that the Populist platform failed to condemn the 
lottery was patently untrue. Tannehill^ supporters took 
the view that the gambling syndicate was a great evil, but 
not the only one which plagued the unhappy state. The New 
Orleans Issue. Populismfs urban advocate, suggested that 
the Foster Democrats had taken up the anti-lottery crusade 
merely to herd working people away from other fields of 
reform. In other words, the lottery was a sacrificial
wolf being thrown to the lambs.
That Foster would be the next Governor became
•^•^ Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Northwest 
Louisiana. 492; Winnfield Southern Sentinel. August 28,
1885, September 16, 1887.
120Alexandria Town Talk, quoted in Opelousas St. 
Landry Clarion. October 3, 1891.
^•^New Orleans Issue. June 4, 1892.
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evident weeks before the election. The Federal government,
by February of 1892, had forced the lottery to discontinue
100its use of the United States mail. ^  McEnery*s obvious
lack of popularity convinced lottery officials that their
cause within the state was also hopeless. The company with-
123drew its request for recharter. Foster obtained 79,388
votes against 47,037 for McEnery in the general election on
April 19. The two Republicans divided 41,818 votes. Popu-
124
list Tannehill brought up the rear with 9,804. Natu­
rally, official returns from any Louisiana election were 
subject to question; everyone but the Fosterites claimed 
that.gross frauds had occurred. One fact, though was clear; 
Populist sentiment had not yet made much headway either in 
the rural parishes or the city. Six per cent of the state 
vote was not an encouraging beginning.
Tannehill ran ahead of his Democratic and Republican 
opponents in just four parishes: Catahoula, Grant, Vernon,
and Winn, These four gave the Populist ticket 2,903 votes. 
One-tenth of Tannehill*s total state vote came from his home 
parish, where he received 1,001 against 305 for all four 
opponents; but, as one Bourbon observer jokingly noted, when 
all fifty-nine parishes were added up it became quite clear
^^Ezell, Fortune*s Merrv Wheel. 266-67.




Louisiana, Official Journal of the Senate. 1892.
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that "Tannehill didn’t Winn."125 The Populist candidate 
made a respectable showing in nine other parishes; Bien­
ville, Calcasieu, Caldwell, De Soto, Jackson, Natchitoches, 
Rapides, Red River, and Sabine, But the urban returns were 
discouraging to the extreme. Out of almost 40,000 ballots 
counted in New Orleans, Tannehill received 71.12^
Four People’s party men were elected to the state 
legislature in 1892. Benjamin F. Brian was the sole Popu­
list member of the upper house; the seat he had once held 
(1879-84) as an Independent, and had run for a total of six
times, would now be his for the remaining years of his 
1 0 7
life. Hardy Brian, his son, represented Winn Parish in 
the lower house. Albert Shelby of Grant, an ex-Republican, 
and John Franklin of Vernon were the other Populist, repre­
sentatives.12® Their legislative record was undistinguished.
125Lake Providence Carroll Democrat. April 30, 1892.
12®Louisiana, Official Journal of the Senate. 1892, 
21. The Populist vote in New Orleans in 1892 was, in all 
probability, considerably higher than the official returns 
would indicate. The city administration was notorious for 
counting third party votes in the Democratic column; in no 
New Orleans precinct were the Populists permitted to have 
commissioners in 1892. Cf. New Orleans Times-Democrat.
April 18-22, 1892; George M. Reynolds, Machine Politics in 
New Orleans; 1897-1926 (New York, 1936), 24-25.
^^Benjamin Brian died in 1896, at the age of 63. 
Louisiana Populist. November 6, 1896.
12®The Official journal erroneously listed all but 
Senator Brian as Democrats. Cf. Louisiana, Official Journal 
of the House of Representatives. 1892, 698-700; Colfax 
Chronicle. April 23, August 6, 1892.
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However, it was clearly the strategy of the four Populist
legislators to support bills introduced by Democratic
members of the Farmers' Union; measures introduced by non-
Democratic members had little chance of ever reaching the
floor for a vote. But at best, the agrarian coalition of
Populists and Farmers' Union Democrats could count on a mere
four senators out of thirty-six in the upper house, and
120twenty-two out of one hundred members in the house. 7 The 
session was notably lacking in reform legislation.
During the summer and fall of 1892, as the presi­
dential and congressional races drew near, the People's 
party of Louisiana came to realize the enormity of the task 
which confronted them. Factionalism within the Democratic 
party was fading. The lottery question was settled, and
Governor Foster's conservatism on matters of economics and
1race began to win plaudits among the old McEnery clique. 
United, the Bourbon Democracy of Louisiana scrutinized 
their agrarian challengers and found them puny but potenti­
ally dangerous; as one of McEnery*s friends phrased it: "A
spirit of political insubordination" was abroad in the 
131land. Foster's handling of the New Orleans general
^Shreveport Times. March 13, 1939.
-^3^Romero, Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXVIII, 
1164-66; Baton Rouae DairvAdvocate. October 7. 1892.
^3*Lake Providence Banner Democrat. September 10,
1892.
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strike in November of 1892 increased his popularity among 
upper class Louisianians. Luckily for the new Governor, the 
25,000 or more striking laborers confined their protests to 
matters of hours and wages and, with few exceptions, were 
apathetic toward the notion of political union with the 
rural Populists.
A meeting of the People*s party executive committee, 
on October 1, 1892, resolved to set up permanent state head­
quarters in New Orleans, and Andrew B. Booth of that city 
was named chairman of the executive committee. A young and 
rather nondescript man, Booth served more as a clerk and
■J O O
errand-boy for the party than as a moulder of policy.
Booth continued on as chairman until 1896. His work in the
shabby New Orleans office was hampered by an almost total
lack of money; often, he was unable to mail out Populist
literature because the office could not buy the postage 
134stamps. Booth earned his living, not as a professional
132por a discussion of the New Orleans general 
strike of 1892, see Roger W, Shugg, "The New Orleans General 
Strike of 1892," Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXI (April, 
1938), 547. The effect of the strike upon urban Populism 
appears to have been virtually nil. The third party ran no 
candidates in New Orleans in 1892, and obtained less than 
500 votes (officially, at least) in 1894. The New Orleans 
Issue, by 1894, was more Socialist than Populist. See 
Pearce, "The Rise and Decline of Labor in New Orleans," 30; 
Hall MS, 10-29; New Orleans Issue. December 10, 17, 31,1892.
■^^Colfax Chronicle. October 15, 1892; Louisiana 
Populist. July 12, 1895.
l34Louisiana Populist. July 12, 1895.
327
Populist, but rather as a lecturer for an organization known
as the Knights of Honor, which had no political affiliation
but appeared to be an insurance company disguised as a bene-
135volent and fraternal lodge. Hardy Brian, who served as 
state secretary of the agrarian party, resided in Winnfield 
until 1894, when he moved to Natchitoches.1^6 j^e chairman 
and the secretary seldom had the chance to meet and plan 
strategy. An effective statewide organization did not exist.
Shortly before the national election of November, 
1892, Populist candidates announced for Congress in four 
Louisiana districts. The news provoked a torrent of Bourbon 
abuse which surpassed all previous expletives used against 
the agrarian rebels. The Daily Advocate and the Daily 
States led the attack. Populists, according to the former, 
were "political hermaphrodites," and their party "a bastard 
organization. . . .  We appeal to the patriots of Louisiana 
to shun this monstrous political gangrene as they would a 
leper at the gates."137 Moreover, the Daily Advocate was 
"quite tired" of the Populist "mouthings and whinings" about
v
vote fraud; "if . . . they . . . can*t protect themselves 
from being 1 counted out,1 they should move out . . . and go
^■^Lake Providence Banner Democrat. February 1,
1896.
136
Louisiana Populist. December 28, 1894.
137Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. October 5, November
1, 1892.
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to some place where people don't 'count out.'"l3® Henry J.
Hearsey, editor of the Daily States. whose adoration of the
status quo was perhaps surpassed only by his love for 
13Qwhiskey, felt that Brian, Guice, and their ragged fol­
lowers were "sore heads, demogogues, agitators, . . . rain­
bow chasers"; in sum, "miserable excrescence of the Demo­
cratic and Republican p a r t i e s . H e a r s e y  advocated dic­
tatorship as the most suitable form of government for 
L o u i s i a n a . H e  was otherwise known for his lachrymose
1 4 Oeulogies to the memory of General Robert E. Lee.
Open Populist-Republican cooperation in Louisiana 
was inaugurated in October of 1892. One month prior to the 
election, Thomas J. Guice journeyed to New Orleans to open 
political negotiations with both the Warmoth-Breaux and the 
Kellogg-Leonard factions of the G.O.P.^43 By October 20 the
*33Ibid.. October 6, 1892.
1397See Homer Claiborne Guardian, quoted in New 
Orleans Weekly Pelican. July 16. 188*fr.
l^New Orleans Daily States, quoted in Colfax Chroni­
cle. August 13, 1892.
*4^For Hearsey*s espousal of dictatorship, see New 
Orleans Daily States, quoted in Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. 
August 27, 189^.
142Shreveport Sunday Judge. January 26, 1896. Major 
Hearsey was originally from Shreveport, and conservatives of 
that city were proud to claim him as a native son. In fact, 
a more fitting place of origin for Hearsey could not be 
imagined.
143Colfax Chronicle. October 22, 29, 1892; Uzee,
"Republican Politics in Louisiana," 125-26.
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bargain was sealed. Populists would nominate candidates in 
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Congressional Districts; the 
Republicans would run their men in the Second and Third; an 
Independent in the First District would be supported by 
both parties. Where the Republicans had no candidate they 
would endorse the Populist nominee; the Populists were to 
return the favor in the Republican districts. Also, an 
agreement was reached on presidential electors. A fusion 
ticket would be issued; four Populist electors pledges to 
James G. Weaver and four Republican electors pledged to 
Benjamin Harrison were to be listed on the ballot.-I44 
Apparently, national leaders of the Republican party were 
much in favor of the Louisiana fusion arrangements,^*4^ 
though some Republicans inside the state had misgivings; the 
national Populist party, on the other hand, criticized the 
arrangement. People’s party National Committee Chairman H. 
E. Taubeneck said the Louisiana fusion was made "against my 
protest.w^4^
Elsewhere in the South in 1892, the Populists and 
Republicans tended toward informal agreements in local, 
state, and sometimes congressional races; but only in
*44White, Mississippi Valiev Historical Review. V, 
9-11; New Orleans Times-Democrat. October 21-23, 1892.
^45Robert Lowrey [ ?] to J. Ernest Breda, October 14, 
1892, in Breda Papers (Louisiana State University Archives).
■^4^Quoted in New Orleans Issue, December 10, 1892.
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Louisiana were the presidential electors joined and the
1 / 1 7
congressional agreement so positive. The fact that the 
first statewide Populist-Republican fusion in the South 
occurred in Louisiana was another indication that the Peli­
can State had an unusually oppressive Bourbon Democratic 
r e g i m e . A s  one Republican grimly observed, the state’s
rulers had devised a cunning substitute for government. It
149was, he said, "an oligarchy by arithmetic."
The fusion agreement of 1892 was, of course, not 
without precedent in Louisiana. The National party move­
ment of 1878 had attempted a combination of yeoman white and 
Negro Republican voters under a similar organization; how­
ever, that effort, falling as it did under conservative 
white Republican control, was a standing lesson to the Popu­
lists of the 1890's. Warmoth, Kellogg, and the other 
remnants of Carpetbaggism were not the most trustworthy of 
allies. Many Populists displayed a lack of enthusiasm for 
the 1892 fusion. Hardy Brian, though he accepted it, re­
vealed a sense of shame when he asked his upland neighbors
^ T a Igx M. Arnett, The Populist Movement in Georgia 
(New York, 1922), 152-53; Martin. The Peopie*s Party in 
Texas. 77; Rogers, "Agrarianism in Alabama," 390-99; Hicks, 
The Populist Revolt. 245-47.
148Professor Key suspects that "the ruling oli­
garchy of Louisiana really pressed down harder than did the 
governing groups of other [southern ] states." Key, 
Southern Politics. 160.
149^ Quoted in New Orleans Weekly Pelican. January 5,
1889.
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to share their votes for a "plutocrat" like President Harri- 
150son. But however different their aims and economic phi­
losophy might be, Louisiana*s Populist and Republican 
leaders had one thing in common: a mutual enemy. As long
as the Democrats denied all opponents the right to a free 
and fair election, cooperation among the out-groups offered 
the only hope, thin though it might be, for success.
Thomas J. Guice obtained the Populist nomination in 
the Fourth District. He now made the race against Congress­
man Blanchard which the Farmers* Union-Independent party had 
invited him to make two years before. Guice*s stature among 
the Populists had risen sharply since midsummer of 1892. 
Then, at the Farmers* Union annual state convention, held in 
Monroe, he captained the third party forces in a takeover of 
the Union organization. President Adams, who recently had 
been sworn in as Secretary of State under Governor Foster, 
resigned his leadership of the Farmers* Union and walked out 
of the Monroe convention. Populists thereupon took over 
four of the six state offices in the agrarian order.
150Winnfield Comrade, auoted in Colfax Chronicle. 
October 29, 1892.
151John Pickett, a recent Populist convert, was 
elected President of the Farmers* Union in August, 1892. 
Pickett was a member of Governor Foster*s official family; 
he had been elected Treasurer of Louisiana on the Foster 
Democratic ticket in 1892. However, he had broken with the 
administration by the time of the Farmers* Union convention 
in 1892. Daniel, "The Louisiana People’s Party," 42-43; 
Colfax Chronicle. August 13, 1892.
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As expected, Guice's congressional candidacy aroused Demo­
cratic ire; “Greasy Guice,1' "Garrolous Guice," "the ignor­
amus candidate," "veritable scum,", were a few of the epi-
152thets applied. Hardy Brian, who was no stranger to
Bourbon invective himself, once remarked that no other
agrarian reformer of his acquaintance was ever subjected to
153as much slander and personal abuse as fell upon Guice. ^
Robert P. Webb, the veteran Greenbacker from Clai­
borne Parish, ran as a Populist against Congressman Boatner 
in the Fifth District. Also in that race was an Independent 
candidate with a Populistic program; Andrew Augustus Gunby, 
publisher of the Moniroe Bulletin.^54 In the Sixth District, 
Josiah Kleinpeter, East Baton Rouge planter, accepted the 
Populist congressional nomination but did not wage an active 
campaign. ^  The Republicans having decided not to make 
the Third District race against Democratic Congressman
Andrew Price, Populist I. J. Mills announced his candi- 
X 56dacy. In the metropolitian First and Second Districts, 
Populists pledged their support to Independent James
*5^Colfax Chronicle. July 30, September 3, November
5, 1892; Lake Providence Banner Democrat. September 10, 1892.
*53Louisiana Populist. September 2, 1898.
154Mer Rouge Vidette. quoted in Lake Providence 
Banner Democrat .^October 29, 1892.
^■^Bayou Sara True Democrat. October 22, 1892; New 
Orleans Issue. December 10, 1892.
^“^ New Orleans Issue. December 10, 1892.
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Wilkinson and Republican Morris Marks, respectively.
Shortly before the election Populist presidential 
candidate James B. Weaver toured Louisiana and several other 
southern states. The fact that Weaver had been a Union 
general during the Civil War was dragged out by the Bourbon
press; his anti-southern activities were described as
158"merciless . . . brutal . . . cruel." After this theme 
was exhausted, the Daily Advocate went on to call Weaver an 
anarchist and a "prostitute."159 Meanwhile, the state's 
Democratic spokesmen flayed away at the already-dead "force 
bill." A Republican measure which had been placed before 
Congress during the 1890-91 session, it would have provided 
for Federal supervision of elections and Federal control of 
registration of v o t e r s . T h e  bill had failed to pass.
But it had summoned up the spectre of military Reconstruct­
ion. Though defeated in Congress, the force bill performed 
a valuable function for southern Democratic leaders; "force
*5®Colfax Chronicle. August 13, 1892.
^^Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. October 7, 1892. 
Forty-eight Louisiana Populists attended their party's 
national nominating convention at Omaha, Nebraska, in July 
of 1892. The Pelican State delegation cast a unanimous 
vote for the men nominated, James B. Weaver of Iowa and 
James G. Field of Virginia. Colfax Chronicle. July 23, 
1892; Daniel, "The Louisiana People's Party," 42.
160Forum. X (September, 1890), 23-26
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bill and nigger domination"-*-^ became a potent shibboleth 
in coming elections. Louisiana's Populists were accused of 
supporting a revival of the measure in Congress. Guice was 
quoted as saying: "Bourbonism is doomed. If they don't
give us a fair count, they'll get the force bill or hell."
None of the four Populist congressional candidates 
managed to unseat a Democratic incumbent in the November 8 
election; in fact, the official returns showed a topheavy 
Democratic victory in all six districts of the state. But 
the Populist leaders discovered a few bright signs. Tanne­
hill 's vote in April had been less than 10,000 for the 
entire state; seven months later, the party, though it 
listed no candidate in two congressional districts, amassed 
17,752.^^ Little of this gain could be attributed to
i63-Louisiana Populist. December 20, 1895.
l^Lake Providence Banner Democrat. November 5, 1892.
Populist candidates for Congress carried seven 
parishes in 1892; Grant, Jackson, Lincoln, Sabine, Union, 
Vernon, and Winn. Guice received 5,167 votes in the Fourth 
District, Webb received 4,301 in the Fifth, Mills 3,123 in 
the Third, and Kleinpeter 2,043 in the Sixth. The total 
credited the party for the congressional races of 1892 also 
includes the 3,119 cast for the Independent, Gunby, in the 
Fifth District. Gunby*s program was Populistic and he soon 
joined the party. Louisiana, Report of Secretary of State. 
1902, 575-76. In the presidential election, Cleveland 
electors polled 87,922 against 26,132 for the Harrison- 
Weaver electors in the state. No equitable division of this 
vote is possible, as Burnham points out; how much of the 
Harrison-Weaver vote was Populist and how much Republican 
can only be guessed at. W. Dean Burnham, Presidential 
Ballots: 1836-1892 (Baltimore, 1955), 487, 918.
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Republican support. The Republican sugar planters in the 
Third District supported the protectionist-minded Democratic 
Congressman rather than Populist I. J. Mills and else­
where, in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Districts, the Demo­
cratic machine refused to relax its grip on the ballot box 
in the Negro parishes. The Republican organization in these 
latter regions, though apparently willing to aid the Popu­
lists, had little help to offer. Especially was this true 
in North Louisiana. No Republican Congressional candidate 
had exceeded 1,756 votes in the Fourth District since Re­
construction; in the Fifth, 1,151 had been the highest G.O.P.
i /  c
total in recent years. Said the New Orleans Issue. with 
only slight misstatement: "We owe nothing to the Republi­
cans."^-^
Populism in the Pelican State next awaited the con­
gressional races of 1894, and the gubernatorial election of 
1896. In the meantime, the lot of the ordinary man, white 
or black, grew worse as the effects of a disastrous national 
depression were felt with increasing severity; Foster*s 
Bourbon administration drifted deeper into reaction; and 
widening political and economic schisms within the upper
■^^Hjzee, "Republican Politics in Louisiana," 125.
l^New Orleans Issue. December 10, 1892; Louisiana, 
Report of Secretary of State. 1902, 572-76.
^•^New Orleans Issue. December 10, 1892.
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class began to shake the self-assurance of the governing 
oligarchy. It was then that the Bourbons of Louisiana would 
face their most serious challenge in the half century be­
tween Reconstruction and Huey Long.
CHAPTER IX
BOURBONISM TRIUMPHANT
During the early summer of 1894, Governor Foster's 
regime made a crucial decision: the time had come to put
down, once and for all, the bothersome agrarian menace. 
Foster himself launched the Bourbon offensive. The Gover­
nor's message to the 1894 session of the legislature urged 
fundamental changes in Louisiana's suffrage and election 
laws;^ it was imperative, he explained later, to dis­
franchise "the mass of ignorance, vice and venality without
2any proprietary interest in the State." The proposed 
legislation was plainly aimed at the poor of both races.
But until such time as these laws could be enacted, the 
attempted coalition of poor white and poor black under the 
People's party banner must be held in check at all costs; 
therefore, the usual methods of vote fraud and intimidation 
were intensified during the elections of 1894 and 1896. 
Populism in Louisiana -was repressed with a violence
^Louisiana, Official Journal of the Senate. 1894,
28.




unparalled in the South.0
The constitution of 1879 had placed no unusual re­
strictions on manhood suffrage. In many parishes its liberal 
provisions were grossly perverted from the beginning; how­
ever, to change the organic law itself meant either a consti­
tutional amendment or a new constitution. The legislature 
of 1894 decided upon the former course. Following Foster*s 
recommendations, a bill was passed which placed before the 
electorate, at the next state election in 1896, a proposed 
constitutional amendment which would restrict the franchise 
to adult males who "shall be able to read the Constitution 
of the State in his mother tongue, or shall be a bona fide 
owner of property . . . assessed to him at a cash valuation
4
of not less than $200." An ominous proviso was attached. 
The subsequent legislature, in 1896, would be specially em­
powered to rewrite the suffrage amendment; after the solons 
made whatever changes they saw fit, the amendment would then 
become a part of the constitution, without resubmission to 
the people. Hardy Brian denounced the whole proposal as
- 5
"infamous, damnable and hell born." Though young Brian 
exaggerated when he predicted that the legislature might
3Key, Southern Politics. 160.
^Louisiana, Official Journal of the House of Repre­
sentatives. 1894, 835-36.
^Louisiana Populist. May 17, 1895.
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raise property requirements up to $10,000, some degree of 
upward revision was, without doubt, the end in view. Nation 
magazine believed the clause for legislative rewriting in 
the suffrage amendment to be "the most extraordinary way of 
changing a constitution ever proposed.
The suffrage amendment passed the House of Repre­
sentatives 74 to 9, and was approved by the Senate 27 to 0 
(Populist Senator Brian was absent). Only two Democrats in
7
the House opposed the measure. The People*s party repre­
sentatives supported instead a change in the state1s 
election laws, based upon an Australian ballot; their bill 
was bandied about from committee to committee, and finally 
tabled without action. Ballot reform, Governor Foster in­
sisted, should wait until the "standing menace" of ignorance
g
was relieved of the privilege of voting. Important seg­
ments of the Democratic press, however, agreed with the 
Populists in urging ballot reform and condemning suffrage 
restriction. The Alexandria Louisiana Democrat called the 
assembly which passed the suffrage proposal "the worst
^Nation. LXII (April 30, 1896), 334.
7Louisiana, Official Journal of the House of Repre­
sentatives . 1894, 836; Louisiana. Official Journal of the 
Senate. 1894, 361.
Louisiana, Calendar of the House of Representatives. 
1894, Bill No. 133.
g
Louisiana, Official Journal of the Senate. 340.
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legislature” in the state's history, Warmoth's and Kellogg's
regime notwithstanding. The paper warned:
There must be a change and speedily, or the people, 
so long defrauded, will reassert their political 
rights even if it entails revolution and bloodshed.
They have long been suppliants, on bended knees, at 
the throne of power. Their just demands have been 
periodically scorned with the utmost contumely.
Patience and forbearance will cease to be virtues, 
and more stringent measures will be resorted to. A 
word to the wise ought to be sufficient.10
Even Goodwy.n of the Chronicle, one of the staunchest 
conservatives in the state, attacked the suffrage measure as 
"bristling with injustice and harshness.” Louisiana, he 
felt, should at least have provided school houses before she 
set about punishing ignorance and poverty.^ But angriest 
of all were the Populist leaders. Hardy Brian described the 
suffrage amendment as a "stepping stone to perpetually place 
this government in the hands of the rich, depriving the poor
of any rights except to eke out their lives in hovels.......
■."12 .^e proposal received unmeasured praise from
Hearsey of the Daily States. He, along with most of the 
ultra Bourbons,, favored anything which would keep "ignorant 
negroes and whites" from the ballot box. In the words of
^Alexandria Louisiana Democrat. June 27, 1894, 
quoted in Louisiana. Official Journal~of the Senate. 1894, 
418-19.
^Colfax Chronicle. January 4, 1896.
•^Louisiana Populist. May 17, 1895.
l^New Orleans Daily States, quoted in Colfax Chroni­
cle. January 4, 1896.
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Governor Foster, the time had come to eliminate “this force 
of brute numbers" from representative government.^4
Significantly, nearly all of the journals which 
catered to the cotton planters endorsed the proposal. The 
Negro vote had been used to advantage by these planters ever 
since Reconstruction. In promoting restriction, it would 
seem, the cotton barons would be minimizing their own influ­
ence in state politics; the huge Democratic majorities 
turned in from such parishes as East Carroll and Tensas were 
based almost entirely upon illiterate and propertyless (and 
often nonexistent) Negro registrants. But the planters were 
realistic men. They apparently had reached the conclusion 
that the potential danger of the Negro vote outweighed its 
temporary advantages. Hearsey's bland explanation, that 
vote stealing "has become tiresome" to the planters, did 
not accurately state the case. Fictitious or real, the 
Negro voter was never a boring subject in Louisiana politics.
Populist influence, by 1894-96, was working its way 
into the black belt; colored men who had not voted in a 
dozen years began to maike inquiries as to the location of 
the registrar's office.^ Negro Populists in Baton Rouge
^Quoted in Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. May 19, 1896.
■^New Orleans Daily States* quoted in Baton Rouge 
Daily Advocate. December 5, 1897.
1ftwBastrop Clarion-Appeal. quoted in Lake Providence
Banner Democrat. March 7, 1896.
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were reportedly making the night "hideous” with their "yells 
17and howls." The registrar in Opelousas locked himself in
jail to avoid the crowds of Negroes who clamored to be added 
18to the rolls. In Grant and Natchitoches Parishes, a
19peculiar fusion of Democrats and white Republicans was
effected in hopes of stopping the rush of Negroes into the
Populist camp, but to little avail; the "colored Populists"
of Grant even committed outrages upon members of their race
20who attended an anti-Populist rally. Conservatives poked
fun at the sight of white Populists in the uplands holding
picnics and inviting their Negro neighbors to come and eat
with them, but such un-southern events surely frightened 
21the Bourbons. Racial animosity seemed to be losing its 
grip upon numerous poor whites; class consciousness was 
taking its place. "We can no longer depend upon the soli­
darity of the white race," grumbled the Tensas Gazette. The 
alternative, therefore, was "either a limitation of suffrage 
or a continuation of the present methods, which [will] 
mean strife, bloody riots, and the degradation of society.
17Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. March 4, 1896 
^ I b i d .. February 28, 1896.
^Colfax Chronicle. May 4, 1895; Louisiana Populist. 
November 1, 1895.
20
Letter from Mark Brazeal, published in Colfax 
Chronicle. March 28, 1896.
^Colfax Chronicle. October 17, 1891, August 5, 1893.
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22. . A diminished voice in Democratic affairs, to.the
planter mind, was infinitely preferable to class war.
The People*s party made a serious effort to capture 
two Louisiana congressional districts in 1894. The silver 
issue had, meanwhile, replaced the sub-treasury plan as a 
favored agrarian panacea for economic ills. Macune*s plan 
had failed to win many adherents outside of the cotton belt, 
and its defeats in Congress finally discouraged Southern 
Alliancemen. The depresion, beginning in 1893, focused 
agrarian attention on the need for an expanded currency. By 
promoting the "free and unlimited" coinage of silver, Popu­
list leaders hoped to lure inflationist-minded Democrats into 
the third party camp, and also expected to obtain increased 
campaign contributions from the wealthy silver mine owners 
of the West. But the Democratic party of the South and West, 
by 1894-95, also began to hop on the silver bandwagon. In 
Louisiana, as in other agricultural states, a Democratic 
free silver movement commenced. However, Governor Foster 
and most of the inner circle of state Democratic leaders, in
1894, still adhered to President Cleveland^ conservative
23gold standard policies. The Populist congressional candi­
dates of the Fourth and Fifth Districts harped upon the
^St. Joseph Tensas Gazette. March 13, 20, 27, 1896.
^Romero, Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXVIII, 
1167. See Also Hicks, The fcopulist Revolt.' 198-204. 301- 
20.
344
silver issue: Alexis Benoit, a Ouachita Parish businessman
and legislator who had recently joined the third party, ran 
against gold standard Congressman Boatner in the latter 
District; Bryant W. B3iley, who campaigned for the seat of 
Fourth District Democratic Congressman Henry W. Ogden, was 
limited by the fact that Ogden had yielded to popular senti­
ment and "hoped and prayed" for the cause of free silver.2^ 
Bailey, an earnest young man of twenty-eight, was 
" strict member of the Baptist Church" at Winnf ield.25^  His 
education amounted to a few months spent in the inadequate 
Winn Parish schools. He had been a third party man since 
1890, when he began working under Hardy Brian as associate 
editor of the Comrade. During the summer of 1894, when Brian
moved from Winnfield to nearby Natchitoches Parish, Bailey
26became the editor of the Comrade. Bailey also owned a 
moderate sized farm. He was able to purchase the paper from 
the Farmers' Union stockholders; Brian, on the other hand, 
had been editor but not publisher. Goodwyn of the Chronicle
07
at first scoffed at Bailey, calling him a "simpering dolt,"
24We st Monroe Alliance Forum, quoted in Louisiana 
Populist. September 21. 1894: Louisiana Populist. October 5, 
1894; Chambers, A History of Louisiana. II, 204. Former 
Congressman Blanchard of the Fourth District went to the U.
S. Senate in 1893.
25
Louisiana Populist. September 7, 1894; Shreveport 
Sunday Judge. January 5, 1896.
2^Colfax Chronicle. September 8, 15, 1894.
27Ibid.. October 27, 1894.
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but it soon appeared that the youthful Populist was a power­
ful stump speaker. MBellowing Bailey"became the Democratic
28nickname for him; Bailey invited local Democrats at each 
place he visited to come up and engage him in open debate.
At Coushatta, according to a Populist account, Bailey's 
invitation was accepted by an elderly Bourbon who refused to 
believe that any post-1877 issue had relevancy. The old
gentleman "foamed and stewed over the 'wah,1 . . . and . . .
30tore his shirt over the old twaddle of 'negro domination,"
Indeed, Bourbon memories of the past became increasingly
31vivid whenever economic issues were discussed.
Bailey and Benoit also challenged their Democratic 
opponents to submit to a white primary. The two Populists 
agreed to withdraw' from the race if they were beaten by a 
vote of the white adult males of their respective districts; 
the Democrats, of course, were supposed to make the same
28Bastrop Morehouse Clarion, quoted in Baton Rouge 
Daily Advocate, February 27, 1898.
^Bastrop Clarion-Appea1. quoted in Shreveport 
Evening Judge. April 6, 1896.
30
Louisiana Populist. October 19, 1894.
31Some Bourbon leaders seemed to fear above all else 
the possibility that younger voters might be getting bored 
with the old shibboleths. Major Hearsey expressed himself 
on the problem in this fashion: "Accursed by the generation
that grows up in ignorance of the significance of 1hese old 
war-whoops and cries. Better that such boys should have died 
in their infancy." New Orleans Daily States, quoted in Baton 
Rouge Daily Advocate. December 5, 1897.
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pledge. This Populist proposal was logically inconsistent 
with their stated adherence to the principle of universal 
manhood suffrage, and no one realized it better than the 
Populists themselves. As Hardy Brian wrote, they were 
"compelled by the intolerant course of the party in power 
to adopt the same narrow policy." The Populists were 
confident that they had a majority of the white voters of 
North Louisiana on their side; they were equally certain 
that the Democratic planters along the Mississippi, Red, and 
Ouachita Rivers would stop at nothing to prevent Negro 
tenants from voting the People's party ticket. However, the 
third party stood firm against constitutional suffrage re­
striction. And, more important, nearly all the Louisiana 
People's party leaders stood up for the right of the Negro 
to vote as long as that vote would be freely cast and
honestly counted. Many Populists put free elections above
33the cause of free silver. In retrospect, the efforts made 
by southern Populists to obtain legal justice and political 
rights for the Negro were unequalled by any other native 
white political movement in the region's history.^ "The
'iO
Louisiana Populist. June 21, 1895.
33
J.A. Tetts to Marion Butler, October 3, 1986, in 
Marion Butler Papers (Southern Historical Collection, Uni­
versity of North Carolina Library), Cited hereafter as 
Butler Papers.
^ C. Vann Woodward, The Burden of Southern History 
(Baton Rouge, 1960), 157.
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People's party," one of its Alabama leaders wrote in later
years, "brought to the South . . . the only democracy the
35South has ever known."
Bailey, in 1894, received 5,932 votes against 12,257 
36for Ogden. The Comrade editor carried six of the twelve
parishes of the District, and despite the wide margin, a
study of the returns--and Democratic admissions, for that
matter— justifies the Populist contention that the election
was stolen for Congressman Ogden. In five of the six
parishes carried by Ogden, no Populist commissioners were
allowed at the polls; these parishes gave Ogden 9,621 of his
total. In Caddo, where Bailey was beaten 2,097 to 66, a
northern visitor asked a Democratic official to estimate the
number of votes which would be polled at a certain precinct.
37"Just as many . . .  as we need," was the laconic reply.
In Rapides Parish, nearly one third of Ogden's 3,097 votes
came from a single Negro precinct; De Soto Parish Negroes
reportedly were told that midnight visits would be paid
their cabins if they persisted in trying to vote for 
38Bailey. A Democratic newspaper in Shreveport termed
3 5 Joseph Columbus Manning, The Fadeout of Populism: 
Pot and Kettle in Combat (New York, 1928), 5.
^Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State.
1902, 557.
37Indianapolis Daily Journal, quoted in Shreveport
Progress. November 24, 1894.
^^Louisiana Populist. November 23, 1894.
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Ogden's total "outrageous," and admitted that Bailey "was 
honestly and fairly e l e c t e d . B u t  another Democratic 
organ of the city treated the lopsided returns with levity: 
"B. W. Bailey; where is he, up a pine tree?" chortled the 
Daily Caucasian.
Benoit, in the Fifth District, received 4,549 
against Boatner's 14,755 vote t o t a l . O n l y  three parishes 
reported a Populist majority. As did Bailey, Benoit in­
sisted that an honest count would show the incumbent Demo­
crat the loser. Relatively speaking, Benoit had the weaker 
of the two Populist claims to victory. But he had one ad­
vantage which Bailey lacked; he possessed the necessary funds 
to contest the Democrat's election. When Boatner returned
to Washington in 1895, Benoit was at his heels to lay the
40
case before the House of Representatives. Benoit charged 
gross frauds in ten of the fifteen parishes; in four of 
these, he received a mere 81 votes against Boatner's 7,124,
In one parish Boatner's vote exceeded the whole regis­
tration (which was padded to begin with) by about
^Shreveport Progress. November 10, 17, 1894.
4^Shreveport Daily Caucasian, quoted in Louisiana 
Populist. November 16, 1&94.
^Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State. 1902,
577.
42
John Ray to William E. Chandler, February 21,
1896, Chandler Papers.
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1 , 0 0 0 . The congressional committee which examined the 
returns found the Populisms charges sustained, but instead 
of seating the contestant, the majority of the committee 
decided that "no valid election had taken place," and the 
seat was declared vacant.44 Boatner had to return and face 
a new election. Benoit was again the opponent. Typical of 
conservative reaction in the Fifth District was that of the 
Richland Beacon, which thought that Boatner was entitled to 
the remainder of the term because "to oppose him would be 
tacitly admitting that the election was a fraud, which we 
cannot afford to do." Predictably, the special election 
of June 10, 1896, sent Boatner back to Congress. Benoit 
contested again, but had to be content with seeing the in­
vestigating committee cut the Bourbon*s legal majority down 
from above 6,000 to 802.4^
Elsewhere in the state, the People*s party obtained 
a majority in two southeastern parishes in 1894; its candi­
date in the Sixth District, M. R. Wilson, carried poor white 
Livingston and Washington Parishes over incumbent
43chester H. Rowell, A History and Legal Digest of 
All the Contested Election Cases in the House of Repre­
sentatives of the United States From the First to the Fifty- 
Sixth'Congress. 1789-1901. H. R. Doc. No. 510. 56 Cona. 2d 
Sess. (Washington, 1901), 519-20.
44Ibid.
45Rawille Richland Beacon. May 9, 1896.
46Rowell, A History and Legal Digest of All the Con­
tested Election Cases . . . 1789-1901. 526.
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Congressman Robinson. But the Sixth District went 7,981 to
2,230 against the Populist.Wilson*s largest vote came
from his home parish of St. Landry; his supporters claimed
they would have carried the parish except for the fact that
their three strongest precincts were closed on election day
48through Democratic machinations. In Southwest Louisiana*s 
Third District, Populist John Lightner posed only feeble 
opposition to the Democratic incumbent, whose real antago­
nist was Republican candidate Taylor Beattie. "John Light-
4Qning," as amused Democrats called him, polled most of his 
641 votes from Calcasieu and Vermillion Parishes. Inde­
pendent workingmen1s tickets in New Orleans, Populist en­
dorsed, ran James Leonard in the First and J. M. Callaghan 
in the Second Congressional District. Neither was given 
representation at the polls. Leonard came out with 370 
votes out of 20,000 cast; Callaghan did even worse, with 166 
out of 22,000 in the Second District.^
Thus the Populists of Louisiana emerged from the 
1894 campaign frustrated but not entirely discouraged. They 
were positive that they had elected two congressmen in North
^Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State. 1902,
578.
4^Louisiana Populist. July 12, 1895.
4^Morqan City Review, quoted in ibid., November 16,
1894.
^Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State, 1902, 
577; Daniel, "The Louisiana People*s Party," 62.
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Louisiana, and the rank frauds perpetrated by the cotton 
parish oligarchy was beginning to repulse middle-class Demo­
crats; a number of the latter were expressing an interest in 
Populism.^ But the picture was quite dark in South Louisi­
ana. Seemingly, almost no impression had been made upon the 
French Catholic voters; Lafayette and St. Martin Parishes, 
for example, reported not one Populist ballot in 1894. The 
fact that Bailey, the Brians, and most People,s party men 
were Baptist in religion was a serious drawback to the third 
party cause among rural Acadians, and Catholics around Baton 
Rouge were informed that Parson Brian and son were “driving 
Catholics” out of Grant and Winn Parishes; this news, said 
the Weekly Truth, should be “highly gratifying" to those 
members of the Mother Church who were sympathetic to Popu­
list ideas.^ In the North Louisiana Catholic outpost of 
Natchitoches Parish, John Scopini, an active Populist and a 
Catholic, felt it his duty to warn his fellow parishoners
about the lies which "low down, thieving Democrats" were
53telling on the Protestant Populist leaders.
Despite the fact that they had failed thus far to 
create a workable statewide organization, the Pelican State
^ Louisiana Populist. October 19, 1894-April 19,
1895.
P .O
Baton Rouge Weekly Truth. August 4, 1894.
^Letter from John Scopini, “a Catholic," published 
in Louisiana Populist. October 11, 1895.
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Populists had solid reasons for hoping, by 1895, that they
were on the threshold of success. For one thing, other
southern states were in formidable revolt. North Carolina*s
Populist-Republican fusionists had taken over all branches
of the government in 1894, and their legislature elected
Marion Butler to the United States Senate; fusion tickets
in Alabama and Georgia had obtained more than forty per cent 
54of the vote. Nationally, third party statisticians could 
add up almost 1,500,000 ballots in 1894--forty-two per cent 
above Weaver*s presidential total two years before. The 
success of the party elsewhere, it was assumed, would en- 
courage membership in Louisiana.
Worsening economic conditions also fanned the flames 
of agrarian radicalism. The great depression of the 1890*s 
dropped cotton and sugar prices ever lower. Middling cotton 
prices, which hovered around ten cents per pound at the 
beginning of the decade, dropped to seven arri then six cents 
by late 1893. Mid-November of 1894 brought the lowest price 
recorded by the New Orleans Cotton Exchange in a half 
century— four and seven-eights cents.^ The tenants and
5^Hicks, The Populist Revolt. 333-39.
^Haynes, Third Party Movements. 281; Louisiana 
Populist. January 18, 1895,
^Boyle, Cotton and the New Orleans Cotton Exchange. 
183; New Orleans Tinges-Democrat, quoted in Colfax Chronicle. 
November 17, 1894.
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small farmers of North Louisiana began to experience pri­
vation as severe as that suffered during the depression of 
the 1870*3. "None can tell if we have reached rock bottom," 
one agriculturist wrote in 1895. "I fear if there is nothing 
done to alleviate the suffering among the people, that we
will have a revolution. . . . The people are restless. . .
57." In the hill country, by the next year, a Democratic
newspaper admitted that Democrats were "as scarce as 
dollars."58
The sugar planters of South Louisiana were also 
feeling the sting of depression. Domestic prices of raw 
sugar fell from almost six cents per pound in 1889 to an 
average of three cents by 1894. From 1890 until 1894, how­
ever, the price decline was cushioned by a two cents per 
pound bounty provided by the Republican-sponsored McKinley 
tariff; the Louisiana planters received, in four years, a 
total of $30,000,000 from the Federal government,5^ But 
President Cleveland*s return to office in 1893 meant trouble 
for the bounty. Cleveland*s low tariff views, embodied in 
the Wilson-Gorman tariff of 1894, repealed the two cent
^Louisiana Populist. January 18, 1895.
58Alexandria Town Talk, quoted in ibid.. January 3,
1896.
5^Sitterson, Sugar Country. 303, 328; Louisiana 
State Agricultural Society, Proceedings of Sixth Annual 
Meeting. 6-7.
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bounty and substituted instead an ad valorem duty on foreign 
sugar which, because of current low prices, was deemed in­
sufficient protection by the planters.^ A sizeable number 
of the Louisiana planters had always voted Republican in 
national elections. But reaction to the Wilson-Gorman 
tariff caused a majority of the state*s larger sugar 
planters to announce their intention "of voting the Republi-
fii 1
can ticket in all national matters in the future." On 
September 17, 1894, at Washington Artillery Hall in New
Orleans, the planters organized the National Republican
+ 62 party.
A serious division within the ranks of Louisiana's 
economic elite had taken place. The newly organized National 
Republicans (better known as the "Lily Whites") were willing 
to cooperate with the Kellogg and Warmoth factions of the 
Regular Republicans; at least, the planters were interested 
in cooperation for the purpose of electing protectionists to 
Congress from the First, Second, and especially the Third 
Districts. There was little indication that the planters 
intended, at first, to meddle with the Democratic status quo
^The Louisiana Planters: A Formidable Revolt
Against the Free Trade Democracy (Boston. 1894). 11-13.
63-Ibid.. 9.
fsO
Ibid., 14-17; New Orleans Times-Democrat. October
18, 1894.
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on local and state matters.^*3 But this step was not long in 
coming. The National Republican's three congressional
f\Acandidates were all beaten in the November, 1894 election. H 
Vote frauds in New Orleans helped account for two of these 
defeats, and Democratic Congressman Andrew Price's pro­
tectionist views helped keep National Republican Taylor 
Beattie's record of political losses unbroken in the Third 
District.
Heresy against the Democratic party did not usually 
go unpunished in Louisiana. This fact was soon impressed 
upon a number of planters in the southern parishes. Gover­
nor Foster, though himself a sugar planter, was plainly
shocked by the conduct of those of his wealthy neighbors who
65had drifted away from the true Democratic faith. The 
hitherto lenient tax assessment rates on certain sugar lands 
were revised upward. John N. Pharr, of Foster's home parish 
of Sti Mary, complained, in 1896, that his taxes had shot up 
about twenty per cent within the last two years.^
Mutual grievances drew the Populists and sugar 
planters together as the state election of 1896 approached.
^3Uzee, "Republican Politics in Louisiana," 149-50.
64Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State. 1902,
557.
^“’Romero, Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXVIII,
1169-70.
^Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. March 12, 1896.
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Both relished the prospect of unseating Governor Foster.
Both deplored the suffrage amendment: the Populists, because
it would wreak havoc among the poor white registration; the 
National Republicans, because their Negro laborers were 
generally amenable to voting any ticket not labeled Demo­
cratic. Both Populists and Republicans felt that honest 
election laws would enhance their political power. And, not 
least important, each was strongest where the other was 
weakest. "The little one to five bale farmers"^ who were 
said to make up the body of North Louisiana Populism would 
not ordinarily support wealthy sugar planters for office; 
the Populists, on the other hand, had failed to make the 
slightest impression upon sugar parish voters in previous 
elections. And the South Louisiana Republican planters 
possessed one commodity which made fusion more tempting to 
the eyes of the upcountry agrarians. As one cynical Bourbon 
accurately remarked, "the Populist wampum was distressingly 
short. . . ."6®
Three-way negotiations, involving the Warmoth wing 
of the Regular Republicans, the "Lily White" National Re­
publican planters, and the Populists, commenced in the late 
summer of 1895.^9 Both Regular and National Republican
67
Shreveport Evening Judge. February 12, 1896.
68Ibid.
^^Warmoth to Chandler, February 4, 1896, Chandler
Papers.
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emissaries were dispatched to the People's party state 
meeting at Alexandria in August of 1895. The Populists 
made no public commitments on fusion at that time, but merely 
issued a manifesto urging "the good people of Louisiana to 
proceed at once in forming such a compact organization as
70will prevent . . . outrages of their rights of suffrage."
A Democratic organ in Shreveport expressed horror at the 
Populist manifesto: "They even go so far as to say that
they are in favor of voting the negro honestly. . . . Think 
of this, Louisianians! Are you willing to go this far with 
them?"71
On November 26, 1895, the People's party executive 
committeemen again met with National and Regular Republi­
cans; this time, however, a public statement regarding their 
plans for cooperation in the forthcoming state election was 
announced. Both Republican groups agreed that if the 
People's party nominating convention, scheduled for January 
8, 1896, would nominate a state ticket which would be 
"representative," and be made up of men who opposed the 
suffrage amendment, then the Republicans would support it.
The Populists sealed the bargain by affirming their oppo­
sition to said amendment, and promising a ticket "liberal
^Daniel, "The Louisiana People's Party," 67-68; 
Louisiana Populist. August 16, 1895.
71Shreveport Evening Judge. August 9, 1895.
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and broad gauged"; moreover, the agrarian leaders added that
free silver and honest election demands would be major
72planks in the platform. Louisiana, as a prominent New
Orleans Republican predicted, would see "pretty lively
73times" as the April election approached.
Andrew Augustus Gunby, Monroe attorney and newspaper 
publisher, was considered the most likely Populist nominee 
for Governor. Gunby had been a "fretful porcupine" in the
^ yl
Democratic party for a number of years; he endorsed the
third party platform as early as 1892; his increasing
affinity for Populism eventually caused the "one hundred
planters" who controlled the Democratic party, and the
election returns, in Ouachita Parish to formally denounce
7 5him as "unworthy of the notice of decent people." Nor did 
the Republican sugar planters care for Gunby*s liberal 
notions. On January 2, 1896, four days before the Populist 
nominating convention, the National Republicans violated the 
spirit of their pledge with the upcountry agrarians by 
assembling at the Hotel Royal in New Orleans and nominating 
E. N. Pugh, a conservative Ascension Parish planter, for
7 2Louisiana Populist. December 6, 1895, January 17,
1896.
73H. Dudley Coleman to William E. Chandler, Novem­
ber 2, 1895, Chandler Papers.
^Shreveport Evening Judge. September 22, 1895; 
Louisiana Populist. January 17, 1896.
"7 R
Lake Providence Banner Democrat. April 25, 1896.
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Governor.*^ The planters* intentions were clear. They 
planned to stage a coup by presenting the Populist con­
vention with a ready-made candidate. But, as the Daily Advo­
cate observed, the Populists had no taste for this proffered 
"sugar teat."^^
The People’s party nominating convention, meeting 
at Alexandria, opened and closed on notes of mingled anger 
and confusion. Almost none of the delegates were willing to 
accept Pugh. But preparations to nominate Gunby stopped 
when the Monroe publisher, though pledging himself to 
support the third party ticket, asked that his name not be
70
presented before the convention. This Populist gathering, 
according to a cruel but probably accurate Bourbon commen­
tator, included among the delegates "many old hacks [such 
as Guice ] with lightning rods up praying to get struck""^ 
with the nomination; but none of the hopefuls had either the 
money to help finance a state campaign or a statewide repu­
tation upon which to draw contributions and votes. Out of 
desperation, party leaders put the name of State Chairman 
Andrew Booth before the convention. Booth himself instigated
7^Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. January 7, 1B96.
^Ibid.. January 8-9, 1896.
^ L o u i s i a n a  Populist. January 17, 1896.
^Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. January 10, 1896.
the move.®^
The "hayseed from New Orleans/' as Booth was some- 
81times called, received the gubernatorial nomination with­
out opposition. Candidates for other state offices were 
also selected; no sugar planter was included. Later that 
day, to the "utter mortification and surprise" of Brian, 
Benoit, and other convention managers, the nominee pri­
vately asked their help in "preparing the convention" to 
accept his resignation as head of the ticket so that Pugh,
QO
the Republican, might take his p l a c e . B o o t h ' s  proposal 
infuriated the third party chiefs. They immediately placed 
the story of the New Orleanean's apparent treachery before 
the convention, and it was soon impressed upon Booth that 
his unconditional resignation as the nominee and as state 
Chairman would be eagerly accepted. However, Booth refused 
to comply. He insisted that, until such time as Pugh was 
nominated, he was the legally designated Populist candidate. 
Faced with this wretched situation, the convention adopted 
a resolution empowering the fifty-three members of the 
Central Executive Committee of the Louisiana People's party 
to fill any vacancy which might occur on the state ticket 
through resignations "or otherwise [sic] ,"83
^Louisiana Populist. January 17, 1896.
8^Shreveport Evening Judge. February 12, 1896.
^Louisiana Populist. January 17, 1896.
83Ibid.
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The Populist state committee met on January 23 and 
replaced Booth and almost every other member of the impro­
vised Alexandria ticket. Shortly before, a compromise with 
the sugar planters had been reached. Though none revealed 
the details, it is clear that the mutually awkward situ­
ation was resolved by an arrangement in which the People *s 
party would select all the nominees, but the positions of 
Governor, Auditor, and Attorney General must be filled from 
the ranks of Republican sugar planters. In return, the 
planters whom the Populists selected for these positions 
would espouse all planks in the agrarians1 platform and, 
with the help of other wealthy National Republicans, would 
furnish the bulk of campaign funds for the crusade to unseat 
Foster and kill the suffrage amendment. The gubernatorial 
candidate selected by the Populist committee was John Newton 
Pharr of St. Mary Parish.®^
Pharr, whose political past included ventures into 
the Whig, Democratic, Prohibition, and Republican parties 
was one of the largest sugar planters of St. Mary and one
®4Besides Pharr, the sugar planters on the ticket 
were: H. P. Kernochan, for Auditor; L. F. Southon, for
Attorney General. The other four positions went to Popu­
lists; J. B. Kleinpeter, for Lt. Governor; J. W. Mc­
Farland, for Secretary of State; John Pickett, for Treasurer 
(incumbent); G. A. M. Cook, for Superintendent of Education. 
New Orleans Times-Democrat. January 22-25, 1896.
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of Louisiana's wealthiest man. ^ Sixty-seven years of age
in 1896, his real estate and manufacturing equipment was
valued at over $700,000; bank accounts probably ran Pharr's
total worth to well above $1,000,000.®^ But his espousal
of free silver and other Populistic demands--temporary
though it was— met enthusiastic reception in the North
87Louisiana hills. In fact, some Republicans thought of him 
as more of a Populist than anything else.®® And a sudden 
blossoming of Populist newspapers indicated that Pharr's 
ample purse had come to the aid of the state's struggling 
third party journalists.
No political movement in the South ever produced a 
more colorful press than did the People's p a r t y . L o u i s i ­
ana was no exception. Beginning with the Winnfield Comrade 
in 1890, no less than fifty Populist weekly newspapers were
^^Chambers, A History of Louisiana. II, 15; Daily 
Picayune. April 26, 1886.
8 f i°ttRecapitulation and Valuation of the Properties of 
John N. Pharr, April 5, 1898," in John N. Pharr Papers 
(Louisiana State University Archives). Cited hereafter as 
Pharr Papers. Unfortunately, the Pharr Pipers contain little 
of a political nature.
®^By the fall of 1896, Pharr had returned to his 
gold standard views and was supporting the McKinely ticket. 
Marshall J. Gasquet to John N. Pharr, September 10, 1896, 
Pharr Papers; James C. Murphy to John N. Pharr, August 22, 
1896, Pharr Papers.
®®J. G. R. Pitkin Letter, addressee's name illegi­
ble, March 20, 1896, copy in Chandler Papers.
®9woodward, Origins of the New South. 247.
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published in twenty-five or more parishes, at one time or
the other, by 1900. Many of them were ephemeral journals,
cropping up during a campaign and then dying for want of
advertisers and subscribers. Grant Parish led the list with
seven Populist newspapers during the decade,^ followed by
St. Landry with five,^ Calcasieu with four,^ and Catahoula
93and Natchitoches parishes with three each. Two People’s 
party papers appeared in each of the following parishes: 
Lincoln, Ouachita, Rapides, Sabine, Webster, and Winn.^4
Grant: Colfax The Ocala Demand (1891-92); Col­
fax New Era (1892-93); Colfax Peopled Demands (1895-98); 
Montgomery Mail (1892-93): Pollock News t1896-97): Pollock 
Peopled Demands (1898-99;; Pollock The People’s Voice (1899- 
1900). Information on these and other Louisiana Populist 
newspapers was obtained from the following sources: Penny,
"The People’s Party Press," passim; Colfax Chronicle. 1890 - 
1900; Louisiana Populist. 1894 - 99; Baton Rouge Daily Advo­
cate. May 27, 1896; Shreveport Evening Judge. August 18, 1895. 
Dates given for the Populist newspapers refer to the known 
years of publication under Populist affiliation.
^ I n  St. Landry: Opelousas St. Landry Clarion (1892);
Opelousas People’s Tribune (1896-98): Washington People's 
Party Tribune (1895-96)Washington Post (1896); Washington 
Advocate (1896).
92jn Calcasieu: Lake Charles Patriot (1894-95);
Lake Charles New Road (1895-98); Oberlin Calcasieu Reformer 
(1895-97); Jennings Record (1896-98).
*^In Catahoula: Trinity Farmers* Advocate (1895-96);
Olla Signal (1895-97); 011a Free Silver Advocate (1898-99).
In Natchitoches, Robeline Battle Flag (1892-96): Robeline New 
Era (1895); Natchitoches Louisiana Populist (1894-99).
^4In Lincoln: Ruston Caligraph (1892); Ruston
Progressive Age (1892-99). In Ouachita: West Monroe
Alliance Forum (1894): Monroe Bulletin (1896-1900). In 
Rapides: Alexandria Age of Reason (1896): Alexandria
Louisiana Reformer (1896). In Sabine: Many Sabine Banner
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Parishes with one Populist newspaper were; Bienville,
Caddo, Caldwell, Cameron, Claiborne, De Soto, East Baton
Rouge, Iberia, Jackson, Livingston, Orleans, Tangipahoa,
Union, and Vernon. Vague references were found regarding
two Populist journals which had a brief existence, though
no specific place of publication was mentioned, Acadia and
96Vermilion parishes would be the most likely locations.
This list of fifty includes only those newspapers 
which were avowed Populist organs. Not included are pro- 
Republican papers which happened to support Pharr or other 
fusionist candidates from time to time. In almost every 
case, the men listed as editors were also politically active 
in the third party. Most of them either ran for local
(1896); Many Sabine Free State (1898). In Webster: Minden
New Forum (1896): Minden Banner of Liberty (1896-97). In 
Winn: Wlnnfield Comrade (1890-1900); Winnfield Southern
Sentinel (1898).
95
In Bienville: Arcadia Alliance Forum (1894-96).
In Caddo: Shreveport Progress (1894). In Caldwell:
Columbia Caldwell-Watchman (1894). In Cameron: Lakeside
Review (1892-96). In Claiborne: Homer Alliance Farmer
(1892-94). In De SotO: Grand Cane Beacon. (1896). In East
Baton Rouge: Baton Rouge Capital Item (1896-98). In Iberia:
New Iberia Enterprise (1897-98). In Jackson: Jonesboro
Jackson Parish Appeal (1896). In Livingston: Springfield
Bee (1896). In Orleans: New Orleans Issue (1891-96). In
Tangipahoa: Amite People*s Call (1895-96). In Union:
Farmerville Herald {1895-96). "in Vernon: Leesville People *s
Friend. (1891-97).
96The Louisiana Mentor (1893-94) was a Populist paper 
which was probably published at Crowley, m  Acadia Parish; 
the Southern Record, published somewhere in the Tenth Sena­
tor iaTHSIsTrlc'tT^wa^ probably located at Abbeville, in 
Vermilion Parish.
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offices or served on state party committees. In all proba­
bility, an exhaustive research into Louisiana Populist 
journalism would turn up at least three or four more papers 
not mentioned in this study; Hardy Brian, who regularly 
published a list of third party organs in the state, noted
that "several" which he did not cite by name had "gone down
97for want of support" by 1895. No more than twenty, how­
ever, were ever published at any one time. This maximum
98number was reached during the spring of 1896. By 1899 
no more than five or six Populist papers were being pub­
lished in the state. All, apparently, had expired or be­
come Democratic by 1901.
Hardy Brian stood at the forefront of Louisiana’s 
third party journalists. He edited the Comrade from 1890
until 1894, and then moved to the town of Natchitoches, to
99take charge of the Louisiana Populist. The latter paper, 
published until 1899 (the name was shortened to Populist in'
^Louisiana Populist. April 5, 1895.
^®Ibid., March 27, 1896. Two of the papers listed 
as Populistic were with the third party for a very brief 
period only: the Opelousas St. Landry Clarion and the
Shreveport Progress. Both were normally Democratic. The 
New Iberia Enterprise, on the other hand, was a journal­
istic curiosity; it was jointly owned by Democrats and 
Populists and had two editorial pages of widely divergent 
viewpoints.
^ Louisiana Populist. August 24, December 28, 1894. 
Brian did not own the Natchitoches paper at first, but did 
possess it when he sold the plant in 1899.
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1898), attempted for a time to act as the official state 
organ of the party. Its approximately 1,200 subscribers 
must have exceeded in number any other Populist paper in the 
state. However, as early as August of 1895 Brian was forced 
to admit that he had failed to attract statewide reader­
ship. Brian was able to retort in kind to Bourbon 
attacks upon himself and his party; at one election, he com­
pared Democratic voters to "a sow returning to her wallow, a 
dog to his v o m i t . H e  described President Cleveland as 
"bovine necked, big bellied Grover, our most excellent
102majesty and tub of fat who reigneth in Washington. . . . "
On ocassion, Brian urged his fellow partymen to go to the 
polls armed, and if Democrats were caught stealing votes: 
"Kill them on the Spot!"*^
J. A. Tetts's Robeline Battle Flag was another often 
quoted Populist organ. Democrats sometimes called it.the 
Bloody Flag.104 In the same shop was published the Robeline 
New Era, a children's weekly made up by Tetts's three 
daughters: Eunice, Lillian, and Ollie. The New Era was
supposed to entertain, give moral instruction, and
IQQlbid.. March 29, August 23, 1895.
^•^Ibid.. September 4, 1896.
102Ibid., September 28, 1894.
•^^Ibid.. December 20, 1895.
■^^Shreveport Evening Judge. August 19, 1895.
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105incidentally sow Populistic doctrines among young people.
As,had always been his lot, Tetts continued to meet with one 
failure and frustration after the other. He became secret­
ary of the state Populist party in 1896, ran for the legis­
lature in Natchitoches Parish, and lost by four votes after 
the Democrats threw out the returns from his home precinct.-^ 
Pressed by creditors he was unable to pay, Tetts had to 
close his newspaper office later that year.-*-07 For a time, 
in 1896-97, he wandered about the state attempting to arouse 
interest in reviving the nearly deceased Farmers' Union; his 
efforts were in vain, the Union held its last state meeting 
in August of 1897.^08 Now past fifty, Tetts tried to make a 
new beginning as a Populist editor in 1898. He moved to
Sabine Parish and began issuing the Many Sabine Free State
1 OQin February of the latter year. As the twentieth century 
began, and Populism died, Tetts joined the Republican party.^0
105Ibid.. October 22, 1895.
l^Ibid., September 4, 1896.
107J.A. Tetts to Chaplin, Breazeale, and Chaplin, 
April 8, 1896, in Chaplin, Breazeale. and Chaplin Papers 
(Louisiana State University Archives). See also Louisiana 
Populist. September 4, 1896.
^**Louisiana Populist. September 25, 1896, July 30,
1897.
~*~^ Ibid.. February 4, 1898.
■^^Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State.
1902, 542.
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The most radical of third party voices in Louisiana 
was that of the New Orleans Issue. Unlike the rural Popu­
list press, the Issue expressed disdain for any farmer who 
hired tenants or laborers, and urged Populists to investi­
gate the doctrines of socialism and "aye, even communism."^-1 
Vulgarity, too, was'no stranger to the New Orleans weekly. 
Commenting upon the Populist notion that the Democratic and 
Republican parties would someday merge, the Issue suggested 
that they were "already snoozing in the same bed. . . .
What we object to is the fornicabuggery [sic] part of it.
They ought to get married and save themselves . . . the dis-
W Ograce." The paper also suggested that Louisiana®s work­
ing people seemed not as intelligent as bees, for bees were
113smart enough to kill the parasitic drones in their hives.
Pharr, the "Old Swamper," as his supporters affection­
ately called him, received the National Republican and the 
Regular Republican nominations shortly after the Populists 
approved of him on January 23. However, Warmoth had to 
fight hard to obtain the Regular's endorsement for Pharr; 
and even then, William P. Kellogg and Negro legislator 
Thomas A. Cage refused to go along with the fusion ticket
■^^New Orleans Issue. October 4, 13, 1894, July 13,
1895.
112Ibid., October 13, 1894.
U 3 Ibid.
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and worked openly for Governor Foster during the campaign^4 
Democrats were eager to create dissension among Republican 
ranks by reminding Negroes that Pharr was one of the sugar 
planters who ejected laborers from the plantation cabins in 
1887. However, the charge that Pharr was the champion 
Negro-flogger of South Louisiana, that "scores of old gray­
headed negroes . . . can testify to the terrors of a bull-
115whip wielded by his lusty arms," that "several have went 
[ sic] to their happy hunting ground through Pharr's mani­
pulations ,"116 was not backed up by references to time or 
place. Pharr was unquestionably a white supremacist, though 
not of the rabid Bourbon variety. His present position, if 
nothing else, led him to give absolute endorsement of the
117Negroes' right to vote and to secure justice in the courts. 
This was enough to prompt Democrats into calling Pharr and 
his allies the "Populist-negro social equality ticket.
^ 4Warmoth to Chandler, February 4, 1896, Chandler 
Papers; Uzee, "Republican Politics in Louisiana," 154-55.
^^Colfax Chronicle. March 14, 1896.
l-^Lake Providence Banner Democrat. April 18, 1896.
11 7
Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. March 1, 1896; Louisi­
ana Populist. February 14, April 10, 1896. "I was reared 
with the negro and worked side by side with him for twenty 
odd years," said Pharr. "I never have found him other than 
a good laborer and as honest as most other men. If he has 
cut a bad figure in politics, we are to blame for it."
Quoted in Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana 
(Louisiana State University Studies. Social Science Series. 
No. 5, Baton Rouge, 1957), 98-99.
•^^Shreveport Evening Judge. February 16, 1896.
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Another Bourbon analysis of the fusion party described its
component parts as: "The wild-eyed bilious pop, the odori-
119ferous coon and the pampered and succulent sugar teat."
For once, the Bourbon oligarchy of Louisiana was 
confronted with the distinct possibility of defeat. Dis­
content over Foster's platform, which evaded the currency 
question and supported the suffrage amendment as a means to
"insure the control of affairs to the intelligence and
120virtue of the state," was not confined to Populist and 
Republican ranks. As one suspicious Democrat wrote,
Foster's next legislature might take a sweeping and arbi­
trary view of who should be disfranchised as "poor white 
121trash." The seriousness of the crisis prompted one con­
cession from Foster. Shortly before the election, Demo­
cratic leaders began soft peddling the suffrage amendment
122and finally dropped it from the platform entirely.
Fosterites were also worried over the situation in New 
Orleans. The recently organized Citizens' League, headed 
by a number of prominent businessmen and social leaders of
H^Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. February 2, 1896.
120Shreveport Evening Judge. December 20, 1895.
1 21^^Many Sabine Banner, quoted in ibid., December 30,
1895. Shortly thereafter, the Sabine Banner renounced the 
Democratic party and joined the Populists.
eveport Progress. April 25, 1896. The suff­
rage amendment was defeated in the April 19 election,
34,671 to 3,534.
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of the city, were placing an Independent ticket in the muni­
cipal election; this contest would be held the same day 
(April 21) as the state election, and the Citizens* League
was powerful enough to prevent the customary ballot box
123stuffing in at least half the city's precincts. The
urban League announded its neutrality in the Foster-Pharr
state campaign. But Mayor John Fitzpatrick, the prime
target of the Citizens* League, was openly supported by
Governor Foster; when Fitzpatrick's city Democratic machine
insisted upon naming most of the poll commissioners for the
election a number of the "best people" in the League made
1 OA"intemperate threats" to support Pharr. ^
The Democratic cotton planters seemed to be experi­
encing an unusual amount of difficulty in discouraging Negro 
participation in the approaching election. "The poor igno­
rant, deluded negro has gone into spasms over the name of
125Pharr," grumbled a Morehouse Parish Democrat. And in 
East Carroll, where the colored population made up over 
ninety per cent of the total, the Banner Democrat listed the 
names of Negroes who were "brewing up trouble" by talking 
for the fusion ticket, and advised them to "leave politics
•^^Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans. 27.
*^4New Orleans Times-Democrat. March 31, 1896.
^Bastrop Clarion-Appeal. quoted in Lake Providence
Banner Democrat. March 7, 1896.
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severely alone . . .  if they want to live. . . then,
in the next issue, observed that "you might as well talk to
a brick wall as to try and make the nigger believe who his
127best friend is." The colored people, however, understood
which of the two candidates had sponsored the "sufferings
1 28amendment," as they called it. Meanwhile, in the New 
Orleans area, a recently established Negro paper called the 
Daily Crusader promoted the Pharr cause with noticeable 
effect. ^ 2^
At least, the Democrats were not furtive about their 
election day plans. A grass roots rebellion against the 
Bourbon regime and its methods had cost Foster the support 
of thousands of white farmers who voted for him in 1892; New 
Orleans could no longer be considered safely Democratic; the 
depression, combined with Foster’s known predelictions for 
the gold standard, increased the governor’s unpopularity; 
nevertheless, the incumbent administration still held abso­
lute control of the election machinery in about a dozen 
black belt parishes, and intended to make the most of it.
The following statement, from a leading North Louisiana
l^Lake Providence Banner Democrat. March 28, 1896.
127Ibid.. April 4, 1896.
^2^Farmerville Gazette. April 22, 1896.
■^2^New Orleans Daily Crusader, quoted in Louisiana
Populist, March 6, 1896.
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Democratic daily, was not intended for humor. It was simply 
frank:
It is the religious duty of Democrats to rob 
Populists and Republicans of their votes whenever and 
wherever the opportunity presents itself and any 
failure to do so will be a violation of true Louisi­
ana Democratic teaching. The Populists and Republi­
cans are our legitimate political prey. Rob them!
You bet! What are we here f o r !130
Hearsey of the Daily States, whose maledictions
against the "carpetbag, scalawag and nigger buzzards" helped
]0 I
keep up the fighting spirit among his planter-subscribers,
prophesied that even if Pharr did come through with a
majority the "better element" of Louisiana would be likely
to inaugurate a "bloody revolution" to keep him out of 
132office. The Daily Advocate also endorsed the idea of a 
right wing revolt; but if war should come, the official 
journal of the state government added, John Pharr would be 
wholly responsible: "This ignorant and low bred boor pro­
ceeds from place to place scattering his fire-brands among
the rabble and inciting the baser passions of the populace. 
133. . But at least the fusion ticket was permitted to
speak at New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and most communities in
130Shreveport Evening Judge. December 15, 1895.
■*-^New Orleans Daily States, quoted in Lake Provi­
dence Banner Democrat, February lf 1896.
•^^New Orleans Daily States, quoted in Bayou Sara 
True Democrat. April 18, 1896.
133Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. March 4, 1896.
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the state. Shreveport, on the other hand, was such a bastion 
of reaction that John Pharr cancelled a speaking engagement 
there, fearing that the Board of Health planned to throw him 
and his "political menagerie" into the Municipal Pest 
House.
In the meantime, individual acts of reprisal were 
carried out against the fusionists. One Populist candidate 
in Baton Rouge was shot and another had his barn burned; the 
printing shop of a third party newspaper in Minden was 
wrecked by Democrats; and economic pressure was applied 
against white and Negro Populists a l i k e . W h e n  trouble 
arose in St. Landry Parish over Populist attempts to regis­
ter Negroes, Governor Foster dispatched state troops, 
equipped with a gatling gun, to the scene. The bitter 
passions unleashed by the Foster-Pharr campaign helped give 
the state one more unenviable niche in the record book of 
violence. In 1896 Louisiana recorded twenty-one lynchings. 
This figure exceeded the combined total for every other 
state and territory west of the Mississippi River for 1896, 
and also accounted for twenty per cent of all lynchings in 
the United States that year.^^*^
-^-^Shreveport Sunday Judge. March 15, 1896,
^ ^ouisiana Populist. February 28, 1896; Farmer- 
ville Gazette. April 16, 1896.
•^^Shreveport Evening Judge. April 6, 1896.
^3^Work (ed.), Negro Year Book . . . 1918-19. 374.
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Official returns following the April 21 election 
showed Governor Foster as the victor over Pharr, 116,116 to 
87,798. Excluding the thirteen river parishes which Demo­
cratic planters firmly controlled, and where the fusionists
were denied representation at the polls, Foster obtained
138
81,589 to Pharr*s 83,538. Hardy Brian predicted shortly 
before the election that it would take "a gigantic piece of 
stealing” to count Pharr out,^^ and the Democrats proved 
equal to the task. Of the thirteen parishes where the 
grossest frauds occurred, six in particular aroused the ire 
of the Pharr people:
White 
Adult Males, i
Foster Pharr Census of 1890
Bossier 3,464 58 1,005
Concordia 3,013 80 609
East Carroll 2,635 0 310
Madison 1,803 0 340
Tensas 1,968 0 401
West Feliciana 3,093 1 613
Totals 15,976 139 3,278
^^Louisiana. Official Journal of the Senate. 1896
22: Louisiana. Report of the Secretary of State. 1902. 554
^Louisiana Populist. March 20, 1896.
^4<\j.S., Compendium of the Eleventh Census. I, 782- 
83; Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State. 1902, 554.
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Though the thirteen plantation parishes had provided 
Foster with his margin of victory, they did not have a mo­
nopoly on fraudulent returns. In the four coastal parishes 
of Cameron, Jefferson, Plaquemine, and St. Bernard, which 
the fusionists had expected to carry, Foster won by a vote 
of 6,337 to 3,050; the total adult male population of these 
four parishes (native white, foreign, and Negro) was 1,240 
less than the number of votes returned.*4* Frauds occurred 
in New Orleans, too, though not on previous levels of in­
tensity. A number of cases were reported throughout the 
state of supervisors of elections who refused to count 
precincts in which the fusion ticket was known to have a 
majority. In Rapides, where Foster's 4,373 votes came 
almost entirely from Negro precincts, a disgusted Populist 
thought that the Governor might demand a recount: "He
should have carried this parish by at least 500,000.M*4^
White registrants were in a majority in thirty-two 
of Louisiana's parishes. Pharr carried twenty-five of 
these, and also obtained a majority in four predeminately 
Negro parishes in South Louisiana. Governor Foster won a 
majority in only seven white parishes, and carried twenty- 
three where Negro voters predominated.*43 Of the three
141Ibid.
*4^Louisiana Populist. July 17, 1896.
*43Louisiana, Official Journal of the Senate. 1896, 
22; Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State. 1902, 554.
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urban centers in Louisiana, Foster narrowly won New Orleans, 
26,330 to 21,683, and obtained a runaway majority in Shreve­
port (Caddo Parish), 3,210 to 277. Pharr took the parish 
which included the city of Baton Rouge, 4,859 to 1,470.
Since East Baton Rouge Parish was heavily Negro, and 
factional fights among the Democrats permitted colored men 
to vote freely there in 1896,^44 this latter figure indi­
cates what the fusion ticket might have accomplished had 
honest elections been permitted in other Negro parishes. 
Also, it is interesting to note that in parishes where the 
fusion ticket won handily, local Democratic leaders did not
accuse the agrarians of fraud. The major accusation hurled
«
at the Populists was that they were trying to let Negroes
145cast a free ballot.
Not since Reconstruction, and perhaps not since the 
Civil War, had the people of Louisiana been confronted with 
a crisis as grave as that which developed between April 21 
and the convening of. the new legislature on May 1 4 . Im­
mediately after the election, Governor Foster ordered state 
troops to Natchitoches and St. John the Baptist Parishes.
In Natchitoches, 500 armed and angry white Populists were
144Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. February 27, March
4, 1896.
145Ibid., April 26, 1896.
^4^White, Mississippi Valiev Historical Review. V,
14-15.
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threatening to assault the parish seat of government, where
Democratic election supervisors had refused to count the
ballots from Negro Populist precincts; news of the militia’s
approach scattered the f a r m e r s . T h e  trouble in St. John
began when Negro fusionists seized a ballot box which they
believed had been stuffed by white Democrats. The militia
unit which Foster hurried to the scene used field artillery
148to disperse the Negroes. These events, thought a number 
of citizens, were only the beginnings of trouble. Even the 
staid Daily Picayune envisioned "war and rapine, and . . . 
blood from the Arkansas line to the Gulf of Mexico," if the 
Populists and Republicans did not submit to the announced 
returns.
The fusionists claimed that Pharr had beaten Foster 
in actual votes cast by at least 20,000. ^  Democratic 
spokesmen, some of them rather proud of their work in over­
coming majority opinion, did not deny that fraud had oc­
curred; their justification for stealing the election was 
perhaps most succinctly expressed by a Bastrop Democrat who 
proclaimed that "a vast majority of the very best people"
l47Louisiana Populist. May 1, 1896.
■^4®Uzee, "Republican Politics in Louisiana," 160.
l49paily Picayune, quoted in Shreveport Evening 
Judge. May 8, 1896.
^^Monroe Bulletin. May 16, 1896, clipping in Pharr
Papers.
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stood behind the Mbrave young Governor." ^ 1  another 
Bourbon explained: the opinion of property, intelligence
and virtue must take precedence over the desires of the 
"corrupt mass."-^2
Both the fusionists and the Democrats issued blood­
thirsty manifestos shortly after election day. Hardy Brian, 
who had succeeded Booth as party chairman, called upon ’’the 
white men of the state" to assemble in Baton Rouge and use 
force, if legal methods failed, to see that Pharr received 
legislative recognition of the g o v e r n o r s h i p . T h e  Demo­
cratic proclamation bore the imprint of Henry J. Hearsey; 
it described the "monster, horrid, formless and crowned with 
darkness" which was threatening to overthrow orderly Demo­
cratic government and place in power the "great horde of 
ignorant blacks who yearn for social equality." And "woe 
betide" those who might try to prevent Foster*s second in­
augural; cost what it must, "this land shall not be a Hayti 
or San Domingo."154 indeed, it did seem for a time as if a 
civil war within a state was building up. Nine thousand 
Populists from North Louisiana were said to be preparing to
^-^Bastrop Clarion-Appeal. quoted in Baton Rouge 
Daily Advocate. June 30, 1896.
l^Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. July 1, 1896.
^ • ^ L o u i s i a n a  Populist. May 8, 1896.
154Shreveport Evening Judge. May 6, 1896.
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march upon the state capitol; and what the Daily Advocate
described as "a boat load of sugar-teats," equipped with
provisions and munitions of war "sufficient to accomplish
the successful bombardment and siege of Baton Rouge" lay at
1
anchor in the Mississippi. Democratic stalwarts in Baton 
Rouge and the Florida parishes organized into militaristic 
units and made preparations to defend the Foster govern­
ment.^5^
The fusionists had some hope of unseating Foster
through a legislative investigation of the returns. Fifty-
five members of the General Assembly had been elected in
opposition to the Foster Democracy: the Populists numbered
nineteen, the Republicans thirteen, the Citizens' League
158nineteen, and Independents, four. Although this still
^55Colfax People's Demands. quoted in Baton Rouge 
Daily Advocate. May 5, 1896.
l^Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. May 12, 1896.
157Ibid.. May 7-14, 1896.
•^•5^Louisiana Populist. July 10, 1896; Reynolds, 
Machine Politics in New Orleans, 28-29. There were two 
Populists in the Senate and seventeen in the House of Repre­
sentatives. The Senators were: J. P. Patton, of Winn; M.
R. Wilson, of St. Landry. The Representatives were: J. W.
Bailey, Jr., of St. Landry; Henry Breithaupt, of Catahoula; 
J. M. Brown, of Natchitoches; J. E. Bullard, of Sabine; 
Patrick Donahay, of St. Landry; C. L. Gunby, of Union; I.
D. Hogan, of Jackson; D. E. James, of Winn; Josiah Klein- 
peter, of East Baton Rouge; R. P. LeBlanc, of Vermilion; S. 
J. Meadows, of Claiborne; T. W. Pipes, of Lincoln; A. W. 
Stewart, of Grant; W. L. Truman, of St. Landry; J. W. 
Williams, of Vernon; J. W. Young, of Acadia.
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left the Democrats with a majority of twenty-six, the chance 
for enough defections among them to swing the balance of 
power to Pharr seemed, for a time, to be good. Even a 
representative from East Carroll, who along with Foster had 
benefitted from the 2,635 to 0 vote in that parish, decided 
as a matter of conscience to vote with the Populists and 
Republicans.
On May 14, a joint session of the legislature re-
1 £
fused, by a vote of 86 to 48, to go behind the returns.
Nor did the rumored Populist army from the uplands arrive. 
Heavily armed Democrats, however, were visible all around 
the State House. The "Pharr Man-of-War" in the river
I fL I
weighed anchor and departed, and only a fistfight or two 
on the streets of Baton Rouge marred the restoration of 
quiet to the city. Before the end of the week, Governor 
Foster delivered his second inaugural address, in which he 
spoke of the need for "some action" in the direction of 
suffrage, restriction, and promised that "the rich man in his 
palace and the poor man in his humble home shall be pro­
tected," as far as it was within the power of the state to
1grant such protection. After the inaugural ceremony, a
l^Lake Providence Banner Democrat. May 23, 1896;
St. Joseph Tensas Gazette. May 22, 11396.
■^^Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. May 15, 1896.
161Ibid.
162Ibid., May 19, 1896.
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grand ball was held in the Governor’s mansion, where a "vast 
concourse of the elite from every parish" gathered. The 
first set was danced by Governor Foster and Mrs. Samuel D. 
McEnery.^^
The state election of 1896 and the legislative 
session which followed broke the back of Louisiana Populism. 
The General Assembly, during the month of June, compensated 
for the failure of the suffrage amendment by approving a 
strict registration and election law; both were designed, as 
the official journal of the government freely admitted, to 
eradicate the votes of the illiterate of both races as well 
as reduce the electoral participation of timid folk of 
moderate learning who might hesitate to register or cast 
their ballots because of the confusing provisions.^4 These 
measures were to go into effect by 1897. Significantly, the 
same session which passed the restrictive laws declined to 
increase the state’s appropriations to public schools.
The General Assembly also passed an administration 
bill which would place before the reduced electorate, early 
in 1898, the question of holding a constitutional con­
vention. By that time at least ninety per cent of the Negro 
vote would be off the rolls, along with a good portion of
164Ibid.. August 19, 1896, December 26, 1897.
165Ibid.. July 3, 1896.
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the poor white vote. The convention bill, passed over Popu­
list protests, stated that if the voters agreed to the 
calling of a convention then the work done by the delegates 
chosen would be final--the new constitution would not be 
submitted to the people for ratification.'*'^ Earlier, in 
the first month of 1896 session of the legislature, a new 
United States Senator for Louisiana had been chosen. With 
Governor Foster's approval, "that noblest Roman of them 
all, . . . that peerless . . . champion of the plain 
people,"16*7 Samuel D. McEnery, was selected by the General 
Assembly. In July the legislature adjourned. Governor 
Foster, wearied by the events of the past few months, de­
parted for an extended vacation into the Dakotas. The 
Louisiana Populist remarked, hopefully: "If the Indians will
only scalp him they will be gratefully remembered by our 
people."16®
The Presidential election and congressional races of. 
1896 aroused little enthusiasm among the dwindling ranks of 
the Louisiana agrarians. The state Democratic regime, 
realizing the inevitability of the free silver tide in the
■*-^Edwin Aubera Ford, "Louisiana Politics and the 
Constitutional Convention of 1898" (unpublished Master's 
thesis, Louisiana State University, 1955), 69-99.
1 6 7
Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. May 28-29, 1896; 
Romero, Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXVIII, 1184.
•^^Louisiana Populist. July 29, 1896
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national party, sent a silverite delegation to the Chicago
convention which helped nominate William Jennings Bryan.-^9
After the People's party convention at St. Louis had also
endorsed the Democratic nominee, Hardy Brian, urged on by
North Carolina Populist Senator Marion Butler, approached
the Louisiana Democracy with the proposal to issue a joint
170ticket in the national campaign. As in other states, 
the Louisiana Populists hoped to get their vice-presidential 
nominee, Tom Watson, on the Democratic ticket in place of 
the conservative who had been selected at Chicago to run 
with Bryan. To the surprise of many, Louisiana's Democratic 
leaders agreed to let the Populists have half- the electors 
for the second place on the national t i c k e t . S e n a t o r  
Butler complimented the Louisiana Populist editor by writing 
that "there is no State in the Union where we have done as
i 70
well as you have done." Yet, in fact, nothing of value 
from the third party standpoint had been accomplished in 
Louisiana. The Watson fusion was the only concession the 
Bourbon Democracy ever made to Hardy Brian's party, and it
^^Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. June 16, 1896; Daily 
Picayune. August 5, 1896.
^■^Marion Butler to H. L. Brian, September 26, 1896, 
Butler Papers.
^•^H. L. Brian to Marion Butler, September 2b, 1896, 
Butler Papers.
■^^Marion Butler to H. L. Brian, September 30, 1896, 
Butler Papers.
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was made for the obvious purpose of enticing them back into
the Democratic fold. Many diehard Populists disliked doing
business with the Bourbons under any conditions. From
Monroe, A. A. Gunby warned his fellow party members: "When
1 73you dance with a bear watch your partner. . . .
Though fusion was arranged at the national level, 
Populist congressional candidates ran against Democratic in­
cumbents in four of the statefs districts. All four Popu­
lists were thoroughly beaten. The new registration and 
election laws had not yet taken effect; the black belt sent 
in the customary overwhelming Democratic returns. Bailey, 
in the Fourth, received 4,726 out of approximately 15,000 
votes cast; Benoit, in the Fifth, obtained 4,870 out of 
about 15,000. The Third District Populist obtained a mere 
195 ballots, and the Sixth District sent in only 924 Popu­
list votes.
The registration law went into effect January 1,
1897. It required no property qualifications and, strictly 
speaking, no literacy qualifications; however, certain 
information had to be recorded on the registrars rolls.
If the prospective voter could not give this information to 
the satisfaction of the registrar, then that person was not
173Monroe Bulletin, quoted in Louisiana Populist. 
October 9, 1896; Tetts to Butler, October 3, 1896, Butler 
Papers.
■^^Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State.
1902, 580.
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entitled to vote. One Lincoln Parish Populist sadly 
announced that his party*s vote was being cut "at least two
I *~7fi
thirds" by the Democratic registrars. The Daily Advocate
noted that the new registration was "death on niggers and
the kind of Pops who will be inclined to vote [ with 
177Negroes ] ." Many small farmers who could have regis­
tered refused to make the effort. As one of them explained, 
their candidates had been counted out so often and so 
thoroughly that they were tired of "going to the election 
and losing valuable time without any valuable result.
Late in 1897 the Populists held a state "mass 
meeting" at Monroe, and issued a platform which declared for 
universal manhood suffrage and denounced the call for a 
constitutional convention. Though the Populist platform 
drawn up at Monroe called for a poll tax as a prerequisite 
for voting, this, in the manner it was proposed, would not 
have restricted the electorate. The state already had a 
compulsory poll tax on all male adults, dating from the 
constitution of 1879. If such a tax were collected by law,
1 7S
Monroe Bulletin, quoted in Louisiana Populist. 
January 8, 1897; Louisiana Populist. January 7, 1898;
Colfax Journal. quoted in Shreveport Progress. January 1, 
1898.
l^Ruston Progressive Age, quoted in Baton Rouge 
Daily Advocate. December 12, 1897.
■^^Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. December 12, 1897.
^Louisiana Populist. May 15, 1896.
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as the Populists urged, it would disfranchise no one and 
would add much needed money into the state's educational 
system. The Populists, said Hardy Brian, were "in favor of 
manhood suffrage as against $ $ suffrage."1^9
Though opposing the holding of a constitutional 
convention, the third party felt that it must offer a slate 
of delegates for the election which would decide upon the 
holding of the convention as well as selecting its personnel. 
Included on the Populist ticket were a number of Republicans. 
These latter were not sugar planters, who had meantime 
generally endorsed the idea of Negro disfranchisement, but 
rather the white leaders of the Regular, or so-called "Negro 
wing" of the Republican party. Democrats laughed at the
slate but were puzzled by it. What had the Populists to
180gain by drawing closer to the Negro, at this late date? 
Colored voters had been hurt worst of all by the new regis­
tration.
Even the most active of Populists, such as Gunby, 
admitted the obvious. With or without the Negro, they
^7^Ibid.. August 27, December 24, 1897. Yet a 
recent study of Louisiana political history erroneously 
assumed that the Populists of the state gave "cheers" for 
Negro disfranchisement. See Allen P. Sindler, Huev Long's 
Louisiana: State Politics. 1920-1953 (Baltimore, 1956),
21- 22.
180Monroe Bulletin, quoted in Louisiana Populist.
January 8, 1897.
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could not stop the convention or dominate its personnel, 
Therein, perhaps, lay the key to the puzzle. As Populist 
ranks thinned, those who remained, realizing the hopeless­
ness of the struggle and finding the Bourbon hand more 
oppressive than ever, were simply making a last, extreme 
protest. State Party Chairman Hardy Brian even went so far 
as to say that the "better than thou" Louisiana aristocracy 
would not rest content until it owned slaves again. "The 
whole effort to qualify suffrage," he said, was aimed toward 
that goal.*®^
The election for the constitutional convention, on 
January 11, 1698, proceeded according to Democratic plans. 
The official ballot was almost four feet long, 252 candi­
dates were listed, and voters were allowed only three
183minutes in the booth. Among those too befuddled to 
finish voting was an associate justice of the Louisiana
1 R4Supreme Court. Less than 50,000 votes were counted:
l®lfc/lonroe Bulletin, quoted in Louisiana Populist. 
January 8, 1897.
• ^ ^ L o u i s i a n a  Populist. August 27, 1897.
*^Louisiana, Official Journal of the Constitutional 
Convention. 1898, 3-6; Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. January
8, 1898. The 252 names included the 92 listed as candidates 
for "delegates at large,", and the remainder ran from indi­
vidual parishes. Thus, no single ballot would list over 100 
names. To add to the confusion, many of the candidates were 
listed two and three times.
^•®^New Orleans Daily Item, quoted in Louisiana Popu­
list. January 14, 1898. The Judge was Joseph A. Breaux of 
New Iberia•
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36,178 for the convention, 7,578 against. Bryant W. Bailey,
editor of the Comrade, was the only Populist to gain a 
185seat. He did little at the sessions but vote "no" and 
refused to sign the completed document.
Not without reason did the President of the con­
vention call it "little more than a family meeting of the
186Democratic party of the State of Louisiana." This pre­
siding officer was Ernest B. Kruttschnitt. His more famous 
uncle, Judah P. Benjamin, had personified the Whiggish
coalition of planters and urban conservatives in ante bellum 
1 87Louisiana. Kruttschnitt continued the family tradition 
into the Bourbon period. Especially did Kruttschnitt glory 
in the fact that the convention, by legislative provision, 
was not to be submitted to the people for ratification. "We 
have absolute and despotic power," he told the assembled 
delegates. "The people [ have ] protected themselves against
l^^Louisiana, Official Journal of the Constitutional 
Convention. 1898, 4. Seven parishes: Bienville, Jackson,
Lincoln, St. James, Vernon, and Winn, voted against the 
calling of the constitutional convention of 1898. St.
James,, despite recent legislative restrictions, still listed 
a majority of Negro voters at the time. The other anti­
convention parishes were in the North Louisiana hill 
country. See official returns in Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. 
January 27, 1898.
^■®^Louisiana, Official Journal of the Constitutional 
Convention. 1898, 8-9.
1 87Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana.
136, 155.
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themselves."^®® Fittingly, the man who was perhaps Louisi­
ana^ most venomous and implacable bigot, Henry J. Hearsey
of the Daily States, was awarded the lucrative printing
189contract for the convention.
What emerged from the convention of 1898 was virtu­
ally the constitution of 1879 drawn up anew, with the ex­
ception of suffrage restriction. Even the six mill limit
190on state taxation was retained. As to suffrage, voters 
had to demonstrate the ability to read and write in their 
native language, or, as an alternative, show a property 
assessment of not less than $300.^9  ^ Supposedly, the 
"grandfather clause," as it was called, allowed a loophole 
for poor whites. Those who had voted before 1867, or whose 
ancestors had so voted, were exempt from the above re­
strictions. But the intent of this proviso may be 
questioned. Only three and a half months were allowed for 
qualification. Many prominent Democrats took the view that 
the clause was merely an "evasion," and, at any rate, the
^®®Louisiana, Official Journal of the Constitutional 
Convention. 1898, 379.
189Ibid.
^^Louisiana, Constitution of 1898. Art. 232.
^ ^ Ibid.. Art. 197. Besides the "grandfather 
clause" exception, naturalized citizens were also permitted 
to vote without literacy or property qualifications. See 
J. L. Warren Woodville, "Suffrage Limitation in Louisiana," 
Political Science Quarterly. XXI (June, 1906), 177.
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United States Supreme Court would declare it invalid. Both
of Louisiana*s national senators put themselves on record
192
to this effect. However, about 40,000 individuals did
register under the "grandfather clause." One hundred and
193eleven of them were Negroes. 7
The demoralized remnants of the Louisiana People*s 
party entered candidates in both the congressional races of 
1898 and the gubernatorial election of 1900. In 1898, 
their candidate who polled the highest vote was Hardy Brian 
in the Fourth District. Yet he obtained a mere 1,476, and 
carried only Grant and Winn.*-94 With the Negro vote re­
moved, the Democratic total in the Fourth and other 
Districts had fallen below the level that Populist candi­
dates had attained four and even two years before; even so, 
the Bourbon party still won by a margin of four to one or 
better. "The great bulk" of what; once had been the People’s 
party, said Hardy Brian, "stayed at home in sullen despair." 
They felt that "it was no use, the Democrats would count 
them out. . . ."195
192shreveport Evening Journal. March 13, April 6, 
1898; Nation. LXVI (May 19, 1898), 374; William A. Mabry, 
"Louisiana Politics and the Grandfather Clause," North 
Carolina Historical Review. XIII (October, 1936), 30d>.
193Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State.
1902, 558.
194Ibid.. 580.
^^Natchitoches Populist. November 11, 1898. The 
Louisiana Populist title was shortened beginning March 18,
1898.
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In 1900, Donelson Caffery, Jr., a conservative,
gold standard Democrat who was at odds with Governor Foster,
accepted the nomination of both the People's party and the
"Republican-Fusion ticket," the latter made up of G. 0. P.
remnants within the s t a t e . O n  the Populist ticket
Caffery obtained 4,938 votes and failed to carry a single
parish. On the fusion ticket, Caffery's state total was
9,277, and he carried only St. James Parish. The state
total for W. W. Heard, the Democratic gubernatorial candi-
1 97date, was 60,206. Thus the Democratic vote in 1900 was 
almost 30,000 less than John Pharr received four years 
earlier. A. A. Gunby, surveying the ruins of Populism, 
attributed his party's decline to a deadening of political 
spirit as well as the restrictions on suffrage. "Apathy," 
he wrote, "seized the majority and they are willing that the 
minority should rule."^® Never again did the People's 
party run candidates in Louisiana.
Bourbonism once again ruled serenely. A few 
planters, perhaps, missed the old excitement of stuffing
•l-^Uzee, "Republican Politics in Louisiana," 179-83; 
Franklin St. Marv Banner. March 10, 1900; Shreveport Evening 
Journal. April lb, 1900; Nation. LXX (January 18, 1900), 42- 
43.
197Louisiana, Report of the Secretary of State.
1902, 564.
^■^^Monroe Bulletin, quoted in Shreveport Evening
Journal. April 22, 1900.
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ballot boxes; Negro registration, by 1900, was down to four
1QQ
per cent of its 1896 figure. And, though white regis­
tration slowly climbed back toward previous levels, the 
agrarian spirit had seemingly been crushed. "The people are 
thoroughly cowed," observed one man who had been associated 
with the third party movement in the northern parishes; the 
people "are under complete subjection. They will bow the 
knee, receive the yoke and pass on, hewers of wood, drawers 
of water, beasts of burden; without spirit, without com­
plaint."^^ But the most fitting epitaph for Louisiana 
Populism was written by Hardy Brian. In March of 1899, in 
the last issue of his newspaper, he wrote: "We refused to
take up the gun [ and ] so we lost. . . . The fight will be
ooi
won some day, but by [ unchristian] methods. . .
Brian’s parting words attracted little attention. 
Neither was much notice given, later that year, to the 
futile efforts of a Winn Parish man to be elected as an
• ^ ^ W o o d v i l l e ,  Political Science Quarterly. XXI, 188- 
89; Paul A. Kunkel, "Modifications in Louisiana Negro Legal 
Status Under Louisiana Constitutions: 1812-1957," Journal
of Neoro History. XLVI (January, 1959), 21.
^^Shreveport Progress. April 2, 1898.
201Natchitoches Populist. March 10, 1899. Brian 
left Natchitoches after the March 3, 1899 issue of his paper 
was destroyed by C. V. Porter, who worked for the rival 
Democratic newspaper in town, the Enterprise. The affair 
was kept out of the city papers, lowing to Mr. Porter having 
lately been appointed District Attorney." See Colfax 
Chronicle. March 11, 1899.
Independent to the state legislature. His name was H. P. 
Long. Huey, and Earl, were the names of two of his small 
children.
^Colfax Chronicle. December 9, 1899-April 14, 
1900. Long's announcement was carried in the Colfax news­
paper, which was in the same state senatorial district as 
Winn, Long's platform, as announced in the December 9 
issue, was Populistic, although Long claimed that he had 
always been a Democrat.
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